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War and Media

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1. The Evolution of a Triangle: Military-Media-Public

A Continuing Story

Only one earlier issue of Communication Research Trends (Cordelian, 1992) has dealt exclusively with the relationship of media and war, but war dominates such a large segment of the horizon of media interest that we have had to deal with it tangentially in many Trends issues, most recently and notably in our discussion of “Terrorism and Mass Media” (Biernatzki, 2002). The present issue, close in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq and the 2002 war in Afghanistan, continues to follow the historical drama whose violent beginning on September 11, 2001, prompted the writing of the “terrorism” issue.

Many of the questions and dilemmas that were seen to dominate the triangular relationship among media, military, and public in the “war on terrorism” continued throughout the war in Iraq and, and, indeed, most of the central characters—Saddam Hussein, Osama bin-Laden, George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, etc.—remained the same. The tactics adopted by the American government and military to mollify press criticism changed strikingly between the times of the first and second Gulf wars (1991 and 2003), but the conflict of interests between the military and the media remains intrinsic to their relationship. The military must conceal at least some information to protect their own forces from enemy action and to insure the success of their own mission, whereas the media are professionally bound to acquire and disseminate as much information as possible.

A Conflict of Interests

The same divergence in roles between the media and the military was evident in earlier wars as well. During the Second World War, General Dwight Eisenhower saw this conflict of interest clearly. In a statement to reporters in 1944, he stated it succinctly:

> the first essential in military operations is that no information of value is given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes divergent considerations. (qtd. in Baroody, 1998, p. 4)

This issue of Trends will explore the evolution of the relationship between the media and the military, especially through the course of the last half-decade or so. At times both sides have attempted to fulfill the task of reconciliation called for by Eisenhower. At other times, impatience has triumphed, and the task has been pursued lukewarmly, at best.

Obviously, little could be achieved in studying media/military interaction in countries where the media are under tight government control. Our discussion will focus, instead, on the relationship between the American military and government—whose powers are constitutionally limited—and the free and aggressive American mass media, since the Second World War. The reportorial conflicts of interest manifested in the American wars are arguably more fully documented and researched than those of other wars during the same period. They also embody the most technologically advanced incursions of free media institutions onto the battlefield. They therefore highlight changes the technological advances have caused in interpretations of how war reporting ought to be conducted. In addition, trends in the progressive evolution (and occasional “devolution”) of the media/military relationship also may be more clearly evident in the succession of wars involving the United States than in other wars of that period. Those “American” conflicts include the Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Grenada and Panama incursions, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and finally the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions of 2001-2003. Persistence of a generally stable U.S. government and an energetic American mass media provides a backdrop that facilitates orderly analysis of their interaction.

Some wars not involving American forces have had to be discussed because of their special relevance to the media—notably the Falklands/Malvinas War between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982. In general, however, the American wars suffice to illustrate the conflicts and tensions that appear whenever free media organizations attempt to report on wars conducted by the military of democratic governments constitutionally committed to media freedom.
Technology Changes Reporting

From their very birth the mass media have been reporting war news. The big changes over the past two or three centuries have been in the speed and comprehensiveness of that reporting. News of the battle of Waterloo had to be physically carried from the battlefield to the offices of newspapers. The Crimea and Gettysburg were brought closer to readers by the telegraph; newspapers were readily available to almost everyone in Europe and North America; and written reports were supplemented by photography. Battlefield photography from that period required long exposures, so the most graphic battle scenes were of the dead. That prompted repugnance, which generated anti-war feeling among at least more perceptive observers (Franklin, 1994, pp. 26-29).

But the lesson was soon forgotten as extended periods of peace made war seem more and more “glorious.” The 1890s saw the birth of “yellow journalism,” the use of lurid, sensationalized reporting by newspapers engaged in fierce competition for readers (Campbell, 2001; Milton, 1989). In the course of that competition, William Randolph Hearst’s editorials challenged the U.S. government to resist Spain’s rule in Cuba and, many believe, helped push the U.S. into an unnecessary and probably unjust war. War was not only portrayed again as romantic but also was exploited in a cold-blooded effort to increase sales of newspapers.

Reporters of the First World War still had to rely on the telegraph to send spot news, but they had at their disposal a much more extensive network of wires and cables than previously. In addition, newsreels brought the action of the battlefield to theater audiences. The true horrors of war again were accessible to the mass media audience, but the movie industry found more profit in fictional, propagandistic glorifications of the war. As H. Bruce Franklin puts it,

...for various reasons the most influential photographic images from World War I, though realistic in appearance, displayed not reality but fantasy....In the United States the most important photographic images were movies designed to inflame the nation, first to enter the war and then to support it. (Franklin, 1994, p. 29)

Real-time, live reporting became possible by radio in the Second World War, as reporters broadcasted from cities under air attack. Films still required days or weeks to process and transport to theaters, but technology had greatly developed their content. They reached their audiences late, but with tremendous impact. Censorship remained the order of the day, although it never reached the level one American censor, quoted by Phillip Knightly, seemed to regard as ideal: “I’d tell them nothing till it’s over and then I’d tell them who won” (Knightly, 2001).

In spite of the emergence of television, the relation between the media and the battlefield remained much the same during the Korean War as it had during the Second World War. The U.S. Army’s initial system of voluntary censorship was soon changed to official censorship at the request of reporters, who had found the definition of “security” too nebulous and had consequently tended towards excessively severe self-censorship. “Within a month, reporters were put under the jurisdiction of the army and subject to censorship not only on national security issues, but also criticism of the ways the allies were handling the war or negative remarks about U.N. forces.” In their effort to avoid appearing to “give aid and comfort to the enemy” some reporters allegedly resorted to creating pure fiction (Baroody, 1998, p. 53).

By the time of the Vietnam War television had replaced cinema as the chief medium of news film delivery. The lag between filming and broadcasting was reduced, and the sights and sounds of war entered the living room, often in color.

Finally, in the first Gulf War of 1991, the lag disappeared, and real-time scenes of combat—the greenish, night-vision views of missile assaults on Baghdad, in particular—were part of universal human experience. In the Iraq War of 2003, cameras with satellite links seemed to be everywhere, from the roofs of high-rise Baghdad buildings scant city blocks from the impact of cruise missiles and smart bombs, to the turrets of armored vehicles at the points of attacking columns. Almost everyone with access to a television receiver was vicariously in the front line. Real-time war reporting had reached such a climax that audiences around the world often saw what was happening before the generals did.

War as a Media Event

Rabinovitz and Jeffords (1994, pp. 5-7) classified the first Gulf War as a “media event.” By constructing such events the media “serve an important social function by working to organize and orchestrate the relationship of the individual to the community.” “Events” are occurrences so outstanding that they cause the media to saturate everyday life with detailed reporting about them. They include such programmed occur-
rences as Super Bowl games and Royal Weddings. A special form of media event is the “media crisis,” which shares with the more definable events their simultaneity of both performance and viewing and their exhaustive reporting of relevant detail. Unlike other “media events,” however, “media crises” lack predictable conclusions. Games and weddings are programmed, with definite beginnings and ends. Wars and similar crises may begin at a certain time, but not even the governments involved, let alone the media producers, know when or how they will end. They thereby acquire a pervasive and ongoing aura of suspense, an expectation of possible sudden disaster or exaltation unmatchable by other events.

Rabinovitz and Jeffords felt the primary functions served by the American media during the 1991 war were “reconstructing history, controlling the dissemination of information, creating social consensus, and solidifying national identity” (1994, p. 14). Those functions are of course subject to differing interpretations, depending on whether particular media outlets favor the government position or oppose it.

2. Vietnam: A Media/Military Watershed

*Fog, not Censorship*

Throughout human history, until recently, tight control over battlefield access and strict censorship of reporters’ dispatches had been taken for granted, with only minor exceptions. In fact, however, the so-called “fog of war” surrounding both frontline soldiers and frontline reporters tended to make tight control over battlefield reports unnecessary. Reports were too fragmentary to provide meaningful intelligence for an enemy. One high Pentagon official has been quoted as paraphrasing the reporting experience of a typical battlefield correspondent: “I’m going to describe that I saw a bunch of guns going off all around and that’s about it, and my own fears and emotions and those I talked to all around me” (Baroody, 1998, p. 2).

In terms of security, more in-depth reporting—informing discussions of tactics, strategy, and weapons, for example—was another matter. The growing technical efficiency of the media during the 19th and 20th centuries made the need for information controls even more imperative, from the point of view of the military. Throughout the Second World War and the Korean War the media generally acquiesced in this position or, if not agreeing with it, at least felt helpless to do anything about it. Considerably looser control was exercised during the earlier part of the Vietnam War. William M. Hammond credits this policy to the Minister-Counselor of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam for Public Affairs, Barry Zorthian, who, in effect, served as “information czar” under General William Westmoreland and the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam. This liberal policy relied on voluntary “guidelines” agreed to by the correspondents. It drew mild criticism from some American officers and politicians, who felt it was likely to “give away the family jewels” of strategic information to the enemy. Nevertheless, it satisfied most of the correspondents, who tended, in turn, to put a favorable spin on their reporting. It was concurred in at the highest levels of the American government. Early in the war “few reporters questioned the legitimacy of the American presence in South Vietnam,” and President Lyndon Johnson “took pains to avoid alienating the American news media” (Hammond, 1996, p. 3).

South Vietnamese information policy was much less liberal than that of the Americans, and American officials feared that heavy-handed Vietnamese treatment of the press would endanger the positive relationship their own policy was designed to encourage. The American military’s Office of Information also tried to advise the Vietnamese government on ways to improve their image in the American media (Hammond, 1996, pp. 4-6). Reporters came and went as they pleased, restrained only by danger from friendly as well as enemy fire and by the need for press credentials in order to attend official briefings. They were able to obtain quarters and transportation from the military for nominal fees. Of approximately 450 correspondents accredited by the U.S. military, by 1968 only three are known to have had their accreditation cancelled for violating reporting guidelines (Hammond, 1996, p. 5).

Despite the lack of formal controls, however, reporting on the Vietnam War suffered from what has been called “censorship at the source,” which led to discrepancies between the contents of official briefings and the much more disturbing reports of correspondents in the field and to a resulting credibility gap that
grew ever larger and more damaging (Woodward, 1993, pp. 6-7).

*The “Vietnam Effect”*

Although the Communists’ Tet Offensive of 1968 was a military victory for the South Vietnamese and Americans, it resulted in a media disaster. Reporters and cameramen, many of whom might not previously have gotten closer to the battlefield than Saigon’s Continental Hotel bar, suddenly found themselves in the thick of the fighting. Television images of battles in supposedly secure places and of civilian casualties turned public opinion against the war and undermined the morale not only of American civilians but also of the troops in the field, and even of the highest government officials.

Daniel C. Hallin (1986, 1994) has charted the growing negativity seen in American television reporting about the war in the wake of Tet. The respected commentator Walter Cronkite insisted, after Tet, that the war was “unwinnable” and could only be ended by negotiations (Rabinowitz & Jeffords, 1994, p. 12). His statement was soon followed by President Lyndon Johnson’s decisions to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, to seek a negotiated settlement, and to refrain from running for reelection (Hammond, 1996, pp. 10-11).

Tet did not immediately turn American public opinion against the war. A Roper poll in January 1968, showed 56% of those polled classifying themselves as “hawks,” and 27% calling themselves “doves.” In a comparable poll early in February 1968, immediately after Tet, showed 61% “hawks” and 23% “doves. The same February poll revealed 71% of the respondents favoring continued bombing of North Vietnam, whereas only 63% had expressed that opinion in October 1967 (Hammond, 1996, p. 9).

In spite of this temporary rise in public support for the war, Tet marked a turning point in the attitude of the American mass media towards the government’s position on the Vietnam War. Not only did the press reflect a shift against the war in the opinion of the nation’s “Establishment,” but also, according to Hammond, control of the press had gradually been shifting to a younger generation of reporters, editors, and producers, many of whom had opposed the war earlier but now had moved into positions where they could express that opposition more effectively (Hammond, 1996, pp. 10-13).

In view of the subsequent history of media-military relations one might reasonably go so far as to say that Tet marked a watershed in that relationship that has continued to influence those relations down to the present. Near-unquestioning adherence to official interpretations has shifted to an underlying cynicism about the motives and truthfulness of official spokespersons. For its part, after the Vietnam War the U.S. military was left with the conviction that the media caused the loss of the war. As I noted in our discussion of terrorism, quoting David Samuels, the phrase, “the Vietnam Effect,” with that implication, has continued in use within the Pentagon into the 21st century (Samuels, 2002, p. 59 as cited in Biernatzki, 2002, p. 10).

Hammond analyzes that change in much broader terms, citing disagreements among high government and military officials as well as between the government and the media:

...the hardening of opinion that set in on all sides as the war ground toward its conclusion, not only between the military and the news media but also between the highest officials of the central government and military officers duty-bound to obey their will, was symptomatic of a malaise far larger than anything the press could have contrived on its own. (Hammond, 1996, p. ix)

3. Two Little Wars with Big Media Implications

*Exclusion and Satellites*

The Americans’ wars in Grenada, in 1983, and in Panama, in 1990, were brief and small-scale, but they set off controversies about media coverage that had been simmering since the American withdrawal from Vietnam. In Grenada, “although there were strong objections from the press about Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s decision to exclude journalists in

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In a small preview of what was to come later, communication satellites began to be used by the media in their overseas reporting during the early 1980s. Reporters used satellites in the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982, and in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the same year. Other innovations included direct-dial international telephone calls and telex. All these had potential for bypassing censorship. “The following year’s Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada formed the first time the U.S. military had been forced to deal with satellite coverage.” Videotaped footage could be transmitted both to network headquarters and to numerous network affiliate stations (Baroody, 1998, pp. 17-18).

**The Sidle Commission, Panama, and CNN**

In response to criticisms, the Pentagon asked retired General Winant Sidle to chair a commission to study ways to improve press-military relations. The commission made several recommendations, including the establishment of news media pools as a means to give the media access to operations and provision of adequate logistical support to help correspondents cover the operations efficiently (Sidle, 1984, pp. 166-167, as cited in Woodward, 1993, p. 9). But the rules laid down by the commission ran into obstacles such as demands by local commanders for changes in stories and delays in passing dispatches through military channels. Although a pool of 16 reporters was flown into Panama at the start of the fighting there, various delays allowed them little access to the battlefield (Woodward, 1993, pp. 9-10).

In Panama a new media factor entered the picture, namely the fledgling Cable News Network (CNN). CNN’s coverage met the same obstacles as were encountered by other media organizations, but it responded with imaginative low-tech innovations such as simply telephoning people in different parts of Panama City asking them to describe what was happening in their part of town. Meanwhile, representatives of the traditional networks were trapped in the upper floors of a downtown hotel by President Noriega’s troops who occupied the ground floor and adjoining streets. Concerned about their people, those networks spent much of their air time asking when American forces would reach the hotel, and seemed unable to say much about the progress of the fighting—according to my personal recollection of the television coverage, as observed in the United States.

Gary C. Woodward saw the germ of tighter future restrictions in the media’s passive compliance with the rules of the Sidle Commission that provided for military “escorts” for reporters and for final clearance of dispatches by military authorities. With the start of the Gulf War, in 1991, the guidelines laid down by the military occasioned loud complaints from the press (Woodward, 1993, p. 11).

**4. The Breakup of Yugoslavia**

**The Balkan Problem**

Somewhat ironically, the process of “de-Communization” in Eastern Europe seemed to “lift the lid” that had kept long-term ethnic, nationalist, and inter-religious antipathies from developing into armed conflict as long as Communist-controlled authoritarian governments maintained order. The most striking examples of this phenomenon were seen in former Yugoslavia, where tight Communist rule had ensured peace among such diverse groups as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Kosovo Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, etc. There, fighting exploded along several ethnic frontiers during the early 1990s.

Perhaps the most sharply-defined boundary was that between the Serbs and the Croats—religiously Orthodox Christian, on the one side, and Roman Catholic, on the other, the one using the Cyrillic alphabet and the other, the Roman. That division could be traced far back into history, when the creation of the Eastern Roman Empire, centered on Constantinople, drew a line between the Western influence of Rome and the oriental influence of Byzantium. Later, Turkish control of parts of the region added complexity to its ethno-religious mix, but the original line demarcating East from West became increasingly significant with the passing centuries. It was only obscured, never erased, by the Communist hegemony that ruled a united Yugoslavia for four decades after the Second World War. A simplistic “ethnic” explanation of the ongoing tensions in the region has been rejected, in favor of “a plurality of political, economic, and social conflicts” (Stones, 2002) by such authorities as Susan Woodward (1995, as cited in Stones, 2002). Nevertheless, many
outside the region, but especially in Europe, became alarmed, since earlier Balkan conflicts had tended to spread to neighboring countries. The most notable instance was in 1914, when the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, by a Serb in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, started the First World War.

Fighting began after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. Often it was a three-way struggle between Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. Later, it involved an alliance of Bosnian Croats and Muslims against Bosnian Serbs backed by the Yugoslav army. It continued to 1995, when a peace agreement was signed in Dayton, Ohio, and a 60,000-man peace-keeping force from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization occupied the disputed area.

Selective Reporting from Kosovo

Conflict soon flared up again, as the predominantly Albanian-Muslim province of Kosovo tried to break away from the surviving remnant of Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, in 1989. By 1997, the Serbs had launched a concerted military effort to regain control of the province. Fearing a repetition of the “ethnic-cleansing” the Serbs had practiced in the earlier conflicts, in Bosnia and Croatia, NATO intervened, most controversially by air attacks against Serb forces, and even against the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade.

The war in Kosovo attracted media attention because, like the earlier conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, it was on the very doorstep of Western Europe. An added factor, both in Europe and America, was widespread doubt about the appropriateness of the NATO intervention. The NATO involvement meant American involvement, which focused the attention of the American mass media on the crisis. That coverage has been strongly criticized by media scholars for adhering to U.S. and NATO interpretations of the character of the adversaries, omitting, for example, the links of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to organized crime, especially drug smuggling. Reports of Serbian atrocities, some of them untrue, were emphasized, while those of the KLA were mostly ignored (Thussu, 2000, pp. 350-352; Vincent, 2000, pp. 333-335). The sometimes questionable ethics of NATO air attacks were often downplayed or excused by the U.S. media (Thussu, 2000, pp. 352-353; Vincent, 2000, p. 337).

One problem in the coverage of Kosovo which is intrinsic to almost all media attempts to explain current events is the need to simplify the issues for the sake of a presentation that will be meaningful to a mass audience. Often, that “meaning” may result in falsification, as the need to communicate in sound bites within a limited time frame, takes precedence over the painstaking research needed to express the truth about a complex situation. Rob Stones (2002) highlighted these deficiencies in his stinging critique of a one-hour Channel 4 TV documentary, “The Roots of War,” broadcast in the summer of 1993 as a “pivotal” segment of that UK channel’s “Bloody Bosnia” season. He cites David Morley’s argument that

...the form and content of television news tends to compound a sense of illiteracy, ignorance, and incoherence for the majority of viewers. A recurring theme is that the paucity of television news means that even those who are cynical, distrustful, and ironically “knowing” about what they are shown will still remain vulnerable to its ‘specific propositions’ and messages for the simple want of any alternatives. (Morley, 1999, pp. 137-141 as cited in Stones, 2002, p. 358)

Stones ends by praising Susan Woodward’s book, Balkan Tragedy (1995), to which he unfavorably contrasts the TV program. In Woodward’s treatment of the same material,

...we are taken much more deeply into the structural dimensions of those plural and articulating causal mechanisms that impinge from a distance upon those lives that we see from a distance in The Roots of War....Approaches such as Woodward’s signal just how much is missing from an account such as that contained in The Roots of War, and by extension, in the many similar documentaries whose refusal or inability to present us with an adequate set of “relevant networks of relations”—coupled with their refusal to alert our sensibilities to that refusal or inability—undermines our ability to comprehend social and political issues....[I]t is important to be forced to acknowledge explicitly the marked, and invidious, degree of asymmetry between the “degree of knowledge” that the sjuzet of a documentary seems to be allowed to claim and the paltry amount of evidence that seems to be required to back up these claims. This asymmetry pushes the realms of decent credulity way beyond the margins of what should be acceptable....The conventions that make this imbalance seem natural and acceptable need to be questioned and challenged... (Stones, 2002, pp. 371-372)
More Innovations

Media innovations during the Balkan wars included the addition of many more global satellite news services to what had been almost a CNN monopoly, but CNN still was the most watched, especially among “influentials,” and even in Europe (Thussu, 2000, p. 355). The growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web had made available many alternative sources of information, for those equipped and interested enough to consult them, although the truth of their contents was often difficult or impossible to evaluate. The use of “cyberwarfare,” as the Serbs sent viruses into NATO computers and interfered with the White House website, illustrated “how much could be achieved by a comparatively small number of Serbs with access to a global system of communications” (Taylor, 2000, p. 297). Tapio Varis cites Simon Rogers’ comments on cyberwar: “In the public media, the NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 may have been the first war fought also on the Internet” (Rogers, 1999, cited in Varis, 2002, p. 20). Varis goes on to note Walter Laqueur’s remark that “20 hackers with US$1 billion might shut down America” (Laqueur, 1996, cited in Varis 2002, p. 20).

5. The Gulf War of 1991

“A War by Any Other Name...”

One’s audience is important to consider when discussing the wars in the Persian Gulf region during the past two decades. People in the region often refer to them as the “First,” “Second,” and “Third” Gulf Wars (TBS, 2003, #10). The first was the long, bloody struggle between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988, that began with an Iraqi attack on an Iran perceived by the Iraqis to be militarily vulnerable. The second began with the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and ended with the American and Coalition forces’ defeat of the Iraqi army, in 1991. The third was the 2003 defeat and occupation of Iraq by chiefly American forces. More usual in the United States is to call the first the “Iran-Iraq War,” the second the “Persian Gulf War,” the “First Gulf War,” or simply the “Gulf War,” and the third the “Iraq War” or the “War in Iraq,” provisionally, although history may eventually give it a more permanent name. Since most of the sources to be cited in this paper are American, it seems simplest to stay with the U.S. terminology.

Paradigms and Social Dramas

Iraq’s blatant invasion of Kuwait had established Saddam Hussein as the “villain” from the very beginning of the 1991 war. In spite of Kuwait’s autocratic government and its alleged subservience to Western governments and their petroleum industries, it was cast as the “underdog.” In the light of a familiar, “good guys/bad guys” paradigm, relatively little opposition to the war developed in its early stages.

As a sidelight, it might be noted that for the media and the public, at least in America, the scenario of “heroically rushing to the aid of the victim” had been deeply ingrained in the course of all major wars since Cuba, in 1898; through France in 1917; China, Britain, the Philippines, and much of the rest of the world in the Second World War; South Korea in 1950; and South Vietnam, in the 1960s. Anthropologist Victor Turner’s conceptualization of “social dramas” and “ritual metaphors” suggests how such cultural patterning can establish a program for action which may seem “obvious” and “self-evident” when it appears applicable to emerging historical processes (Turner, 1974). The invasion of Kuwait seemed to fit this pattern perfectly, and made American involvement practically inevitable, with strong support from U.S. public opinion. Although Gallup polls between the invasion and mid- to late January 1991 were only slightly in favor of “going to war,” the favorable percentage rose to 71% in a poll of January 30-February 2nd, when only 24% voiced opposition (Moore, 2003). Whether or not this patterning was influenced by propaganda or slanted reporting is beside the point, since—rightly or wrongly—they are factors in shaping public opinion and cultural paradigms.

Battlefield in the Living Room

The 1991 war exploded onto a mass media environment that had developed significantly since the Vietnam War. In the United States, 60% of households now had cable television linked to networks by satellite, with the average cable franchise supplying 36 channels, almost always including CNN. Remote control permitted viewers to change channels instantly. Most television was received in color. Since the early
1960s, a majority of American adults had cited television as their main source of news, and by 1989, 65% said it was (Gantz, 1993, p. 8). A survey in January 1991 found that, in two U.S. states, 79% and 88%, respectively, of those who were at home when the air war began, on January 16, 1991, got their first news about it from television. Almost all those in transit at the time first heard about it from radio (Gantz & Greenberg, 1993, pp. 170-171). In Europe and other industrially developed countries, and many developing countries, satellite links often made diverse sources of news available to viewers, although some governments attempted to control access. The Internet also had evolved as a common means of communication among a small, but influential part of the world’s population.

“Guidelines” vs. Censorship

The war began with the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. A United Nations deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passed on January 15, 1991, and air attacks began the following day. The ground phase began on February 23, 1991, and the fighting had ended by February 28th (Gantz, 1993, p. 1). Troops from 29 countries were involved in the American-led Coalition, and “by January 16, 1991, over one million soldiers were in the region, ready to fight” (Gantz, 1993, p. 7).

The U.S. military put into effect the media procedures that had been recommended by the Sidle Commission, including provision for press pools, escorts, and clearance of dispatches by military authorities, as well as “supplementary guidelines” that effectively limited physical access of reporters to the troops. Although the major news organizations were committed to comprehensive coverage, with few exceptions they had to accept the “ground rules” and guidelines. “Beyond this, the press may have regulated its own output. From the standpoint of the news organizations, there was risk associated with appearing to question the Administration or not fully support the troops” (Gantz, 1993, p. 7). “The conventional wisdom was that the press had much more freedom in Vietnam [than in the Gulf War]” (Baroody, 1998, p. 180).

CNN: Reporter and Actor

One media organization transcended its media role to become a major factor in the war itself. CNN, the Cable News Network, with its all-news format focused on breaking news, might have been hard pressed, in ordinary times, to fill its 24-hour-a-day, 7-days-a-week programming. During the war, however, its 24 hour “news hole” gave it far better capacity than the more traditional networks to carry live news wherever and whenever it might occur (Wicks & Walker, 1993, p. 99). The network’s use of its unique position in its own self-promotion has drawn criticism (White, 1994, pp. 121-141). Its coverage also led to a particular kind of news distortion. “From the outset, CNN’s coverage of the Persian Gulf War brought banality and fatality into direct identification, as audiences were treated to the banality of obsessive live coverage of the activities of the network’s own reporters while, off-screen, elsewhere, the fatalities mounted. The war was no catastrophe...Only the loss of signal threatened something more dire.” (White, 1994, p. 139).

CNN nevertheless did seem to be on top of many aspects of the war, including negotiating with Saddam Hussein the right to broadcast live from Baghdad. Although that brought on angry denunciations from other media organizations, from the military, and even from the White House, it was in line with CNN’s broader perspective on news sources.

The most significant difference between CNN and network news coverage...is that CNN paid more attention to non-U.S. points of view, particularly that of the Iraqis. Peter Arnett’s continuous reporting from Baghdad was perhaps the most visible and controversial aspect of this. The fact that he gave reports which included the official Iraqi view was heavily criticized by the White House as talking to the enemy...The broadcast networks charged that CNN made concessions to the Iraqis in exchange for special access....Conservative observers...called CNN “The U.S. Voice of Baghdad.”...Other news media observers...regretted the degree of Iraqi control, but felt that the information gained was worth it.... A widespread public debate ensued in print, on television, and even on radio talk shows about whether CNN (and other media) should air reports that included foreign, particularly Iraqi enemy, points of view. (Elasmar & Straubhaar, 1993, pp. 232-233)

CNN became an alternate intelligence source, for both sides, often “scooping” the governments’ own intelligence agencies. Baroody cites John Condrey (1991) as saying that “an American, watching CNN and talking on the phone to his daughter in Israel, could tell her a missile had been launched at Tel Aviv before the air raid sirens sounded there (Baroody, 1998, p. 18).” Baroody goes on to note that “Iraq propelled Scud missiles into Saudi Arabia and Israel at the exact moment...
a television briefing by Secretary [of Defense] Cheney and General [Colin] Powell ended, timing the Pentagon suggests was not coincidental” (Rosenthal, 1991, p. A13 as cited in Baroody, 1998, pp. 18-19). A Navy lieutenant commented, “I know for a fact that CNN was on 24 hours a day in the command center of CENTCOM in Riyadh and in the national military command center here in the Pentagon, and I’ll bet you it was on 24 hours a day in Baghdad as well” (Baroody, 1998, p. 191). “Everyone tuned in, including Saddam Hussein and George Bush. The political and military authorities on both sides needed and used the media to help their causes and to sustain their war efforts...this was a propaganda war” (Shulman, 1994, p. 107).

Technology vs. Deliberation
Baroody comments on how technological changes had diminished “the time for receiving a message and reacting to it,” reducing the time available for “policy deliberation.” Furthermore, “technological changes have meant that media transmission is not only faster but more widely disseminated....The impact of world-disseminating technology is multiplied by the fact that English has become so widespread that audiences around the world can follow Pentagon briefings as they air.” Much of the world therefore saw the war through “an American lens” (Baroody, 1998, p. 19).

Correspondents’ thirst for information often drives them to seek it from all possible sources, and an ethical imperative has been growing in journalistic ranks to adopt an impartial attitude, even in wartime, one that does not favor their own country’s interpretation of events over that of its enemies. Some have negatively described this orientation as a mark of “a post-social responsibility age” (Stepp, 1990, p. 198 as cited in Baroody, 1998, p. 31); while others describe it favorably as “post-ideological” (p. 31).

Objectivity vs. Patriotism
As early as the later years of the Vietnam War, Richard Dudman insisted on the post-ideological interpretation that “reporters must be detached observers and should not necessarily support the policies of their own countries in their coverage” (Dudman, 1970-1971, p. 35, as paraphrased by Baroody, 1998, p. 32). During the Falklands/Malvinas War, the BBC was criticized for its non-partisan stance. Lack of other information also drove the network to use Argentine sources. But reportorial objectivity faded as the war progressed and the fate of the British expeditionary force became more doubtful (Baroody, 1998, pp. 32-33).

Several incidents early in the Gulf War added fuel to this controversy. CNN reporter Peter Arnett was accused by a senator of being an Iraqi sympathizer for his broadcasts from Baghdad. “CNN’s Bernard Shaw replaced the word ‘enemy’ with ‘Iraqi’ in news updates, arguing that CNN is seen in 105 countries and must be considered free of bias” (Baroody, 1998, p. 33). John Corry, of Boston University, considered both sides of the media neutrality issue, but had to conclude that journalists cannot choose to “represent the international public interest at the expense of the national interest,” since the “public interest” is so amorphous that it most often represents only the interests of advocacy groups, rather than that of any real “public” (Corry, 1991, p. 25 as cited in Baroody, 1998, p. 34).

Holly Cowan Shulman points out that Saddam Hussein used the American media to reach the West simply because he had no alternatives. “What much of the world reads, watches, and hears in its foreign news—although not in its domestic news—is a product of the news services and news media of the United States and Western Europe....It is therefore important to place the story of Saddam Hussein and CNN within the context of the movement of international news generally, and the role of the international electronic media specifically” (Shulman, 1994, p. 108). The controversy over Western domination of Gulf War news was merely an extension of the larger controversy over international news flows dating back to the early 1970s or before (see Kumar & Biernatzki, 1990; Biernatzki, 1997; McAnany, 2002).

What About “Foreign” Media?
American domination of information sources on the Coalition side of the war inevitably led to complaints that media of other nations were not being given equal access to those sources. In-depth interviews with selected journalists and Department of Defense public affairs officials reported on in Baroody’s book revealed mixed responses to the question, “Does the U.S. government have obligations to foreign media during war?” The U.S. journalists interviewed tended to be divided between “yes” and “no” responses, but military respondents were more negative, or at least ambiguous, leaning to the view “that the U.S. does have obligations to foreign media but they are secondary to its obligations to American media” (Baroody, 1998, p. 146).

At various times “100 to 400 reporters” were “milling about in Dhahran complaining that they couldn’t have access to U.S. units who were a domi-
nant force in the war.” Responding to the needs of large numbers of American reporters already had strained the resources of the public affairs officers, and reporters from other countries added greatly to the burden. A Department of Defense official acknowledged responsibility to the foreign reporters, but cited problems with them. “We spent half of our time dealing with the Japanese. Everybody wanted to go cover the Americans....How do you deal with that?” Another public affairs officer said, “It’s not particularly pretty, but I took the view, let the French cover the French troops, let the Brits cover the British troops, let the Americans cover the American troops” (Baroody, 1998, pp. 147-148).

6. The Iraq War

The Data Are Still “Raw”

Needless to say, this writing, in June and July 2003, is too soon after the end of the major ground fighting in the Iraq war to be able to refer to much academic research on that war. Nevertheless, reporting on the war has been subjected to such intense scrutiny that many “journalistic” articles on the topic can lay some claim to the name “research.” Such articles, as well as some commentary by informed sources provides most of the source material for this section.

A Long Preamble

Between what we are calling the “Gulf War,” of 1991, and the “Iraq War,” of 2003, was a period of 12 years dominated, with regard to Iraq, by repeated United Nations calls for Iraq to give up its “weapons of mass destruction” and submit to arms inspections, by the declaration of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq and their enforcement by British and American air forces, and by the Iraqi government’s repression of anti-Saddam elements within the country and obstructionism regarding weapons inspections. American claims that Iraq possessed and would use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs—chemical, biological, and radiological weapons) became increasingly urgent in tone.

The American concerns grew even more insistent after the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington by al-Qaida and the American attack on al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. They reached a crescendo in President George W. Bush’s January 2002 declaration that Iraq was one of three members of an “axis of evil,” with Iran and North Korea, because of its possession of WMDs and its bellicose statements and irresponsible behavior in its international relations.

Afghanistan Overshadowed

The war in Afghanistan was popular and intensely covered by American media, but news coverage was limited by the largely-clandestine character of U.S. involvement—employing special forces and CIA agents working through the various anti-Taliban Afghan forces—and by the country’s vast distances, unfamiliar culture, and daunting terrain. It also was quickly forgotten by many, as tensions in Iraq built up and monopolized media interest. Lori Robertson reports that Lexis-Nexis, in the period January to April 2002 carried more than 1,000 stories on Afghanistan “that were too long to display.” By the same period in 2003, the total had declined to 167. Robertson quoted the Baltimore Sun as titling an April 2003 story, “Remember Afghanistan? Anybody?” Nevertheless, the situation in that country remains a live issue, likely to develop into a major problem again unless greater attention is paid to it by the American press and government (Robertson, 2003).

An international symposium, “Between War and Media,” under Japanese and French sponsorship, was held in Tokyo March 25-27, 2002, to discuss factors such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the American response in Afghanistan, that already were beginning to foreshadow the attitudes and developments that finally led to the Iraq War. A preliminary outline for the symposium noted the centrality of the role of the media in modern warfare. In the 20th century “media did not simply record and cover war from without, but rather became a part of war, defining it, representing it, and mediating its memory…” The same outline added, “now, we are at present witnessing the ultimate combination of war and media at the entrance to the 21st century.” September 11th, Afghanistan, and the “war on terrorism” were seen by the author of the outline as marking the beginning of a larger war.
The trends of the war that has just started are as yet unclear. Yet there is no doubt that media will become an essential condition for structuring our perception of the world....And media, one must add, is steadily becoming unavoidably involved with this horizon of perception itself. (International Symposium, 2002)

Polls and Coverage: Pro and Con

The attack on Iraq in 2003 had far less international support than the 1991 war. Early in 2003, European polls indicated strong opposition to an attack on Iraq, even with United Nations sanction. In Germany, 87% opposed war, and “the Forsa poll found 57% of Germans held the opinion that ‘the United States is a nation of warmongers’.” Despite many of their governments’ stated support for the American initiative against Iraq, public opinion in Eastern Europe opposed it. Support for a war, even with UN sanction, was reported as 38% in Romania, 28% in Bulgaria, 20% in Estonia, 23% in Russia, “and in Turkey, polls have consistently found an overwhelming majority to be against war on Iraq.” An opinion poll in the Times of London found that 51% of a British sample criticized Tony Blair as “a US poodle,” although 47% trusted him to do the right thing” (Horsley, 2003). However, once British forces became fully involved in the war, a Mori Poll in early April reported a 20% opinion shift in favor of support for that involvement (Dodd, 2003).

Media Tenor, in Bonn, Germany carried out one of the first scientific studies of media coverage of the Iraq war during the period from March 20th to April 2nd, 2003. Television news was monitored in five countries: Germany (ARD, ZDF, and RTL), The United States (ABC evening news), Britain (BBC news at six and ten o’clock), Czech Republic (CTV), and South Africa (SABC and E-TV). ARD, ZDF, BBC, CTV, and SABC are public channels, while RTL, ABC, and E-TV are private. The content analysis showed that evaluation of U.S. military action in Iraq was critical on the part of all three German channels, with RTL significantly more negative than the public channels. ABC was positive in its treatment, while the BBC was about evenly balanced between positive and negative treatments. The Czech channel broadcast about three times as much negative coverage as it did positive. In South Africa, the public channel was positive, and the private channel overwhelmingly negative. The German channels became more positive in early April than they had been in mid-March, and ABC was much more positive by the later date (April 2nd), with positive evaluations in about 45% of total coverage on that date. The German channels paid more attention to Iraqi casualties, while both ABC and BBC gave more coverage to Coalition casualties. ABC covered anti-war protests more than any of the other channels except E-TV and ARD, while BBC covered them least (Media Tenor, 2003).

According to Gallup polls, American public opinion in January 2003 was divided, with 53% saying they thought the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over, while 42% said it was not. By April 9th 76% said it was worth going to war, and only 19% said it was not. In a poll taken June 27-29, 2003, the “worth going to war” proportion had declined to 56%, and the negative view drew 42% of responses. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction and the continuing attacks on Coalition troops were seen as factors in the more negative June responses. Only 8% of those in the June survey who said the war was worthwhile gave their main rationale as “to stop weapons of mass destruction from being sold or made,” while 30% said it was worthwhile to “protect the United States,” 27% cited the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, 18% “freeing the Iraqi people,” and 13% “to stop terrorism” (Moore, 2003).

The American administration based its justification for invasion on a UN resolution which had, in effect, been disavowed by many nations that had at first supported it—most notably France, Russia, and Germany. Although a few Arab governments supported the attack, widespread demonstrations signaled broad opposition among Arab populations. Although American public opinion tended to support it by a narrow margin, domestic opposition was nevertheless widespread and vocal, as expressed both through demonstrations and in the media. This dissension reached into the U.S. government itself. Although government sources steadfastly denied it, a serious disagreement about policy and strategy between the Defense Department and State Department was embarrassingly evident to all.

The Media’s Armaments Race

Between the wars the American military had greatly upgraded its weapons and its communication systems. The mass media, particularly television networks, also had been engaged in an “armaments race” of their own, and by the start of the war several, including CNBC/MSNBC, CBS, and Fox were fully prepared to challenge CNN’s superiority in battlefield reporting capability (TBS, 2003). This challenge was undertaken at great expense, and, according to some observers,
ultimately with a net financial loss by many news organizations, print as well as electronic (Fine, 2003). Lawrence K Grossman disputes the idea that the media suffered any long-term losses, despite their large investments. “Indeed, in many respects, war is a boon to the news business, not a liability,” he said. The costs of covering the Iraq War were relatively less than those of the Gulf War, according to Grossman, among other factors because new equipment was lighter, cheaper, and easier to transport. Financial costs could be offset later by crowding commercial schedules and by raising rates, with the raises justified by expanded audiences. Citing a study by McKinsey and Co. management consultants, Grossman went on to comment that war reporting might actually be the “most efficient way a news division can spend its money, because so much of what the money is spent on gets on the air” (Grossman, 2003, p. 6).

Several new technologies were used by reporters, especially satellite videophones with compression technologies that greatly improved transmissions and cut costs (Cass, 2003). One type was so advanced that “its location-finding system is accurate to within 100 meters.” Since its transmission location could be accurately targeted by Iraqi artillery, some American commanders banned its use (Forrester, 2003).

“Us,” “Them,” or Neither

News organizations of other countries were not to be outdone. Britain’s BBC, Independent Television, and Sky were eager, especially in view of the significant British troop involvement. Brian McNair gave British television high marks for objectivity.

The BBC adhered throughout to the formula “the British say,” “the British are on the outskirts of Basra.” This style is traditionally intended to convey its impartiality vis-à-vis the UK government, even at times of war. But there was no neutrality expected, nor offered in coverage of Saddam’s activities. The badness of the Iraqi regime was a given from the start, for all three channels....All media organisations operated under military restrictions, of course, and their correspondents were often used in the service of Coalition propaganda. (McNair, 2003)

But he added that

Criticism of the war plan was regularly covered, however, especially in week two when the main wobble occurred....In addition to the unprecedented access extended to journalists, then, this was a war in which, from the UK perspective at least, there was no attempt by media organisations to downplay or dismiss opposition to the war policy. (McNair, 2003)

“Where are the WMDs?”

Failure to find the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that had served as the central Anglo-American rationale for the war became a major issue after the main fighting ended. The media’s involvement in the controversy developed more rapidly in Britain than in the U.S. Even the venerable and highly respected BBC was drawn into the debate. The U.K. government complained that the BBC had accused the government of falsely exaggerating claims about WMDs, especially concerning the rapidity with which Iraq was claimed to be able to bring them into action. The BBC, meanwhile, stuck to its accusations, adding that the government was unfairly targeting Andrew Gilligan of the BBC staff. On June 29, 2003, Peter Beaumont, of The Observer, supported the BBC’s side, saying,

...Gilligan still got it right.

He did so because he reported what was widely being briefed to journalists—including myself—by MI6 officers and the Foreign Office that Number 10...had gone out of its way to overstate the threat posed by Iraq to make the case for war.

That it did not involve one big lie but a myriad of smaller untruths does not make it less bad, for its intention was the same—to manipulate debate over the threat both in the Commons and among the public via the media. (Beaumont, 2003)

One observer commented, “This is a row that will not go away” (BBC World Service, 2003).

The controversy took a tragic turn with the apparent suicide, on July 18, 2003, of David Kelly, British Senior Advisor on Weapons of Mass Destruction and a former UN arms inspector. Three days earlier he had been questioned by the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs “about whether he had been the source of an accusation broadcast by the BBC that the British government had doctored intelligence findings in its campaign to gain public support for going to war in Iraq” (New York Times service, 2003).

Arab Television

The independent Arabic-language network, Al Jazeera, had gained notoriety earlier, broadcasting video and audio tapes recorded by the fugitive al-Qaida
leader Osama bin-Laden during the American campaign in Afghanistan (Biernatzki, 2002, p. 11). It again took the lead among services based in Arab countries. Abu Dhabi TV, Al Arabiya, and Al Hayat/LBC were not far behind, and several other Arabic-language services were active on a smaller scale. Much of the growth in Arab countries’ international television news had been fueled between the wars by the need to cover the intensifying Israeli-Palestinian confrontation from an Arab perspective (TBS, 2003).

Western television frequently depended on feeds from these Arabic services, especially later in the war when the Western media had greater difficulty working in Iraqi-held territory.

Although Turkey is not an Arab country, its proximity to Iraq gave its government and population an urgent motive to pay close attention to the war coverage. Two established media scholars, Dilruba Catalbas and Christine Ogan have provided in-depth analyses of Turkish coverage two weeks into the war (Catalbas, 2003; Ogan, 2003).

**Turkish Reactions**

Turkey is well-supplied with modern media, including collaboration between NTV and MSNBC, for round-the-clock coverage that can be received by 70% of the Turkish population, and a joint venture between the Dogon Media Group and CNN, one of only two CNN channels that broadcasts in a language other than English. Despite an abundance of media, “concentration of ownership and issues related to media globalization are as serious in Turkey as anywhere else in the world,” limiting “the range of different voices” about the war. “Turkish broadcasters got less than high marks for their war coverage...” However, there was likely more diversity of coverage than in the United States, as viewers could choose among Islamic viewpoints, the U.S.-based channels and opinions, coverage by Turkish reporters in the field, and also get the European perspective.” A conference of media scholars held at Anadolu University, Eskisehir, Turkey, coincided with the start of the war and directly addressed the problems of media and war and “how to make the media more responsible and more reflective in their coverage” (Ogan, 2003).

Turkish media seemed torn in two directions in its reporting on the early days of the war. “Anti-war but pro-US Military experts, international relations and foreign policy analysts, ex-diplomats, and politicians dominated much of the coverage in the first two weeks.... Due to the ethnocentric perspective of the media toward the war, most commentaries and debate were about US-Turkey relations.” Islamist channels Kanal 7 and STV were critical of the war, but placed emphasis on “Islamic identity and solidarity,” and “seemed to down-play the AKP government’s pro-American attitude.” The interest of Turkish viewers in the war did not equal the diligence of the media in covering it. “Rating reports showed that the main evening newscasts of the major channels were far behind those of the popular sit-coms and soap operas” (Catalbas, 2003).

**The Arab Perspective**

Charlene Gubash, of NBC News, quotes Professor Hussein Amin of the American University in Cairo, in explaining the different perspective of the Arabic services.

“They are all giving news coverage from an Arabic perspective,” says Amin, “talking about Iraqi casualties, Iraqi resistance, inviting Arab analysts to comment on U.S. press briefings and pick out what is wrong with them, just as the British use English experts. In Arab eyes it is fair, in American eyes it is biased.” (Gubash, 2003)

Al-Jazeera had five correspondents in Iraq, two of whom were embedded with U.S. troops. Arabiya TV (Dubai) had 25 in the region of conflict and two embedded with U.S. and British troops. The Arab media were sometimes able to show film that contradicted official US/UK claims about particular actions (Gubash, 2003). Although they may have shown some bias, al-Jazeera, in particular, claimed to make a considerable effort to be impartial. In fact, at one point Saddam Hussein ordered two al-Jazeera reporters to leave the country for reporting a more rapid advance by American forces than the Iraqi Information Ministry was willing to admit. Their expulsion was rescinded when the network threatened to withdraw all its personnel from Iraq, a move which would have deprived Saddam of an important means for airing his own views to the world (PBS, 2003).

Michael Massing, who was in Iraq not as a reporter but to monitor journalists’ safety for the Committee to Protect Journalists, said, “it was no secret that the U.S. military was unhappy with al-Jazeera,” especially in its emphasis on civilian casualties. In an effort to ensure the safety of its personnel, al-Jazeera gave the Pentagon the coordinates of its Baghdad office, with the plea that it not be attacked. It nevertheless was attacked, with loss of life, as its Kabul office had been during the Afghanistan War (Massing, 2003a, p. 37;
PBS, 2003). Despite U.S. apologies and disclaimers, many observers were not wholly convinced that either bombing was purely accidental. Al-Jazeera also claimed its websites were sabotaged from time to time, with pro-American material replacing them. Spokespersons for the network did not make accusations about the identity of the saboteurs, but did comment that the hackers would have required considerable funding and technical expertise to do it (PBS, 2003).

The Military Cooperates

The attacks on al-Jazeera may have been an exception to its broader policy, but the U.S. military did show that it had learned some hard lessons from its clashes with the media in wars of the previous four decades and therefore had decided to give the fullest possible cooperation to the media, especially the television services. Journalists were even offered “hostile environment training,” to enhance their survivability when they accompanied troops in combat (Ricchiardi, 2003). Operational security was defined as narrowly as possible. Special operations and the exact locations of units with “embedded” journalists were taboo, but most other topics were wide open. Brian McNair described the result, from a British perspective:

The unique nature of the Iraqi conflict was heightened by the decision of British and US political leaders to allow unprecedented media access to the battlefield. More than seven hundred journalists were “embedded” with front line units in Iraq itself. Hundreds more were installed at media centres in Qatar....Together they provided real time, round the clock coverage of what became, to a degree only hinted at by coverage of Gulf War I, the first virtual war. (McNair, 2003)

In spite of these positive developments in media-military relations, glitches inevitably developed. One of the most thorough discussions and evaluations, to date, of reporting during the Iraq War can be found in the May/June 2003 issue of the Columbia Journalism Review (CJR, 2003). The most frequent violation for which reporters were evicted from Iraq by the U.S. army was being too explicit about the location of U.S. troops.

Filming Prisoners and Casualties

“The new-age-war live coverage also presents other new problems of professional ethics about how far to accept official dictation.” Al Jazeera’s tape of captured American soldiers being interrogated by the Iraqis was available to American networks, but most of them acceded to urgent Pentagon requests to withhold broadcast out of regard for relatives not yet aware of what had happened to their loved ones....On his website, Matt Drudge asked the obvious question, “If anchormen and others in the media have viewed it, why can’t the average citizen?” It is one of many professional questions bound to arise in this era of Live from the Battlefront....And there is no easy answer. (Schorr, 2003)

For its part, al-Jazeera justified its use of the footage saying that only governments, not private media, were barred by the Geneva convention from showing pictures of prisoners of war (PBS, 2003).

Too explicit footage of casualties even in domestic disasters usually is not shown on American television or in general circulation print media, with the same policy applied to war coverage. Glenn Frankel, of the Washington Post is quoted as explaining,

“We’re very cognizant and sensitive of the fact that we’re reaching a large audience of varying demographics and we really don’t want to shock people in a visceral way.... That doesn’t mean we want to hide from the truth but we’re reluctant to use pictures of people with major wounds. We draw the line at blood and guts.” (Marks, 2003)

According to Jacqueline E. Sharkey, this policy of the American media was criticized during the Gulf War by “media analysts and former military officers.” They were “concerned that these images presented an inaccurate picture of war. They criticized the Pentagon and the White House for presenting a sanitized view of military conflict that could make Americans more willing to accept short-term wars as an alternative to diplomacy” (Sharkey, 2003). Sharkey adds that, “The American people, however, supported the government’s policy. A postwar poll in 1991 by the then-Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press showed that nearly 70% supported the press restrictions and 90% expressed confidence that the military was providing accurate information about the war” (Sharkey, 2003).

British journalists also limit what they show, but the ethics of such decisions are not clear in either country. Naomi Marks relates an incident in which the editors of the Guardian had to make a difficult decision about publishing a picture of an Iraqi child killed in an American air raid.

It was a powerful image. It was also a disturbing one, leaving the reader with little doubt about the
human cost of the war. But a central concern for [editor Alan] Rusbridger in using the picture big on the front page was the reaction of children who might see it as they bought sweets in newsagents on their way to school.

In the end, a balance between portraying the reality of war to Guardian readers and keeping unintentional distress to a minimum was struck: the picture was used small and what is known as “below the fold,” so that it remained hidden on the newsstands. (Marks, 2003)

The media in some other places, particularly in the Middle East are willing to be more explicit. “Much of the Middle Eastern media carries images of carnage that would be unacceptable in the United Kingdom. In part, at least, though...their use can be put down to the recent history of suicide bombing in the region, which means that such images often no longer shock” (Marks, 2003, quoting Adel Darwish).

“Only one thing is certain for the media: none of these decisions on how far you can go in communicating the bare face of war death and injury are taken easily. Context, dignity, distance, and the nature of the audience are just some of the factors under consideration” (Marks, 2003).

Two recent books (Howe, 2002; Sontag 2003), reviewed under the title, “Will you flinch: Confronting the images of war,” by the Columbia Journalism Review in its issue on reporting the Iraq War, discuss communicating the human suffering of war. (Swofford, 2003, pp. 58-60). “Both books insist that the critic and photographer and writer must keep trying to transfer the reality of warfare to the viewer/reader” (Swofford, 2003, p. 60).

The “Embedded” and the “Unilaterals”

The existence of many alternative sources of information put pressure on the Western media to correct some of their own natural biases. Various correspondents chose not to be “embedded” with Coalition units, in order to preserve their freedom of movement. They served a valuable function, observing and reporting much that the embedded correspondents could not. But they had little guarantee of safety. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, Central Command spokesman, told them frankly, “We don’t know every place a journalist is operating on the battlefield. We only know those journalists that are operating with us.” Others were “putting themselves at risk.” Michael Massing drew, from this, “one disturbing conclusion...that the U.S. military believed that only reporters who were officially embedded had the right to protection” (Massing, 2003b, pp. 33-35).

John Donovan also saw the unembedded “unilaterals” as caught in the middle. They were resented by the U.S. military, who had assumed no formal responsibility for them but nevertheless would have had to rescue them if they got in trouble. “The Iraqis saw journalists as part of an invading force. And the invaders—the coalition forces—saw unilateralists as having no business on their battlefield. There was no neutral ground.” Nevertheless, there were advantages, and unilateralists got closer to the people than the embeds, and reported some otherwise untold stories, concerning, for example, civilian casualties and the ambiguous feelings many Iraqi civilians had about the invasion (Donovan, 2003, p. 35). Unilateralists had to sneak into Iraq when the border was officially closed to them. Donovan found “a nearly perfect solution” when reporters who were not officially embedded were “adopted” by some U.S. unit. Being unilateralists, they had their own transportation and could wander freely, but they also had a “home” with the unit, and some consequent security, as long as they stayed out of trouble (Donovan, 2003, p. 36).

Evaluations of the embedding policy varied. Terence Smith called it “the most innovative aspect of the coverage of the second gulf war...a new standard was set for war reporting. It is impossible to imagine a future U.S. military campaign without reporters embedded in frontline units...there is no going back” (Smith, 2003, p. 26). In his over-all evaluation of coverage of the war, Smith gave the media high grades (“B+”) for “getting it more right than wrong” and for helping present the “big picture.” On the other hand, he felt that more patience and reflection would have produced better reporting and analysis, and that the media too often “fell for the Pentagon spin” on the news—regarding, for example, the “shock and awe” prediction about the air campaign, the prediction that Baghdad would be heavily defended, and failure to report a raid by Apache helicopters that was a near-disaster, with one downed and the rest so badly damaged that the unit was rendered ineffective for further combat—(“C-”). He also felt that jingoism sometimes compromised objectivity (“C”) (Smith, 2003, pp. 26-28).

Paul Friedman was less sanguine about the reporting, in general, and embedding, in particular, calling it “a missed opportunity.” He felt the “coverage...was less drastically different than many had expected.” It marked “a bold return to the Vietnam War,” with up-close coverage which, however, revealed “only small slices of
reality.” According to Friedman, embedding gave some measure of safety to reporters, but it also restricted their coverage so that not much real combat footage resulted, and that had to be shown over and over. The frequent live transmissions demanded by their networks required the reporters to spend excessive time on logistics, rather than on getting pictures. Unembedded reporters and official army cameramen got some of the best pictures, and action scenes from Baghdad during air attacks resulted from cameras left unattended but running on the roofs of buildings there after the reporters themselves had been expelled. Friedman felt that Secretary Rumsfeld was correct in calling for more context in the reporting. Networks tried to supply that with experts in their studios, but sometimes overdid it. The rapid transmission of footage also resulted in stories having no “beginning, middle, and end,” unlike in Vietnam, where slower transmission allowed for more coherent editing (Friedman, 2003, pp. 29-31).

Other Critics

Todd Gitlin has been especially critical of nearly all aspects of the reporting of the Iraq War and post-war events, embedding being the least of its problems.

The prime deficiencies in the immense war reportage lay elsewhere, deep in the network headquarters where imagination was paralyzed, Washington deference was normal, and war coverage was (to paraphrase the title of Chris Hedges’ recent book) a force that kept us mesmerized. The dirty little secret of much war “news” is that much of the audience wants to entrance itself into emotional surrender, and news officials want to elicit precisely that surrender. (Gitlin, 2003)

Some conservative American analysts were also critical of American correspondents who gave negative interpretations of U.S. operations, sometimes accusing them of “simply relaying Iraqi propaganda” (Times Watch, 2003). In any case, a wide range of perspectives was accessible, either directly or indirectly to the world’s media audiences. Inevitably, no one seemed perfectly satisfied. Rhonda Roumani quotes an Egyptian who had watched the television coverage in Flushing, New York: “I watch CNN—nobody gets killed. I watch al-Jazeera—it’s like a tragedy...something is missing from both of them” (Roumani, 2003, p. 64).

Internet, WWW, and Online Journalism

The importance of the Internet and the World Wide Web as alternative sources of information and opinion had become evident during the 1990s, especially by the time of the conflict in Kosovo. In the Afghanistan and Iraq wars it became a complicating factor, often a weapon in itself. Even sites that claimed to be objective often were operated by non-journalists, whose professionalism has been called into question by media scholars. For example, Jane B. Singer says that “the online news worker fundamentally challenges the already-disputed concept of journalists as professionals” (Singer, 2003, p. 139—abstract). She notes that “the World Wide Web has had a tremendous impact on traditional media outlets and the people who work for them” (p. 139).

The emergence of nonprofessional online journalists has raised serious questions about how they relate to “the professional community of traditional journalists.” Either there will have to be “considerable accommodation in the self-perception of what a journalist does or considerable change in the way online journalism is carried out.” For example, the online sites’ relationship to special interests often is concealed, or at least unclear. In Singer’s view, this calls into question a key professional essential of journalism: “Autonomy from commercial as well as government influence is a core professional requirement if the trust necessary to perform journalism in service to the public is to be possible” (Singer, 2003, p. 157). At the same time, much of the online material does originate from persons qualified as professional journalists. Given the abundance of online sources, especially concerning such a high-profile story as the Iraq War, it often is not easy to evaluate the reliability of individual reports.

Post-combat Debates

The Iraq War has carried over into post-war reporting, sparking controversy about the evident lack of preparedness of the military for reestablishing order and public services in a conquered Iraq (Landy & Strobel, 2003), for apparent deceptions or at least exaggerations on the part of American and British leaders in their arguments favoring war, for defects in intelligence gathering and its accurate communication to decision makers, and for assuming a close relationship between the Saddam government and terrorist organizations which, in fact, was never significant (Kelley, 2003).

Dependence of both government and media on secularistic explanations, with consequent failure to adequately probe the religious dimensions of the Middle Eastern context of the war will be discussed at length in the “Perspective” section, p. 21 below.
7. War Games: War as Entertainment

*Competition and War*

Sports almost always involve contests of some sort, and contests, like war, involve conflict. This is even true of parlor games, board games, and video games. Chess is a war game, as is Go in which the object of the game is to surround and annihilate the opponent’s black or white markers with one’s own markers of the other color. Nina Huntemann points out this militaristic dimension of seemingly peaceful pastimes in an interview about her own work on video games (Barron, 2003). Huntemann is the director of a film, “Game Over: Gender, Race, and Violence in Video Games,” distributed by Media Education Foundation (Huntemann, 2003). Today’s interactive video war games are similar to the board games of centuries ago, in that respect, but they differ in their extreme realism. Huntemann describes how such games contribute to forming a militaristic psychology in young players: “The link between video games and militarism is that video games continue to make play out of warfare in an extremely realistic manner, more realistic than any previous entertainment game that is technologically oriented” (as quoted by Barron, 2003).

*Video Game Research Findings Outmoded*

Stephen Kline has remarked that early research on video game effects has been outmoded by the rapidly growing sophistication of the games’ design. “Early studies of video game ‘effects’ involving Pac Man, Space Invaders, and even racing games are so primitive that few researchers now consider them relevant to today’s much more realistic, more dynamic, and much more ‘violent’ games” (Kline, 2000, p. 49).

Warlike video games have proliferated in the United States, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Huntemann’s research suggests that the newer games tend to emphasize “covert-ops,” undertaken secretly, without international sanction, and with no moral or ethical questioning. Their starting point is an imperative: “We must neutralize these terrorists!” There is no attention paid to context, to why the “terrorists” act as they do, or what limitations should be placed on the methods used in their “neutralization.” The emphasis is on the technology of war, not on either its casualties or morality, according to Huntemann. She credits their current popularity in part to the fears arising from the terrorist attacks. Winning a game gives us the illusion that we can control a fearful environment.

*Training to Kill*

The American military have produced or adapted video games for training purposes. The U.S. Marines adapted the game, “Doom,” which already had been available commercially—and, incidentally, had been a favorite game of the two students who shot and killed so many of their classmates in April 1999, at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado (Perse, 2001, p. 199).

Huntemann says that in 1999 the Pentagon and Hollywood spent $45 million in government funds to create the “Institute for Creative Technology” to develop technology for military training and education. The U.S. Army spent $6 million developing a game, “American Army,” that was released to the public without charge in November 2002. The usual cost of developing a commercial video game, according to Huntemann, is between $1 million and $1.5 million. Although the game also was used as a training tool, its free public release was justified as a recruitment tool (Barron, 2003).

Dave Grossman, a retired U.S. Army officer who had spent much of his career teaching soldiers to kill, has become a strong critic of the interactive entertainment industry, accusing it of “providing military quality training to children” (Grossman & DeGaetano, 1999 as cited in Kline, 2000, p. 45). Most people have a natural aversion to killing, but Grossman feels that children can be desensitized to its horror by the repeated experience of “shooting” the bloodless video game “enemies” (Kline, 2000, p. 45).

Grossman’s observations are supported by psychological research into “habituation.” After reviewing the research, Elizabeth M. Perse concludes, “There is a good deal of evidence that people can become habituated to media violence. Children who are viewers of a lot of television violence showed less physiological arousal when watching violence than do viewers of a light amount of television” (Cline, Croft, & Courrier, 1973; Thomas, Horton, Lippincott, & Drabman, 1977,
as cited in Perse, 2001, p. 212). Perse goes on to point out the escalation of violence in the media that takes place over time, as the media industries try to adapt to the demands of heavy viewers of violence who have become desensitized to it in this way (Jhally, 1994 as cited in Perse, 2001, p. 212).

On the other hand, there is no clear statistical evidence that media violence breeds violence in society. Perse (2001, p. 199) says flatly, “Perceptions are common that our violent media culture has bred a generation who are desensitized to crime and mayhem. These perceptions, though, are inaccurate....In fact, there is an inverse relationship between the Nielsen ratings of violent television programs and criminal violence rates across 281 geographic areas (Messner, 1986).” Nevertheless, there is evidence that televised violence breeds aggressive behavior among some particularly susceptible individuals. Perse quotes a 1982 report of the National Institutes of Mental Health: “After 10 more years of research, the consensus among most of the research community is that violence on television does lead to aggressive behavior by children and teenagers who watch the programs” (NIMH, 1982, p. 6 as cited in Perse, 2001, p. 202). After reviewing many more studies, Perse concluded that “mass communication scholars overwhelmingly accept that media violence bears some responsibility for violent behavior” (Perse, 2001, p. 221).

Complex Causes of Violence

Cecilia von Feilitzen would agree, in general, while emphasizing the diversity of the factors involved. “Looking beyond direct and simple causal relations between media violence and aggression, one understands that we all get impressions from and are influenced by media violence—but in different ways based on our varying motives, intentions, wishes, and life conditions” (von Feilitzen, 2001, p. 119). She notes that researchers’ interpretations can differ, depending on their philosophical views on free will vs. determinism, as well as on whether their research goals stress how we are influenced by violence and on how we choose, use, and interpret media violence.

These perspectives, however are not contradictory. They only have different locations on the theoretical maps. Nor are the findings from the studies contradictory. The same persons can appreciate and construct meaning from media violence while also getting less desirable impressions from it. The fact that we both are influenced by and seek to influence the environment is true of most contexts. (von Feilitzen, 2001, p. 120)

8. Children and War News

Paucity of Research

Exactly how war news fits into this broader, but already complex picture of media violence requires further exploration by researchers, but it seems undeniable that it plays some role. Only limited research had been done, at least up until the early 1990s. The authors of one of the few studies on the effects of the Gulf War TV coverage on children prefaced their paper with the following comment on the sparse literature available:

Although there are many studies of the emotional reactions of children who have experienced war directly in their own environment, such as in Israel (e.g., Baider & Rosenfeld, 1974), there do not seem to be any studies focusing on children whose exposure to war has been through mass media only. (Cantor, Mares, & Oliver, 1993, p. 325)

News and Children's Fears

Earlier research on children’s media-induced fears had shown that television news was among the top ten sources of such fears. But the researchers were “soon reminded that controlled studies of the impact of real news events as they happen are difficult because the events are largely unpredictable, and the coverage usually terminates before a research project can be mounted.” The Gulf War therefore presented researchers at the University of Wisconsin–Madison with a “unique opportunity” to plan their research strategy in advance of the actual events (Cantor, Mares, & Oliver, 1993, p. 326).

They designed a project to interview parents to ask their perceptions of their children’s reactions to war news. Based on earlier research, they anticipated that parents would “tend to underestimate the negative emotional effects of media, relative to children’s self-
reports,” but earlier studies had shown enough consistency to yield meaningful results (Cantor, Mares, & Oliver, 1993, p. 329). Fears were found to be related to developmental stages. Most concern was expressed for people in the Gulf region by all groups, but it was more pronounced among the younger children. Fear of war in the U.S. declined with age, but fears of terrorism and nuclear war were more prominent among older children. “By far the most frequent manifestations of upset that were mentioned spontaneously occurred in verbalizations, mostly in the form of questions...those asking for the reasons or motivations behind the war...and those asking about the risks involved in the war...” (Cantor, Mares, & Oliver, 1993, pp. 332-333).

Parents’ own feelings were elicited, and “the findings suggest that the relationship between parental exposure to news and the children’s emotional response was not a function of the parents’ feelings alone.” A surprising finding, for the researchers, was that “there was no evidence for television-induced desensitization to the horrors of war.” A correlation between children’s responses and their viewing of educational television suggested that the viewing of discussions of empathy and concern for others on shows such as Sesame Street and Mr. Rogers had fostered “the type of attitude that makes the destructiveness of war seem more horrible” (Cantor, Mares, & Oliver, 1993, p. 339).

Parents as News Sources

An Illinois State University study indicated that parents were a major source of news about the war for many children, and parents “may have communicated their own emotional states, both negative and positive, to their children when discussing the news.” Sadness was experienced by “over 90% of the children in this study,” while anger was reported more frequently by older than by younger children. Reports of fear were linked to feelings of personal vulnerability, but most reported feelings of pride, linked with the success of the United States and its allies in the war (Hoffner & Haefner, 1993, pp. 378-379).

In a Dutch study during the 1991 war, the researchers found “no significant difference in the degree to which parents and children were emotionally affected by the coverage” of the war (van der Voort, van Lil, & Vooijs, 1993, p. 349). That few expressed strong emotional reactions was attributed, in part, to suppression of images of casualties in news coverage (pp. 341, 351), and to the war’s brief duration, as well as to the lack of Dutch forces participation in land combat (p. 352).

Two British studies during the Gulf War yielded results roughly comparable to those of the Dutch study. David Morrison and Brent MacGregor, of the University of Leeds, found that “the fear manifested in Britain...that the coverage of the war generated high levels of anxiety in children, had little basis as a reality in children’s lives....The news and the images transmitted from the Gulf had a difficult time finding space in the lives of children whose time was taken up with the everyday existence of being children” (Morrison & MacGregor, 1993, p. 363). Mallory Wober and Brian M. Young found that British children tended to personalize the war, much as adults did, blaming it on Saddam Hussein and urging his removal. Little or no correlation was noted between the children’s experience of fictional wars on television and their reactions to televised news about a real war. “Now that they have seen a real war, it is clear that they are dismayed by it” (Wober & Young, 1993, p. 394).

Time has not allowed for publication of scientific studies of children’s reaction to the Iraq War, although such studies are certainly being done. Numerous web sites, drawing on existing research, have been developed to advise parents and others who work with children on how to discuss the war with them. Professor Aaron T. Ebata, of the University of Illinois, has developed a list of such sites (Ebata, 2003). Their on-line addresses will be listed in an appendix to this essay.

9. Perspective

Analyzing “American” Wars

As was mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, I have concentrated on the later history of the mass media’s involvement with wars, as well as tending to focus on both American media and American wars. Both emphases seem justified on the grounds that the American wars have been well documented—more fully, for example, than Soviet and Russian wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, various conflicts in Africa, or the Communist conquest of China—and also because they have embodied a rapid evolution in both the technological and human sides of war report-
ing and of the relationship of the media to military operations.

That relationship has, in fact, become an essential consideration in war. The American military only gradually became aware of that development as the U.S. government found the media shifting against its policies in Vietnam and challenging its monopoly of information sources in Grenada and Panama. Finally, by the time of the Iraq War, the military were forced to accept and support massive media presence on the battlefield.

But there is no such thing as a fully “public” war. Not only do many operational aspects have to be kept secret to ensure their success and the safety of the troops, but many historical, social, cultural, economic, political, and psychological factors affect decisions about war at all levels. Similar factors affect media coverage. Some of these factors are known by the participants. Some are so subtle and complex that even the most diligent analysis by future historians may never bring them to light. At the same time, media professionals in free societies are under an ethical obligation to bring them to light. At the same time, media professionals in free societies are under an ethical obligation to probe the motives of their governments and call them to account for questionable decisions and moral lapses, both in their decisions to fight and in their conduct of the fighting.

# Religion a Neglected Factor?

Recent wars in the Middle East have brought religion into the forefront of war news to a degree unparalleled in the past two or three centuries. Few topics a journalist might confront offer the degree of complexity and pitfalls for misunderstanding as does religion. This journal has paid considerable attention to that problem in earlier issues (Biernatzki 1991, 1995, 2000-2001, pp. 84-98). When religions relatively unknown to a writer, or several religions with varied doctrines, values, and relationships to the political sphere are involved, the prospect of accurate journalistic interpretation becomes problematic, indeed.

Sincere adherents of any religion tend to be sensitive, or even paranoid about perceived criticisms of their faith. In the United States, for example, many taboos limit reporting about religion, and the taboos apply in different ways to different religions and at different times even to the same religion. Generally, the “purely religious” side of religion is immune to criticism in the public media. Often the “purely religious” seems to be defined by the secular media as “private,” “irrational,” and irrelevant to public life. When its followers apply moral principles identified with their religion to the public or political sphere they are often bruta-

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Zionism,” that exerts significant religious influence in certain denominations of fundamentalist Protestantism and, through those denominations’ large and conservative memberships, significant political power, as well. Both movements are somewhat taboo for general press coverage in the United States—anything about the Saudis having economic as well as political implications, and anything negative about Zionism being instantly labeled “anti-Semitic.” The media’s reluctance or inability to deal with them both in depth results in serious gaps in the public’s understanding of the causes of America’s recent wars in that region.

Wahhabism

As is suggested by the two quotations from the Qur’an cited earlier, Islam is open to various interpretations concerning the right to take violent action in the name of religion. In the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the American mass media became interested in Wahhabi Islam because it forms the principal religious tendency in Saudi Arabia, where its followers call it “Salafi” (al-Ahmed, 2001), or “muwahhidun,” meaning “unitarian” (Kjeilen, 1996-2003). It was, in fact, used as an instrument by the Saudi government, when it came to power in 1932, in an effort to unify competing sects and ethnic groups within the Kingdom.

Social anthropologist Mai Yamani, the first Saudi woman to earn a Ph.D. from Oxford, describes the thinking behind that policy as follows: “They regarded it [Wahhabi thought] as much purer because it’s more fundamentalist, much more conservative than the people who are like in the south, the people in Mecca, who had more mystical religious trends, such as the Sufi trend, which is very mystical” (Yamani, 2001). Fifteen of the 19 hijackers who seized the four planes and made the attacks on September 11th were Saudis. Osama bin Laden, regarded as the principal organizer of al-Qaida and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, although from a Yemeni family, was born in Saudi Arabia and is a Saudi citizen (Interpol, 2003). He has shown strong affinity with the ultra-conservative doctrines of the Wahhabis.

With its Saudi backing, Wahhabism is more powerful than comparable groups, such as the Deobandi movement, discussed by the BBC’s Roger Hardy (2001). The Deobandi originated among Sunnis in the Indian Himalayas and gave birth to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, whose sheltering of Osama bin-Laden motivated the American invasion. Wahhabism seems to have borne bitter fruit in the al-Qaida terrorist organization of Osama bin Laden (Hardy, 2001), but a close relationship between Saudi Wahhabism and al-Qaida is contested by Saudi sources, who stress the Yemeni roots of bin-Laden’s family (Forte, 2002). Hardy cautions that “It would be wrong to see either Bin Laden or the Taleban [sic] as typical of modern Sunni movements. They represent a radical fringe, rather than the Sunni mainstream” (Hardy, 2001).

Nevertheless, Ali al-Ahmed, a Shi’a Muslim who grew up in Saudi Arabia, has indicated how the Saudi school system indoctrinates all students with a version of Islam that is “intolerant toward other Muslims who are not Salafis [i.e., Wahhabis]. You can see a book that is printed [by] a branch of Imam Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Washington area,...where they say that 95% of Muslims are claimant to Islam,” but are not real Muslims, despite claiming to be Muslims. Wahhabi/Salafi is “a sect, because it differs from everybody else, from Sunni Muslims and from Shi’a Muslims. And they have different ideas about God, about religion...totally different, probably, from the general Islam” (al-Ahmed, 2001). He quotes a ninth grade Saudi textbook prescribed for use in Saudi middle schools that purports to quote the Prophet as saying, “The day of judgment will not arrive until Muslims fight Jews, and Muslim[s] will kill Jews...” He goes on to say that the current curriculum, in the year 2000, includes statements that not only non-Muslims but also Muslims, Saudi citizens, who do not follow the strict Wahhabist doctrine, “will burn in hell, that they are paganist, that they will be destroyed in the day of judgment” (al-Ahmed, 2001). Although strong statements against Shi’as were removed from textbooks in the 1990s after protests,

...the same writer, the same guy who wrote those books, he still writes these books or curriculums....The attitude toward Shi’a is that they...are not Muslims; they are not full Muslims, at best. Some clerics stated [that] they should sometime be either killed or thrown away or deported, and they should not be allowed even to work....This year there is...another fatwa by a government official who is still working for the government, who said the same thing: that jihad should be waged against Shi’a...” (ibid.).

The influence of Wahhabism has been noticed in American institutions which have Islamic chaplains. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee has voiced concern that a growing Wahhabi presence in the United States “has potentially harmful and far reaching consequences for our nation’s
mosques, schools, prisons, and even our military.” Of special concern to the speaker, Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York, was the case of an imam, “a strict believer in Wahhabi Islam,” who had become Administrative Chaplain of the New York Department of correctional Services, “responsible for the hiring and firing of all chaplains in the New York State prison system.” He had finally been discharged after “preaching to inmates that the 9/11 hijackers should be remembered as martyrs.” Furthermore, Schumer warns that the federal prison system is not immune. “Militant Wahhabism is THE ONLY form of Islam that is preached to the 12,000 Muslims in federal prisons” [emphasis in the original]. Continued reliance of the Pentagon on two Wahhabi-influenced organizations as the only sources for the appointment of Muslim chaplains for the military also was regarded as disturbing by the same speaker (Schumer, 2003).

It should be noted that an item placed on the website, Al-Jazeerah.info, “Arab American News Focus,” by the Arab American Institute, strongly criticized the Senate subcommittee for “scheduling...such a biased, hurtful, anti-Arab American and anti-Muslim American panel” (Al-Jazeerah, 2003). An Al-Jazeera disclaimer says the opinions expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors, not necessarily of Al-Jazeera.

Shiite groups in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere also often demonstrate potential for political eruptions, but they lack the vast financial resources allegedly being furnished to the Wahhabi missionaries by the Saudis. As noted, above, the lack of distinction between religion and other dimensions of life in fundamentalist Islam makes Islamic movements especially susceptible to calls for militant radicalism.

Christian Zionism

But sources of extremism are by no means limited to Islam. The terrorist activities of Zionist groups such as the Stern Gang, in the foundation process of the State of Israel during the 1940s, for the most part is conveniently forgotten, for example. More recently, the disproportionately heavy-handed responses of the Israeli military to Palestinian provocations and the ongoing theft of Palestinian land by Israeli settlers tend to go on without much media criticism. The at most lukewarm American government criticisms of Israeli actions must seem, to Palestinians and other Arabs, to show tacit American support for almost everything Israel cares to do. It sometimes seems to be such an unbalanced favoritism towards Israel as to give rise to twists and turns in American Middle Eastern policy that sacrifice the best interests of the United States in favor of the interests of Israel, thrusting America into conflicts with Arab countries that might otherwise have been avoided.

Reasons for unquestioning American support for Israel might be found in some collective sense of guilt for the Holocaust, in the political influence of Zionists in the American Jewish community, in the pioneering image of early kibbutz settlers reflecting the pioneer spirit in America, etc. The negative stereotype of Arabs, long a feature of American racist prejudices, also tended to cast Arabs as the “enemy,” in contrast to European Jews, who are so much more “like us.”

But a stronger influence than any of those may be a “Christian Zionism” that has influenced American foreign policy for many decades. Like Wahhabism, in Islam, Christian Zionism has an almost purely religious origin, but with powerful political effects.

The power of Christian Zionism in the United States was illustrated by a series of events in April 2002, according to Donald E. Wagner in a recent article documenting the movement’s influence. At that time, Israel had recently demolished the Jenin refugee camp and other Palestinian targets, in revenge for terrible suicide bombings by Palestinians during Passover.

Under increasing international pressure, President Bush made a series of appeals for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to withdraw his forces from Jenin immediately. The pro-Israel lobby, in coordination with the Christian Right, mobilized more than a million e-mails, telephone calls, and personal visits urging the president to avoid restraining Israel. Once their campaign was activated, not a single word of restraint was issued by the White House to Israel. (Wagner, 2003, p. 20)

The roots of the seemingly strange alliance between Jewish and Christian Zionisms can be traced back to the early 1800s, in England, when millennialist Protestant fundamentalists, with political leadership from Lord Shaftesbury, began to advocate the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. The movement was inspired by the belief that “God’s covenant with Israel, including promises of land, continues in full force distinctive from Christianity.” Re-establishment of the state of Israel was seen, by these Christians, as a necessary condition for the “millennium,” the thousand years of peace that were believed to precede the Apocalypse, at the end of the world. Shaftesbury not only declared that God would bless the British Empire
for promoting and defending the reestablishment of Israel, but he also recognized, with many less-religiously-motivated politicians, that a Palestine peopled by European Jews would help promote British colonial ambitions in the Middle East and Africa. Eventually, this trend resulted in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain agreed to support a Jewish national homeland in Palestine.

The United States in the 19th century provided fertile religious ground for millenarian beliefs. Christian Zionism spread quickly from England across the Atlantic. One political expression was a petition presented to President Benjamin Harrison by 400 leading politicians in 1891, asking that he support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Harrison ignored the request. But the idea gradually gained strength below the surface in fundamentalist Protestant churches until, according to Wagner, a series of trends converged in the 1970s and 1980s. In part, this was a reaction against President Jimmy Carter’s even-handed policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. It finally brought the Christian Right and Jewish Zionists into open and vocal alliance at the “Washington Rally for Israel,” in April 2002.

At that rally, Janet Parshall, a radio evangelist representing National Religious Broadcasters, declared full support for Israeli policies: “I am here to tell you today, we Christians and Jews together will not labor any less in our support for Israel. We will never limp, we will never wimp, we will never vacillate in our support for Israel” (Wagner, 2003, p. 24; NCLCI, 2002).

The movement had powerful literary support, too, especially from the Left Behind series of ten novels, by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins (1999+), and later motion pictures “that focus on events leading to the end of history and the return of Jesus...the first two volumes reaching the New York Times bestseller list and the book series selling more than 50 million copies” (Wagner, 2003, p. 22). Hal Lindsey, author of The Late Great Planet Earth (1972), is one of those who view the success of the State of Israel as a necessary prelude to the end of the world. Carl Olson, is a convert to Catholicism from a fundamentalist Protestant background and author of a book, Will Catholics be “Left Behind”? (Olson, 2003a). The book is intended to alert Catholics and others to theological problems in dispensationalism—the doctrine that the elect will be saved by “rapture,” being taken bodily to heaven through a special dispensation that will free them from having to suffer the “tribulation” preceding the apocalypse. In an interview for the magazine, Catholic World Report, he responded to the interviewer’s question that many U.S. voters “are looking forward to certain developments in Israel which would, as you put it, ‘set the clock ticking’ toward the rapture,” saying,

That’s right. And many of the Israeli leaders, over the years, have recognized that. We have seen an Israeli prime minister, speaking to a group of Evangelical Protestants, tell them that the Israeli people recognized them as their best friends and allies....And many of those folks believe that this is not merely a matter of watching and waiting, to see what will happen, but actually believe that they can make this happen....For instance, Hal Lindsey has been very enthusiastic about encouraging as many Jews as possible to move back to the Israeli state. One of his beliefs is that once there is a certain number of Jews living there, that will be a factor in kicking off the sequence of events he awaits...they will have more power and will be able to do certain things that need to be accomplished before the end times can begin. (Olson, 2003b, p. 49)

Olson says that Protestant denominations with a strong dispensationalist, and therefore Christian Zionist, theology may represent between 20 and 50 million members in the United States. The Assemblies of God “are emphatically and openly dispensationalist.” “Southern Baptists, who form the largest Protestant body in the United States, over the years have semi-officially embraced dispensationalism.” Even some Methodists and Lutherans have been known to accept some of its doctrines (Olson, 2003b, p. 46). The movement is, in general, vehemently anti-Catholic, regarding “the Catholic Church as a pagan, apostate religion” (Olson, 2003b, p. 49).

Wagner suggests that Jews look more closely at hidden dimensions of “the prospect of unconditional support for Israel from upwards of 25 million Christian fundamentalists.” The eschatology of Christian Zionism, part of its theology of “dispensational premillenianism” may call for Jewish control of Palestine, but it also holds that all who are to survive the “last days” through being snatched up to heaven in “pretribulation rapture,” must be converted to Christianity. Non-Christians, including Jews, have no hope of survival except through conversion and baptism, in that view. Even prior to the last days, “the Christian Zionist agenda does not consider long term survival for the state of Israel in an increasingly hostile Middle East.” Furthermore, it totally ignores the rights of Palestinian
Christians, “who are fleeing their homeland in record numbers not due to Islamic extremism, but because of Israel’s brutal occupation policies, including economic closures, theft of land and settlement construction, and military aggression” (Wagner, 2003, p. 47).

In the same issue of *Sojourners*, Old Testament scholar Leslie C. Allen and ethicist Glen Stassen point out that in Genesis, God established an eternal covenant with all the children of Abraham, Arabs—“Ishmaelites,” the offspring of Abraham by Hagar—as well as “Israelites,” his offspring by Sarah (*Genesis* 12 and 15). So, according to these authors, the Zionist claim that Israel should rule without consideration for the Palestinians is a false reading of Scripture, since the Palestinians can assert at least a secondary, Scripture-based right to live in the “Promised Land,” beside and in kinship and friendship with the Jews. Allen and Stassen emphasize that the prophets frequently declared that Israel must repent and do justice or it would be driven into exile. “True and effective support for Israel is to join the call of the prophets for repentance, justice, and peacemaking. That is what will make life more secure for the people of Israel and Palestine” (Allen & Stassen, 2003, p. 25).

In fairness to evangelical Protestants who are not Christian Zionists and who do advocate an “even-handed” American policy in the Middle East, *Sojourners* accompanied the two articles with a box quoting a letter to President Bush from several distinguished representatives of evangelical churches and organizations, which said,

the American evangelical community is not a monolithic bloc in full and firm support of present Israeli policy. Significant numbers of American evangelicals reject the way some have distorted biblical passages as their rationale for uncritical support for every policy and action of the Israeli government instead of judging all actions—of both Israelis and Palestinians—on the basis of biblical standards of justice. (Mouw, et al. 2003)

**Conclusion**

This last section may seem inconsistent with our main theme, war reporting by the mass media, but war is much more than shooting. The combat and bloodshed always are preceded by worsening relations between the antagonists. No war can be fully understood unless the reasons for its outbreak are also understood. The Middle Eastern wars of the recent past are, in part due to political causes, but many of their roots extend deep into both cultures and religious doctrines and practices.

The two movements discussed in this section—Wahhabi Islam and Christian Zionism—contain important clues to some of those roots. Each inevitably interacts with more mundane causes of war—oil, land, dictators’ imperial ambitions, etc.—but none of those can explain what is happening without considering the religious factors, as well, even if their consideration steps on toes and violates taboos—as thorough media analyses of both Wahhabi Islam and Christian Zionism inevitably will do.

The courage required to report from the battlefield is laudable and evident to all. Equal or greater courage is necessary to unearth and report on the beliefs that lead to war.

**Appendix**

On-line resources to assist in discussing war with children (Source: Ebata, 2003).


**American Psychological Association.** Resilience in a Time of War. [helping.apa.org/resilience/war.html](http://helping.apa.org/resilience/war.html)

**BrightHorizons.** What is Happening Now in the World?: Talking with children about a War in Iraq and Terror. [www.brighthorizons.com/talktochildren](http://www.brighthorizons.com/talktochildren)


**New York University Child Study Center.** At War with Iraq: Tackling Tough Issues with Kids. [http://www.aboutourkids.org/articles/war_iraq.html](http://www.aboutourkids.org/articles/war_iraq.html)

**New York University Child Study Center.** Talking to Kids about Terrorism or Acts of War. [http://www.aboutourkids.org/articles/war.html](http://www.aboutourkids.org/articles/war.html)
Communication Research Trends, 21(1), 1-27.

Communication Research Trends, 21(1), 1-27.


Sharkey, J. E. (2003). The television war: Unparalleled access and breakthroughs in technology produced riveting live coverage of the war in Iraq. But how com-


Singer, J. B. (2003). Who are these guys? The online challenge to the notion of journalistic professionalism. Journalism, 4(2) 139-163.


Additional Sources


Featured Review

Introductions to the Work of Walter J. Ong, S.J.


Walter Ong is most widely known as an orality-literacy theorist and participant in the revolution in media studies precipitated by Marshall McLuhan's *Gutenberg Galaxy* (1962) and *Understanding Media* (1964). Readers of Ong's most popular book, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (1982), would find little to contradict this impression. *Orality and Literacy* is the most useful book on orality-literacy contrasts available and should be a starting point for any scholar or general reader with an interest in Walter Ong's thought and the theory that communication technologies structure thought and can transform human consciousness. The two books under review here set out to present a broader and much more comprehensive view of Walter Ong and to prepare the ground for a deeper exploration of his thought and its implications for communication studies and cultural studies in general.

In *Walter Ong's Contributions to Cultural Studies: The Phenomenology of the Word and I-Thou Communication*, Thomas Farrell offers us the first comprehensive book length study of Walter Ong's life and work. In the second book, *An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry*, Farrell is joined by Paul Soukup as co-editor of a collection of Ong's essays, reviews, and interviews that gives the reader a glimpse of the range of subjects Ong engaged in his long career. I will begin this review with a detailed discussion of Farrell's study and finish with a briefer overview of the contents of *An Ong Reader*.

In *Walter Ong's Contributions to Cultural Studies*, Farrell places Ong in the field of cultural studies to register the diversity of his interests and of his influences. From Ong's early work with Peter Ramus, through the detailed psycho-social studies of contest, *Fighting for Life* (1981) and Gerard Manley Hopkins, *Hopkins, the Self, and God* (1986), Farrell stops off to examine every major development in Ong's rich professional, scholarly, and religious life. This is done with thoroughness and care, providing both a detailed bibliography and interpretation of Ong's oeuvre. The bibliography alone, listing 213 of Ong's publications, is worth the cover price.

The overall organization of the book is historical, beginning with an overview of Ong's life and work and concluding with an assessment of his contributions to cultural studies. Each chapter details an aspect of Ong's life work and offers a discussion of its significance and suggestions for further research drawing on Ong's insights. Chapter 1, “Prologue,” describes the scale of Ong's work, critiques the attempts of the “Great Divide” theorists to discredit the orality-literacy theory, and asserts the general importance of Ong's accomplishments in the field of human communication.

Chapter 2, “Ong’s Life and Work,” offers a brief but very helpful biography. Farrell explores Ong's Jesuit training and his relationship with Marshall McLuhan, observing the importance of Ong's work on Ramus to the shaping of the more famous McLuhan's ideas on the media. One section of this chapter is devoted to Ong's professional life and documents carefully his involvement in teaching and scholarship. Ong served as president of the MLA in 1978 and held numerous visiting professorships such as the Berg Visiting Professor of English at New York University (1966-1967) and the Willett Visiting Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago (1968-1969).

Chapter 3, “Ong Studies Peter Ramus and Ramism,” explores Ong's first major scholarly publications, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (1958), and *Ramus and Talon Inventory*, first published by the Harvard University Press in 1958. It is in this work on Ramus that Ong begins to explore the phenomenology of sound and sight and its relation to communication technologies, themes that inform much of his later work. Farrell places Ong's work on Ramus in the context of Havelock's *Preface to Plato* (1963) and Frances...
Yates’ *The Art of Memory* (1966), suggesting that it may serve as a sequel to these works in the general development of the theory of the separation of the knower from the known that characterizes the gradual interiorization of writing and print by western literates. Farrell here asserts that any scholar seeking to “understand where the modern mind came from” (p. 77) should study Ong’s book on Ramism with care. Farrell’s argument is convincing, and he provides the resources for a careful evaluation of his assertion.

Chapter 4, “Ong the Religious Commentator,” features one of the most interesting and useful aspects of Farrell’s book, the integration of discussion of Ong’s religious vocation with discussion of his scholarly work. Farrell presents Ong as one of the leading 20th-century American Catholic intellectuals and clearly outlines the relevance of his scholarly work to his vocation and willingness to reflect deeply on the status of Catholicism and religion in general in American culture. Farrell views Ong’s religious vocation as inseparable from his reflections on human communication, grounded as they are, as Farrell’s subtitle indicates, in the spiritual dimension of the phenomenology of I-Thou communication.

Chapter 5, “Ong the Intellectual at Large,” explores a shift in Ong’s focus from writings directed to Catholics to writings directed to a more general audience. Farrell surveys the essays collected in *The Barbarian Within* (1962) and *In the Human Grain* (1967), finding a general concern with a modern consciousness that finds itself divided between “the drive inward (the me) and the drive outward (the I)” (p. 103). Farrell finds that these essays in general register a turn toward a personalist philosophy that adds great spiritual depth to Ong’s reflections on communication technologies and the ways in which they shape human consciousness. These are the themes that will be explored more fully in *The Presence of the Word* (1967).

Chapter 6, “Ong the Cultural Relativist,” is devoted to an explication and exploration of what Farrell calls Ong’s “seminal synthesis of cultural and religious history” (p. 122), *The Presence of the Word*. Farrell places this work in the lineage of Havelock’s *Preface to Plato* and Albert Lord’s *The Singer of Tales*, both of which heavily influenced Ong’s articulation of the orality-literacy theory. Farrell quite rightly here focuses attention on the term “presence” which has been so agitated by current deconstructive renderings. Farrell does not shy away from the spiritual implications of Ong’s use of this term which would be understood in Christian thought as connecting the word with the presence of God, thus establishing a foundational claim that “presence is presence of person to person” (p. 126). This person-to-person presence is facilitated by oral communication. The phenomenon of presence is voiced in the encounter of the “I” with the “You” and becomes problematic when the voice in inscribed. In this sense inscription is alienating, but not permanently so since writing can be revivified by the event of speaking, reasserting, as Farrell points out, the feeling-valuing function over the thinking function. Farrell makes all of the appropriate connections here, from Havelock and Lord to Martin Buber’s *I and Thou* and Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Plato’s *Phaedrus* in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (*Disseminations*, 1981). If you want to explore the spiritual and philosophical implications of this important work, especially Ong’s view on the nature of presence, Farrell’s essay is an excellent starting point.

Chapter 7, “Ong’s Literary and Communication Studies,” examines the works that have most come to be identified with Ong as literary scholar and communication theorist, *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology* (1971), *Interfaces of the Word* (1977), and *Orality and Literacy* (1982). The last of these, *Orality and Literacy*, has become the definitive source for scholars wishing to reference Ong’s theories, and it is a useful “handy” resource for those working with orality-literacy contrasts. It does not, however, as Farrell’s book clearly attests, serve as a summation of Ong’s contributions to intellectual history or cultural studies. It is, in fact, unfortunate that this book has come to overshadow other works, such as *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, and *The Presence of the Word*. This being said, the essays collected in *Rhetoric* and *Interfaces* will be of great interest to literary and communication scholars. They examine in more detail many of the insights of earlier work and suggest rich avenues for further exploration. As Farrell points out, essays such as “Rhetoric and the Origins of Consciousness” (*Rhetoric*, 1971, pp. 1-22) and “Voice and the Opening of Closed Systems” (*Interfaces*, 1977, pp. 305-341) remain richly suggestive and worthy of wider circulation. Farrell is very helpful in organizing these diverse essays into a coherent presentation of Ong’s thought and serves as an excellent guide through these texts. His discussion of *Orality and Literacy* places it clearly in Ong’s oeuvre, addressing the reception of the work and questioning its definitive position in considerations of Ong’s life work.
In Chapter 8, “Ong’s Two Culminating Psychological Studies,” Farrell demonstrates the connection between the themes of Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (1981) and Hopkins, the Self, and God (1986) and Ong’s life-long interests. Fighting for Life revisits and develops an interest in agonistic behavior that is first noted in Ong’s 1959 essay, “Latin Language Study as a Renaissance Puberty Rite.” Farrell places Fighting in the context of a larger cultural conversation about male agonistic behavior and the psychological basis for aggression sourced in works such as Eric Neumann’s The Origins and History of Consciousness (1949/1954) and E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975). Continuing his interest in the phenomenology of communication, Farrell points out, Ong finds contest to be “rooted in biology” (p. 170). This examination of embodied communication and its psychological ramifications has not been sufficiently recognized as the synthesizing work it is. Its comprehensiveness points to one of the difficulties in studying Ong that Farrell’s book addresses, and that is the wide range of Ong’s interests. He cannot be captured in one discipline, and his work addresses the spirit as well as the mind and body. Fighting for Life exemplifies this personal diversity and is rightly recognized as a “culminating” work.

Hopkins, the Self and God is an equally challenging and rewarding work. Farrell demonstrates the degree to which Ong’s Jesuit vocation helps him understand the consciousness that informs Hopkins’ work. Farrell also shows how Hopkins’ theology, influenced by Scotus, resonates with Ong’s own interest in the mystery of incarnation. In fact the whole direction of Ong’s thought about media and communication explores voice as the speaking of the body/spirit. As a phenomenologist he is an incarnationist, always exploring the interfaces of body, spirit, and consciousness.

This is where Farrell ends up in Chapter 9, “A Concluding Assessment,” drawing all of the threads of Ong’s thought into a comprehensible whole. Where Ong has been treated as a lesser McLuhan or a simplistic Great Divide theorist, Farrell shows us a seminal thinker on the cutting edge of reflection on the human condition. I think that Farrell is correct to count Ong a philosopher. His contribution is not so much in making facts or theories as it is in reflecting on the human condition and the mystery of human consciousness as it ramifies in our constant attempts to communicate. Farrell’s book is true to the whole man and will serve as an indispensable guide to Ong as philosopher, theologian, and communication theorist for some time to come.

Readers interested in exploring further Ong’s contributions to rhetoric, literary studies and communication may now also resort to Farrell and Soukup’s new An Ong Reader to fill in the gaps left by the more specialized focus of Ong’s Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. As the Reader makes clear, Ong was much more than an orality-literacy theorist. The essays, interviews, and reviews collected in the Reader include discussions of Ong’s sprung rhythm, “Hopkins’ Sprung Rhythm and the Life of English Poetry” (1941/1949), the then new criticism, “The Jinee in the Well-Wrought Urn” (1954), typography and Renaissance commonplace collections, “Typographic Rhapsody: Ravisius Textor, Zwinger, and Shakespeare” (1976), and contemporary digital communication, “Digitization Ancient and Modern: Beginnings of Writing and Today’s Computers” (first published in Communication Research Trends, 1998). The Reader brings back into print important essays that appeared in the earlier collections, The Barbarian Within (1962), Rhetoric Romance and Technology (1971), and Interfaces of the Word (1977), such as “Oral Residue in Tudor Prose Style” and the often quoted “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction,” as well as an extensive interview from 1971 and Ong’s substantial discussion of language, “Why Talk? A Conversation about Language with Walter Ong Conducted by Wayne Altree.” Together these writings provide a full view of Ong’s thought and his development as a philosopher and cultural critic.

The 600-page volume includes 28 selections completed between 1941 and 1998. The organization is historical after the first two selections, a review of McLuhan’s The Interior Landscape from 1970 and George Riemer’s 1971 interview with Ong. Ong’s early work with Peter Ramus is recorded in two selections, “Ramus: Rhetoric and the Pre-Newtonian Mind” (1954) and “Ramus and the Transit to the Modern Mind” (1955). These essays capture Ong’s early interest in the effects of print on the residually oral mind as he observes the impact of literacy on Ramus’ revisions of the traditional rhetorical curriculum. Reviews of Lord’s Singer of Tales, McLuhan’s The Gutenberg Galaxy, and Havelock’s Preface to Plato document Ong’s debt to these writers as he prepares the synthesis of thought on orality and literacy that will be fully presented in The Presence of the Word. Ong’s interest in rhetoric, agonism, and biology is explored in “The
Agnostic Base of Scientifically Abstract Thought: Issues in Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and
Consciousness,” and the final three essays bring the orality-literacy theory into the computer age with reflections on technology, information, and digitization. A careful reading of this anthology along with Ong’s Orality and Literacy will provide a more complete picture of his development as a thinker and offer many suggestions for further study.

The contextualization of Ong’s work is helped greatly by Farrell’s 58 page introduction. Farrell provides an overview of Ong’s work, its implications, its sources, and directions it might take in the future. He makes clear in this introduction why the Reader is subtitled “Challenges for Further Inquiry.” Farrell does not characterize Ong’s work as finished but as a part of an ongoing conversation about human consciousness, human communication, and human spirituality. This is in the spirit of Ong’s emphasis on person-to-person communication and his excitement about reflecting upon the human enterprise. This excitement is conveyed in Farrell’s introduction and in Farrell and Soukup’s astute selection of representative works from Ong’s lifetime of scholarship.

Taken together, Walter Ong’s Contributions to Cultural Studies and An Ong Reader offer the interested reader a rich place to go after reading Orality and Literacy and on the way to The Presence of the Word and Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. But both books also stand on their own as introductions to Walter Ong and to his important body of work. I would recommend that the Ong novice begin with An Ong Reader and Farrell’s helpful introduction before moving on to the more complex survey of Ong’s life work contained in Walter Ong’s Contributions to Cultural Studies. Both books are accessible to readers unfamiliar with Ong, but some familiarity with his ideas and style of thought will make the experience of reading Farrell’s book much richer. Both books contain useful bibliographies and indexes and are comfortable to hold and to read.

—David Heckel
Pfeiffer University

Ong, W. J. (1958). Ramus and Talon Inventory: A short-title inventory of the published works of Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and of Omer Talon (ca. 1510-1562) in their original and in their variously altered forms, with related material. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Book Reviews


“Gender” acts as a verb as much as it does as a noun. In this posthumously published study of language in use and conversation, Hopper, the Charles Sapp professor of communication at the University of Texas at Austin, argues for the former approach and, in doing so, invites our sustained reflection on gender (the noun),
interpersonal relations, and the cultural construction of the world. Hopper describes his project in this way:

Gendering talk is a phrase with two meanings. It refers to certain features in talk that are strongly saturated with gender, for example, my use of the word “woman” to describe a character in Matisse’s painting.... To use the word “woman” is to infuse gender into the human conversation...

A second sense of this phrase...refers to the ongoing, taken-for-granted project to gender the world of social experience. Talk is not the only thing we gender: We also gender clothing, jewelry, room decor, career paths, public restrooms, household chores, and above all, sexuality. (p. 2)

Hopper notes that the implications of these uses of gender color the entire human communicative experience.

Using field notes and recorded conversations, Hopper gradually unpacks the action of gender. Distinguishing gender from sex, he introduces the reader to the psychological concepts of masculinity and femininity, to the linguistic concept of grammatical gender, and to sexism. Later chapters examine flirting as a playful gendered activity and sexual violence—a different and dangerous combination of attraction and sexuality. In both, the initial linguistic cues include a fair amount of ambiguity.

The exploration moves on to commitment and how people enact being a couple in their language. But at the same time, members of a couple must also distinguish themselves from each other. And so coupling is, in Hopper’s terms, “a difference engine.” Those differences also happen in language and talk.

Our sense of gender runs deep in our language. Hopper considers how we talk about men and how we talk about women. In the United States culture, a lot of the taken-for-granted language of gender is weighted against women. “Ironically, our language features allow us to make women look bad, while our cultural practices obligate women to look beautiful” (p. 145). The language seeks to enforce sex differences, with sexual terms and jokes loaded with values and ideologies. After reviewing the evidence, Hopper concludes

- We talk differently about men than about women. We emphasize men over women, marginalizing women and their achievements, confining descriptions of women to stereotypical women’s places. When we do talk about women, many micro speech features serve to derogate women through sexual insult. We hobble women’s being taken seriously by discussing them in terms of physical appearance and describing their accomplishments as lucky rather than skillful.

By calling attention to the practices, Hopper encourages people to change.

Later chapters review how women and men actually talk, for gender marks even the practice of language. Gender “creeps into talk” and Hopper asks the reader to become aware of its advent. He ends with both a plea and an agenda for men and women to work towards change, though he recognizes that such a task demands a great deal and that we—speakers all—“creat[e] our problems at each moment” (p. 222). But we can do something.

The book features endnotes, which include bibliographic references. There is no index.

—Paul A. Soukup, S.J.
Santa Clara University


The question that may be asked, “what does economics have to say about language?” would be followed by, “why does this review appear in a communication journal?” The first question is answered by the editor, Donald Lamberton, who has long been interested in the economics of information and communication.

I like to think the economics of language is not just another Beckeresque [i.e., Noble Laureate, Gary Becker, on the economics of human capital] intrusion into another corner of social activity. Language is a resource of the symbolic species—some argue it defines the species....In economic terms, language is an essential complement of information in communication and learning processes. Why then, now that we live in the so-called knowledge-based economy, is so little attention given to the economic aspects of language? (p. xii)

Despite neglect, language has figured in a variety of recent studies concerning economic theory, profits and wages, language policy and technology, areas that the editor chooses for the four major sections of his book.
The answer to the second question is more easily given: language remains central to the concerns of the communication field that studies human interaction by means of language. The connection with the field of economics stems from the last four decades of interest in the economics of information and the media that carry that information. Lamberton provides a brief overview of this “neglected” area of economics and demonstrates the relevance of language for theory, the economic consequences of language policies for the Digital Divide as well as for the proper functioning of a global economy. He introduces the notion that languages change over time, sometimes shrinking, sometimes proliferating, but the major question in our global context of the Internet and other technologies so dominated by the West and the U.S. economy is whether there is a future for all but a few major languages. These are some of the issues analyzed in the major sections of the book.

In the Theory section, we find a variety of chapters that deal with economic theory and methods applied to language. This choice of means to ends is fundamental in economic theory and concerns the most efficient communication means to achieving a goal (Marschak’s seminal 1965 article). The economic consequences of language policies like those in Canada, the distribution of language skills as a game equilibrium, the economic study of language survival, a study of predictors of English language learning from economic and linguistic factors and a study of language acquisition in relations to where immigrants live in the U.S. make up the themes of the seven chapters of this section. The general argument is that economic theory and methods are useful in studying how languages are learned, are lost, or serve to enhance wages.

In section two, Profits and Wages, the chapters deal with some very concrete and useful insights into how language helps or hurts businesses. The first chapter, an early study by a Czech economist during the Communist period does a brief and abstract economic analysis of why a centrally planned economy takes little notice of consumer feedback into consideration in the production of goods for society. The next two chapters are surveys of British and U.S. corporations as to how they respond to growth in global trade with better language training. Even though British firms are part of the polyglot European Union, it is not clear that they have a clear policy direction in training their staff in languages other than English. The American survey is even less optimistic as to how transnational corporations go about meeting their language needs. In the U.S. the author finds that most corporations do not invest in serious language training but rather tend to depend on hiring foreign nationals or consultants. Still, the realization of the need to work across the globe has made U.S. corporate executives aware of the growing demand for skills in other languages and cultures beside English. In another important chapter, the authors provide some empirical evidence of how speaking the native language of a large multinational company (Finnish in this case), help staff with “superior language capabilities [speaking Finnish and another national language important to the corporation]...to build broad networks within the multinational” while those with only their native language had to depend on language mediators and had less opportunity for advancement.

The two chapters on language Policy in section three deal with Australia’s efforts to get more of the business world speaking an Asian language since the importance of trade with Asian countries has become apparent in recent years. In both chapters, the difficulties of changing educational and business practices are emphasized, even though the need is recognized.

In Section Four on Technological Solutions, the broad issue is whether the Information Revolution, in comparison with the Industrial Revolution, will in the long run be constrained by its reliance on English. One chapter dating from the 1970’s argues for the development of a universal ideographic language to overcome the language barrier for non-English speakers throughout the world. A more recent practical technology is discussed in another chapter concerning a sophisticated telephone interpreting service (TIS) developed in Australia and used in their international business dealings. Two brief chapters discuss the immediate possibilities for machine translation on the Internet, one a journalistic account touting the imminence of this as a widespread technology; another, a more cautious analysis, argues that machine translation will never be the same as human translators but that businesses can adjust their expectations and make the machine translations fit different business communication needs. Finally a chapter discusses how the Internet is becoming more linguistically diverse in some important areas as access grows. Besides the fact that many Internet providers like Yahoo are now making content available in a variety of languages, the author points out that language diversity is driven by need. In some areas like science and international trade, English will probably
continue to dominate, but in others like politics, news and culture local languages have begun to take over.

In an important appendix, the editor includes a 1993 summary article on the whole issue of how rhetoric affects economic writing and theory. Stemming from the early work of McCloskey who introduced hermeneutics into the reading of economic writing, the authors summarize the challenge to a strict quantitative view of the discipline by those who see all science as a manifestation of human thinking and writing in a linguistic medium and therefore subject to the inherent dynamics of human communication.

This book opens up many linguistic aspects of economics and shows in numerous ways how current research in this discipline is intimately related to that of communication.

—Emile McAnany
Santa Clara University


Now more than ever human beings are bombarded with persuasive messages. All manner of appeals, images, and claims contribute to shaping our attitudes on issues ranging from the type of soft drink we may casually pick up at the grocery store, to our attitudes on smoking, safe sex, or political ideologies. These ubiquitous and complex persuasive processes are the subjects of Richard Perloff’s *Dynamics of Persuasion*. “This book …is about persuasive communication and the dynamics of attitudes communicators hope to change” (p. 4).

Perloff’s 12-chapter second edition follows the first by ten years. The book establishes the premise that attitudes “influence thought and action” (p. 39). Preliminary chapters (1 through 4) identify the nature of persuasion by contrasting it with what persuasion is not, e.g., coercion and propaganda, and provide a detailed overview of the nature of attitude definition, development, and measurement. Remaining chapters extend this thesis through discussion of theory—such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model, the Extended Parallel Process Model, Social Judgment Theory, and Cognitive Dissonance—and practice through advertising and persuasive campaigns. Perloff suggests that understanding the formation and development of attitudes will allow students to analyze persuasive messages in more sophisticated ways and improve their own persuasive skills: “This book, focusing on academic scholarship on persuasion, attempts to increase your knowledge of attitudes and persuasion” (p. 33).

The text is divided into three sections. Foundations includes “Introduction to Persuasion,” “Attitudes: Definition and Structure,” “Attitudes: Functions and Consequences,” and “Attitude Measurement.” The second section, Changing Attitudes and Behaviors, includes “Processing Persuasive Communications,” “Who Says It’: Source Factors in Persuasion,” “Message Factors,” “Personality and Persuasion,” “Cognitive Dissonance Theory,” and “Interpersonal Persuasion.” The final section, Persuasion in American Society, presents persuasion in action through investigation of “Advertising” and “Communication Campaigns.” The index is divided into both author and subject sections.

Several features highlight this book. First, the author includes several “boxes” in each chapter that serve as illustrations or extensions of chapter material. For example, Chapter 1 includes a two-and-a-half page box that explains the Heaven’s Gate Cult as a means to illustrate the sometimes ambiguous and related nature of persuasion and coercion; Chapter 4 on attitude measurement includes a box that provides examples of often misleading types of questions asked in surveys about products such as popular makers of jeans and automobiles; and, Chapter 11 dedicates a box to the nuances of cigarette advertising.

A second feature is the large number of research citations. Perloff’s text is based heavily on foundational and contemporary research on persuasion, including initial research on attitudes. Based on the social scientific approach to persuasion, the book includes a great deal of research. Perloff writes that “research, the focus of this book, is important because it clarifies concepts, builds knowledge, and helps solve practical problems” (p. 28). The text includes an extensive bibliography.

A third feature is Perloff’s focus on contemporary examples. The book includes numerous references to the advertisements of Nike, McDonalds, and other companies, and an extended example of the national and international effort by the Bush administration to rally support for war (which Perloff calls the campaign like no other) following the events of September 11, 2001. Perloff also refers to body art, the Monica Lewinsky scandal, anti-drinking campaigns, and other examples relevant to today’s students.

—Pete Bicak
Rockhurst University

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*Communication Research Trends*

Drawing on the notion that Western film studies needs a reinvigorating shot in the arm, Graeme Turner, currently Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, has compiled a collection of essays from 35 film scholars written over the past 20 years to make up *The Film Cultures Reader*. The Reader was originally intended as a companion volume for Turner’s introductory textbook *Film as Social Practice* (3rd ed., 1999). Like that text, Turner focuses this collection of articles solidly “within the study of contemporary popular culture and the media” (p. xix). Normally, Turner claims, articles like these are consigned to the final pages of film studies anthologies—if included at all. Therefore, he intends this collection to appeal to a more diverse audience, including “media studies, communication studies,” and “cultural studies.” He claims the text reflects “a new agenda for film studies,” highlighting “research into the cultural function of popular cinema genres, into audience reception and consumption of movies, and into a version of film history that is more interested in industry economics than in the formation of a canon” (p. 7).

Given the popularity and continual growth of the cultural studies perspective, all who study and teach film would be well served to familiarize themselves with Turner’s “new agenda.” Many of the ideas expressed in the *Reader* are located outside of what film scholar David Bordwell calls “grand theory,” which represents the tradition most American and Canadian film studies programs have emphasized since the discipline began gaining legitimization in the 1960s and 1970s. “Grand theory” (sometimes called “screen theory”) refers to the historically “dominant theoretical influences” upon film studies, including psychoanalysis, semiotics, and earlier feminist theory (p. 5). Many of these canonized approaches were borrowed from language and literature studies, with remaining ideas coming from noteworthy filmmakers (Eisenstein, Derr, scholars (Arnheim, Benjamin), critics (Bazin, Comolli, and Narboni), and reviewers (Sarris, Corliss). (A popular text emphasizing the grand theory tradition might be Mast, Cohen, and Braudy’s *Film Theory and Criticism*.)

Turner’s collection does not, however, eclipse grand theory inasmuch as it builds upon, challenges, and offers alternative perspectives to it. “It does not represent a sea change,” he writes, “in that it has by no means comprehensively displaced ‘grand theory,’ nor is it discontinuous with what has gone before. Rather, we are witnessing an increasing diversification, a growing plurality of approaches to film studies” (p. 7).

A key difference in Turner’s *Reader* is that the contributing writers are less interested in film aesthetics and more in the sociological relationship between individual viewers and the bigger motion picture. Many of the writers here regard “the feature film—together with the audiences who consume it and the industries who produce it—as a cultural practice, rather than as an aesthetic object” that exists in a vacuum (p. xix). Emphasis, therefore, is placed on the holistic importance of film as an integral part of popular culture. Contributors explore economic conditions under which films are produced as well as how and why they are consumed by specific audiences. In short, these essays “are interested in establishing a more complex and nuanced understanding of the competing forces which frame the individual experience of popular culture in general, and popular film in particular” (p. 5).

Necessarily, Turner’s collection is selective. Familiar contemporaries like David Bordwell, Bill Nichols, Linda Williams, and Noel Carroll are passed over in favor of “alternative” voices. However, this is consistent with what seems to be Turner’s agenda. He has assembled an intriguing collection of articles from scholars in the process of promoting less familiar, cultural-centered research in film studies.

Following Turner’s introduction, the *Reader* is organized into six thematic parts: (1) Understanding Film, (2) Technologies, (3) Industries, (4) Meanings and Pleasures, (5) Identities, and (6) Audiences and Consumption.

Part One, “Understanding Film,” represents what Turner calls “the shift towards cultural studies approaches.” This section includes Tony Bennett and Janet Woolacott’s “Texts and Their Readings,” along with other articles by Janet Staiger, Judith Mayne, and Annette Kuhn. These articles are intended to familiarize readers with key tenets from British cultural studies, along with recent trends in feminist scholarship from contemporary American writers.

In Part Two, “Technologies,” Turner highlights the importance of technology in communicating aesthetics, an area he believes has been greatly underemphasized in conventional film studies texts. “The interplay between sound and image” has “yet to be explored comprehensively,” he writes, and needs as much attention as the emphasis on the visual (p. 8). Included is Ed
Buscombe’s article on the cultural determinants of technological innovation and Steve Neale’s essay on the use of color as a malleable component of narrative realism. There is also an interesting excerpt from Richard Dyer’s book White (1997), which asserts that movie lighting stems from techniques used to light the white face rather than the faces of people of color. Also included are essays on digital sound and computer-generated imagery by Barbara Creed, Stephen Prince, and Gianluca Sergi.

“Industries,” the third section, takes film as commercial and cultural business as its focus. In particular, commercial industries are compared with national ones as to their respective goals—economic success or cultural maintenance. The film industries of Australia, Britain, and Hong Kong differ from Hollywood with regard to the impact of globalization, politics, nationalization, and the audience’s role in film production. Tom O’Regan, for example, looks at how the directions of primarily nationalist industries are often determined by the operations of dominant international commercial cinemas. The recent history of British cinema is traced by John Hill, while Stephen Teo studies the industry changes in Hong Kong. Finally, Tino Balio and Thomas Schatz explore the globalization of Hollywood as the world’s dominant international cinema.

Parts Four, Five, and Six contain perhaps the most innovative contributions of Turner’s collection. Part Four, “Meanings and Pleasures,” is a section devoted to treatment of the film as text, a distinct cultural studies influence. Turner has categorized this group of articles according to film’s “appeal, its function for its audience, and its cultural roots and resonance.” Two essays by Richard Dyer and P. David Marshall, for example, explore the kinds of pleasure audiences derive from film stars. Jane Feuer, Stella Bruzzi, Tania Modleski, and Jim Collins, on the other hand, observe the meanings and pleasures audiences get from film genres such as horror films, musicals, period, and nostalgia films.

The fifth part, “Identities,” should attract interest from both feminist and identity politics scholars. It begins with recent articles by Yvonne Tasker and Sabrina Barton contributing to the still ongoing conversation initiated by Laura Mulvey’s 1970s notion of the “male gaze.” Alternatively, Susan Jeffords examines Hollywood’s contemporary constructions of masculinity, and Chris Straayer the cinematic construction of “The Hypothetical Lesbian Heroine in Narrative Feature Film.” Isaac Julien and Kobena Mercer look at black or diasporan cinema in the U.K., while Ella Shohat and Robert Stam investigate how early films served the ambitions of Eurocentric imperialism.

“Audiences and Consumption” serves as Turner’s theme for Part Six, and contains the remaining articles in the Reader. The chief emphasis is on the interaction between films, the film industry, and the spectators who consume movie texts. Included is an interesting piece about the audiences of silent film by Miriam Hansen titled “Chameleon and Catalyst: The Cinema as an Alternative Public Sphere,” which should appeal to those who study the rhetorical aspects of film. “Hollywood Cinema: The Great Escape,” by Jackie Stacey, is a look at how women in post-war Britain were served by cinematic desire, while Jaqueline Bobo’s “Watching The Color Purple: Two Interviews,” probes how black viewers received that film. How market research fuels decisions in film distribution is explored by Justin Wyatt, and Mark Jancovich investigates the cult appeal of teen-slasher films.

Turner’s Reader is a collection written by authors who do not appear to love movies as much as they want to understand their social functions. No auteurs are glorified here, and tensions between realists and formalists are not dramatized. If used for an introductory film course, I suggest Turner’s Reader (and 1999 text) augment another “grand theory” oriented text, since most of the articles are reacting to or building on established notions the authors assume their readers already understand. However, if curriculum allows, students would be better served from this collection if selections were required readings for an upper division or secondary course in a cultural studies approach to studying cinema. The strongest sections are Parts One, Two, Four, and Six, although there is worthwhile reading throughout the entire book. If the desire to move a film studies program forward into the 21st century is a department goal, then Turner’s Reader is indeed a useful tool. Although Turner’s Reader could benefit from more illustrations (only 20 for 500 pages), it is well indexed and referenced. This makes it a handy resource for all serious film scholars, particularly those looking for a doorway to redirect their research away from aesthetics toward alternative paths.

— J. A. G’Schwind
Regis University


Catholic high schools and public relations? Many will probably view the two as an emulsion of oil and water or strange bedfellows at best. Wirth extinguishes this seeming paradox quickly in the first chapter: “Catholic high schools live and die by their effectiveness in recruiting and fundraising.” She goes on “Schools thrive when they tell their stories well to parents and prospective students, alumni/ae, parishes, feeder schools, news organizations and the general public. They suffer when they do not” (p. 1). Surprise, surprise. It is just like Corporate America.

Effective Catholic High School Public Relations is an excellent and surprisingly (for its stingy 89 pages) complete handbook for those with responsibility for public relations to plan, create, execute, and measure PR programs. With the understanding that most Catholic high schools have small or nonexistent PR staffs, dioceses with limited resources for PR, and PR placed at a very low administrative priority, this handbook provides literally everything one needs to know and do in effectively using public relations to achieve their school’s objectives.

Wirth has developed a clear and concise organization model for the business issue addressed in each chapter. The model consists of:

- An overview and definition of the business issue
- Establishing the need and a concise definition of the pertinent public relations concepts and principles involved
- Why Catholic high schools need to address the issue based on research
- Bulleted lists of what to do and how to go about doing it
- Actual case histories of how Catholic high schools from around the country handled similar situations and their learning outcomes
- Exercises, or step-by-step execution plans. Each Exercise is an excellent “to do” list in planning and executing the program suggested in the chapter
- Relevant References: Should the practitioner want or need more information, well here it is.

All any practitioner, whether a seasoned veteran or novice, has to do is read the chapter of interest, study the cases, adapt the situation and issues to their specific school, and following the steps in the Exercise section. Presto, you have a PR program that will make the professionals in New York envious.

Wirth addresses the essentials of public relations and corporate communications: (1) identity and image, (2) media relations, (3) parent relations, (4) fundraising and recruitment, (5) community relations, and (6) crisis public relations. If this weren’t enough, she completes the handbook with three appendices covering the strategic planning process, research techniques, and fundraising/recruitment materials; all information that you can use today, straight out of the book.

This handbook is a natural and logical outcome from Wirth’s life experiences in Catholic schools, then as a journalist, a PR practitioner, and scholar. The book addresses both the academic what and why and the business world’s how. The book emphasizes core business concepts of planning, being prepared, being honest in all activities, branding/image, differentiation and measurement.

For example, her treatise on Media Relations (Chapter 4; pp 17-26) addresses what is newsworthy, using media relations, developing relationships with the press, using a variety of news outlets, what to do when a reporter calls, and facing an interview. This chapter alone is more to the point, more practical, and easier to understand than virtually any of the established textbooks we use in teaching PR at the university level.

Her research on and knowledge of parochial schools and how many have used public relations to take advantage of opportunities and deal with problems makes this must reading for every administrator. No, I take that back, this book is must reading for EVERY CEO and senior manager in Corporate America. In fact, I know many PR practitioners that can benefit from reading and using this excellent handbook on effectively using public relations as a business tool.

Eileen Wirth once told me that public relations fundamentals, what a practitioner must know about the function, and how to plan and execute a PR program can not be covered in just one college-level course. Well, she has proven herself wrong, as she has accomplished just that in a mere 89 pages! No mean feat.

I encourage Wirth to develop a series of sequels by changing the case histories, adding new ones, and adapting the book to any number of commercial industries. Many badly need her sound, pragmatic view of public relations.

While each chapter stands alone, there are three appendices followed by a complete bibliography of books and articles.

—H. Buford Barr
Santa Clara University
Walter J. Ong, S.J.
1912-2003

Walter J. Ong, S.J., a world-renowned scholar and former advisor to the Centre for the Study of Communication and Culture (publishers of Communication Research Trends), died August 12 in St. Louis, Missouri. He was 90.

Perhaps best known for his research and writing on matters of orality and literacy, Ong maintained a wide-ranging scholarly interest. (For an initial sense of those interests, please see David Heckel’s review essay of two recent books about and by Fr. Ong, on page 32 of this issue of Trends.) From his master’s thesis on the sprung rhythm in the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, through his doctoral research into the educational reforms of Peter Ramus, Ong examined the sound and appearance of human communication—themes he carried on even to his most recent publications in Communication Research Trends, on information (1996) and on digitization and writing (1998).

Active as a scholar and teacher from the 1940s, Ong published hundreds of articles and 16 books (see http://homepages.udayton.edu/~youngkin/biblio.htm for a listing of his works). Based at Saint Louis University for his entire teaching career, Ong also taught and lectured around the world, visiting and speaking at many of the world’s most prestigious institutions of higher learning.

Born November 30, 1912, in Kansas City, Missouri, Ong was the elder of two sons of Mr. and Mrs. Walter Jackson Ong, Sr. He entered the Society of Jesus in 1935 and was ordained a Catholic priest in 1946. Ong earned a master’s degree in English at Saint Louis University with the thesis on Hopkins, a thesis supervised by Marshall McLuhan, who later quoted his former student in his classic, The Gutenberg Galaxy. After earning his doctorate degree in English at Harvard University in 1955, Ong returned to Saint Louis University, where he held appointments as University Professor of Humanities, the William E. Haren Professor of English, and Professor of Humanities in Psychiatry at the Saint Louis University School of Medicine.

Ong’s books have been translated into numerous languages, and his scholarship has been cited in more than 2,000 works. The French government decorated him for his scholarly work. From Japan to Nigeria, Ong gave special talks in nations all over the globe. As his fame grew, prestigious national organizations sought out his expertise. He served on the 14-member White House Task Force on Education under President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967 and was a member of the National Council on the Humanities between 1968-74. In 1978, he served as elected president of the 30,000-member Modern Language Association of America, the largest scholarly society in the world.

Ong explored ideas and looked for connections. His commentaries on Catholic life in the 1950s claimed at least partial inspiration from Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the French Jesuit paleontologist who lived in the same Jesuit community as Ong in Paris during Ong’s doctoral research years. He found common ground in his attention to communication and oral styles not only with his former teacher McLuhan but also with classicists like Eric Havelock, Milman Parry and Albert Lord. His mastery of Latin and his attention to Renaissance education made him notice the effects of Latin-based single-sex education, leading to his works on agonistic thought and gender. His interest in Hopkins, coupled with his observations of a communication medium’s effect on thought, led him to explore issues of interiority and consciousness. His book on Hopkins shows Ong most explicitly addressing the questions of spirituality that run throughout his career. Ong truly spanned disciplinary boundaries.

Saint Louis University concludes its obituary tribute to him, “Defying categorization, his work brought together innovative ideas in literature, anthropology, philosophy, theology, psychology, and media
studies. Perhaps Ong’s most lasting contribution was to show how various forms of communication—from storytelling to cyberspace—shape our thoughts, relationships and cultures.”

The Saint Louis University text also notes that “Ong rooted his work in the existence of an always-mysterious God, and when other thinkers felt trapped between what they saw as mutually exclusive alternatives, Ong built a bridge between them.” For example, he felt that new technologies (like writing or print) didn’t replace their predecessors, but interacted with them, reinforcing some aspects and reshaping others. He found more commonalities than differences between women and men. His central insights clustered around the transition of one form of communication to another.

Ong always disliked the label of a theorist, insisting that he “just tried to say how things are, describe, things.” He paid careful attention to every detail in the world around him and not just philosophical matters.

**Announcements**

**4th International Conference on Media, Religion, and Culture**

September 1-4, 2004, Louisville, Kentucky USA

**Call for Proposals**

All submissions must be received by November 7, 2003.

The 4th International Conference on Media, Religion, and Culture invites proposals for papers, panels, and creative showcases. The conference will focus on five themes: (1) production (how and why diverse print and electronic media have acted as bearers of social, cultural, and religious meaning); (2) community (ways that media have been used in temples, synagogues, mosques, and churches to enrich worship and enhance dialogue and a sense of belonging); (3) audience (how audiences have interpreted or used particular media for both implicit and explicit religious ends); (4) ethics (religious responses to issues of media literacy or media justice); and (5) globalization (worldwide issues, including virtual religion in which a sense of place doesn’t seem to matter).

The purpose of the conference is to share the latest developments in and research on religion, media, and culture. Each of the preceding three international conferences generated continuing conversations as well as a published book. *Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture* (Sage, 1997), edited by Stewart Hoover and Knut Lunby, followed the first meeting in Uppsala, Sweden; *Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media* (Columbia University Press, 2002), edited by Stewart Hoover and Lynn Schofield Clark, followed the second meeting in Boulder, Colorado; and *Mediating Media: Studies in Media, Religion, and Culture* (T&T Clark, 2003), edited by Jolyon Mitchell and Sophia Marriage, followed the third meeting in Edinburgh, Scotland. A selective anthology of quality original work will likely emerge from this conference, too.

Proposals should be no longer than 500 words. They must include:

- Title of proposed presentation
- Name(s) and title(s) of author(s)
- Institutional affiliation(s) and address(es) of author(s)
- Category (paper, panel, or creative showcase)
- Description of presentation

An international panel will evaluate proposals on the basis of originality and significance. Applicants will be notified of their status in February, giving those chosen to present six months to prepare. All presenters must preregister.

Send proposals as email messages or .rtf attachments to ferre@louisville.edu.
