TELEVANGELISM AND THE RELIGIOUS USES OF TELEVISION

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The end of the policy of networks giving free broadcast time to 'mainstream' religious denominations—Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, etc.—has led to radical changes in religious broadcasting in the United States. The organized churches have almost disappeared from most TV channels, while the so-called 'televangelists'—non-denominational preachers who finance their broadcasts by appeals to their viewers—have purchased time on local stations and the networks, as well as vigorously exploiting cable. Some observers even feel that televangelists have become the chief spokespersons for the 'religious viewpoint' in America.

Televangelism has begun to spread outside the United States, to Europe, Latin America, Africa and East Asia. Its identification with fundamentalism and Pentecostalism raises, in some places, the spectre of an alliance between conservative religion and reactionary political forces.

Secular researchers are concerned with the political implications of televangelism and with what it can tell us about the processes of media communication in general. Researchers in the mainstream denominations are asking, "What are the televangelists doing right?" and "What are our own communicators doing wrong?" Both are interested in the accuracy with which the efforts of the televangelists have been evaluated.

In this issue of Trends we shall look at some of this research, to see what it reveals about the television medium, in general, and about its uses for religious purposes, in particular.
I. Religion in the History of Broadcasting

The BBC in the Radio Era

Religion has been broadcast practically from the beginning of broadcasting. In one of the first major trials of wireless telephony its inventor, Reginald Fessenden, read Bible passages in a broadcast to ships at sea on Christmas Eve, 1909 (Abelman and Hoover 1990:53). It also received high priority when regular broadcasting to the public began, just after World War I.

In Britain, the first Director General of the British Broadcasting Corporation, John Reith, saw religious broadcasting as having a central place in the network's output, according to Kenneth Wolfe. Britain, Reith assumed, was Christian, and the public service role of the BBC therefore required that it serve the cause of Christianity as well as other aspects of the public good (Wolfe, 1984).

The first religious address on the BBC was by the Rev. J. A. Mayo, Anglican Rector of Whitechapel, on Christmas Eve 1922. Soon after, Reith invited the main Christian denominations to participate in formulating a BBC religious policy. In May 1923 a 'Sunday Committee' was set up, comprising representatives of the Church of England, major Protestant denominations and Roman Catholics, to advise the BBC and provide it with Sunday speakers. Three years later, in 1926, the committee became the Central Religious Advisory Committee (CRAC).

Reith had to overcome some opposition from churchmen, themselves, who feared that religious broadcasts would be heard by the irreligious, and that this would trivialize and cheapen the religious experience. But Reith was a Presbyterian, deeply committed to a practical, evangelical Christianity. He wanted religious broadcasting to give the nation a strong and optimistic Christian message. He found an ally in the Rev. H. R. L. Sheppard, at the Church of St. Martin-in-the-Fields, London, who stood, as he put it, for a 'diffused rather than a sectional Christianity'. The first special broadcast was transmitted from St. Martin's in January 1924, and it soon became the 'BBC Church'. The 'Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields' eventually became known for its church music worldwide, through its regular broadcasts over the World Service of the BBC. By 1929, the BBC was broadcasting regular Sunday services, weekly Evensong from Westminster Abbey and a daily service. Except on special ceremonial occasions, no broadcasting was done between 6 and 7.45 pm on Sunday evenings, so as not to keep people from church services.

One early point of difficulty was the amount of control to be exercised by the BBC over the content of religious programming. The Corporation was proud to say that it broadcast nothing controversial, and did not want that policy violated by the clergy. 'Lay' (i.e., BBC staff) advance censorship of sermons was resisted by the Catholics, in particular. Broadcasts of the Catholic Mass and Benediction were considered to be 'controversial' because, on the one hand, they were too distinctively Catholic, and, on the Catholic side, some regarded broadcasting them as irreverent.

The Emergence of British Television

The BBC at first attempted to apply the principles developed for radio to religious broadcasting on television, but again encountered some reluctance on the part of the churches due to such misgivings as the fear of irreverence. It also became clear that Anglican and Roman Catholic liturgies were usually 'aesthetically more appropriate to television' than some of the Protestant forms of worship. More controversy arose when the first sacramental television programme, on 13 July 1952, turned out to be a Mass from the Abbey of St. Denis, in Paris--part of a week of linked broadcasts with French television. This aroused the indignation of the Presbyterians, in particular, and the national relay of the programme was not shown in Scotland. Anticipated conflicts between television schedules and church services, or Sunday school schedules also evoked debates (Wolfe 1984:504).

An early encounter between the BBC and American televangelism, in the person of Billy Graham, in the mid 1950s, also gave rise to controversy. Some opposition to Graham was based on what was regarded as his 'defiant anti-intellectualism'--which was felt to be ultimately
harmful to Christianity in Britain (p. 476). When finally telecast, from Glasgow, the claim was made that the programme was 'watched by more people and aroused more comment than any religious transmission apart from the Coronation' (p. 479, citing a BBC secretarial document, which used figures supplied by the Graham organization).

One of the Corporation's most ambitious early religious television undertakings was an eight-part dramatization of the life of Christ, *Jesus of Nazareth*, in 1956. Although it did not please everyone, it was more readily accepted than had been the radio presentation, *The Man Born to be King* written by Dorothy L. Sayers, in 1941 (Sayers 1943). The latter provided a landmark illustration of the problems of applying dramatic forms to religious subjects (Wolfe 1984:218-238).

The creation of the Independent Broadcasting Authority and the rise of commercial television created a new situation which the churches at first viewed with trepidation, but which eventually resolved itself into a relationship not dissimilar to that between them and the BBC (pp.511-537).

**Radio Religion in the U.S.A.**

In the United States, religious broadcasting began almost two years earlier than in Britain, on 2 January 1921, when an evening service at Calvary Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh was broadcast over America's first commercial station, KDKA. That broadcast also was the first 'remote' broadcast--originated from outside the station's studio--by a commercial station (Abelman and Hoover 1990:63). In 1922, an exclusively religious station was set up in Chicago, called WJBT, which stood for the words, 'Where Jesus Blesses Thousands' (Cotham 1985:105).

One of the first Church vs. State clashes in U.S. broadcasting occurred in 1925, when the federal government temporarily closed a station owned by the high-profile evangelist Aimee Semple McPherson for habitually drifting off its assigned frequency. She dashed off a telegram to the Commerce Secretary asking him to 'Please order your minions of Satan to leave my station alone. You cannot expect the Almighty to abide by your wavelength nonsense' (Hadden and Swann 1981:188-189).

An especially ambitious project was WMBI, established by the Moody Bible Institute, in Chicago, in 1926. The Institute and WMBI became an inspirational and training centre for later generations of religious broadcasters.

Father Charles E. Coughlin, a Catholic priest, began broadcasts in the 1920s from Royal Oak, a suburb of Detroit, Michigan. By the late 1930s he could claim an audience of tens of millions but also had earned a reputation for political demagoguery.

Religious broadcasting in the United States kept pace with the growing numbers of radio stations, with evangelical and fundamentalist preachers always in the vanguard. They broadcasted chiefly on local stations, but many became national figures. Each had a distinctive style and charisma. Some, like Garner Ted Armstrong, found the keys to solving contemporary problems in biblical prophecy, while others, such as Frederick B. Eikerenkoetter II--better known as 'Reverend Ike'--anticipated later tendencies by preaching what many saw as a caricature of the Calvinist belief that God would favour the elect by giving them material success (Cotham 1985:106).

Some of the mainline denominations started their own stations during the 1920s. The first was KFUO, founded at Concordia Lutheran Seminary, in Saint Louis, in 1924. Although ten percent of the country's 600-odd stations were owned by religious institutions by 1925, many of these had passed into commercial hands by the 1930s (Fore 1989:444).

At first the networks, National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), were willing to sell time to religious broadcasters, but soon backed away from this policy as some preachers, like Father Coughlin, became increasingly political or otherwise objectionable. Instead the networks collaborated with major Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups to make available free, 'sustaining' broadcast time as well as most programme production costs of those mainstream groups. This forced the theologically or ideologically marginal groups to concentrate on arrangements with local stations, on which time was either purchased or free, and on their own special-purpose networks established between local stations over telephone lines (pp.444).
Religion on U.S. network radio reached its peak between the late 1930s and the early 1950s, with such diverse successes as The Voice of Prophecy of the Seventh-Day Adventists, Music and the Spoken Word of the Mormons, The Eternal Light from the Jewish Theological Seminary, The Lutheran Hour, and The Catholic Hour. Most of these were possible because of the sustaining time policy, incorporated into the Federal Communication Act of 1934, which required broadcasters to carry a certain amount of non-entertainment and non-commercial, 'public affairs' programming (Hoover 1988:51).

**The TV Transition**
The sustaining time policy carried over into television, but as television time became commercially more valuable the networks developed increasing resistance to it. Time had become big money, and they were less willing to give it away. Few religious figures were able to draw large audiences and therefore be attractive to commercial sponsors. An exception was Monsignor, later Bishop, Fulton J. Sheen, who started on radio's Catholic Hour, but shifted to a sponsored program, Life is Worth Living, on network television in 1952. The programme continued until 1967, and has been called 'the only religious program ever to have competed on a commercial basis on network television' (Hoover 1988:53).

**Religious Radio in Other Countries**
The leading countries in the early development of radio were, in terms of total numbers of receivers in the late 1930s, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. In Europe, France, Italy, Holland and Denmark also had high proportions of receivers for their populations, but outside Europe, North America and the Antipodes the technology did not spread so rapidly. Japan had only thirty receivers per 1,000 inhabitants before the Second World War, compared with 188 in the United States, 146 in New Zealand and 131 in Australia, in 1936, and 171 in Denmark, 122 in Germany, and 76 in France, in 1937. Britain had about 150 receivers per 1,000 population at that time, with the radio tax being paid by 71% of its households (Miquel 1984:25-46).

In the religiously divided Netherlands ecumenical broadcasting has been the rule from the beginning (Elvy 1990: 23).

Danish radio began religious broadcasts in 1925, and by 1928 was allowing non-Lutheran services to be broadcast (p.107).

Religion seems always to have played an active role in Norwegian radio broadcasting. Ninety of the 465 local radio stations were classified as 'Christian', and local churches played a role in thirty or forty more stations, as of 1989. Pentecostal influence has been increasing in religious broadcasting in Norway in recent years (pp.114-115).

The Swedish network, AB Radiotjanst, began broadcasting religious services at its inception, in 1925, and has broadcast the Lutheran high mass nearly every Sunday and religious holiday since then. Broadcast time devoted to religion on the network increased threefold between 1928 and 1985, but religion is now less in evidence on television than on radio. The churches exercised strong influence over programming in earlier years, but have much less control now, and a critical attitude towards religion has appeared. Major Christian denominations present in Sweden all appear to have some access to the media, although the Church of Sweden dominates (Larsson 1988:241-242). But the Pentecostals still feel discriminated against at home and have turned to large scale involvement in international broadcasting (Elvy 1990: 28).

Radio Renascença started broadcasting for the Catholic Church in Portugal in 1937, and since then has grown into a national network of 13 medium wave and 34 FM transmitters, domestically, and a 100 Kw shortwave transmitter for broadcasting to Central Europe and South America, by 1989 (Unda 1990).

Spanish Catholic stations flowered somewhat later, but about two hundred appeared between 1950 and 1959. These were gathered under the Spanish Episcopal Conference into one organization, Cadena de Ondas Populares Españolas (COPE), in 1959 (CEEM 1990).

In Italy the Lateran Treaty of 1929 established a modus vivendi between Church and State which made it possible for the independent Vatican City to start Vatican Radio, in 1931. Its construction was supervised by
Marconi, himself, and it initially broadcast on shortwave at a power of 10,000 watts (Browne 1982:306). Under the same legal protection, some Catholic broadcasting was carried over domestic Italian stations during the rule of Mussolini, but broadcasts by other religions were not permitted until after Italy’s liberation, in 1944 (Fore 1989:445). Deregulation has gone further in Italy than in any other major country of Europe. This has permitted local church-related stations to multiply. There are now at least 500 Italian radio stations more or less under Catholic Church influence, although few can be said to be 'official' church stations (Cecchin 1987:2). The total number of local radio stations in Italy is now about 3,500. Of the approximately five hundred TV stations in Italy, the Catholic Church controls forty-five (Elvy 1990: 26).

In general, the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* tended to apply to religious radio broadcasting outside Scandinavia or the Netherlands and the English-speaking countries until after the Second World War, insofar as religion was allowed on the airwaves at all. Peter Elvy, in predicting that the stress given religion in the future will depend on audience demand, has rephrased this as, *cuius religio, eius radio* (Elvy 1990: 76).

**An American Phenomenon**
On balance, it can be said with some justification that the early history of religious broadcasting in general, and of the evangelistic use of the medium, in particular, was centred in the United States. To a large degree radio and TV evangelism have remained an American phenomenon, although variations on the same theme have begun to appear in various parts of the world. Some understanding of American evangelistic and fundamentalist tendencies in religion therefore is necessary for an understanding of the present phenomenon of televangelism.

II. 'The Sawdust Trail': Revivalism in America


Religion was a major factor in the shaping of the United States, even though many historians have failed to give it due weight. Massachusetts and some other New England colonies were begun as theocracies, while other colonies were established by people of particular denominations seeking freedom from persecution and willing to grant the same freedom to others. The general religious atmosphere, however, was Calvinist, tempered by upper-class Anglicanism and, later, by the reformist enthusiasm of Wesleyan Methodism. In an environment of religious pluralism particular doctrines tended to fade into unimportance, while feelings and signs of healing and salvation assumed greater importance.

**The First Great Awakening**
The 'First Great Awakening' swept through the American colonies from 1730 to 1760. It did so with a speed and intensity which surprised even the Reverend Jonathan Edwards, who has come to be thought of as its central figure. Three-quarters of the population were, at the time, Calvinists of one kind or another, and the religious revival's main theme was fear of hell but tempered by the hope of salvation through the extraordinary action of a merciful God. All deserved only damnation, but those who yielded to God's will and opened themselves to His mercy showed that they had been predestined for salvation and would, accordingly, accept Christ and be saved (McLoughlin 1978:45-46). Although based on Calvinistic theology and insistent on the reality of hell, the theme of the 'Awakening' was more focussed on the mercy of God and the hope, held by the elect, of salvation. The 'Arminian' tendencies, which rejected predestination entirely and were later to be so evident in the Methodist and Baptist theologies of the 'Second Great Awakening' (Martin 1990: 21) thus already can be discerned pushing aside
'orthodox' Calvinism in America as early as the middle eighteenth century. McLoughlin saw the revival of religious fervour as arising from the stress placed on both religious and political institutions by the burgeoning migration from Europe, across the ocean, and on to the frontier. Law was increasingly what the frontier communities had to legislate in order to survive, not what was arbitrarily handed down by higher authorities. The Calvinistic worldview was less and less able to explain the kind of world which was developing as a result of this frontier pragmatism, the ideas of the English Revolution of 1688 and of the Enlightenment, as well as the early effects of the Industrial Revolution (1978:51-53). The same factors encouraged the independence movement leading to the American Revolution of 1775-1783. Some went so far as to view the Great Awakening as 'the unifying spiritual force leading to the American Revolution' (Marsden 1980:18).

The Awakening was spread by itinerant preachers, such as the Reverend George Whitefield, who were strong on zeal and charisma, but somewhat eclectic as to doctrine. Ordained an Anglican priest, in England, Whitefield seems to have claimed Calvinist leanings, but nevertheless preached that sinners could be saved if they really wanted to be saved and took the necessary measures to repent and reform. He emphasized personal responsibility and de-emphasized religious institutions (McLoughlin 1978:61). Whitefield was less Arminian than John Wesley, but nevertheless would fit well into the theological pattern of today's televangelists.

The period of the Second Great Awakening was also the period in which American forms of commercial merchandising and advertising began to take shape. Quentin J. Schultze (in Schultze 1990: 28) remarks how the 'rhetoric of conversion' was in the air, together with the feeling that 'practically anyone could be converted to practically anything new'. Evangelistic patterns of salesmanship provided the models for all kinds of secular 'evangelism', social political and commercial. Later revivalists have been accused of taking over secular modes of advertising and salesmanship, but in a real sense their predecessors had created the commercial forms they later borrowed back.

American culture and evangelicalism shared a disinterest in tradition, a faith in technology, a drive toward popularization and a spirit of individualism which led to a continuous interaction and cross-fertilization. The mass media were amenable to use by evangelicals because they had largely been shaped by evangelical precedents, but as they ventured into the new media, hoping to give away their faith, they also changed the very texture and substance of the faith', according to Schultze (1990: 41).

The Second Great Awakening
American independence was quickly followed by a 'Second Great Awakening', from 1800 to 1830. McLoughlin saw it as partly the result of insecurity and a national identity crisis, paralleling a loss of revolutionary fervour and the outbreak of political debates about the shape the new government should take (1978:98). By this time, a 'national faith' had begun to take form. It included a melange of Anglican and Calvinist doctrinal survivals, showing an Arminian stress on hope and equality, added to a strong component of Enlightenment principles, all filtered through the philosophical debates surrounding the drafting of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Also important were various myths and beliefs born from or reinforced by the frontier experience, such as belief in progress through science and hard work, individualism, and a growing sense of a quasi-Biblical national 'manifest destiny', not necessarily linked to racism, but often tainted by it (McLoughlin 1978:102-106). All these things, too, have been represented, at various times and to varying degrees, in the electronic church.

In New England and the Midwest, the Second Great Awakening tended to promote a much-mitigated Calvinism, deemphasizing predestination, based chiefly in Congregational and Presbyterian Churches. In the South, however, Methodists and Baptists predominated, and much greater continuity with the First Great Awakening has been suggested (McLoughlin 1978:131-132).

In the scattered settlements of the South, church-going was as much a social event as it was religious, and the camp meetings, which
were the characteristic locale of the evangelists' preaching, were high points of the year's social life. In many frontier regions they substituted for churches, until the latter could be established. People often went to great effort, travelling considerable distances to attend the meetings. They were occasions for baptisms and weddings performed by ministers, for group singing, and opportunities for people to give vent to pent-up emotions in a responsive human environment—a relief from their isolated farm life in remote forest clearings. The 'folksy' social dimension of the meetings far outweighed liturgy or 'churchiness' for the participants. Extravagant behavior, such as jumping, rolling, shouting, trances and visions, often was encouraged by the preachers as part of the conversion process among people who were poorly educated and socially unsophisticated (McLoughlin 1978:136).

The Second Great Awakening in New England and the northern Middle West showed tendencies toward social reform, and its more liberal branches supported the gradually developing movement for the abolition of slavery. The Southern tendency was much more towards personal, rather than social reform, and no preacher could hope for success if he opposed slavery, especially after it became a hot political issue, about 1830 (McLoughlin 1978:130, 136).

The Third Great Awakening
The 'Third Great Awakening' started around 1890 and extended up to the threshold of the age of electronic evangelism, in the 1920s. This was a confused period of industrialization, population movements, social change, political agitation, wars, and overseas expansion. Evangelists like Billy Sunday set themselves in outspoken opposition to such 'dangerous' developments as Darwinism, alcoholic drink and the 'new immigration' of culturally different people from southern and eastern Europe.

Sunday, by far the movement's outstanding figure, achieved great fame and popularity between 1905 and 1920. He organized massive urban evangelistic meetings, using the most advanced professional public relations techniques. He was not the first to assemble teams of experts to refine his organization and tactics, but he went far beyond any predecessors. So great was his persuasive power that he often got the majority of Protestant churches in a city to cancel their Sunday services during his revival meetings and to send their congregations to his 'tabernacles', where crowds of 15,000 to 20,000 were normal.

His extreme fundamentalism and flamboyant style of preaching—he leaped around his revival platform like an acrobat, shouting and telling funny stories and waving the American flag as he stood on top of the pulpit—alienated and embarrassed many ministers of the conventional denominations (p.147). Furthermore, he was socially and politically conservative at a time when the evils of the Industrial Revolution were becoming increasingly disturbing to the consciences of the more liberal clergy. Although Sunday recognized the need to address social issues, he stressed the personal sinfulness which caused local corruption. After one of his revival meetings in an Iowa town a headline read, 'Burlington is Dry: Billy Sunday Has Made Graveyard of Once Fast Town' (p. 147).

After the First World War, Sunday became more nativistic, advocating restrictive immigration policies, allowing hooded members of the revived Ku Klux Klan to participate in his services and preaching loudly against 'Bolshevik' influences (McLoughlin 1978:147).

Fundamentalism
McLoughlin's 'Awakenings' were periods of special activity and of a certain popular legitimacy for revivalistic evangelism, but important developments occurred between them, as well. Razelle Frankl (in Abelman and Hoover 1990: 57-58) stresses the special contribution to the culture of the revival made by Charles Grandison Finney (1792-1875). Finney systematized the technique of giving revivals as planned events. He also moved evangelism from a rural to the predominantly urban setting in which teleevangelism now thrives.

The growth of Protestant fundamentalism was a continuous process. Although it overlapped the revivalist movement, and frequently involved the same people, it should be distinguished from revivalism or pentecostalism, especially the emphasis of the latter on 'speaking in tongues', healing and other extraordinary spiritual manifestations. Many,
but by no means all, who consider themselves as fundamentalists would regard such manifestations as inappropriate.

George M. Marsden (1980:4) has defined fundamentalism as 'militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism'. He saw it taking a distinct shape, in the United States just after the Civil War (1861-1865), as secularism and materialism threatened to drive religion out of the public forum and Darwinism seemed to challenge the Biblical basis of the whole Judeo-Christian religious tradition. In reaction, the fundamentalists tried to draw people 'back to the Bible', by which they meant a 'safe', literal interpretation of its every word.

A leading early exponent of fundamentalist evangelicalism was Dwight L. Moody, who 'looked like a businessman' and, in the style of the capitalist 'empire builders' of his day, used businesslike methods to create the largest evangelistic organization prior to that of Billy Sunday. By the time of his death, in 1899, he had founded his own 'empire' of organizations and schools, including the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, designed to give quick, practical scripture training to lay religious workers.

Moody had given up business in the early 1860s to devote himself to religious work through the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). His relatively moderate preaching style delivered a message which would have been acceptable to most mainstream American Protestants of his day. He avoided threats of hellfire, arguing that they would not help convert people, and instead based his preaching on the 'Three Rs': 'Ruin by sin, Redemption by Christ, and Regeneration by the Holy Ghost' (Marsden 1980:35). He preached withdrawal from the world, and his attitude towards the mass media has not been followed by the televangelists, since the 'four great temptations' of his time which he condemned included the theatre and Sunday newspapers, in addition to disregard of the Sabbath and 'atheistic teachings', including evolution (Marsden 1980:35).

III. The Character of Televangelism


The main lines of the preaching of the televangelists were drawn during the long history of American revivalism and fundamentalism just described. Organizationally, the quickness of the revivalists to adapt to new technological possibilities reflects the zeal of the frontier circuit riders who exerted strenuous efforts to organize camp meetings in the wilderness. The same zealous energy and resourcefulness drove Charles Finney, Dwight Moody and Billy Sunday to apply newly developed organizational methods of the business world to meet the religious needs of their day. The rapidity with which television was mobilized for preaching was impressive, but it probably did not exceed the speed with which the revivalists of an earlier generation had taken up the use of radio. The first commercial radio station had begun late in 1920, and by January 1925, 63 of the 600 or so stations then in operation in the United States were said to be owned by churches or other religious groups (Hadden and Swann 1981:73-74).

McLoughlin (1978:179-216) felt that a fourth 'Great Awakening' had begun about 1960, and might endure to around 1990. It was sparked by the Soviet space successes, which called into question America's scientific dominance and was fueled by several events and issues of revolutionary import--such as the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War and the Second Vatican Council. All produced changes in beliefs and values and an alteration of Americans' world view which some have called the most drastic in history (McLoughlin 1978:179). As with the Awakenings of the past, the fourth grew out of a time of pervasive uncertainty and insecurity which drove many to a search for lasting values and a more coherent social and psychological environment. Faith in both political liberalism and science was proving to be misplaced. Many turned inward, trying to
reaffirm basics, either as found in fundamentalist, or at least traditional, religion, or by looking elsewhere, to Zen or drugs or alternative lifestyles of various kinds.

**Forerunners: Bishop Sheen and Billy Graham**

Bishop Fulton J. Sheen is cited as the most successful forerunner of the television evangelists, although his Catholic religion was a major exception to the typically Protestant character of the phenomenon. His special charisma made him stand out in the secular as well as religious media; but apart from it, and his Catholicism, he preached much the same message as the later televangelists: a traditional interpretation of religion, opposition to atheistic philosophical Liberalism and Communism, the need to return to proven values.

But if there was, or is, a 'Fourth Great Awakening,' as McLoughlin claims, its central figure is not Bishop Sheen but Billy Graham. Graham has been fully in the established revival pattern, relying on highly sophisticated organization and public relations work, preaching a simple, conservative, upbeat Gospel message, and stressing emotional as well as rational appeal.

Like Sheen, Graham started his electronic media career on radio, with his *Hour of Decision* programme, in 1950, and switched to television later. To call Graham a 'televangelist' may be problematic, however, despite his intensive use of television to advance his work. He still works best before live audiences, some of which have been claimed to number one million or more; and his television broadcasts are mostly taped and edited versions of those public appearances (Cotham 1985:108; Fore 1987:82). Graham excels in large-scale but detailed organization, mobilizing local churches to promote his revival meetings and referring the cards filled in by those who have 'accepted Jesus' at the meetings to their own pastors for follow-up attention.

**The Blooming of the Electronic Church**


Although they were imitated by many televangelists, in one way or another, neither Fulton Sheen nor Billy Graham are typical of the genre which has come to be called 'televangelism'. William F. Fore prefers to use the term, 'electronic church', which he distinguishes from other religious broadcasting. He limited this field to about two dozen programmes, at the time he was writing, which typically were nationally syndicated, usually through paid time, 'depend on a highly visible charismatic leader', used slick, high budget production for their typically 30 to 90 minute programmes, solicited money in their broadcasts, and used the telephone and computer to personalize their contact with their audiences (Fore 1987:86).

Fore discerns five 'generations' of the electronic church, spanning the history of American television. The first, represented by Graham, was typified by the use of television to cover revival meetings, much as it would a sports or political event. The second generation marked a change to the style and technique best exemplified by Oral Roberts, a tent evangelist and faith healer. By the mid-1950s, Roberts' broadcasts stressed participation, not only by his live audience but by viewers in their homes, as well. The medium began to control the shape of the revival meeting, which moved from tent to television studio.

In the 1960s, Rex Humbard, representing the third generation, built a church especially designed for television, complete with rotating stage, and the religious service became a television production.

Pat Robertson, with his *700 Club*, did much to shape the style of the fourth generation of televangelism. He adopted a 'host show' format, in which he dialogued with guests around a coffee table before a studio audience. Robertson periodically ran fund-raising marathons, and a major element of his technique was to bring the viewing audience into intimate contact with the studio through phone-ins and membership in the *700 Club* (Hoover 1988).

Robertson also figures prominently in Fore's 'fifth generation', which involves the establishment of television networks.
Cable-satellite networks also have been developed by the mainstream denominations, as they have come to recognize that this combination of technologies offers a relatively inexpensive means of reaching the more than fifty percent of North American homes with cable TV. These organizations range from the ultra-low-budget network of Mother Angelica, a Catholic nun based in Birmingham, Alabama, to the ecumenical Protestant network, VISN (Vision Interfaith Satellite Network), and its Canadian counterpart, Vision Television. A Catholic network, CTNA (Catholic Telecommunications Network of America), was established in 1981 to provide other information services as well as television. It was slow to develop, however, due, according to some observers, to a preoccupation with technology to the neglect of production and the mobilization of grassroots support (McDonnell 1989:23).

Attractive features of electronic church programming for its audience appear to be its authoritative style, which emphasizes individualism and established American social values (not least, the free enterprise system), endorsement of that value system by successful celebrities interviewed on the programmes, the element of competition ('God vs. the Devil'), and a concrete eschatology, paradoxically proclaiming the transience and imminent end of the world and, at the same time, the material advantages of religious faith.

IV. Who is Watching and Listening?


The book edited by Abelman and Hoover contains a comprehensive picture of the state of North American research on religious television today, from a wide range of disciplinary and denominational perspectives. Prominent among its contents are articles addressing the size and character of religious television audiences—a topic which has generated considerable interest and controversy in recent years. Religious broadcasting has not been high on the agendas of communication researchers in the past, but some studies and debates about it pose challenges for anyone interested in the theory and methodology of audience research. Hoover (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:112) notes the special methodological challenges involved in 'analyzing relatively insignificant portions of total television viewing', comprising the religious television audience, and in determining the social and political significance of a particular audience—such as those of Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson—a significance which could possibly be disproportionate to actual audience size.
An Early Study


One of the first concentrated efforts to investigate the impact of broadcast religion on a community was the study of New Haven, Connecticut, undertaken in 1951 by a large research team from Yale Divinity School (Parker, et al. 1955). The survey covered 3,559 households out of the 71,180 households in metropolitan New Haven--approximately a five percent sample (p. 16). The general survey was supported by studies of specific facets of the question, such as content analyses of the programmes viewed in the community and extensive depth interviews with informants representing particular audiences--especially those of Bishop Sheen's *Life is Worth Living*, on the one hand, and Protestant programmes, on the other. This distinction seems to have been made necessary by the high proportion of Catholic households in the city, reflected by the Catholic proportion of 52.8 percent in the sample, compared to only 29.0 percent for Protestants (p. 21).

The survey indicated that Sheen was able to attract viewers from a wide range of backgrounds through his talent for constructing complex, subtle sermons with multiple layers of meaning which were significant for different kinds of people. His audience was broadly representative of the entire New Haven population, from a sociological perspective (p. 119). Dr. Ralph W. Sockman, a Methodist, represented a mainline Protestant radio ministry addressed to well-educated, upper middle class Protestants. According to the survey he succeeded in reaching that group, though not others, with a quiet approach, more upbeat than Sheen's. A word analysis showed that Sheen used substantially more words with unfavourable associations--sin, hell, penance, etc.--than he did words with favourable associations (p. 120). Sockman, by contrast, used far more favourable than unfavourable words and concepts -- love, joy, etc.

Dr. Charles E. Fuller, of the *Old Fashioned Revival Hour*, presented, on radio, a 'typical' revival meeting more directly in that tradition than either Sheen or Sockman, and also more directly representing the content and style of later televangelists--including lively Gospel songs and a call for members of the congregation to come up to the altar and 'accept Christ as their personal Savior'. Fuller's sermons also were more 'positive' than 'negative', although the world he described was a thoroughly evil one (pp. 139-141). Fuller, broadcasting on purchased rather than sustaining time, succeeded in reaching a New Haven audience of 'lower middle class Protestants of limited education, rural or small town either now or in background, to whom conventional revival language and style are familiar' (p. 142).

Billy Graham drew an audience similar to that of Fuller, older, working-class Protestants (p. 221), with less than high school educations (p. 268). Both programmes are seen as appealing to a fundamentalist Protestant nostalgia. Graham's more dynamic, socially and politically relevant approach differed somewhat from Fuller's greater stress on personal conversion. The study did not elicit a satisfactory level of response about Graham's programmes, possibly due to broadcast schedules or to the urban, New England character of the population studied (p., 392).

Although the researchers devoted a large part of their work to a demographic analysis of 'who watches what', they said that they found their lengthy nondirective interviews, supplemented by details of life history and current status and one or two personality tests, 'can provide the material necessary for a student in this field to state with some assurance the role and effects of religious radio and television in an individual's life style, and to predict reaction to future exposure to such programs'. They found clusterings around personality types correlated well with use and nonuse of religious programmes, and that this use of their data was most valuable for policy-making by the sponsors of the research, the Broadcasting and Film Commission of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. An awareness of the personality attributes of an audience comes to a clergyman almost instinctively in a face-to-face communication situation, but needs to be 'much more systematically understood and planned for in religious communication.
addressed to the large, anonymous audience reached by the mass media' (p. 400).

Parker and his co-authors emphasized in their conclusion that churches and clergy using the mass media must understand the nature of their real audience and the ways their message has to be presented to reach the various potential audiences, with their varying needs and in terms of the varying role of the mass media in their lives. Although the need for research to tailor the programmes to the audience seems obvious, religious communicators prior to their study appear to have paid little attention to it, preferring to embrace a mass and amorphous audience whose character was essentially unknown to them (pp. 401-407).

The Electric Church in a Mirror


National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) is an association of evangelical broadcasters with fundamentalist leanings established in 1944. In 1978, Ben Armstrong, who had had twenty years of experience in religious broadcasting, became executive director of NRB, and shortly thereafter wrote this overview of religious broadcasting from the perspective of the NRB, which by that time comprised some 800 members, mostly in the United States, and could speak authoritatively for the broadcast evangelists.

Armstrong saw what he called the 'electric church' as 'a revolution as dramatic as the revolution that began when Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the cathedral door...'. (p.10). The book sketches the history of the electric church, in both its radio and television forms. As a former international religious broadcaster (Trans World Radio, in Monaco), he devotes some attention to the effort of the evangelist-broadcasters to extend their influence outside the United States. By 1977, adaptations of the Bakkers' PTL Club, for example, were being broadcast throughout Latin America in Spanish, in Portuguese in Brazil, were used as the pattern for 'the only indigenous gospel television program for West Africa' from Lagos, and its Korean broadcasts originate in the Full Gospel Central Church, in Seoul, 'the world's largest Pentecostal church' (p. 109).

At the time Armstrong was writing, in the late 1970s, television already had become the most glamorous manifestation of the 'electric church', but he nevertheless regarded radio as more important, because of its wider audience. He estimated that the weekly viewers of religious television in the United States totalled 'in the neighborhood of fourteen million men, women, teen-agers, and children', on the basis of a method which did not count the same individual more than once for each week. Using the same criteria, the radio audience for religious broadcasts was estimated at 114 million per week—eight times that of television (Armstrong 1979:122).

Audience estimates seem to be a perennial bone of contention in the world of religious broadcasting—as they are among commercial broadcasters. For example, in the September 1990 issue of Religious Broadcasting, the monthly magazine of the NRB, a table was published showing the 'Households/Markets' of twenty syndicated religious television programmes, as reported by the Arbitron Company. This showed the 700 Club ranked fourteenth, and with a decline of 6.4 percent between February and May 1990 (Religious Broadcasting 1990a:29). In the November issue, a representative of the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN), which produces the 700 Club, wrote to object, saying that the A. C. Nielsen ratings gave the 700 Club a much higher audience for the same date and that, in any event, to compare it with the leader in the Arbitron list, Robert Schuller's once-a-week Hour of Power,'is like comparing the Queen Mary to a 747' (Religious Broadcasting 1990b:4-5).

'The Great Commission' as Rationale

Televangelism, in contrast to much other religious programming, claims as its primary justification to be spreading the Gospel to unchurched or irreligious people, who can be reached in large numbers through radio and television. In the words of Ben Armstrong, 'God has raised up this powerful technology of radio and television expressly to reach every man, woman, boy, and girl on earth with the even more powerful message of the gospel' (Armstrong
1979:7). The 'electric church', in Armstrong's view, involved 'the unprecedented linking of twentieth-century technology with Christ's commandment to "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature"' (Mark 16:15). Obedience to this 'Great Commission' in a direct form, and usually with a fundamentalist or at least conservative theological outlook has become the hallmark of televangelism. Outreach to 'all the world' thus becomes an essential, and can be more or less measured by audience size.

Furthermore, with the administration of President Jimmy Carter, a professed 'born-again Christian', and increasing direct involvement of evangelists in political affairs—such as the unsuccessful presidential candidacy of Pat Robertson—greater attention came to be paid to the political influence of the televangelists. The size of their audiences and the manner in which they were being influenced by religious broadcasts therefore became major topics in research to analyse American political behavior.

**Empirical Reservations**


Empirical researchers nevertheless were nearly unanimous in concluding that the audience for religious broadcasting, in general, and for broadcast evangelism, in particular, comprised a small and relatively definable segment of the American listening and viewing public.

Horsfield says that the various research findings on the audience for paid-time religious television programmes indicate that it represents only a 'rather small subculture', even within evangelicalism (1984:117). Typically, the audience is more female than male, older rather than younger, tends to comprise people of lower income and education and members of the working class ('blue-collar occupations'), tends to be from the southern and midwestern states, rather than from the northeast or the west, and tends very markedly to consist of people who already are active church members (Horsfield 1984:111-116). Not only is the non-churchgoing audience for religious television small, but studies of the ways people use religious programmes and the gratifications they obtain from them suggest 'that the dominant functions now being served by Christian programs for the major segments of its audience appear to be personal inspiration, companionship, and support' (Horsfield 1984:120).

Furthermore, the awareness of this use of the programmes by the audience has caused the broadcasters to adjust their programming even more to fill that need, developing facilities for personal counselling and putting even greater stress on emotional uplift, while implicitly reducing the proportion of the 'harder sayings' a more fully-rounded religious message would have to contain.

Hadden and Swann (1981:47) claim that virtually all the television preachers 'get carried away' in estimating the size of their audience. Jerry Falwell, of *The Old-Time Gospel Hour*, for example, is reported to have estimated his audience at 25 million, in the spring of 1980, then, in July of the same year, one of his close associates claimed 50 million viewers, when 'the truth is that fewer than 1-1/2 million tune in Jerry Falwell each week'.

**The Annenberg-Gallup Study**


By 1980 considerable debate had arisen about the religious television audience question, but it was generally recognized that no one had much hard data on which to base credible statements about the size or character of the audience. In February of that year a 'Consultation on the Electronic Church' was held at New York University at which Dr. William F. Fore, representing the National Council of Churches (NCC), and Dr. Ben Armstrong, representing National Religious Broadcasters (NRB)—and therefore, respectively, the mainstream denominations and the broadcast evangelists—agreed to commission a disinterested research project in an attempt to gather some hard facts.
The study got off the ground in 1982, with the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania, under Dean George Gerbner, as the prime contractor and the Gallup Organization cooperating to do a nation-wide survey (Niklaus 1984). High hopes accompanied the release of the report, in 1984 (Hostetler 1984a; Clark 1984), but doubts began to arise. Soon a series of rather acerbic debates broke out about the meaning of the report, which appears to have left the issue more confused than ever, at least to the casual observer.

First Reactions
James F. Engel discerned some of the difficulties almost as soon as the report appeared (Engel 1984). He felt that the Annenberg survey underestimated the regular audience, at 13.3 million, because it neglected viewers of cable television and of local nonsyndicated programmes. He estimated that the audience is closer to 20 million. Engel agrees with the study's finding that most of the audience are active churchgoers, but denies an interpretation which would hold that there are no evangelistic effects.

Ben Armstrong (1984) and others strongly welcomed the study's conclusion that watching religious television does not reduce church attendance. That issue had been a serious concern for some conventional pastors, who felt that their congregations were being drawn away by religious television programmes.

Harold Hostetler (1984b) quickly reevaluated his early positive view of the report, focussing on discrepancies between the Annenberg and the Gallup sections of the study concerning total size of the audience. The Gallup survey had estimated an audience of 22.8 million, compared to Annenberg's estimate of 13.3 million.

The Academic Debate


Three years later, a debate about the merits of the Annenberg-Gallup study broke out in the pages of the journal, Review of Religious Research. Sociologists Jeffrey K. Hadden and Razelle Frankl, who 'had access to the ongoing project over the five or six year life of the Committee' which supervised the study, launched an attack on the study's methodology, particularly that of the section which was the responsibility of the Annenberg team. In their view, the study seems to have been designed to 'fit' Gerbner's theory of television enculturation', and therefore the conclusions were to a large extent predictable. The researchers are said to have assumed a homogeneity in religious programming which would yield a uniform, 'mainstreaming' effect on the cultures of heavy viewers. Frankl and Hadden (1987:116-117) deny that such a uniformity is present either in religious programming or in general programming, and they say that categorizing people as either 'heavy' or 'light' viewers--an important distinction in Gerbner's research method--obscures some of the more important viewer characteristics which might otherwise have been revealed by the data.

They saw the genesis of the study in 'the history of conflict between evangelical broadcasters and the liberal churches over the control of the airwaves' (Hadden and Frankl 1987:102). The end of sustaining time on the national networks had effectively squeezed the liberal Protestants, as well as Catholics and Jews, off the air, while the NRB evangelicals, previously blocked out of most sustaining time, exploited commercial programming strategies to essentially take over most religious broadcasting in the United States. In 1959, paid-time programming accounted for fifty-three percent of all religious programming, but this figure had
risen to ninety-two percent by 1977 (Hadden and Frankl 1987:103). The significance of this change also has been stressed by Quentin J. Schultze, who has noted that 'in the 1980s none of the 10 highest-rated weekly religious television broadcasts was supported primarily by a denomination or council of churches' (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:43).

The authors of the project report responded to the criticisms by Frankl and Hadden that the research problem they faced was one of the most difficult in mass communication research, i.e., 'the extent to which variation in television content bears a relationship to differential social effects in its audience' (Gerbner, et al. 1989:94), and that they had to study it under stringent budget limitations, necessarily putting aside some of the points Hadden and Frankl would have liked dealt with in greater depth.

Stewart Hoover’s explanation of the audience aspects of the Annenberg-Gallup study appeared in the same issue of Review of Religious Research as the attacks on that project by Hadden and Frankl; so it is not an answer to them, but it helps put the research in context and answer some of their objections to it.

Hoover (1987:144-145) concludes that the project’s findings generally supported those of earlier studies, as far back as that of Parker, Barry and Smythe (1955). Religious audiences tend to be older than average media audiences, lower in income, less educated, more conventionally 'religious', more male than female, slightly more non-white than white,

more rural than urban, and more southern than northeastern. Despite all the changes through the history of televised religion, therefore, the composition of its audience has stayed about the same. He discusses in detail the factors affecting estimates of total audience size. Much, for example, depends on what is regarded as a 'significant' amount of viewing--some researchers counting as little as six minutes per month, while others require at least fifteen minutes per week. Viewers, themselves, differ about what constitutes a 'religious' programme--some regarding a secular mini-series or televised movie with a religious theme as equivalent to watching a televangelist (pp. 140-141).

The failure of some studies to control for duplicated viewing--with a large total of aggregate viewing run up by relatively few viewers who watch many programmes each -- has contributed to inflated audience estimates. The Annenberg study attempted to control for this in order to arrive at a total aggregate rating for all religious programmes--a principal aim of the project (Hoover 1987:142). Hoover concludes that religious television viewing appears to be both an infrequent behavior, and one which is engaged in for very short periods of time. Furthermore, if controls are used to estimate only significant viewing, it is clear that audience size is quite small. The accessibility of cable seems not to increase the size of the religious television audience, and cable households may, in fact, watch less religious television than non-cable households.

V. Evangelizing the World


Europe

The fundamentalist, sometimes Pentecostal evangelism typical of the televangelists usually is thought of as a North American phenomenon--or even more specifically, a U. S. 'Bible Belt' phenomenon, centring on the states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri and Oklahoma--which is not very exportable to other
countries. This has generally been true of Europe, even of the United Kingdom, from which sprang most of the dominant streams of American Protestantism. As Eric Shegog notes, religious films or programmes have not formed a significant part of the otherwise massive influx of American media products into Europe (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:331). Nevertheless, by 1985 the major televangelist organizations in the United States had begun to promote foreign distribution of their programmes and had initiated fundraising campaigns to support it (Abelman and Hoover 1990:3). Shegog feels that deregulation and privatization, with the opening of many new cable and satellite channels, may create a programming vacuum which the more affluent religious programmers may rush to fill (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:337). But he sees little likelihood that American-style religion will appeal very widely to a Western European audience (p. 350).

On the other hand, Eastern Europe, long starved of religious expression under Communism, recently has become a prime target for all sorts of missionary activity—non-Christian as well as Christian—but most especially for the broadcast evangelists. For example, Trans-World Radio, one of the largest international evangelical networks now has studios in Moscow, Minsk and Kiev (Elvy 1990: 55). Little formal research has yet been done on this new development—although British researchers under Michael Rowe at Keston College, are currently studying it—but it is attracting the attention of the western news media. Billy Graham was the first major Western evangelist to penetrate Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but more recently San Diego-based Morris Cerullo and Argentinian evangelist Luis Palau have been active there. Cerullo has a daily programme on the European 'SuperChannel' direct-broadcast satellite, and during a November 'crusade' in Moscow he conducted a 45-minute television programme on Soviet television, 'paid for by the Communists', as he described it (Smith 1991).

In an atmosphere of religious hunger and lacking religious sophistication stemming from years of isolation and repression, all Eastern European countries except Poland appear open to all forms of evangelism, particularly those which are most emotional (Smith 1991).

Asia
Although Southwest Asia has Islamic rather than Christian fundamentalism to distract it, South Asia seems relatively less affected by either. However, certain countries of East Asia have proven to be quite receptive to American-style revivalism. Not far from the National Assembly building in Seoul, Korea, for example, is the huge Pentecostalist church building mentioned earlier. It is the Korean home of the PTL Club, and its ministers use every means which Korean communication laws allow to reach beyond its estimated 150,000 or more Sunday congregations. Korea has long had a Protestant radio network, and observers predict that new Catholic and Buddhist FM stations will soon expand into networks. Although Korean Pentecostalism has been encouraged both by cultural and political factors (Martin 1990:150-151), it still has not gained the kind of access to the domestic mass media necessary to generate a full-fledged televangelism.

The Rev. Moon Sun-myung, founder and charismatic leader of the syncretistic Unification Church, has drawn heavily upon the preaching style and organizational methods of American evangelists. Although the 'church' is not Christian, the international success of the 'Moonies', as Moon's followers are popularly called, suggests that some aspects of revivalistic evangelism are not only exportable but can be twisted into strange new shapes to serve other ends than preaching the Christian gospel.

Africa and Australia
In South Africa, Martin (1990:157-158) notes the emergence of both black and white independent 'super-churches' with Pentecostalist characteristics. In other parts of Africa--Martin (p. 157) singles out Ghana and Nigeria for special mention--Pentecostalism is growing, but with most media under tight state control throughout the continent, little broadcast evangelism seems yet to have developed.

In Australia, American religious programmes have long been broadcast, and at times have exceeded Australian religious programmes by two and a half times, according to Peter Horsfield (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:322). Nevertheless, audiences have been small, and both their lack of Australian content and their
fund-raising efforts prompted the imposition of some government restrictions in the early 1980s. As in Europe, technological developments and regulatory changes keep the situation of religious broadcasting in Australia in a state of flux (pp. 326-327).

Latin America
It is in Latin America, though, that U. S. Pentecostalism and revivalism have made their greatest impact. Much of their effort has been person-to-person proselytism, but wherever possible radio and television both have been employed. Their use began in 1931, with the establishment of radio station HCJB, Quito. There are now ten evangelical radio stations in Central America (Vanhengel et al: 1990), and several commercial stations with largely evangelical programming.

As Hugo Assmann notes, radio is still the preferred means of electronic evangelization in Latin America, since it still is more accessible than television in most countries, to both evangelists and mass audiences. He feels that one factor in the success of the movement has been that the historical churches have been slow to direct their attention to the poor. The fundamentalists and pentecostals, on the other hand, have made an option to go to the poor, and the latter can best be reached either by personal contact or by radio, rather than the more expensive medium of television.

More recently indigenous Brazilian evangelists, in particular, have greatly increased their ownership and use of both television and radio stations, and both research and popular interest in the phenomenon have become intense. The same tendency is on the rise in other Latin American countries (Assmann 1991). Argentinian Luis Palau has built up an especially strong international following.

The most extensive study of electronic evangelism in Latin America, at least up to the time of Assmann's writing, was done in 1985 by the Centro Evangélico Latinoamericano de Estudios Pastorales (CELEP), in four nations of Central America--Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The study focussed on practicing Christians in the urban middle class in those countries to determine the characteristics of the radio and television audience in that population, to measure the penetration into that audience of the electronic media in general and of religious media in particular, and to study the level of credibility attributed to those media by the audience (Assmann 1987:105-118).

According to the CELEP study, the most popular North American evangelist, by far, was Jimmy Swaggart, whose programs have been transmitted both in Spanish and Portuguese throughout most of Latin America. They were the only regular North American televangelist programmes broadcast on Brazilian TV, as of the time of Assmann's writing. Swaggart's organization has established regional centres, in Guatemala for example, which answer letters and sell books. His programme is orientated toward the lower middle class, and his influence appears to have been growing at the time of the study. Swaggart was followed in popularity by the "PTL Club" and the "700 Club." Pat Robertson, of the "700 Club," is famous and Assmann says his influence is increasing. Club PTL is produced in Spanish, rather than being dubbed, and appeals to a middle class audience with a reassuring message. There is some implication in the CELEP study, however, that the audience tends to use the slick, North American broadcasts as entertainment, rather than thinking of them as religious (Smith in Schultze 1990: 303).

Relying on less formal evidence, Assmann tried to evaluate the impact of various other U.S. evangelists throughout Latin America. According to him, Oral Roberts' healing techniques are much imitated by Latin American evangelists. Rex Humbard broadcasted in both Spanish and Portuguese to a white, middle class audience, but his Brazilian programmes have been discontinued. Although Jerry Falwell has been influential among evangelical leaders in Latin America, his mass popularity has been limited. Robert Schuller and Bill Bright are known in Latin America more by their books than by their broadcasts.

Dennis A. Smith (in Schultze 1990: 301) says that the only locally based TV preacher who has established a following in Central America is a Guatemalan Catholic layman, Salvador Gómez.

Assmann says that domestic televangelism has caught on in Brazil. Nelson Do Amaral
Fanini, one of the most prominent, is called the 'Brazilian Billy Graham'. His programme was on 88 television and 40 radio stations, as of 1987, and he claimed to receive 50,000 letters per year. 'Lumen 2000', a worldwide Catholic communication movement with some affinities to televangelism, is quite active in Brazil. Two Pentecostalist preachers, R. R. Soares and Obispo Macedo, have daily half-hour television programmes. Jairo Pereira's programme, *The Time of the Eucharist*, makes heavy use of Catholic symbolism in connection with a revitalization movement which Assmann regards both as 'exotic' and morally questionable (pp 86-89). Various other programmes with evangelistic overtones could be listed, extending from Catholic or Protestant orthodoxy, on the one hand, across the whole lush range of Brazilian religions to extremes of syncretism, on the other.

**Involvement with Reactionary Politics**

Central American Protestantism has concentrated on evangelizing the poor, but it has not advocated social justice to any great degree. A recent strong influence has been that of 'dispensational theology', promoted by the Texas-based Central American Mission and by televangelist Jimmy Swaggart. In this view, the Church's great task is embodied in the 'Great Commission' -- to teach all nations -- and witness against social injustice is seen as a useless distraction, or even as heretical, according to Dennis Smith (Schultze 1990: 291). Such a theological outlook could not but be attractive to rulers concerned with maintaining the status quo against such threats as liberation theology and real or imagined 'Communist' influence.

Several countries in both Central and South America have been especially receptive to Pentecostalism. The Catholic leadership has been concerned about this development, but has been unwilling or unable to mount an equally effective evangelistic effort of its own to stabilize the Church's position. The development of Pentecostalism has raised fears in other quarters, too, because of a tendency for it to become closely identified with right-wing causes and conservative governments, in a manner similar to the way it has done in the United States.

When General Efraín Ríos Montt, a convert to a Pentecostalist church, became president of Guatemala in 1982, he was hailed by the more politically-oriented North American televangelists, particularly the 700 Club of Pat Robertson (Hadden and Shupe 1984:341-342). Guatemala was by no means unacquainted with militarism and repression prior to Ríos Montt's presidency, but a new element of zeal was added by his Pentecostalist identity which may have contributed to the slaughter of thousands of Indians during his campaign to repress a leftist rebellion allegedly inspired by Catholic liberation theology but labelled 'Communist' by the army (Stoll 1990:180-206).

By the time Ríos Montt was overthrown, evangelical leaders in Guatemala had come to recognize that they were being blamed for his policies, since he had created the impression that he wanted to set up a Protestant theocracy. They consequently tried to disassociate themselves from him. He had done little for Guatemalan Protestantism, and in fact many evangelical Indians had been caught up in the indiscriminate slaughter (pp.207-215).

**Some 'Contra'-indications**

One Latin-American political cause especially promoted by the North American evangelists was that of the anti-Sandinista 'Contra' guerrillas, in Nicaragua. The issue was not as clear-cut to Protestants inside Nicaragua, who were almost as badly divided as were Nicaraguan Catholics over the conflict (Stoll 1990:218-265). Although Pat Robertson vigorously touted the cause of the Contras, he struck a deal with the then-Sandinista-controlled television network to run his programmes. Bruce speculates that the Sandinistas may have wanted to use the broadcasts to undermine conservative Catholic opposition to their policies--indicating how complicated the political-religious picture in the region could become (Bruce 1990:217-218).

**Catholic Radio in Latin America**

The Catholic Church throughout Latin America has for many years placed great emphasis on local radio. As of April 1991 there were 275 stations under Catholic auspices in the
and van Valderen 1989). They also have indicated that one of their goals is 'to build a
dam against Protestant fundamentalists' in
Latin America (Elvy 1990: 51). Some Catholic
communications workers and bishops have been
disturbed by its allegedly ultra-conservative
tenor and its selective attitude towards
collaborating with other Catholic media efforts
and even in its cooperation with the hierarchy.
Lumen 2000 links and assists local Catholic
efforts with which it sympathizes, including a
weekly TV programme in Malta, access to a
satellite with potential for reaching 30 million
viewers in southern Brazil, video production in
Mexico, evangelization through a media school
in Colombia, relations with fifteen local
television stations in Italy, assisting in the
development of a television station in Portugal,
television production and training in the United
States, programmes on 31 television stations in
Japan, and various activities in France,
Argentina, the Dominican Republic and other
places (Borrat 1988).
The movement has considerable moral
support from the Vatican. However, it once tried
and failed to achieve official recognition as a
special communication organ of the Church
(Borrat 1988). It can claim official church
recognition only by reason of its membership in
OCIC, the International Catholic Organization
for Cinema, since 1990. In their joint world
meeting at that time OCIC's sister organization
for broadcasters, Unda, granted only provisional
membership to Lumen 2000, after considerable
debate and pending Lumen's authentication to
Unda's Board of Management as a bonafide
international organization, according to
participants in that meeting.
With its selective application of its
considerable resources Lumen 2000 appears to
be pushing Catholic broadcasting in many places
towards more conservative content and formats.

**Openings in Europe?**
Although televangelism is thus far an
insignificant factor in European broadcasting,
deregulation and the decline of public service
broadcasting, as well as the spread of cable and
satellite access, may soon drastically alter the
situation and open the door at least to home-
grown evangelists, if not to imported
programmes. Eric Shegog cites an estimate that such an increase in the number of television channels will occur in Europe during the next five years that, by the year 2000, 1.5 billion hours of programming will be needed to fill the available cable and satellite channels (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:341). This huge potential programming vacuum is viewed eagerly by such evangelical organizations as the European Broadcasting Network, who have seen in it the potential for a second "Great Reformation" (pp.337-338).

British broadcasting policy has been in a quandry over the competing pressures for privatized deregulation and the continuation of public service broadcasting, and the implications of any legislation on the subject are bound to be of great importance with regard both to the amount and kind of religious programming which would be available. The few cable systems in the country already have some religious programmes, including American evangelists, but the systems are not widespread. Direct ownership of broadcasting facilities by religious denominations has not been permitted in the past, nor has direct solicitation of funds. Content of religious programmes, on both the BBC and Independent Television, has been subject to prior review to prevent broadcasting which the respective authorities do not regard as appropriate. The dominant religious traditions in Britain have been guaranteed balanced expression, and the limitations have been generally acceptable to the mainstream denominations, but they have served to keep out most televangelism of the American pattern. Even small moves towards deregulation could change this situation substantially, however, and open the field of British broadcasting to televangelism.

British and US Audiences
Shegog (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:344-350) has summarized the findings of several studies of British religious television audiences and has compared them with data from American research. Despite much lower church attendance in Britain (12 percent of the population compared to 52 percent in the US), the audiences for the two principal religious programmes on Sunday evenings are much larger than those for any religious programmes in the United States. This may be in part because the programmes are broadcast at the same time on the two most-watched channels and few attractive alternatives are available. British religious audiences, like those in the US, tend to be older, churchgoing women; although the proportion of men in the audience is somewhat higher in Britain. Educational levels of viewers, especially on the more intellectually challenging religious programmes offered during the week, are substantially higher than those of American religious audiences, and professional people are much better represented in British audiences. The religious spectrum of the British population is much better represented in the UK audiences, whereas Shegog says that paid time programmes in the United States attract an audience that is 92 percent Protestant--chiefly representing the denominations predominant in the South, Midwest and rural areas (p. 348). British audiences for religious programming also are much more theologically liberal than are their American counterparts, and they expect television to reflect non-Christian religions, not only Christianity.

International Religious Broadcasting
Some discussion of international religious broadcasting was included in the previous issue of Trends (Vol. 10, No. 4), on international news flows, so our discussion of it will be brief and will concentrate on the evangelical dimension. Robert S. Fortner notes (in Schultz 1990: 307-328) that evangelical religious broadcasters constitute the largest single category of international radio broadcasters, accounting for over 20,000 hours of programming per month in over 125 languages. Most of this broadcasting is in shortwave and faces many technical and cultural obstacles and constraints which greatly reduce its impact. A serious cultural factor is that large percentages of the programmes in most languages are produced in the United States or other Western countries, and are ill-adapted to the cultures of the audiences. Consequently, as Fortner says, they may be converting people to American culture as much as to Christianity (p. 316), if they have any effect at all. Many religious broadcasters depend wholly on letters from listeners to
estimate the size and character of their audiences. Most simply cannot mount effective audience studies, and some actually devalue audience research (p.321).

Fortner believes that new technologies, such as direct broadcast satellites, will not replace shortwave and medium wave radio in international religious broadcasting within the next thirty years, partly because the usual target countries simply will not be able to afford the technology needed to receive such broadcasts on a large scale. Technology will, however, change the social and cultural environments in which international broadcasting is received, and few members of any audience may remain satisfied with an 'evangelization only' programming (p. 326).

Bruce (1990: 221-223) points out that the boom in international religious broadcasting came precisely at a time when more and more of the world was denying admission to Christian missionaries. This was the case not only in the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries, but also in the Islamic world and various other places. This problem of physical access gave missionary organizations added incentive to broadcast. Much of the missionary thrust was Pentecostalist, and therefore the broadcasting, too, came to represent the Pentecostalist version of radio and television evangelism (Bruch 1990: 223). Dennis A. Smith (in Schultze 1990: 300) has listed some of the deficiencies in such programming in Central America, as perceived by participants in a 1984 regional conference sponsored by the World Association for Christian Communication. They tended to feel that even the better-quality religious programmes in Latin America were middle-class oriented, presented Christ as a 'magician' who could solve all problems, that they stressed death more than life, that they presented Christians and the Church in an idealized way, that the Church was presented as an institution interested more in its own preservation and fund-raising than in evangelization, and that they ignored the daily context of their audiences, neglecting cultural differences and cultural values.

How much real impact the international broadcasts have may be problematic, since many may be listened to chiefly because the stations are strongest and clearest and because they give a different perspective than government controlled domestic stations (Bruce 1990: 222-223). Nevertheless, Pentecostalism is spreading, and the expansion can be expected to have some 'cultivation effect' -- to influence the culture in some way. Exactly what role broadcasting may have in causing this effect may never be known, given the difficulty media effects researchers have in distinguishing among interacting causes.

VI. Televangelism in Context: Religion and Broadcasting in General


Evaluations of the Electronic Church

Steve Bruce summed up his conclusions about the importance of televangelism as follows:

'To put it bluntly, not much televangelism is consumed by not many people. Even fewer actually give financial support. And for all the experimentation with new formats and new methods of making the product available, the audience is largely found among less well-educated older women who are already conservative Protestants' (Bruce 1990:234).

Although quite a number of researchers appear to share this negative view, they have had little effect on the enthusiasm of the religious broadcasters themselves. Perhaps with some of the criticisms in mind, Jerry Rose, President of National Religious Broadcasters,
recently wrote, 'God has raised up our ministries and He will sustain us. There is no doubt that there is a greater need for Christian media today than ever before' (Rose 1991:4).

Televangelism went through a crisis of sexual and financial scandals in the late 1980s, which are discussed by Bruce (1990:140-161 and 198-212). All institutions, including eventually all religious institutions, go through such crises. Although they seem to have affected audience size to some degree and prompted considerable preoccupation with financial ethics on the part of the National Religious Broadcasters (see Abelman and Hoover 1990:185-192), they are not especially relevant to the kind of consideration of religious audiences with which this issue of Trends is concerned. The cultural patterns which brought the electronic church into being are much too firmly rooted to be shaken by particular events of that kind. As a result of his intensive analysis of the audience of the electronic church, Stewart Hoover concluded that 'Although religious television is currently in a state of flux, due to recent controversies involving Bakker, Swaggart, and others, it is clear that it has attracted such a diversified viewership that its future remains quite solid' (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:105). Quentin J. Schultze has said, 'The electronic church is not merely temporary or faddish'. But the question remains, 'What are the possibilities for communicating authentic belief amidst the popularity and prominence of electronic manifestations of religion?' (Schultze 1989:112).

Schultze takes pains to distinguish the 'electronic church' of the televangelists from other forms of religious broadcasting. His description recapitulates the characteristics which have been described in the previous sections of this issue:

...I wish to limit the term to particular religious broadcasters characterized primarily by (1) experiential theologies validated by the personal experiences of the broadcaster and his audience, (2) charismatic leaders who become the focus of the broadcast, (3) broadcast organizations based on business values, especially efficiency and control, (4) faith in mass media technologies as ordained by God to accomplish the Great Commission to preach the Gospel and baptize new believers, (5) media-derived formats and styles of programming, and (6) spin-off ministries such as educational institutions and other missionary projects funded by contributions to the broadcaster (1989:113).

Schultze's criticisms of the electronic church are from the perspective of a mainstream Protestant interest in the use of the mass media for religious purposes. He says that the electronic church 'popularizes' religious belief in a way that rips it from the context of tradition and becomes infatuated with ritualistic expressions of optimism, demanding little personal sacrifice and appealing, rather, to selfishness. Furthermore, according to him, it sensationalizes religious belief, creating false hopes without a grounding 'on reason, evidence, Scripture and, especially, tradition' (p.117). Hand-in-hand with sensationalization goes commercialization. The electronic church's use of marketing and promotion techniques creates the image that all organized religion is merely another self-serving business, not worthy of credence or commitment. Doctrine and liturgical practices of all religions thereby become cheapened and devoid of meaning, for people who perceive them as no different from the electronic church (pp. 118-119).

Although Schultze is a Protestant, he sees the non-denominational televangelists as promoting a negative kind of 'protestantization', an anti-denominationalism which spreads an attitude of disrespect for all religious institutions. In its often untempered denunciation of the defects of institutional churches 'the electronic church instills as much scepticism as it does commitment' (p. 121). The electronic church also has revived America's technological optimism, linking it again to religion as it was in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. In short, while ostensibly calling for faith in God, it actually encourages faith in technology (p. 122). Finally, the electronic church politicizes religion, unnecessarily wedging it to political--usually conservative--causes, thereby dragging it down from the level of principle and ultimate values to that of political wrangling and expediency (pp.122-123).

For Schultze the key question facing religious broadcasters whether inside or outside the
'electronic church' is that of the 'authenticity of the message'. Each of the negative characteristics of the electronic church listed above militates in some way against the ability of the audience to perceive its message as authentic, and thereby has contributed to the growth of disbelief and scepticism. He specifies this general question in terms of each problem area: 'What are the limits of authenticity in the popularization of religious messages?' 'What are the limits of sensationalism in maintaining authentic messages?' 'How can religious messages be funded without commercialization?' 'How can religious messages be grounded in particular traditions without resorting to protestant appeals?' 'What are the real limits of various media technologies for communicating authentic beliefs?' and 'How can religious messages be politically prophetic without equating religious belief with specific political allegiances?'

The Role of Television in Religion
The questions posed by Quentin Schultze are impossible to answer definitively. As he says in a later article (in Inbody 1990:36), 'because they are relatively new, the electronic media are the most difficult to assess. Only the fool would claim to know for certain what role they should play in religious faith and practice'. Nevertheless, people who are serious about religious broadcasting must make an effort to answer the question to the best of their ability. As James D. Nelson points out (in Inbody 1990:43-58) fear of television, or disdain for it, are still widespread among religious leaders. Nevertheless the technology has created a new environment to which church authorities are now forced to adapt, whether they like it or not, just as their predecessors had to adapt to changes in their social and technical environments in the past, such as the invention of printing.

Gregor Goethals (in Inbody 1990:157-160) compares the American mass media to a huge canopy of audio-visual signs which are shared public symbols, helping people answer the questions, 'Who am I?' and 'Who are we?' Television both frames the shared beliefs of a common public faith and de-mystifies, undoes meaning and shakes up commonly held assumptions. It therefore has something of the conservative, structure-maintaining function which religion always has manifested as well as religion's equally pervasive but anti-structural prophetic function. The effort to understand this quasi-religious dual character of the mass media should thus be given high priority by those who see religion as an important part of life.

Religion and Commercial Television
If, as Gregor Goethals has said, television performs some of the important functions of religious institutions, the mainstream of television programming must also be of central interest to whoever would like to have religion remain a significant dimension of culture. Televangelism is now the most visible religious presence in the mass media, at least in the Western Hemisphere, but even it--let alone other forms of religious broadcasting--appears to have relatively little influence on any sizeable segment of the general media audience or upon the total effect of the mass media on culture. The civil religion shaped by secular television assumes greater importance by far, in this view, than all the efforts of religious broadcasters combined.

In his contribution to Ferré's book (Ferré 1990:3-27), Quentin J. Schultze moves out from his earlier critiques of televangelism to explore the narrative character of the whole television medium. According to him, narrative, especially the mythopoetic narrative of storytelling, 'is a natural way for human beings to structure experience', and 'television appears to be the major storyteller of our age'. He draws a parallel between the ways television drama functions in society and the way religious narrative functions in religious congregations. Agreeing with Horace Newcomb's view (in Ferré 1990:29-44) that television production is ritualized--artists imitating the successful patterns of the past and audiences expecting such imitation--he says that American television thereby has come to present 'an amazingly coherent source of beliefs and hopes', which reinforce and stabilize the institutions of society in a way similar to religious rituals.

At the same time, television functions as a prophet, preaching and reformulating the myths
of culture. Unlike the Hebrew prophets of old, however, television's prophecy tells people little that they do not wish to hear, since it derives its prophetic authority not from God but from the consent of its audience. Three themes predominate in this prophetic message: 'Good will triumph over evil', 'Evil exists only in the hearts of a few evil people', and 'Godliness exists in the good and effective actions of individuals'. On many counts the prophetic message of television is seen to distort or oversimplify the moral dimension of life—not only as seen by traditional religion, but even as history's outstanding secular thinkers have interpreted it.

Newcomb is somewhat more positive than Schultz, citing several examples of specific programmes which attempted to deal more deeply and effectively with moral and religious themes. In searching for something new to say, television writers will continue to explore different facets of the moral dilemmas of human life, adding a progressively more complex embroidery to Goethe's canopy of audio-visual signs. Robert S. Alley (in Ferré 1990:45-55) continues Newcomb's stress on positive elements in individual programmes, noting that many, even if not all, persons in television care about promoting good values. In a pluralistic medium, as in a pluralistic society, differences inevitably arise in the interpretation of 'good', but in the process a public forum is created where the differing interpretations criss-cross, and the mind of the responsible viewer may be opened to new insights and understandings.

PERSPECTIVE

The study of televangelism and religious mass media audiences is a microcosm of audience and media effects research in general, with at least the same degree of complexity, uncertainty and unsatisfying findings which characterize the field of effects studies as a whole. The religious commitments of many of those who carry out or criticize the research add an element of emotion to debates about it which is not usually quite so apparent in discussions of purely secular effects research, but otherwise the problems and dilemmas are similar.

The central thrust of the empirical research on electronic evangelism seems to suggest rather strongly that its significant audience—those who view or listen frequently enough and long enough to permit the assumption that they actually are paying attention to the broadcasts—is quite small compared to audiences for secular programming. Consistent enough to be persuasive, too, are the findings that the religious audiences, at least in the United States, tend to be overrepresentative of older persons, women, Protestant churchgoers, people from rural—in the US, usually southern or midwestern—backgrounds, upper-lower to lower-middle socio-economic class, people with less education than average and members of minority ethnic groups.

All this is not to say that the evangelization effect claimed for the programmes is entirely absent, since as Stewart Hoover points out people watch or listen for a wide variety of reasons, not all of them religious. Those who watch for entertainment or out of curiosity may end up being converted (in Abelman and Hoover 1990:105). Also, the small audience of the televangelists is not necessarily an indication that they cannot muster significant political power, since the size of an audience is not an indicator of its political composition or of the level of political activity among its members.

In this discussion we have largely bypassed the political question, except in Latin America, as well as the financial and sex scandals which have rocked televangelism recently. They are well enough known, and the research into audiences and religious effects—the intended effects of the broadcaster—has seemed more worthy of attention and more useful for Trends' readers. Kept in perspective, the more sensational issues seem generically little different among the televangelists than they are in any large religious institution. There is no reason to question the sincerity of the majority of broadcasters in the electronic church; although there may be reasons to disagree with their strategies and their interpretations of aspects of their ministries.

The research findings do highlight the
impression that direct evangelization by mass media can affect culture only in limited ways, and cannot of itself bring about the total conversion of society which most religious broadcasters would like to see accomplished. Studies of the 'cultivation effect', the impact on the total culture, of religious mass media are frustrated by the insignificant segment of the media occupied by religious communication. On the other hand, television, in particular, and radio, though not to the same degree, have become major shapers of culture; so the degree to which religious images, symbols and messages penetrate the mass of the secular media will influence the extent to which religion affects culture. Religious communicators who wish to influence a broad spectrum of the population with their message should therefore try to utilize an equally broad spectrum of media and programme types--drama, music, talk shows, even news and sports--not only in the form of explicitly religious programmes but through secular programming as well.

REFERENCES


CURRENT RESEARCH ON TELEEVANGELISM AND AUDIENCES FOR RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

INTERNATIONAL
Robert White (Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome), Stewart Hoover (University of Colorado, Boulder), and Eric Shegog (Church of England, London) are writing a book on religious broadcasting.

AUSTRALIA
Peter Horsfield (Theological Hall, Ormond College, Parkville, VIC 3052) continues his interest in American religious broadcasting. He recently did a study of American religious programmes on Australian media (Abelman and Hoover 1990:313-328).

BRAZIL
Hugo Assman (Department of Communication, Universidad Metodista de Piracicaba (UNIMEP), Rua Rangel Pestana 782, CP68, 13400 Piracicaba, SP) continues his research and writing about televangelism throughout Latin America.

Joana Puntel (Ediciones Paulinas, Av. Indianapolis 2752, 04062 Sao Paulo) is completing her Ph.D. thesis in Canada on 'The Electronic Church in Latin America'.

COSTA RICA
The Centro Evangélico Latinoamericano de Estudios Pastorales (CELEP - Aptdo. 1307, 1000 San José) conducted an extensive study of televangelism in four Central American countries. CELEP has offices throughout the Western Hemisphere.

ITALY
Robert White (Pontifical Gregorian University, Piazza della Pilotta, 4, 00187 Rome), has been studying media education curricula in Catholic seminaries in Nigeria, Colombia and the Philippines. (See also, 'International', above.)

The S.P.I.C.S. Seminar (Via Alessandro Severo 56, 00145 Roma), composed from communication departments of several Catholic universities in Italy and based at the Paulist University, Rome, is preparing a book on the presentation of the Catholic Mass on television and radio.

KOREA
Kim, Kyu (Department of Mass Communications, Sogang University, CPO Box 1142, Seoul) is currently on academic leave to serve as a member of the Korean National Communications Commission--the nation's highest communication supervisory body--but retains his interest in the study of the audiences for religious broadcasting.

NETHERLANDS
Yido Ypma (KRO Audience Research, Emmastraat 52, Postbus 9000. NL 1201 DH Hilversum. Tel. 035 719520) is doing audience research for IKON as well as KRO. These are two of the Dutch religious broadcasting systems, as are NCRV and EO. Research for NCRV is done by Christien den Draak and Hilde Carel (Schuttersweg 8, NL 1217 PZ Hilversum. Tel: 035 719433. Research for EO is done by Gerben van Ommen (Oude Amerisforstseweg 79a, NL 1213 AE Hilversum. Tel: 035 882 629.)

The Catholic University of Nijmegen (Comeniuslaan 4, POB 9102, 6500 HC Nijmegen) has an ongoing project, SOCON, concerning religion, culture and society, including studies of religious broadcasting.

NORWAY
Ove Ingvalstad wrote a thesis (see Ingvalstad 1989 in additional bibliography) on concepts of religious broadcasting in BBC radio (English Department, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Trondheim, University Centre, 7055 Dregvoll, Trondheim).

Knut Lundby (Department of Media and Communication, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo, POB 1072, Blindern, 0316 Oslo 3) conducts research on religious broadcasting audiences in Norway.

UNITED KINGDOM
Chris Arthur (Department of Theology, St. David's University College, University of Wales, Lampeter, Dyfed, SA48 7ED, Wales) conducts research on religious broadcasting audiences in Wales.

Michael Rowe (Keston College, Heathfield Road, Keston, Kent BR2 6BA) has been studying the religious revival in Eastern Europe.

Eric Shegog (Director of Communications, The Church of England Board of Social Responsibility, Church House, Great Smith Street, London SW1) remains interested in all aspects of religious broadcasting. (See also, 'International', above.)

UNITED STATES
Robert Abelman and Kimberly A. Neuendorf (Department of Communication, Cleveland State University, Euclid Ave. at 24th Street, Cleveland, OH 44115) have carried out a study of religion in broadcasting for USA-USA, the organization of Catholic broadcasters.

Joe E. Barnhart (Department of Philosophy, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203) continues his long-term research interest in televangelism.

The Billy Graham Center of Wheaton College (Wheaton, IL 60187) maintains archives specializing in the history of American evangelism.

James Carey (Dean, College of Communications, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801) continues his interest in the mythological dimension of religious programming.

John Ferré (Department of Communications, The University of Louisville, Louisville, KY) studies the place and treatment of religion in commercial television.

Razelle Frankl (School of Business Administration, Glassboro State College, Glassboro, NJ 08028) has studied televangelism from the perspective of marketing. She chaired a session on 'Mainstreaming Televangelism: What We Have Learned About Televangelism and How Does It Relate to Other Disciplines?' at the November 1990 meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) and Religious Research Association (RRA).

Jeffrey Hadden (Department of Sociology, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903) continues his intensive and long-term interest in the study of televangelism. He and Barry van Driel (University of California, Santa Cruz, Sta. Cruz, CA 95064) delivered a paper, 'New Religions and the Media', at the November 1989 meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion and Religious Research Association.

Stewart Hoover (University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309) recently moved to the University of Colorado to take up a joint appointment in mass communication and on the graduate faculty of ritual studies. (See also 'International', above.)


William Martin (Department of Sociology, Rice University, POB 1852, Houston, TX 77251) has recently done a study of the ministry of Billy Graham.

Gary R. Petty (Department of Communication, Cleveland State University, Euclid Ave. at 24th St, Cleveland, OH 44115) has studied cycles in religious social movements.

Andrew Quicke (Department of Communications, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA 23464-8380) is studying the implications of changes in British broadcasting policy for religious broadcasters. He delivered a paper, 'Teleevangelism Spawns New Cottage Industry' at the November 1989 meeting of the SSSR and the RRA.

Quentin J. Schultze (Department of Communication Arts and Sciences, Calvin College, 3201 Burton, SE, Grand Rapids, MI 49506) has published widely on a range of issues related to televangelism and other aspects of the interaction of religion and television. His most recent book is American Evangelism and the Mass Media.

Anson Shupe (Departments of Sociology and Anthropology, Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne, Fort Wayne, IN 46805) has written on a wide range of new religious movements, including televangelism.

**ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON TELEVANGELISM AND AUDIENCES FOR RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING**

Evangelism and Revivalism

An analysis of the causes of the resurgence in Protestant fundamentalism from both a social science and theological perspective.


**Televangelism**


... A negative view by a former 700 Club producer.

**Religion and Broadcasting in General**


Catalogues 79 books, 169 dissertations and theses, and 1,395 articles from the period.


Report of a content analysis of 1,876 articles about the Catholic Church in U.S. newspapers through the 1960s, 70s and 80s.


History and discussion of a major French Catholic effort in television, from its inception in 1949.

Lectures by the former Head of Religious Broadcasting at the BBC.


An argument against using the media for religious purposes.


A Swedish survey to study the hypothesis that 'watching TV services...provides the same amount of over-all gratification as attending church'.


**BOOK REVIEWS**


Not to be confused with the *Handbook of Intercultural Communication*, also with Asante as chief editor and published by Sage in 1979, this is an all-new compilation bringing together the closely-related fields of international and intercultural communication. Its contents consist of twenty-three articles by thirty-five authors from a wide range of cultural backgrounds, although most are connected with North American universities.

The contents are diverse, ranging from interpersonal communication between members of different ethnic groups to mediated communication among such groups, along one axis, and from comparative research to the study of interaction, along another axis. After an overview of major theories, processes and effects in international and intercultural communication are dealt with in ten chapters. Six chapters then discuss the contexts of international and intercultural communication, such as interpersonal bonds, international workplace, international marketplace, diplomacy, development, and intercultural communication training. Finally, two chapters discuss, first, research processes in general and, second, the issue of translation.

The articles generally take the form of reviews of the recent research in each area, and are accompanied by abundant bibliographical references.


Although Brazil won its independence from Portugal in 1822, different emperors ruled the country until Pedro II abdicated in 1889 and a republic was formed.

In this symposium celebrating the 'Centenary of the Brazilian Republic' communication researchers studied in a multidisciplinary way the role of communication media a hundred years ago. Experts in history (of politics, culture and communication), iconography, theater, literature, art and communication have studied the following issues: the cultural modernization project of the Republic at that time, photography as an ideological tool, the theatre, journalism, caricature, cartoons, chronicles, and even architecture as a promoter of the ideals of 'Order and Progress'.


This monograph is an effort to resurrect the seemingly moribund ethics of narrative. Booth considers the often conflicting things which many authorities have said about the ethics of story-telling. He aims first to restore intellectual legitimacy to the idea that there can be both good and bad stories—something common sense always has told us—and, second, to apply ethical criticism not just to particular, stable works but to broaden it to include fluid conversation about the qualities of the company we keep and the company that we ourselves provide.

For Booth ethics goes beyond morality to encompass the entire range of effects narrative can have on the person. The 'dialogue' generated between novelist and reader involves a pattern of life proposed by a would-be friend, comparable to a proposal which might occur in a face-to-face relationship. Is it a pattern which true friends might pursue together, to their mutual benefit? Or is it a perverse offer, like that of sadist to masochist, of rapist to victim, or of exploiter to exploited?

Booth notes that a full ethic of the novel must take into account the careful separation between the author's own
views and those expressed by his characters. Mark Twain did not necessarily share the 'racist' traits for which many black critics have condemned Huckleberry Finn, 'one of the greatest books of the world', which, in the context of its time, struck one of the most telling blows against racism. The responsibility of the reader (or listener or viewer) is just as great as that of the novelist, narrator or playwright.

In Booth's view an ethics of criticism is not an 'open-and-shut' case, but is relative to the situation, here and now, of each reader. He suggests the 'pragmatic choice of a critical pluralism—a pluralism with limits'.

José Goldemberg and José Marques de Melo, eds. Direito à informação, direito de opiniao (A right.to information, a right to opinion). ECA/USP, São Paulo, Brazil, 1990, 200 pp.

Intellectuals and public opinion leaders had been criticizing the deformities and distortions of information, that occur frequently in Brazilian mass media, so owners and journalists of the main newspapers and radio and TV stations got together with union leaders, lawmakers, advertisers and professors in a colloquium organized by the School of Communication at the University of São Paulo, to discuss 'the right to information, the right to give opinion'.

Certainly the public has a right to be informed, and democracy should guarantee the expression of a plurality of positions, but this is not respected in practice, at least in Brazil, according to the conclusions of the colloquium. Personal opinions of journalists, owners or editing boards usually go into signed articles and editorials. But they go disguised, too, in news, even by the way space and location are given to news. This is done because mass media are powerful means to acquire or preserve power and to defend ideas and interests. The issue is how power is exercised on the final product of mass communication.

On one side owners, in the mood of classical liberalism, usually do not want any legislation or censorship. On the other side the right to answer is proclaimed, journalists and advertisers agree to follow the ethics code, readers or listeners want to organize themselves in order to defend their own interests, the 'ombudsman' can be inside editorial teams and more space or time can be given to readers or listeners in each mass medium. Finally, both sides desire that universities give better training through professional and ethical formation.


This introductory reader is in Routledge's 'Studies in Culture and Communication' series, which has John Fiske as its general editor. The contributing authors, who include Paddy Scannell, editor of the journal Media, Culture and Society, come from Britain, America and Australia, and tend to represent the approach of the British critical 'school' of communication studies.

Scannell's chapter outlines the history of public service broadcasting, typified by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and discusses the various pros and cons of the principle. In Britain it continues to provide a counter force against the complete domination of broadcasting by commercial forces which otherwise might occur.

Other contributions deal with the family and television, bias in news coverage, ideology, documentary drama, the 'hegemonic' function of television entertainment, sports and game show competition on television, gender in soap opera, situation comedy, ethnicity, the ways audiences receive and understand television, and trends in technological innovation—almost all in the context of British broadcasting.


The symbolic world of the Yekuana people of southern Venezuela, described in this ethnography, is best exemplified by their basketry, whose designs are believed to contain great power for good or evil. Guss went among the Yekuans to study their narrative, but found that stories are told by them in snatches and fragments, never really complete, but interweaving with life like the canes of their carefully constructed baskets. The all-encompassing narrative of Yekuana life is paralleled by the complex symbolic world evoked by the baskets' bold geometric designs. The two, together, interacting with the physical world, construct the Yekuana understanding of reality. Weaving a basket is weaving the world, and all events in the Yekuana's experience are as meaningful and interwoven as are the parts of a basket.

José Marques de Melo, ed. Comunicação comparada: Brasil/Espanha (Comparative Communication: Brazil/Spain). IPCJA (Instituto de Pesquisas de Comunicação e Artes), Universidade de São Paulo, Edições Loyola, São Paulo, Brazil, 1990, 176 pp.

This work consists of articles of historic reflection and sociopolitical comparison by Brazilian communication scholars on the behaviour of mass media during the process of democratic transition experienced by both Spain and Brazil. The descriptive analysis is based on academic and professional literature.

The book is for teachers and students of Schools of Communication, who want a modern study of comparative communication. It is also for professionals who work in mass media so that they can see how societies in process of change think, feel and act through their social patterns and collective behaviour.

Finally, it asks that political leaders not consider mass media just as mere instruments on behalf of their personal interests. Rather they should know that this industrial culture has a decisive importance for mass education, and that the state should act courageously in defense of public interest, although respecting the rights of minorities at the same time.


Which challenges face communication research in Latin
It certainly has conquered a specific and legitimate academic space after three decades, in which the European and the US methodological models were not completely applied in Latin America. They do not always answer wholly the basic needs of the majority of the Latin American population. Nevertheless, solutions are not easily found.

There is also a crisis of the functionalist paradigm based on the quantitative method and of the marxist paradigms based on the School of Frankfurt and Gramsci's perspective. Finally, which is the best type of research for communication: the theoretical/critical (that comes from the academic world) or the empirical/functional (that is required by the professional market)? How to establish a dialogue between the critical and functional research?

During the 70s research as a denunciation flourished. It was based on the postulations of the critical theory of Frankfurt and on the dialectic method of Althusser. It was used because authoritarianism dominated Latin America. But is it right to continue with that line of thought after military governments have failed and democracy is being rebuilt in many countries?

The main trends in Latin American communication research are reviewed in this book, together with the main research centres, such as CIESPAL.


One hundred experts (professors, academic researchers, professionals and mass media entrepreneurs, political and diplomatic personalities) from 13 countries got together to study the relations between Iberian Europe (Spain and Portugal) and Latin America, (the fourth such under the same sponsorship).

The discussion comes from these facts and presuppositions: Spain and Portugal will join the European Community in 1992, Latin America should also integrate within itself, and some kind of integration of Spain and Portugal with Latin America, which has similar cultural and historical roots, should be looked at. How should mass media behave so that they help the integration process at all levels.

This kind of discussion is possible now that dictatorships and military governments have been discarded by Spain, Portugal and Latin America.


The updating of Communication teaching was studied in a National Colloquium participated in by 21 Schools of Communication from all over Brazil, together with representatives of different communication research organizations.

The main items discussed were: historical transformations of University teaching, the demands of the labour market, which determines whether students get a professional job after their graduation, and finally the social-political-economic changes that occur at the national and international level, and influence teaching in some way.


A collaborative effort by Powers and McLuhan, before the latter's death in 1980, is brought to completion in this volume, which outlines a conceptual model for understanding recent technological changes in communication and consequent changes in human consciousness.

The authors say that the Western world has been characterized by 'Visual Space'--linear and quantitative perception--well adapted to print media, but that the East has been characterized by 'Acoustic Space'--holistic and qualitative--better suited to the dynamic, 'many-centred' orientation of the new, electronic media. To prevent conflict between these two perspectives in the diminishing confines of the 'Global Village' into which the world has been turned by technological developments both systems must be understood and integrated.

Reflecting the 'left-brain/right-brain' dichotomy of functions, the interaction of the two perspectives in given situations is conceptualized in terms of 'tetrads', each consisting of two 'figure-ground' patterns in complementary balance. On the one hand 'enhancement' and 'obsolescence' constitute, respectively, the 'figure' and 'ground', while on the other these positions are taken by 'retrieval' and 'reversal'.

One of the many examples of this process listed in a 'tetradic glossary' at the end of the book is that of radio and television (page 175). The growth of these media: (A) Improves (regional) simultaneous access to entire planet--everybody: "On the air you're everywhere"; (B) Ooselaces wires, cables, and physical bodies; (C) Retrieves tribal ecological environments: echo, trauma, paranoia, and also brings back primacy of the spatial, musical, and acoustic; (D) Reverses into global village theater (Orson Welles's Invasion From Mars: no spectators, only actors)!


Taylor traces the 'family' theme through the history of U.S. television. The theme encompasses more than the kinship group, since television has treated pubs (Cheers), police stations (Hill Street Blues), army units (M.A.S.H.), and newspaper offices (Lou Grant) all as quasi-families. Some of the most successful shows have nevertheless dealt directly with families, usually in the situation comedy genre. These began with the star-focused shows of the 1950s, and became the polished shows of the late 1980s, with their stress on characterization, such as The Cosby Show or Family Ties.

Throughout its four decades, the television family has retained both its typical affluence and its affable coherence, as real American families came apart at the seams. One TV shift has been from 'zany' happy families to those who, in more pluralistic forms, face somewhat more realistic problems--though never with the disastrous consequences.
such problems often have for real families. During the 1970s, in particular, family-theme programmes experimented with some of the real challenges faced in family life, and some of this open discussion survived through the '80s. Inevitably, however, the commercial imperatives of the industry have worked to set limits on the articulation of ambiguity, uncertainty, and the dissident voice.

IN MEMORIAM

Father Pedro Arrupe, S.J.
1907-1991

Superior General of the Society of Jesus
1965-1983

Founder, Centre for the Study of Communication and Culture
1977

'Grant me, O Lord, to see everything now with new eyes, to discern and test the spirits that help me read the signs of the times, to relish the things that are yours, and to communicate them to others.'

Personal Prayer of Pedro Arrupe, S.J.
ERRATUM: In our last issue (Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 11) an omission of several words made it appear that a rather dated estimate of the BBC World Service audience has originated not only with the McBride report, but also with the article, 'Audiences for International Broadcasts' by Graham Mytton and Carol Forrester, in European Journal of Communication', Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1988). The page number in the citation also was in error. The passage should have read as follows:

In the late 1970s, the BBC estimated its regular (at least once-a-week) World Service listeners at around 75 million, and that the Service's total audience was about 130 million (McBride 1980, pg. 73); by 1988 regular listeners had risen to 120 million (Mytton and Forrester 1988:481n).

Our apologies to the authors.

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