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After Development Journalism:
Asia and Africa

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After Development Journalism: Asia and Africa

Editor's Introduction

Researchers have referred to journalism that serves the development goals of governments as "development journalism," a phenomenon well known in the developing economies of the global south. "Usually called development support communication, such journalism uses all forms—mass media, folk media, and small group and interpersonal communication—to promote the total development plans of an authoritarian regime" (Ogan, 1980, p. 1). In many of these countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, journalists had aligned themselves with the anti-colonial movements that eventually took power after independence. The journalism that these groups continued to produce often supported their governments.

The practice described by Ogan dates from the early years of many of these countries' histories. That kind of journalism may have appeared odd or even corrupt when evaluated from the narrow perspectives of journalism in the United States, which still adhered to a model of a non-partisan, independent, seemingly objective journalism designed to hold the government to account.

However, not surprisingly, things do change, both in the countries and in their journalism. The three essays in this issue of COMMUNICATION RESEARCH TRENDS provide an update on the journalism of Asia and Africa. The journalistic practices they narrate describe a situation that has developed after the development journalism stage and, in some ways, challenges the existing journalism order. In each case, the relationship between the journalistic order and their respective governments has foundered upon the reef of the Internet, which has rewritten the rules of the game.

Muhammad Izawan, Baharin Moniza Waheed, and Lea Hellmueller introduce a changed journalism in Malaysia, one that affects not only reporting but also the political alliances that have defined the country. The impact of digital media platforms appears clearly in the election results of the last several general elections.

Robert White focuses on the continent of Africa, sketching how journalists in a number of countries across the region have challenged what White calls the "neo-patrimonial" state. His analysis frames this new approach to journalism in terms of specific themes: challenges to control, the rise of critical reporting, the support of protest movements, the support of human rights, and the freedom of information movements.

Of all these countries, India has a more mature journalistic culture, though one that often supports the government. Aayush Soni describes how digital platforms have freed journalists to redefine political engagement, particularly for the rising middle class.

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The Impact of Digital Media Platforms on the Ethnic-Based Political System in Malaysia

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1. Introduction: A Glimpse of Malaysia's Political System

Malaysia, a Southeast Asian multi-ethnic country, has a long history of colonialism. Gaining its independence in 1957, the country has known the same ruling party ever since: Barisan Nasional (BN). This coalition, first known as the Alliance (1955–74), later changed its name to BN in 1974 (Segawa, 2015). BN consists of 13 component parties based on ethnicities with three dominant alliances, namely the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) (Fee & Appudurai, 2011). According to Segawa (2015), BN has survived for 60 years because each component within the party represents the individual ethnicities' interests and identities.

We can partly attribute this consistency to the practice of development journalism, where the news media functions as a government machinery (Tamam & Abdullah, 2015). According to Welsh (1996), Malaysians are willing to limit democracy if it threatens social order. However, the general election in 2008 marked the beginning of changes in the media and the political landscape in Malaysia. Results from that election sparked the public's realization and awareness for a better democracy which would involve greater media freedom (Tamam & Abdullah, 2015). We can also attribute this partly to the beginning of high Internet penetration levels in the country starting in 1995. In January 2017, Malaysia ranked fifth in the world for social media penetration after United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Kemp, 2017). The pro-government mainstream media began to face competition from online news portals—something which may play a role in causing the citizens' votes to sway.

Against the backdrop of the decades-long tradition of development journalism, this essay aims to shed historical light on the media-government partnership and the power-sharing formula in the form of ethnic-based political parties in Malaysia. Surprisingly, researchers have published little about the emergence of new independent media portals in this majority Muslim country. The second aim of this conceptual essay is therefore to analyze the increasing numbers of independent media portals and the potential shift they bring to the political system. To gain a better understanding of Malaysia's media landscape, we first discuss several factors that explain its multi-ethnicity composition such as the development of politics since gaining independence and the large influence of development journalism with close ties to the government. In the second step, we map new trends and developments as well as the introduction of independent news platforms and their impact on local politics. In the concluding sections, we discuss the impact that the developments have on democracy in Malaysia as well as present new directions for future research on journalism in non-Western contexts and in systems in which politics and religion are intertwined with developments in the media market.

A. Colonialism in Malaysia

Malaysia has a long history of colonialism dating from 1511. First the Portuguese (1511–1624), then the Dutch (1624–1886), the British (1886–1943), the Japanese (1943–1945) and finally the British once again (1945–1957) governed the country (Hooker, 2003). Now independent for more than 60 years, the Malaysian people have gone through various changes since then,

in areas pertaining to the modernization of agriculture, economy, manufacturing, industrialization, and urbanization (Pepinsky, 2013). The one constant element in Malaysia, or known as Malaya (during British colonialism period) is the government. BN has always held power in the Malaysian government. As noted before, BN consists of an elite pact formed between the UMNO, MCA and MIC (Lee, 2016). However, Malaysia encompasses more than the three main ethnicities; the establishment of Malaysia on 16 September, 1963 after the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak expanded the multi-ethnic composition to include other ethnic groups such as the Ibans, Dayaks, Kadazans, Muruts, and Melanaus that are also recognized as Bumiputeras (sons of the soil) (Saad, 2012).

The Department of Statistics Malaysia (2016) estimates the population of Malaysia at 31.7 million people, with Malays and other Bumiputera groups recording the highest percentage, 68.6%, followed by Chinese (23.4%), Indians (7.0%), and others (1.0%). The British brought the Chinese and Indians to Malaysia to meet the demands for labor after the establishment of the Straits Settlements comprising of Penang, Singapore, and Malacca in 1826 in order to protect their colonial economic interests in the booming tin-mining industry and rubber plantations (Ahmad Fauzi, 2007; Case, 1996). During that time, the British divided the ethnicities into three main socioeconomic fractions: The Malays in agriculture, the Chinese in commerce, and the Indians

in plantation (Fee & Appudurai, 2011; Haque, 2003). The Chinese and Indians who settled in Malaya before 1957 were naturalized as Malaysian citizens.

The first challenge faced by the country with the emergence of the Malays' political awareness involved resistance to the intentions of the British in 1946 to abolish the Malay monarchy's sovereignty and no longer recognize the Malays' special rights as indigenous people. This marked the beginning of UMNO. The party was established to protect the Malays' interests and rights (Brown, 2007; Segawa, 2015). Since then, a coalition of political parties under the BN has governed Malaysia by adopting the idea of a power- sharing or consociational political system, where each ethnic party and community must cooperate for the purpose of conflict avoidance and nation-building.

Malaysia's political system features a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy and His Majesty the King as the Paramount Ruler. Malaysia also practices a system of democracy based on the Federation system. Within this system, the 13 states of Malaysia surrendered part of their powers such as financial, defense, education, foreign affairs, and others to the administration of the Federal Government (Official Portal of The Parliament of Malaysia - History of Parliament of Malaysia, 2017).

At the 13th general election in 2013, BN won only 133 seats in the 222-seat House of Representatives, lost the popular vote by only gaining 47.4%

Political parties in the House of Representatives.

BN Component Parties

United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)
Malaysian People's Movement Party (GERAKAN)
People's Progressive Party (MyPPP)
United Bumiputera Heritage Party (PBB)
Sabah United Party (PBS)
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
United Sabah People's Party (PBRS)
United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut
    Organisation (UPKO)
Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP)
Sarawak People's Party (PRS)
Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP)

Opposition Parties

People's Justice Party (PKR)
Democratic Action Party (DAP)
National Trust Party (AMANAH)
Malaysian United Indigenous Party (PPBM)
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)
Socialist Party of Malaysia (PSM)
Sabah Heritage Party (WARISAN)

Source: "Official Portal of The Parliament of Malaysia - Political Parties," (2017)

compared to the opposition coalition that won 50.9%, but still managed to form a government under the Westminster style first-past-the-post voting system (Welsh, 2013). Currently, the ruling party is still convinced that for the welfare of the multiethnic citizens of Malaysia, the country must maintain the status quo of having ethnic based political parties.

B. Gaining independence

Malaysia experienced an historical racial riot between the Malays and Chinese on 13 May 1969 that forced the government to apply emergency measures. According to Brown (2007), the government blamed the Malays' economic backwardness as a result of the legacy of British colonial period for the riot. Hence it decided that it had to implement a policy to change the imbalanced economic situation.

This became the turning point for the government's plans for an affirmative action policy known as the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1979–1990). NEP expanded the Malays' special rights in investment, capital ownership, and education. Through NEP, the Malays' and Bumiputeras' economic situation improved. The governments granted them access to licenses, shares, import permits, contracts and public funds from government backed agencies (Amran & Devi, 2008). The NEP then evolved into the National Development Policy (NDP, 1990–2010) and later, the New Economic Model (NEM, 2010–present) (Abbott, 2011; Yang & Md Sidin, 2014). The affirmative policy

generated much of the scholarly debate about creating a situation whereby some hold that the Malays have become overly dependent towards the government, thus creating lopsided development among the Malaysian ethnicities (Amran & Devi, 2008; Derichs, 2002; Moten, 2009). Although the non-Malays may be uncomfortable with such a policy, the BN nevertheless managed to survive for a long time because most Malaysian citizens have tolerated their policies in each general election (Case, 1996; Segawa, 2015).

One cannot deny that the BN's position has been under threat in the last two general elections (2008 and 2013). In the 12th general election in 2008, BN lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Observers attributed his loss to the strength of the opposition political parties' coalition—the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) consisting of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), and Democratic Action Party (DAP)—an economic slowdown, an increase of the cost of living, and the influence of social media (Mohd Azizuddin & Zengeni, 2008). The results of the 13th general election in 2013 worsened for BN after it only managed to secure 133 seats compared to 89 by opposition alliances, dropping further from its 140 seats in the 2008 general election. People also considered it the worst party performance after losing their popular vote for the first time since 1969 (Gomez, 2014a). This occurred despite efforts of Malaysia's current Prime Minister Najib Razak to to rebrand the administration by introducing various national transformation agendas.

2. Challenges of the Ruling Party after the 2008 National General Election

After losing its two-thirds majority in the 2008 general election, the fifth Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi had to step down and his deputy, Najib Razak, took over his position in April 2009. Najib still serves as Malaysia's Prime Minister. Najib soon adopted various changes throughout his administration, including the Government Transformation Program (GTP) and the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) to serve the people better, rejuvenate the government, and to secure the future of the country (Government Transformation Programme, 2010; Economic Transformation Programme A Roadmap For Malaysia, 2010). The most high profile campaign that received extensive coverage from the media was the

theme "1Malaysia" that promotes the concept of fairness, ethnic harmony, and economic growth (Jaharudin, 2014).

These efforts, however, failed to translate into votes at the ballot box. According to Jaharudin (2014), the 2013 election results indicated the manifestation of changes in terms of voters' demands towards a more effective economic and social structure, as well as the formation of a new identity among young people who believe in different values. The political landscape in Malaysia has simmered with other controversies surrounding Najib. Among the allegations include his involvement in a money laundering scheme within a development company owned by the Malaysian gov-

ernment, also known as 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB); the increase of national debt; and the rising cost of living due to the implementation of unpopular policies such as the Goods and Services Tax (GST); and reduction of subsidies on several goods (Mahathir Mohamad, 2015). Najib's administration has worked hard to win back the support, but the disappointing election results raises the question of whether this has signaled the beginning of the end of racialization in a plural society. (Fee & Appudurai, 2011).

A. The effects of digital media on the 2008 General Elections

In the beginning, social media platforms, blogs, and news portals did not gain serious attention from the government. They did not have any major impact in the 2004 General Election which saw the BN win once again (Muhamad, 2015). During the 11th General Election on March 2004, BN won 198 parliament seats, leaving the opposition only with 21 seats. According to Rajaratnam (2009), the factors that contributed to BN's enormous win related to the voters' hope after the end of Mahathir's leadership (Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister) of 22 years in power. At that time, the most plausible candidate for the Prime Minister's position was Abdullah Badawi, a fatherly person known as "Mr Clean." However, Anwar posed no threat to the position because he was in prison and had established an oposition party while behind bars. The election campaign filled with promises to fight corruption, promoting transperancy and better governance.

The 2008 general election, however, managed to shake the grounds on which BN stood. The party lost a substantial number of votes. Some attributed this to Abdullah's failure to deliver on his promises. People saw him as a weak leader with his anti-corruption pledge working too slowly and who handled religious issues poorly. In order to deal with Malaysia's poor economic situation at that time, the government drastically cut fuel subsidies which caused the prices to increase by 20 cents in 2005 and a second time by 90 cents in 2006. This sparked tremendous public resistance and a series of protests in March 2006 (Moten, 2009).

Another reason for its dwindling support in 2008 arose from the BN's loss in the online war with the opposition. They underestimated the power of social media (Lalitha & Balakrishnan, 2013). In 2007, Malaysia had 14 million Internet users (Lalitha & Balakrishnan, 2013). The opposition parties had familiarized themselves with the utilization of various forms of digital media such as blogs, YouTube, and online independent news sites. These formed their primary campaign machineries (Moten, 2009).

The results from the 2008 general election proved that digital media had a strong influence on the voters' political decisions. Two weeks after the election, Abdullah admitted that the government underestimated the power of online news platforms:

> We certainly lost the Internet war, the cyber-war. We made the biggest mistake in thinking that it was not important. We thought that the newspapers, the print media, the television was supposed to be important, but the young people were looking at SMS and blogs. (AFP, 2008)

The fairly free Internet in Malaysia at that time provided an opportunity to the opposition parties that had not appeared before (Willnat, Wong, Tamam, & Aw, 2013). The cyberspace hosted hundreds of Malaysian political bloggers who offered strong anti-government commentaries and presented themselves as a substitute for the government-controlled mainstream media (Yoong, 2008). Mohd Sani (2009) stated that for many years, the government would warn the citizens that toppling them in the elections would only increase racial tensions in the country. However, with alternative online news, this fear appeal seemed to have lost its effect on people. The 2008 election marked the beginning of when many politicians acknowledged the power of the Internet as a new medium to reach out to the voters. In this election, awareness of the presence of opposition parties online rose and heavy users of online media in Malaysia displayed higher levels of political participation (Willnat et al., 2013). However, they were not more likely to vote.

B. The effects of social media on the 13th General Election

The 13th general election in 2013 marked the rise of digital platforms as political communication channel by both the government and opposition political parties. The utilization of social media such as Facebook and Twitter by political parties and politicians reached an all time high during the campaign season. The target audience for this method of campaigning was young and first time voters. Prime Minister Najib Razak claimed the 13th general election as Malaysia's first "social media election." According to Lim's early analysis (2013), social media did not form the biggest factor influencing the election results, but they definitely increased the tempo of political discussions and debates.

Almost all parties and candidates established their own websites, blogs, and social media accounts like Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube. This indicated a significant change in the campaigning methods compared to the 2008 elections. Najib also participated in the social media frenzy. According to Mohd Sani (2014), after Najib's actively participating in social media, the Internet monitoring site Socialbakers stated that Najib's Twitter hashtag (@NajibRazak) recorded the highest number of followers in Malaysia with 1,510,127 and 11th highest in the world in the category of politicians. Additionally, on the Facebook's Fan page, Najib ranked in second place for the most "liked" politician with 1,633,812 "Likes," falling short of the Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister, Mahathir who had 2,085,034 "Likes."

The opposition parties also increased their presence in cyberspace. According to Tapsell (2013), the oppositions effectively used Twitter as an artificial media center to distribute information. This dissemination effort went undetected by the mainstream media and government news sites. The most infamous cybertroopers during 13th general election was DAP's "Red Bean Army." This term used by UMNO bloggers described the "keyboard warriors" that supported DAP and aggressively posted articles, comments, satirical photographs, and banners against Najib and other UMNO leaders. Najib had even called for an open warfare with Red Bean Army by urging UMNO members to counter the "false views" about himself and the party (FMT Reporters, 2015). DAP denied the accusations that they funded the cybertroopers and claimed that the so-called Red Bean Army were mostly "angry" Chinese young men that wanted to express their dissatisfaction against the government (Tapsell, 2013).

During the 13th General Election, BN dominated the Twitter sphere (Kasmani, Sabran, & Ramle, 2014). Their hashtag #PRU13 appeared prominently in almost 43.7% of tweets. Both BN and Najib successfully improved their online presence but the domination of social media did not reflect the ballot box results. BN only managed to secure 133 seats compared to 89 by the opposition. Gomez (2014a) noted that the general election result indicated a failure on the part of the government to handle the rising cost of living, corruption, and equal opportunities for all Malaysians.

Regardless of the election outcome, we cannot deny that digital media brought a new dimension to Malaysian politics. It enhanced the quality of democracy by providing equal opportunity for opinion expression. According to Rajaratnam (2009) digital media broke the monopoly of the mainstream media and enabled people to openly speak about changing the government. This inevitably caused concerns regarding the unlimited and uncensored used of the digital media platform. The Internet brought both benefits and detriments. The latter appear in forms of the manipulation of facts that in turn publicized slanders and lies that can cause racial tensions. In addition to that, citizens allegedly uploaded pornographic videos and pictures of political leaders which the political parties used to smear the reputations of one another (Lalitha & Balakrishnan, 2013). The methods of political campaigning on social media differ greatly from those on traditional media which was governed by Development Journalism.

C. The influence of development journalism

Researchers have noted the acceptance of development journalism in developing nations such as Malaysia, India, and China. These countries generally focus on local development issues such as rural development, health, and environment. Here, the roles of journalism include the dissemination of governmental or national policies. The coverage on these issues seeks to mobilize the masses in an effort to achieving economic development (McKay, 1993; Wong, 2004). At the same time, many have criticized this journalism practice, with a focus on the government control of the media in order to maintain its influences and power.

The history of development journalism in Malaysia (or Malaya) dates back to the 1920s and 1930s, when the literacy rates among the society increased due to the availability of education (Hooker, 2003). Journalism took as its main purpose initially to serve the colonial interests to push for religious reforms and influence the political awareness of the Malays, especially, to gain independence from the British Empire (Ng & Lim, 2008; Lent, 1978). Anand (2014) posits that development journalism appears most clearly when journalists become effective partners of the government in the nation building process. The journalists do this by focusing on the government's activities in developing the states and country.

In order to maintain peace and harmony among Malaysia's multi-ethnic and multi-religion society, Malaysia's Constitution provides its citizen with "the right to freedom of speech and expression" but allows for limitations on this right (Azlan, Rahim, Basri, & Hasim, 2012). The limitation states that the govern-

ment must eradicate any views or attempts that can allegedly harm the harmony of multi-ethnic relationships and the national stability to protect the citizens (Mohd Sani, 2008). This also applies to the media, where the state makes journalism responsible to strengthen the relationships between ethnicities and shape a conducive political culture.

The practice of development journalism in Malaysia was reinforced in the early 1970s, when the government felt the importance of social change and modernization (Wong, 2004). According to Anuar (2005), Malaysia's former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, later championed the practice of development journalism. He believed this practice necessary to maintain a national unity that would secure Malaysia's economic development. With this justification to protect the multi-ethnic and multi-religious harmony, the government controls the media through ownership and legislation such as the Printing Press and Publications Act (PPPA) of 1984, the Sedition Act of 1948 and the Official Secret Act (OSA) (Mohd Azizuddin, 2014; Mustafa, 2014; Steele, 2009). Through PPPA, printing press organizations must apply for an annual permit granted by the Home Affairs Minister; it is a criminal offence if any of those organizations fail to do so.

The Sedition Act prohibits any speech, act, publication, or other things that have seditious tendencies; OSA, on the other hand, allows the prosecution of anyone (including journalists) who publishes official information without authorization (Abbott & Givens, 2015; Gong, 2011). Scholars, however, have criticized the government's actions because it controls the flow of information in a way that maintains the ruling political party's power (Mustafa, 2005; Tamam & Abdullah, 2015). This creates a suppressive atmosphere that leads to successive undermining of freedom of opinion and media pluralism.

The government's control over the media has affected Malaysia's media freedom rating over the years. Freedom House (2016) reports that Malaysia's press freedom scores have dropped from 65 to 67 points in 2015 due to the implementation of the Sedition Act of 1948 to arrest and charge several journalists who were critical towards the controversy of 1MDB. The issue arose in 2015, when several foreign newspapers and news portals reported that the 1MDB company had channeled funds into the accounts of Malaysia's current Prime Minister and others linked to him (Nazmi & Rahim, 2016). During the wake of the 1MDB issue, the mainstream media maintained their position as pro-government. This occurred although Najib, in his early years as Prime Minister, tried to reform media freedom by reviewing the PPPA and abolished the need for annual license renewal among media organizations (Ahmad & Othman, 2014).

Some scholars such as Wong (2004) claimed that development journalism lacked fair and independent press coverage. Some have said that the practice of development journalism in Malaysia simply creates a modern version of a traditional authoritarian approach. This situation appears most evidently during the election campaign period where only the BN receives ample airtime and publication space on mainstream media. This practice not only creates a bias among citizens but insinuates that BN remains the government and will continue as such (Gomez, 2014b).

D. The influence of religion on journalism

In secularized Western societies, religion exists independently from secular life. According to Mowlana (2003), the separation of Islam from the secular sphere has never materialized. He stated that although some have attempted such a separation, the process was never completed. Malaysia, similar to Indonesia, has a majority of Muslim journalists. Since religion guides the daily lives of Malaysians, we can assume that religion may also affect the carrying out of professional duties in journalism. However, according to Steele (2011), scholars have not explored the ideology of mainstream journalists in Indonesia and Malaysia.

A stark difference exists in the understanding of media freedom, particularly when comparing Malaysia to the United States. The U.S., a Western democratic country, subscribes to the popular understanding that the role of the press has its roots in the ideas of the Enlightenment and the doctrine of natural rights (Levy, 1985). It therefore understands journalism as a secular occupation. The interpretation differs when one considers the strong influence of Islam on journalism in Malaysia: "Malaysiakini's Fathi Aris Omar similarly said, 'in terms of ethics, journalism is almost 100% the same as the goals of religion: to seek justice, to help the poor, to promote equal distribution of wealth, and to fight against corruption'" (Steele, 2011, p. 536). Despite this, some argue that despite the important role of Islam in Malaysia, the media are still bounded to laws and regulations, even when reporting on Islamic related issues.

Some research implies that the government may use religion as an indirect persuasion technique in

order to win more votes. Manaf and Sedu (2015) found that, during the election season, news reports on Islamic related issues (that appear mostly in Malay-language newspapers) tend to be pro-government. A similar situation exists for the news coverage of Chinese-language newspapers on Islamic related issues. A study by Yong and Ishak (2010) found that the news report concerning Islamic issues in the Malaysian Chinese newspaper, the Sin Chew Daily, plays a surveillance role. One could argue that this is predictable, regardless of the role of religion. But we cannot ignore how the various laws and regulations for the Malaysian media aim at preserving the government's political power (Dafrizal, Ibrahim, & Ahmad, 2011).

3. Digital Media Platforms in Malaysia

A. The rise of digital media platforms

Due to the limited flexibility within the role of the mainstream media, a growing number of independent news portals that serve as platforms for opposition parties have emerged (Manaf & Sedu, 2015; Lumsden, 2013). According to Mohd Sani (2014), the citizens utilize the Internet as a platform to criticize the government. This practice began after the government sacked the former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and removed him from the government in 1998. Since then, the opposition parties managed to establish their own web sites, and the independent news portals began to emerge as providers of alternative information to the public.

The Reformasi (Reformation) Movement in September 1998 caused by the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim managed to change the Malaysian political landscape. His supporters joined protests on the streets of Kuala Lumpur and other major cities. At the same time, the government championed the development of information technology under the jurisdiction of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). The growth of this sector served as an opened window for Anwar's supporters, cyber troopers, and sympathizers. To show support for Anwar, and/or dissatisfaction with the government, they formed online communication platforms to spread alternative information. This new platform existed free from limitations or restriction to spread propaganda and information (Salleh, 2013). At a time when information and communication technology (ICT) was at its infancy, opposition political figures such as Anwar and Lim Kit Siang had begun their blog sites to provide regular updates.

B. Blogs

In the early 2000s, the opposition parties actively utilized online platforms such as blogs to broadcast videos of parliamentary debates (Muhamad, 2015). This gained popularity as the alternative channels provided information from a refreshing angle (compared to the mainstream media). During this time, the blogging phenomenon grew quickly. When Facebook and Twitter appeared in the ICT world, the opposition parties quickly adopted them and they quickly became a staple for information diffusion.

A well known Malaysian socio-political blogger, Ahirudin Attan (or better known for his blog "Rocky's Bru") categorized the development of political blogs in Malaysia into three waves (Salleh, 2013). The first wave of bloggers debuted during the reformation era and became known as the "sifu" (master) bloggers. The second wave became known as the Jeff Ooi era (Jeff Ooi was an IT consultant by profession and is currently a politician). Finally, the third wave form the era of Raja Petra Kamarudin of Malaysia Today. Malaysia Today is a blog site which offers independent news online.

Considering the development of political blogs, one would assume that Malaysians manifest a high interest in politics and that political participation has significantly increased. However, Weiss (2012) claimed that Malaysian blogs in general lean towards entertainment rather than politics. His survey in 2007 shows that only 16% of Malaysia's top 50 bloggers wrote on politics. This list included those from the three waves. Jeff Ooi's "Screenshots" blog ranks number four, followed by Ahirudin Attan's "Rocky's Bru" at number 10, and Lim Kit Siang's blog at number 11.

C. Independent news sites

The rise of independent news portals offered news from a different perspective to Malaysians. These portals did not fall under the regulations of the PPPA. Among the popular independent news portals are Malaysiakini and The Malaysian Insider. A former journalist of The Star newspaper, Steven Gan, and a businessman, Prem Chandran, founded Malaysiakini

in November 1999. Similarly, a group of businessmen and journalists established The Malaysian Insider in February 2008. Allegedly George Soros and the U.S.-based National Endowment for Democracy have funded these sites. Some have critized the sites for becoming too opposition friendly (Abbott & Givens, 2015). Nevertheless, by providing news coverage that seems taboo by the mainstream media, these news portals have gained popularity by providing the other side of certain issues.

4. Law Enforcement for Misconducts on Digital Media

The problem of misconduct on digital media platforms proved to be a challenge to the Malaysian political scene, which had to deal with it. Therefore, the governments enforced two regulations: the Communication and Multimedia Act 1998 and the Sedition Act 1948. According to Yong (2016), section 263(2) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 prohibits a person from making any comment, request, suggestion, or other forms of communication that is obscene, indecent, false, menacing, or offensive with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person. Under this law, a person who commits an offence will be liable to a fine or imprisonment or to both.

The Sedition Act 1948, on the other hand, prohibits any seditious tendencies towards sensitive constitutional issues. This refers to (1) the King or government; (2) the Malaysian administration of justice; (3) races or classes of the population of Malaysia; and (4) the right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty, or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III of the Federal Constitution or Articles 152, 153, or 181 of the Federal Constitution (Part III involving nationality or citizenship; Article 152, 153, and 181 dealing with national languages and other languages, special position of Bumiputera, and the legitimate interests of other ethnics and sovereignity of the Malay Rulers, "Sedition Act 1948," 2006).

These strict laws did not stop people from speaking their minds openly. In recent years, the police have arrested many with charges under these laws. They were found to post insulting comments on social media regarding the king and/or the royal families, mocking religion, persuading the public to participate in demonstrations against the government, etc. For instance, a former minister in the Prime Minister's Department by the name of Zaid Ibrahim was charged under Section 233(1)(a) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (Act 588), punishable under Section 233(3) of the same Act that carries a maximum RM50,000 fine or up to one year's jail, or both, upon conviction due to the allegation of making an offensive statement while calling for the resignation of Najib. He allegedly used his blog to make the offensive statement with the headline, "Rally Behind Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad" at http://www.zaid.my (Bernama, 2015).

People from all walks of life have gotten in trouble for wrongly expressing themselves online. In 2015, Lawyers for Liberty Executive Director, Eric Paulsen was charged in a Sessions Court over a tweet in which he allegedly accused the Malaysian Islamic Development Department (JAKIM) of promoting extremism. He was charged under Section 4(1)(c) of the Sedition Act 1948 (Act 15) which is punishable under Section 4(1) of the same Act ("Paulsen charged over Jakim tweet," 2015).

Independent news portals too were prosecuted if found guilty of violating the abovementioned acts. Some government-run authorities would limit information to be shared with the public by way of censoring, hindering and/or creating an environment of self-censorship. Any news portal found to overstep the commonly understood boundaries will receive a strong warning from Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). Depending on the severity of their misdemeanor, they will face legal consequences (Ahmad, Kee, Mustaffa, Ibrahim, Mahmud, & Dafrizal, 2012; Farid Sufian, 2011; Tapsell, 2013).

Thorough surveillance of the authorities towards independent online news sites, particularly those displaying pro-opposition tendencies leads the authorities to file charges leading to severe punishment. For instance, The Malaysian Insider had to cease operations as a consequence of reporting the ongoing 1MDB scandal. In another example, the UK-based Sarawak Report website was blocked because it highlighted the same sensitive issues (Hucal, 2016). The business and financial weekly, *The Edge Weekly* and *Edge Financial Daily* also experienced the same consequences after

their consistent reporting on the sensitive 1MDB issue. The government suspended the publishing permit of *The Edge* for three months effective July 2015 with the reason that these reports posed potential threats to public order and national security ("Malaysia suspends newspaper over 'prejudicial' 1MDB reports," 2015).

Although the government created these laws to protect the harmony of Malaysia's multiethnic and multi religion society, Abbott (2011) claimed that they have been used by the government to silence any critical sentiments toward itself. The fear appeal, however, has not prevented bloggers and independent news portals to provide their perspective of issues—which many consider critical towards the government.

A. Criticisms that have gone unpunished

Malaysia's fourth and longest serving Prime Minister is also an active blogger who expresses his opinions on anything he deems as wrongful. Mahathir held his position as Malaysia's Prime Minister for 22 years and still receives strong support from many Malaysians. His blogging content includes criticizing current government policies, the behavior of the current Prime Minister, and the ruling party. Currently, Mahathir's blog has reveived 25,771,222 visits since its establishment in 2008 (Mahathir Mohamad, 2008). A study by Kee, Ahmad, and Wan Mahmud (2010) found that Mahathir often uses arguments based on morality (or morality frames) to attack the ruling party, which he once led. He often directs his criticisms towards UMNO.

Besides Mahathir, other prominent individuals actively write in blogs and are not afraid to criticize the government's policies and actions. An example of such a person is the veteran journalist and Journalism Laureate recipient, A. Kadir Jasin. Another prominent figure who does not shy from expressing himself through blogging is the former Information Minister, Zainuddin Maidin. Despite their forward ways, they have not (yet) faced legal actions.

5. The Future of Digital Media in Political Communication

The digital media and social media have shown a steady increase in development since the 13th General Election. Internet World Statistic reported that by June 2016, the Internet penetration in Malaysia stands at 67.7% with Facebook subscribers having reached 19 millions users ("Asia Internet Stats by Country and 2017 Population Statistics," 2017). With the increasing number of social media users, the influence of these platforms will also grow tremendously. Both the ruling party and the opposition parties realize this and have invested efforts in building relationships with their future voters.

We do not know whether the countless social media efforts will result in winning votes. According to Dumitrica (2016), social media plays an important role in the lives of young people. However, research has not demonstrated whether their "likes" on a political candidate's Facebook page or their re-tweeting of political statements will impact election outcomes. In the 2013 election, the BN suffered the loss of a substantial number of votes despite investing time and resources in order to make its presence felt on all social media platforms.

Some scholars, on the other hand, argue the opposite by stating that a positive effect can result from having large number of Twitter followers because the politicians can better connect and influence his/her voting decisions (Spierings & Jacobs, 2014). Their argument rests on a study by Quintelier and Theocharis (2012) that found that if a politician could establish engagement with a group of citizens, then the potential of winning votes from this group is guaranteed. They revealed that people who engage in politics online appear sociable, energetic, and assertive. They found that those who actively participate in online politics are more open-minded and actively seek for new information.

We must not overlook the fact that most of the previous studies on online political engagement focus on Western society, which when compared to Malaysia, differs in terms of political perspectives, ideas, and beliefs.

A. Conclusion

Malaysia holds great interest as a country with a long colonial past and a complicated demographic profile. Malaysia also provides one of the few unique cases of a nation ruled by the same political party since having gained independence from the British in 1957. Despite having the substantial presence of many ethnic

groups, the government's priority is the Malays. In order to establish and maintain national unity that will secure the country's economic development, the country introduced development journalism (Anuar, 2005, Wong, 2004). Development journalism complemented the government's efforts to control the media systems through media ownership and the implementation of various legislation such as the Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) 1984, the Sedition Act 1948, and the Official Secret Act (OSA) (Mohd Azizuddin, 2014; Mustafa, 2014; Steele, 2009). With these rules in place, the government ruling party received the opportunity to dominate the mainstream media. These efforts proved effective in a time before the introduction of the Internet, where all Malaysians would rely on the mainstream media to gain information.

The Internet has brought substantial changes to Malaysia's political scene. Although mostly known as a developing country, Malaysia has, according to Socialbakers (2014), witnessed a tremendous growth in the usage of online sites. People have established independent news portals to serve as platforms for opposition political parties (Manaf & Sedu 2015; Lumsden, 2013). Researchers and pollsters have observed the dwindling support for the government party since the citizens can gain more political information with different perspectives (from those of the mainstream media) when they frequent online news portals which include blogs, online news sites, and various types of social media. Interestingly, although parties from the ruling government have also taken their campaign online, their number of votes continues to decline.

Some have questioned whether the role of journalists reflects Islamic religious practice. Some support this notion, such as "Malaysiakini's Fathi Aris Omar," as reported by Steele (2011), while others insinuate that in Malaysia, religion functions as an indirect method of persuasion by the government, whereby news reports pertaining to Islamic issues will simultaneously portray the government ruling party in a positive light, particularly during the election season (Manaf & Sedu, 2015; Yong & Ishak, 2010).

In this essay, we have argued that while it is becoming increasingly apparent that some Malaysians would like a higher level of openness and justice in news reporting, it remains unknown whether mainstream and alternative media freedom (that inevitably brings freedom of speech), will jeopardize the peace and economic development of the country. This begs the question of the necessity of media systems reforms in Malaysia. Furthermore, if a certain level of media closedness must exist to maintain peace and development in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion country then is absolute democracy still the best option? Might democracy with guidance to the press work? The sensitivity and subjectivity surrounding this issue warrants further investigations.

This essay has tackled only few aspects of a wider issue. We need research focusing on more aspects in order to provide a more detailed understanding of the Malaysia case. In the future, we encourage research on news framing of political issues in order to understand the role of the mainstream media in assisting the governement. Perhaps it will uncover the efforts taken after the declining citizens' supports in the last two general elections. The framing research should also extend to digital media platforms for comparing and contrasting purposes. Additionally, interviews and/or surveys with journalsists representing various media platforms will provide a different perspective to the understanding of political communication and media effects towards public opinion in Malaysia.

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African Journalism Cultures: The Struggle of Free Expression Against Neo-patrimonial Control

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The continuous struggle of journalists with the autocratic, personalistic styles of governance in Africa forms one of the most prominent aspects of journalistic cultures in Africa (Diamond, 2010). With every stroke of the computer, the journalist asks, "Will this get by the editor who represents the interests of the newspaper owner linked in with the political elite? Will my article bring down personal reprisals from the presidential security agents? Dare I allude to the corruption and mismanagement caused by the latest party appointees in the ministry I am analyzing?"

A culture consists of the values, folkways, and daily routines of the inhabitants of a given community. All journalists learn the fundamental values to represent *truthfully* what the public *should know* about public affairs *that affect the well being of the public* and enable the public to *form an opinion about those affairs*. Though fear, bad pay, harsh editors, and the daily living a lie and silence about the corruption in public life may dull the commitment to these values, they always remain present in the minds of journalists (White, 2008, 2010). Why are these values so present for journalists in Africa?

Journalists and the press stood in the forefront of the independence movements in Africa, but from the beginning of the press in Africa representing the truth has remained a struggle. From the earliest initiatives of the press in Africa, journalists represented various forms of independence movements, affirming the value of native African culture, native economic activity, and indigenous political goals (Omu, 1978). Colonial founders formed governments around the virtually absolute power of the colonial governors, and those governors clung to a commitment to maintain continued colonial political and economic control. From the earliest years of colonial rule there was continuous confrontation between the press and colonial rule. Journalism came into the independence movements with a strong commitment to challenging autocratic governance (Hyden & Leslie, 2002).

Journalists can only write about the people, their action, and views of the people. In spite of scattered strong independence movements, colonial rule did not permit or cultivate a widely rooted citizen commitment to the interests of representation and organization. Into this vacuum of civic culture came the strong men lead-

ers who not only built upon and continued the autocratic, highly centralized colonial governance, but added to this their personalistic, neo-patrimonial style (Diamond, 2010). The presidential figures built a structure of power based on patronage stretching down to the village elders and gaining loyalty through familistic, ethnic ties and flows of money from the public treasury. Journalists who had developed a culture of protest against the colonial injustices quickly turned their skills against the neo-patrimonial governments that came into power. Those journalists most open to issues of human rights and justice to the marginal and poor linked up with and became the voice of the civil society movements contesting dictatorial, self-serving governments.

Over the 50 years since independence journalistic cultures of protest and critical analysis in Africa have taken on a variety of facets and emphases that many have researched and extensively commented on. This essay attempts to gather some of this research and describe some of these dimensions of the journalistic culture.

A. Reforming the personalistic discourse of governance

In Africa, "patrimonial rule" means literally the pretension of "fatherly authority." Many simply expect the media to treat the actions of presidential figures with unthinking, childlike obeisance (Schmitz, 2006, pp. 33–34). In cultivating this image of ceremonial elegance, heads of state put themselves above the rule of law, and their officials make anyone questioning this kingly, arbitrary governance suffer the punishment of disobedient children (Gonzion, 2011, p. 307). A good example of this comes from the expectations of the head of state in Côte d'Ivoire, Felix Houphet-Boigny. During his long reign from 1960 to 1993, he adopted the title as the "Le Vieux," the "Old Man," or, better, "Our loving father." Widely known as "The grand old man of Africa" or "The sage of Africa," Houphet-Boigny became a model for Hastings Banda in Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi in Kenya. Journalists in Côte d'Ivoire not echoing this kingly praise of the president or showing the slightest disrespect were taken out to the military camp of Seguela for a week of "mental straightening out" (Gonzion, 2011, p. 309). Journalists referred to the reprisals of Houphet-Boigny as "paternalistic repression." Later presidents in Côte d'Ivoire ordered critical journalists to be whipped like naughty boys.

Unfortunately, the journalistic response to this familistic style often becomes just as personalistic. The journalists in the Côte d'Ivoire and in many African countries responded to this self-serving governance by forming professional associations to monitor the cases of irresponsible, emotional journalism (Gonzion, 2011, pp. 310–315). At the same time, journalists in many Africa countries took the lead in fostering a responsible, accurate public discourse based on universal human rights and universal norms of good governance.

The Minister of Information banned the newspaper *MwanaHalisi* in Tanzania for a period in 2008 for reporting the clearly evidenced disreputable behavior and illegal trading by President Jakaya Kikwete's son because it showed disrespect for the president and his family (Masanja, 2012, pp. 288–389). The journalist establishment in Tanzania responded by trying to raise the level of critical, responsible public discourse. The journalist associations working with the Media Council of Tanzania developed the "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Editorial Freedom, Independence, and Responsibility" which has set down norms and guidelines for introducing an objective and accurate evaluation of government and other public services.

B. Defending the right of objective, critical reporting

The 40 years of military rule in Nigeria from the early 1960s to 1999 marked a period of continued plunder of the national treasury and brutal repression of any protest. The military dictators of Nigeria demanded of journalists above all a reverence for the personalistic "dignity" of the presidential figure (Ogbondah, 1994). Journalists, however, followed their own mandate. They carried on a relentless revelation of the violations of imprisonment without trial, the enormous theft of national resources, and the use of public office for personal gain. During this time virtually all editors and senior journalists suffered interrogation sessions and even torture. A letter bomb killed Dele Giwa, one of the founders of the news magazine *Newswatch* that introduced a tradition of investigative journalism, but he became a major inspiration of the unswerving criticism of the military dictatorship. This continual keeping the repression before the public eye and supporting human rights groups proved an important factor in the return to democratic elections in 1999.

The journalists of Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa have sought legal protection for the right to carry out responsible investigation of governance and public services on behalf of the public. Fortunately, the more

recent constitutions have introduced much more explicit protections of journalists (Kiptinness, 2012), but journalists must still carry on a continual effort to get the practical application of these legal defenses (Diraba & O'Donnell, 2012).

C. Challenging the "universal control" of a neo-patrilineal power structure

One of the characteristics of neo-patrilineal systems is that the central ruler and his immediate clique attempt to link the leadership of all the major institutions into their personalistic control system: local political bosses, ethnic icons, leaders of major economic enterprises, the church hierarchy, the educational system (especially the universities), and, of course, the media. The heads of these sectors receive rewards for collaboration: they become "friends" and "comrades" with privileged access to the leader and receive lavish monetary outlays and other forms of corruption. Media owners and top editors of collaborating media usually become an integral part of the presidential circle (Ugangu, 2011).

Although neo-patrilineal rule may succeed in bringing the leadership of all the sectors into their control system, the universities, the churches, professional associations, and especially the media also have their internal dissident traditions which attempt to insist on freedom of aspirations, human rights, social justice, truthfulness, and equal opportunities. This constant conflict with political control systems *within* media organizations forms a central aspect of the journalistic culture of Africa.

A typical example of challenging political control within a newspaper comes from the Rawlings era in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s. The brilliant journalism of Paul Ansah created a general discourse of public questioning of Jerry Rawlings' dictatorial actions. Ansah knew how to crystallize public opinion with language that brought widespread questioning of Rawlings' actions. Ansah's famous phrase, "I am going to go to town on that fellow," eventually found its way into the book. *Going to Town,* which brought out the journalistic skill of Ansah in coalescing support for more democratic governance.

The questioning of the actions of the Rawlings' regime became at times a confrontation of journalists with editors of leading newspapers such as the *Daily Graphic*, a government-owned newspaper. The willingness to risk even one's employment in contesting editors reveals much of journalistic culture. Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo, a journalist with the *Daily Graphic,* according to his own account, chose to support the right of opposition parties to form and campaign even when the government board of elections was officially reluctant to allow opposition parties this right to begin campaigning. This brought him into violent confrontation with the editor of the *Daily Graphic.* Day after day Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo brought to the editorial planning meetings articles on the demand of the opposition parties to begin campaigning. Finally, after a furious battle of words in the editorial meeting, Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo submitted a letter of resignation. Shocked at this show of values, the editor wrote a letter supporting Boadu Ayeboafo, "Of all the senior journalists at this newspaper, you are the one I feel so much confidence in." But once the editor knew that he had the united support of the staff, he was ready to risk taking an independent stand.

In other occasions Boadu Ayeboafo wrote news articles openly challenging the growing business interests and open corruption of Rawlings. In fact, Boadu Ayeboafo helped to articulate the feelings of Ghanaians who deeply resented the oppressive governance of Rawlings.

Boadu Ayeboafo had so much influence because of another important value: He had a reputation of being politically independent, not in the hire of any particular political strong man or political party. He could point out freely and honestly how a particular political leader violated the principles of the Ghanaian constitution. He thus became much more credible, popular, and widely read by the Ghanaian public. In all of this he remained aware of the risks for his career and even to his life, but he was willing to take the risks because of his conviction of the importance of public debate for the country. Because of his wide popularity he claimed that he was never arrested because obviously that would only increase his credibility with the public (Diedong, 2008, p. 219).

Boadu Ayeboafo emphasized his freedom, but was aware of the responsibility that freedom brings:

> It is good to be free. But as a journalist, how are you using the freedom to the benefit of the larger society. Are you using the freedom simply because it is freedom and you can do as you wish or because you are free you can do a lot of things for the people. (Diedong, 2008, p. 21)

Where do the cultural values of journalists willing to confront autocratic rule come from? Boadu Ayeboafo had read widely the major thinkers and writers of Africa. He was particularly influenced by Chinua Achebe.

My fundamental belief is underlined by what Chinua Achebe said about the individual who owns the cock in the community. When it crows in the morning, it becomes the property of all. In Achebe's words, "The cock that crows in the morning belongs to one household, but its voice is the property of the whole neighborhood." So my belief is that regardless of who owns the cock, it serves the good of the community in which it is found. This is the core belief that I have canvassed and shared with the people. Their interests are the things that should inform (us journalists) on the things we write about. The primary interest of every journalist must be the public interest. (Diedong, 2008, p. 217)

Boadu Ayeboafoh promoted the solidarity of journalists in the face of attempts by politicians to separate and buy off. He served as executive secretary of the National Media Commission from 1999 to 2003. For years he was a major supporter of the Ghana Journalist Association and was vice-president of the GJA from 1999 to 2003 (Diedong, 2008).

Membership in the GJA enables journalists to learn from each other. It also enables me to reach out to my colleagues because, as you interact with them, you are not regarded as an alien. The seminars and workshops organized by the GJA on pertinent topics are useful in enhancing the standards of media performance. Exposure to all these seminars has had a very positive influence on me. (Diedong, 2008, p. 220)

Many journalists in Africa remain manipulated by their economic dependency, but Boadu Ayeboafoh claims that he generally did not care about his personal support because people widely recognized him as competent and honest and he had many side jobs such as part-time teaching, lecturing, writing for magazines, and special work with media councils and other organizations.

D. Introducing the language and convictions of human rights into the public discourse

The culture of neo-patrilineal governance highlights several values: might makes right, using control of wealth to buy compliance regardless of legal procedures, and bullying the opposition into submission. Again, a case from the experience of Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo illustrates the readiness of journalists to challenge minor officials who perpetrate the violation of human rights.

Boadu Ayeboafo heard of the accusations of witchcraft against a group of women in a rural area in northern Ghana, false accusations against frail old women whose red eyes and cracked voices raised suspicions. So he went up to the area and heard the beating of a gong in the silence of the night. The District Chief Executive of the area judged the situation with the norms of patrilineal governance and accepted the belief that the sounding of the gong called out the witches to carry out malevolent threats against the local people to extort money. This indeed was the world of beliefs of the governance in that time of Rawlings. When Boadu Ayeboafo spoke to the official about the rumors of the harmful intentions of the so-called witches, the official noted immediately that this journalist did not share his belief that the people should torture or even kill the women. Instead of joining the official plan to punish these elderly women on unfounded suspicion, Boadu Ayeboafo returned to the main editorial office and wrote a feature article referring to the accusations against old women but described the fact that many false accusations arose against elderly women simply because they had bad eyes, walked with a limp, were often toothless because they could not afford proper dental care, and talked with a hoarse voice. The article called for compassion and argued the need to help these elderly women, not immediately call for punishment that the officials of the Rawlings government seemed only too willing to implement. The article was widely read and two weeks later Boadu Ayeboafo got a call from the Department of Social Welfare in the area inquiring about the location of the elderly women whom the government officials accused of witchcraft. Boadu Ayeboafo's reporting led to the introduction of a program to assist the so-called witches who were simply elderly women with problems of illness, and lack of proper food and shelter. The article caught the attention of many in Ghana at the time and started a kind of movement to assist elderly women falsely accused of witchcraft. It was a case of the culture of journalists asserting itself against the culture of authoritarian officialdom.

E. The media culture of radical protest

Most journalists realize that the information that governments put out is a cover up or outright lie. This gives rise to a deep commitment quietly running through newsrooms to search for ways to reveal to the public the untruth of most of what governments claim. Yet the neo-patrimonial governance has built up such a

convincing discourse that journalist find it difficult to unmask its falsity.

Journalists do not make the news, but from time to time civil society groups can create an event that reveals the falsity and even the absurdity of autocratic governance, and journalists can then draw out the evident meaning. The demonstration of the bare breasted women in Uhuru park against the Moi regime led by Wangari Mathaai provided the opportunity which brought the Kenyan nation to rebuke Moi and eventually de-legitimate his pretensions to continued dictatorial governance (Maathai, 2006) The impact of this event could not have had its effect if the journalists had not drawn out its full symbolic meaning.

An even more striking example comes from the role of the investigative journalism of the Nigerian news magazines in de-legitimating the claim of the military governments that they constituted the only force for peace, order, and economic progress in Nigeria and led toward the restoration of democratic governance in 1999. The Nigeria news magazines do not lack their academic critics, but a number of studies, especially that of Torwel (2008) have brought out the journalistic strategies that can reveal the falsity of the government defenses of unjust governance.

The labor unions, together with most other sectors of the civil society, argued the falsity of the claim that the government had to increase petrol prices and pointed that the pricing would cause serious economic hardship to the mass of commuters and would in the end fill the coffers of President Olusegun Obasanjo's friends. But the investigative journalism created a language that de-legitimated the autocratic reasoning of Obasanjo and forced him to back down from the fuel price increases. Neo-patrimonial rule attempts to defend its self-enriching forms of governance by inventing a discourse of appeal to national emergency, security, and need for social order. This insistence on obedience to a higher authority covers over their violation of constitutions, silencing the voice of parliaments and civil society and the protests against their corruption. Journalists have the role of attempting to develop a contrary discourse of democratic representation, defense of human rights, and promotion of social justice. The news magazines in Nigeria brought in a new vocabulary of accountability of governance by showing that Obasanjo had not consulted the congress regarding the increase of fuel prices, that the president did not inform or consult the National Council of State or the National Economic Council, that most political leaders and economic advisors thought it a wrong and ill-advised move, that the president ignored the Speaker of the House of Representatives, that he overrode his own vice president, and that he refused to allow the evidence of economic advisors in meetings. The news magazines convinced the public that Obasanjo was continuing with his usual style of military governance that he introduced under the guise of national crisis. At the same time the news magazines legitimated the democratic voice of the labor unions emphasizing the guidance of economic experts, the support of leading intellectuals in the country, and the supporting opinion of major experienced political leaders.

The second discursive battle with neo-patrimonial regimes occurs over the question of benefits of autocratic, self-serving action. Obasanjo typically argued that the hike in the cost fuel would channel resources into long-term national development, but, of course, not indicating any specific development project or plan. In fact, in most African countries autocratic regimes benefit the immediate circle of friends and stifle the growth of the most promising productive industries. The news magazines brought out the fact that the increase in fuel prices would benefit the local fuel importers and would hurt the growth of local refineries and other local petroleum-related industries. By taking money out of the pockets of ordinary Nigerians to pay for increase in petrol prices people would have faced increased transport costs, leaving less resources for the education of their children, health needs, or decent housing. Obasanjo's measures would help his friends in the fuel importing business, but it would not create a stronger market for Nigerian products. The news magazines attempted to create a discourse of analysis of the benefits to the public so lacking in much public discussion of economic planning in Africa.

Neo-patrimonial regimes, because they often control the content of most major media, can create a series of major falsehoods that protect their interests. Journalists typically become aware of these falsehoods and, given the basic commitment to public truth instilled in their education and professional standards, attempt to create a much more truthful public discourse. However the general public finds it difficult to recognize the falsehood of many of the government claims. The news magazines examined each of the government's main arguments for hiking fuel prices and provided clear evidence in a language understandable to the general public that these claims lacked merit. More importantly, the news magazines revealed the half truths, smoke screens, and other strategies used to

get the public to systematically believe the falsehoods of the government propaganda; in other words, they gave the people the tools to continually reject the false government claims and find counter evidence. What is particularly devastating about the dishonesty of governments is that it cultivates a general culture of dishonesty in the nation. The news magazines also revealed the immorality and injustice of a false public discourse in order to build in the public a desire and commitment to truth.

F. The struggle against the repressive legal system

Journalists in Africa work with the constant fear that an article will cause an outburst of anger and hurt pride by some leading politician resulting in an invocation of the laws restricting media freedom. These laws discourage attempts to inform the public of the corruption and other forms of unjust governance.

One of the most notorious cases of this use of repressive laws held over from the colonial period comes from Tanzania. The independence government in Tanzania not only kept the colonial legislation against the press, but in 1968 amended it to include the power of the president to stop publication of any newspaper if it acted, in his opinion, against public policy. In 1976 the government of Tanzania introduced the Newspaper Act which not only retained the Penal Code establishing as criminal acts of publication of false news, incitement to violence, contempt of court, obscenity and criminal libel, but added the offenses of abusive and insulting language, contempt of court, and obscenity. The Act lumps all these so-called offenses together under the general offense of "seditious language." The government of Tanzania has the power to register, deregister, refuse circulation, or ban circulation of a newspaper (Masanja, 2012, p. 387). However, the Act creates a problem in that it lacks a precise definition of what is seditious (Masanja, 2012, p. 387). Over the last 20 years the government has invoked the law of sedition frequently on points that have wounded public officials emotionally. For example, in 1999 it banned the *Majira* newspaper for one week all over Tanzania for publishing proposed "salaries of government ministers and members of parliament" (Masanja, 2012, p. 338). In spite of protests against the sedition law by newspaper associations, the Media Council of Tanzania, and other communication organizations, the parliament of Tanzania, controlled by the CCM Party for 55 years, will not make any changes.

In general, the media and the association of journalists in Tanzania consider the law courts and the legal profession as hostile to the freedom of expression in Tanzania (Matumaini, 2011). Tanzania does not have among its legal parliamentary statutes specific legal protection of free expression in the media (Matumaini, 2011, p. 226). In a 2010 survey of media houses, media owners,, training institutions, the Media Council of Tanzania, the offices of Information Services of the government, and the advocacy organizations MISA-TAN and TAMWA, 81% of the respondents affirmed their fear of continued legal threats and intimidation of journalists. Most respondents responded that they are continually afraid to protest the continued threats and harassment from branches of the government.

G. The influence of money on journalism products and journalism styles

The typical characteristics of neo-patrimonial governance to buy personal support also invades the newsroom. Many argue that direct payment to slant news is not only rather widespread but also increasingly common. However, the top most respected persons in the journalistic field are professionals intelligent enough to find ways to maintain their integrity and commitment to express what they think they must say to protect rights and democratic processes in given situations (Maugo, 2012). This esteem for outstanding integrity, we would argue, is a dominant value in the journalistic culture in African contexts. At the same time, many journalists recognize that they do not live up to this ideal, and they find ways to justify their lack of ability to reach the ideal, especially the failure to find just remuneration (Mpagze & White, 2010) .

Widespread criticism exists of the pervasive bribery in countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, or Zimbabwe where there is an extremely high degree of concentration of power. A few serious evaluations of journalism ethics in these countries lament the complete breakdown of journalism norms (Diraba & O'Donnell, 2012). But the majority of journalists simply resign themselves to the political situation as it exists now

One of the most widely debated issues bordering on bribery is whether a journalist should accept monetary or other assistance to cover a public event of some public interest that will obviously favor the interests of the sponsor (Skjerdal, 2010). Classical journalism ethics holds that a journalist should never take any assistance from the sponsors of an event because

inevitably it will influence the objectivity of the reporting. Not a few newspapers in Africa proudly say that they will provide their own financial assistance to give journalistic coverage to an event considered important, and they absolutely forbid their journalists to take any assistance from the sponsors of the event. However, many African journalists now say that they see no violation of ethics to take this assistance because their employer cannot provide them assistance, and without the help of the sponsor the event would never receive public coverage (Nwabueze, 2010). Many journalists now readily admit that when they accept some kind of hospitality or other outright assistance in covering an event, they will cover the event in way reasonably favorable to the sponsor. This, in their view, constitutes only common courtesy. They expect that the public will recognize that the coverage advertises the public event and can make up their own mind about the validity of the claims.

Journalists often take the announcements of programs of government ministries, major business enterprises, professional organizations, or other public institutions such as hospitals as promotions of dubious validity. But the media for whom they work often do not regard themselves in a position to start a debate about the claims made. Every development effort in a struggling continent such as Africa is fragile. Many have questioned the validity of "development journalism" in Africa. Yet, the continent fosters a widespread commitment to promote "development communication," keeping hopes high and avoiding pessimism (Skjerdal, 2011).

H. The significance of journalism education, media councils and investigative journalism

Africa has developed a wide variety of institutions to improve the role of the media in the process of political democratization (Rioba, 2012). Have these reformist institutions had an impact on the practice and values of journalists? Although the newspapers, radio and television stations, and numerous magazines may have as their higher goal to further education, democratic participation, uplifting entertainment, and general law-abiding life of the public, the immediate goal of all media remains the return on the investment that the owners, including public service media, try to obtain from all of this.

The universities training personnel for the media generally devise a curriculum to prepare people to provide a public service in the media, and often the graduates can successfully provide the news that enables the public to evaluate their elected representatives. On the whole, however, young people in the media do not have the training to bring about the transition from a power-centered society to a more democratic society. They learn instead how to produce the kind of media that will sell newspapers, attract people to tune into their radio or television stations, or buy their magazines. Their universities train them to treat the public as entertained spectators not as people active in a democratic governing process in their place of work, their community, or in the nation. Most graduates will move up in an organization if they can improve the sales of newspapers, gain more advertising, stimulate more conversations about the content, and not disturb political or economic leaders too much.

Guy Berger (2011), in his summary of the accomplishments in African journalism since the Windhoek Declaration on press freedom in 1991 concludes that the press councils, the continual assessment of agencies such as MISA [Media Institute of South Africa], and the greater legal protection of journalists mark important advances in journalistic freedom. Berger also places great hope in the continued improvement of the professional university education of media personnel. But one must ask whether the university education of journalists really makes that much of a contribution. Much depends on the skill of the journalistic establishment in discovering the key political issues of concern to leaders in the civil society and being able "orchestrate" a challenge to the concentration of power in the hegemonic leadership of a country by bringing into play the deep-felt symbols of public protest.

The media in Africa form the site of two conflicting cultures: the site of a search for an African form of democratization of society and culture and the site of economic survival. However, economic survival in the media depends so much on the small closely linked controllers of political and economic power that, in the final analysis, journalistic values are determined by the search for ways to get along with neo-patrilineal political lords.

I. Is the "freedom of information" movement an important value for African journalists?

A general belief holds that if journalists could get the proper information about what governments are doing and inform the public, this would help the public to elect good governments. No country in Africa suffered more from bad governance than Nigeria, and these corrupt governments managed to stay in power in part by the way they managed to conceal from the peo-

ple their catastrophic governance. Leaders in the Nigerian civil society believed that if they could force the governments to reveal their activities through a "right to information" legislation, good governance would come to Nigeria.

The movement to enact "freedom of information" legislation, made up of three major civil society groups, the Nigeria Union of Journalists, the Media Rights Agenda, and the Civil Liberties Organization, began in 1993 to draft a document entitled "Draft Access to Public Records and Official Information Act (Ojebode, 2011, pp 269–270).With the help of international organizations such as the Article 19 Centre, the movement presented its first draft of legislation in 2000. Legislation was approved finally by the Senate in 2006 but vetoed by President Obasanjo. A new bill was finally approved by the Nigerian House and Senate and signed by President Goodluck Jonathan in May, 2011.

The bill provides elaborate detailed procedures to enable every Nigerian to request information from any public official or agency and, if refused access, gives the applicant the right to institute legal actions to compel the public official, agency, or institution to supply the requested information. The legislation also protects the person or agency from any recrimination for supplying information (Ojebode, 2011, pp. 270–276). Once the legislation was enacted, efforts to obtain information began almost immediately by five or six civil society organizations, though, surprisingly, journalists did not stand in the forefront of the action. In almost every case, the action became bogged down in seemingly endless court litigation. Unfortunately, there no government supervisory body exists to force the agencies to provide the information, and the litigants must shoulder the expenses.

An evaluation of the impact of the legislation (Ashong & Udoudo, 2012) reveals that to this day virtually no person or institution has successfully obtained the information they sought. The first reason, suggested above, is that no party has envisaged the long court process and expenses needed to obtain the information. One of the most surprising results appears in the fact that journalists have made little effort to use the legislation. Most journalists said that the legislation did not make the public agencies more willing to reveal information. Some 82% of the journalists surveyed said they never requested information under the legislation, and those who did request met stiff resistance and were told that they had no right to the information! No journalists decided to go further and take the matter to court. Asked why they did not go to court, the journalists questioned said they do not trust the courts, the long duration of the court process, and the sheer lack of political will to make the government respond. The holders of public information seem unaware of the legislation as do the great majority of journalists (Ashong & Udoudo, 2012, p. 352). One wonders what happened to the civil society organizations who worked so hard to formulate the legislation when the implementation of the legislation began.

J. The demands of profitability as an obstacle to critical journalism

Rising production costs have particularly hit African journalism, which also has little or no funding for investigative journalism. Most of the newspaper space relies on inexperienced graduates of journalism schools who have little training in the critical journalism that would dig out the injustices and violation of human rights that most of the African populace faces. Some research has termed the process "juniorization," the reliance on young and inexperienced "correspondents" (Wasserman, 2010). Criticism of government scares away advertising, most of which comes from the government or sources close to governments. The trend has moved toward light, glamorous life-style journalism, travel, health tips, interior decoration, and other feature journalism that attracts advertising The continual revelation and personalistic attacks on the corruption of political leaders appears as more sensationalism than serious analysis of good governance The media do not report the major political decisions (or lack of such decisions) by parliaments and ministries that affect the basic conditions of education, health, housing, and employment, but instead relate internal personalistic squabbles among political leaders (Nyabuga, 2012). The increasing concentration of political power and economic wealth has brought newspapers into close association with governments and blocked the reporting on the neo-patrimonial impoverishment of countries (Ugangu, 2011).

Still, African journalists have not given up their critical, investigative analysis and revelation of the systematic injustice by autocratic governments, but have migrated to more effective media in reaching leaders in civil society organizations. Examples include the news magazines referred to above and other specialized newspapers with greater freedom of expression and the chance to work with teams skilled in research and political analysis.

The new forms of radio that allow direct expression of public opinion with call in and ongoing discussion also provide important avenues. A study in Malawi (Kaufulu & Burton, 2013) reports the combination of open discussion radio, mobile phone, and social media that opens up issues of bad public services, injustices, and public problems and then gradually builds widespread support of public opinion that eventually forces government or private agencies to respond. This form of communication allows for much more direct democratic influence. However, much depends on how this formation of opinion links with advocacy groups that have the skills to put pressure on centers of decision social decision making

Social media which allow for interchange without direct intervention of powerful political-economic control also can contribute to the formation of movements for political change.

K. Conclusion: Will the African journalistic culture of protest against neo-patrimonial governance persist?

Much depends on the vigor of the civil society and advocacy groups in a given moment in the history of a country. Advocacy groups generate protest, make contact with journalists, and furnish analytic skills. The likelihood of advocacy groups seeking out journalists depends largely on the degree of unhappiness of middle class, professional groups with the state of their economic welfare and life possibilities and the ability to see that autocratic, personalistic governance blocks their aspirations. This happened in the 1990s in many African countries and brought a return to constitutional rule in many countries, though the structure of neo-patrimonial governance has persisted and civil society has generally returned to quiescence.

The growing concentration of political-economic power has given autocratic rule even greater power over the big media, but alternative media exist and remain available to civil society advocacy groups. Unfortunately, leadership in the middle class, professional groups finds its own solutions through personal upward mobility and fears damaging personal opportunities by association with advocacy groups.

Finally, the alternative media—especially social media—offer possibilities for forming civil society groups. They feature much communication of opinions, but this often does not translate into political-economic action (Kamau, 2012).

The will of journalists in Africa to vindicate freedoms and rights which began in the confrontation against colonial regimes and has developed new tactics with the growth of neo-patrimonial governments remains very much alive and ready to cooperate if African civil society proves ready to work toward more definitive social transformation.

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Journalism in India Today: A brief Overview

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In the last seven years, the news media landscape in India has undergone a drastic, almost unrecognizable, change. Digital journalism, once considered an ancillary function, now provides the focus of attention and investment. The year saw the birth of startups like Scroll, The Quint, Quartz India, Huffington Post India. The process continued in 2015 and 2017 with the birth of TheWire and ThePrint. All of these ventures manifest the attempt to reach the Indian middle-class consumer who is almost always mobile and, as a consequence, almost always logged on to the Internet. "After years of slow growth, Internet use and digital advertising has grown very rapidly in India in recent years, powered especially by the spread of mobile Internet use, and double-digit growth in both the number of users and which in advertising is expected to continue. India now has the second largest number of Internet users in the world and rapid growth in Internet use and digital advertising is seen by many as the biggest market opportunity outside China since the Internet took off in the United States in the 1990s" (Sen & Nielsen, 2016, p. 3).

The use of social media by the country's politicians has significantly shifted the way in which they interact with the press and their voters. Chief among them is Narendra Modi, prime minister of India, who chooses to bypass traditional media and, instead, uses Twitter and Facebook to make announcements. Similarly, other regional and national politicians like Arvind Kejriwal, Mamata Banerjee, Omar Abdullah, and Amarinder Singh use these platforms to engage with audiences. Journalists, in turn, quote their commentary during daily bulletins or reproduce them on the pages of their newspapers and/or websites. Perhaps the first major public event to receive widespread social media traction was the protest by social activist Anna Hazare in 2011, over the Jan Lokpal Bill. According to Ashutosh, then an editor with the IBN7 news channel, much of this movement was a creation of the media that wanted to exploit the middle-class' anti-politician sentiment. "People were fed up, society was waiting, media had given them a reason, media had created an issue, created an ambience and an atmosphere, and in that charged atmosphere, people were waiting for a leader and suddenly Anna Hazare came in" (Rodrigues, 2014, p. 2). Among the less glamorous but central pillars to journalism over the last seven years has been the Right to Information Act, first enacted in 2005, as an instrument to bring transparency in the functioning of the government and bureaucracy. In this essay I will review existing research on the growth of media in the last seven years and its impact on journalism.

A. The middle class and the media

In a paper analyzing the news media's push towards a singular narrative and the misplaced need for regulation, Bharat Bhushan, a senior journalist, draws a link between the 1991 economic reforms and journalism. A media, initially critical of opening up the Indian economy to international financial institutions, changed their tone very quickly "as media owners realized that they stood to gain directly from economic liberalization and the new class of consumers it created. If readers with disposable incomes increased, so would advertising revenue" (Bhushan, 2013). He adds that the media "shaped the image of a new middle class that was united only by their disdain for state intervention and their aspirations towards international patterns of consumerism" (2013). In other words, Bhushan points towards the lack of diversity in the news media in India. Journalists working for media organizations belong to a certain class of society—upper middle-class, English-speaking, urban Indians—who don't have the experience of struggle and discrimination as Dalits and minority groups do.

> Dalits in the newsrooms of India's media organisations. Stories from the lives of close to 25% of Indians (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) are unlikely to be known—much less broadcast or written about. Are there any Dalits anchoring a program or going regularly to camera on a major Indian television channel? My contacts tell me there aren't. It will be a big

moment when that changes—and a daunting burden on the person who breaks that barrier. (Jeffrey, 2012)

B. Right to Information Act: The invisible pillar

It isn't just Dalits and minorities who are absent from Indian newsrooms. The lack of diversity also extends to the editorial content of media organizations. A category of stories that deserve more prominence are those based on RTI [Right to Information] applications. But these seldom get real estate either in newsprint or on the airwaves.

> In a 30-day content analysis of reporting priorities on the front page Murty, Ramakrishna, and Melkote (2010) found that the majority of articles covered politics, public affairs, and legal issues, but few to none were investigative in nature (none for *The Times of India,* 1% for *The Hindu,* and 3% for *The Hindustan Times).* Of those front-page investigative articles, the authors found that only one article (out of 290) in the *Hindustan Times* focused on corruption, as did only one article (out of 285) in *The Hindu.* Nonetheless, the Indian press' support of the right to information movement made the news media a likely candidate for use of the RTIA law. (Relly & Schwalbe, 2013, p. 288)

Relly and Schwalbe conduct a content analysis of their own of stories in *The Hindu, The Hindustan Times,* and *The Times of India* and reach conclusion similar to Murty, Ramakrishna, and Melkote. However, their research would benefit more had it also delved into two additional areas. First, they might have focused on how successive governments in India—states as well as the central government—have consistently tried to dilute the RTI. In a speech in October 2011, Manmohan Singh, the then prime minister said "Even as we recognize and celebrate the efficacy and the effectiveness of the Right to Information Act, we must take a critical look at it. There are concerns that need to be discussed and addressed honestly. I had mentioned last time the need to strike a balance between the need for disclosure of information and the limited time and resources available with the public authorities" (Singh M., 2011), indicating an attempt to weaken the legislation. Second, the authors' research fails to mention how journalists themselves have not used the RTI as often and as effectively as they should have.

> The problem, it seems, lies in the time and persistence needed in procuring and analyzing the

information. Take for instance the recent Adarsh Society Scam in Mumbai. The information sought by the National Alliance for Peoples' Movement (NAPM) made a brilliant story which ran for several months and also had the desired impact. Any journalist would have loved to get a by-line on this story. NAPM began looking into the issue six years ago. It filed around seven RTI applications with the Mumbai collectorate, state revenue department, Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, state urban development and environment departments asking for details of file notings, sale of land, and environmental clearances. It had to wait for almost six months to get responses even though under the RTI Act, it is mandatory for authorities to reply within 30 days of receiving the query. Needless to say, the fight for release of information was diligently followed for months by members of NAPM. To imagine a journalist doing something similar seems implausible. (Moudgil, 2011)

C. Political engagement, journalism, and social media: a tri-junction

A striking feature of the last five years has been the paradigm shift in the way India's political class interacts with the press and its voters. Social media that allow users to tailor, target, and take control of the message they want to send out drive much of this new engagement. This forms one of the principal reasons why social media have appealed to political leaders in India, who don't like their perspective being broadcast via a journalistic lens. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was amongst the earlier political leaders to have realized the potential of social media platforms.

> Modi's online image is carefully crafted. His social media outlets feature photographs that fit within a larger brand image that at once straddles two spaces—a man who represents values and tradition and a man who represents globalized modernity. Social media allow control over the initial dissemination of the news and imagery, and the use of various outlets simultaneously has helped build this image. Modi's Facebook page . . . shows him with his mother, his Pinterest profile has images of development initiatives, and his Twitter page features selfies that have gone viral. During the elections [of 2014], online products featuring Modi included laptop bags, MacBook skins, and even an Android-based smartphone. Images of Modi in pensive poses with his laptop preceded selfies he

took on a slick large-screen mobile device. (Pal, 2015, p. 2)

In an analysis of Modi's tweets, the author discovers that 60.2% of Modi's followers had never tweeted and 19% of them had tweeted just once. "From the total sample of 10,000 studied, only 55 were individuals with more than 100 followers and 300 tweets (excluding all identifiable corporate accounts)" (Pal, 2015, p. 7). Pal's analytical piece would have been more incisive had he noted that, correspondingly, Modi has not held a single press conference so far. He has given interviews to major news networks like Network18 and Times Now but those seem scripted and the questions pre-approved. The media too are only happy to oblige him and "even the traditionally belligerent Arnab Goswami was transformed into a most accommodating soul apologetically posing questions for Mr Modi. This pattern was repeated on CNN News 18, with interviewer Rahul Joshi displaying reverence, if not hero worship, in lobbing questions of the softest variety. The long monologues were hardly interrupted by the timorous questions posed by the interviewer whose provenance is unknown to the wider TV audience. The PM had nothing new to say but the interview was repeated many times with trumpets blaring" (Singh, 2014).

Similarly, the newer media organizations like *The Wire, Scroll, The Quint,* and *The Print*, to name a few, use social media regularly because, given their digital nature, that is their principal distribution channel. "In terms of distribution, most of these start-ups recognize they are unlikely to be destination sites or apps for large numbers of users at this stage and have prioritized social media distribution to build reach and engagement. (Content-based start-ups and non-profits alike use social media to promote and distribute their content; aggregation based start-ups have focused on using social media to market their apps.)" (Sen & Nielsen, 2016, p. 3).

D. Rise of the news media startups

In conclusion, the biggest change has been the rise of digital news media companies led by journalists. As noted earlier, 2014 saw the birth of *Scroll.in, The Quint,* and *Quartz India.* In 2015, they were joined by *The Wire* and in 2017 by *ThePrint.* A common thread that bind them is that unlike legacy media organizations that are owned by big business houses, these were founded by journalists. Raghav Bahl founded *Network18* before he exited and started up *The Quint. The Wire* has three co-founders: Siddharth Varadarajan,

MK Venu, and Sidharth Bhatia, all veteran print journalists. Shekhar Gupta, former editor-in-chief of *The Indian Express* newspaper started up *ThePrint* after his exit from the paper in 2014. Naresh Fernandes, founding editor of *Time Out India,* launched *Scroll* the same year. These were preceded by *Newslaundry*, started by Madhu Trehan, founding editor of the *India Today* magazine. "Fernandes argues that the heart of Scroll is their editorial profile built by journalists who have been reporters and not just managers. Part of the appeal, he says, is that the digital space enables new entrants to prove to people that they deliver something that is distinct from—and perhaps better than—what legacy media offer: 'I think there is the realization that we need many more voices and the barriers to entry are relatively low in terms of new technologies'" (Sen & Nielsen, 2016, p. 21; see also Bhushan, 2013).

Over the least three years, these media startups have established a template of how to produce news for an Internet audience. These include conducting live interviews on Facebook, curating news from other sources, writing original content, producing short videos across genres—politics, entertainment, science, civic affairs, satire etc. *TheWire* and *The Quint,* also have Hindi editions (*Scroll* has a sister website in Hindi called Satyagrah that it acquired in 2015) and on August 15, 2017 *TheWire* will launch an Urdu edition as well. Sen and Nielsen, the authors of the Reuters Institute report, have done an impressive study of these and other startups: interviewing their founders, analyzing the digital media market they operate in and their use of social media to drive traffic. However, I wish they had also delved deeper to ask questions that are fundamental to the daily workings of these organizations. For instance, how many journalists do they employ full-time and how much do they rely on freelance contributions? Are lean, mobile teams the future for media organizations? More importantly, how are they addressing issues that have plagued legacy media organizations, namely the presence of journalists who are Dalit or belong to other minority groups? How often do they use RTI for their stories? While it's important to dwell upon ownership structures, I think it's equally necessary to ask questions that concern the day-to-day character of journalism and I hope that any future research will do that.

E. Conclusion

The last three-and-a-half years haven't been kind to Indian journalism. Ever since Narendra Modi took

charge as prime minister of India, there have been constant murmurs about how journalists and media organizations have had to either censor themselves or become mouthpieces of the government. "It is also clear now, three years into Narendra Modi's term as prime minister, that his government does not need to impose any kind of direct censorship on the media. The media, by and large, have already fallen in line. Even documentary films on subjects the government does not like are stopped from being screened at film festivals. However small the critical component of mainstream and other media, this government is not prepared to tolerate any of it. Shut it down, is the clear message" (Sharma, 2017). Such a scenario in which the media are polarized and not discharging their traditional duties, is not conducive for any qualitative research. Perhaps research might want to wait till the day when the twin senses of fear and blind sycophancy evaporate in favor of real journalism.

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Book Reviews

Bunce, Mel, Suzanne Franks, and **Chris Paterson** (Eds.). *Africa's Media Image in the 21st Century: From the "Heart of Darkness" to "Africa Rising."* London and New York: Routledge, 2017. Pp. ix-xvi, 240. ISBN 978-1-138-96231-6 (cloth) $140.00; 978-1-138-96232-3 (paper) $39.95; 978-1-315-65951-0 (eBook) $27.97.

Journalism *in* Africa as well as *about* Africa helps to define the continent for the rest of the world. It is an old story that colonial views of Africa told of disease, disaster, and chaos, but how much has really changed in the past 25 years? This new book by three British journalist-researchers builds on the legacy of a volume in 1992 by Beverly Hawks, *Africa's Media Image*, that first challenged the stereotypical news images of Africa common in previous decades. The editors in the introductory chapter argue that the image of Africa has begun to change from the Dark Continent to Africa Rising, the latter image of a growing population and economy that bodes well for business and a growing middle class. But the news world has also undergone changes that suggest a new challenge and a new possibility: the challenge of dramatic reductions of some news organizations, including news agencies, in the West; the possibility of expansion of both national news outlets and the addition of Al-Jazeera of Dubai and Xinhua of China; and the rise in cell phone use and smart phones that promote the response of African audiences in the form of Twitter and other forms of social media.

The book is divided into four parts: Part I, about how Africa is portrayed today with a number of content analyses as well as commentary from those critical of

the coverage; Part II, about how news is actually made from producers and researchers about the process; Part III, about how stories of humanitarian responses to disasters have given way to a certain extent to news about business and sports though conflict remains a topic to be dealt with as well; and Part IV, about some of the geo-politics that enters into news making about and in Africa, including China's growing investments and news presence as well as that of the large increase of U.S. military in Africa since 9-11.

The first part contains several challenging chapters that suggest that the task of both doing journalism in Africa and doing research about the process pose formidable problems. Mel Bunce in her lead chapter on content analysis of African news from 1994 to 2013 impresses, in that she tries to assess whether news about Africa had improved. And, indeed, she finds that it has moved in a more positive direction. The study is ambitious but also shows that weaknesses of a quantitative research remain: there is no explanation of how "tone" of articles was determined though it is a critical element; or how to explain outside reporters' attitude about African news. Howard French and Michela Wrong both add critical comments about a CBS story (French) and why journalists covering Africa work under great limitations of time and resources (Wrong). Martin Scott challenges all researchers by arguing that most studies limit their sampling and come up with questionable conclusions. Consequently, he concludes the news about Africa remains to be properly studied.

The second part opens with an interesting article on how journalists think about their audience, or who they are writing for. Toussaint Nothias uses a discursive analysis of 24 in-depth interviews with foreign reporters in both South Africa and Kenya with a sophisticated use of this qualitative method. He concludes that reporters use imagined audiences back home to investigate and report on what they think the audience wants, thus, forming part of the problem. He adds that with Twitter and other social media African audiences have become increasingly part of the process with reporters knowing that their stories will be scrutinized by local as well as international audiences. Danielle Becker in her chapter argues for the particular power of images with smart phones and Instagram, but also warns that the uses of upper and middle class is not a model for what the rest of Africa will do with that social app when it is available to them. Rachel Flamenbaum studies an Africa Rising story in Ghana where a higher education project, New Ghana, has attracted much attention internationally. The dilemma is in the branding that carries a moral imperative for graduates to avoid the "corruption" that they are taught to fight. She concludes with both a hopeful but cautious view of both the discourses of New Ghana and Arica Rising.

In Part III on development and humanitarian stories, Ludek Stavinoha has an interesting analysis of news coverage of AIDS in Africa over a 20-plus year period that illustrates the framing stereotypes that British reporting continued to produce. He concludes that the centrality of epidemics and poverty in Africa reporting continued with the AIDS story, but he adds that some of the reporting did nudge the centers of political and economic power to move toward solutions that have reduced but not eradicated the epidemic. Kate Wright analyzes a case in Kenya of a nonprofit that used a commercial advertiser to promote its work with paraplegics and the problems inherent in this approach. It is of interest because it opens but does not resolve the issue for many social enterprises in Africa. But it is worth pondering. Audrey Arsis and her colleagues report on the coverage of the Millennium Villages Project, a very large development effort over a decade in the making. The chapter is valuable for demonstrating the complexity of reporting this kind of development effort and why it is often left out of the news.

In the final part on the politics of representation, four authors touch on the increasing Chinese media presence in Africa. Vivien Marsh has the most complete analysis by comparing the Chinese framing of news as harmony and stability and that of BBC as conflict on reporting of Boko Haram and other stories. The chapter also comments on the rapid growth of Chinese reporting on Africa. Herman Wasserman sees some positives by having Chinese reporting as offering an alternative view of events. James Wan also points out that the positive approach to African news reporting has found some support, especially among politicians, but he points out that many viewers/readers do not trust this news and do not watch it. Finally, Chris Paterson analyzes the dangers of old imperialisms with the increasing Chinese economic and media presence in Africa and compares this with the greatly increased U.S. military force in many African countries. His analysis of three leading news agencies showed no recognition but a continuation of the old stereotypes of Africa as dependent on outsiders for help.

This book is worth a close read for anyone interested in international news coverage, but especially of

the complexity of this task in Africa. Each chapter has notes and references and a final complete index.

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Cushion, Stephen. (2015). *News and politics: The rise of live and interpretive journalism*. London: Routledge. Pp. xi; 182. ISBN 978-0-415-73988-7 (cloth) $155.00; 978-0-415-74471-3 (paper) $41.95; 978-1-315-72764-6 (eBook) $29.37.

Anyone who tunes in to 24-hour news programming daily in the U.S. or UK is likely to see the same personalities speaking about the news of the day. Political news commentators draw on their positions as journalists/political culture pundits to engage in a give-and-take with the politicians they cover and their audiences to construct political discourse. This arena of political discourse is populated with journalists operating through many media channels. Despite the common claim that new media (such as social media, news sources on the Internet, etc.) have become the preferred sources of news for many consumers, Stephen Cushion cites convincing evidence that the news bulletin still remains one of the most used for receiving political news. A news bulletin is the fixed time delivery of broadcast news, such as the evening news on Britain's BBC or ITV or typically at 6:30 pm Eastern time on network television in the United States, that follow a traditional message logic. Researchers contrast bulletins with rolling news presentation, made ubiquitous by 24-hour new channels. The author's thesis holds that we can only fully understand how other media have affected news bulletins if we discuss the ways and the extent to which bulletins have adapted to contemporary forces.

Several theoretical concepts frame the book in current debates in the media studies field. First, *mediatization* refers to a key distinction in media studies. While mediation, traditionally, refers to the processes and types of filtering of information between human beings, mediatization deals with how changing journalistic conventions shape political discourse, and the extent to which media affect and are affected by deeper changes in social institutions that result from mediatization (a tautology Cushion acknowledges multiple

times). Put another way, forms of discourse have a reciprocal effect when mediated—media shape political activity and political activity shapes media. The mediatizing of news coverage of political discourse involves all manner of technology beginning with the advent of news bulletins in earnest in the early 1950s, and transforming through decades of media innovation, including exponentially in the past 10 years through 24-hour rolling newscasts and social media.

As a result, a *media logic* controls message structure and content. Media logics vary depending on the delivery format, e.g., a news bulletin logic differs from a rolling news logic; social media has its own logic; and so on. *Journalistic interventions* describe the ways that the media logics are altered and adapted, thereby changing the basic structure of media logic. For example, an intervention on a news bulletin such as an anchor interacting with a reporter in the studio, a reporter in the field, a reporter in the field acting independently, etc., all describe interventions that can change media logic. And all of this forms part of the mediatization of the news that can come from an *institutionalist* or *social constructionist* point of view. Cushion approaches his subject from an institutionalist point of view that treats media as autonomous entities capable of establishing their own logics.

The text's chapters present data from various studies. Chapter 2 takes on the effects of a rolling news logic. Cushion asks, how has mediatization of news in the present culture, most notably rolling format news, affected the media logic of the traditional news bulletin? Or put another way, as our information culture grows more mediatized, what has happened to the so-called mainstream news bulletin that was the origin of news programming? In part, Chapter 2 presents data that supports the notion that the increase in the use of live two-way reports in a news bulletin has the effect of making bulletins more interpretive, one effect of adapting to a rolling news logic.

Chapter 3 provides a detailed look into the media logic of the news bulletin. The methodology is consistent and detailed. Broadcasts on BBC and ITV from 1991 to 2013 serve as units of study to examine changing structures. Cushion reports that interaction that is two-way and in-studio has increased. Journalists may play a more central role, but media logics haven't changed considerably:

> …in edited political news there appears to be little evidence of a mediatization of political content on UK television news bulletins from 1991

to 2013. The evidence instead suggested the driving force behind mediatization was in live reporting. (p. 77)

Cushion extends his reach in Chapter 4 which provides a comparative approach. Here he examines Norwegian, UK, and U.S. news bulletins in a comparative analysis of evidence of mediatization. For example, The UK and U.S. exhibit more uses of the journalistic intervention of live reporting, which indicates mediatization based on the prominence of rolling news formats in those countries. Similarly, Chapter 5 investigates the intervention of the live two-way report, which is an occupational necessity in the current climate. It offers journalists a chance to interpret the news and act as experts. They become "de-spinners" of the products of the "professionalization of political culture" (p. 129).

While Chapters 2 though 5 present data from numerous studies, Chapter 6 considers the studies as a whole to examine the effects of the findings on audiences. For example, data provided in the book seem to indicate that the British public sees the BBC and ITV as the most reliable sources of political information. The trust may lie in the nature of journalistic interventions that bring more information to the public, though as public broadcasting entities, those sources are subject to impartiality commitments. Cushion goes on in this chapter to continue to defend the studies in the book against charges against mediatization in general as a concept without a distinct definition: "the aim of *News and Politics* has been to interpret mediatization in the wider context of economic, political, and cultural changes, and by developing a rigorous research design to analyze media over time" (p. 146).

Chapter 7 deals with new media. Here, Cushion addresses views of the role of the journalist in the contemporary media landscape. He focuses most specifically on Twitter and BuzzFeed as examples of social media platforms that aggregate news and information. As for Twitter, he highlights its power to undercut traditional journalism outlets as gatekeeper, but he maintains that it is the combined role of traditional sources and social media that result in power to shape news. That is, Twitter may serve as an origin of a significant quote, but it is the rolling news cycle and traditional news bulletin that still function symbiotically to frame how messages are create and received.

Regardless of one's position on the mediatization debate, Stephen Cushion's well-researched book illuminates the issues that underlie it. The interplay among media logics, journalistic interventions, citizen journalism, and even subject-generated political comments (presciently, the author seems to predict the potential of Twitter illustrated by Donald Trump's barrage of tweets in the first six months of his presidency) is a phenomenon in the field that needs to be addressed almost constantly. The book provides results of longitudinal studies providing depth and comparative and contemporary studies providing breadth. Stephen Cushion's *News and Politics* also informs our understanding of basic media theory, including media ecology, uses and gratifications, and agenda setting. I certainly recommend it as reading for scholars and students in media studies.

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Gonsalves, Peter. *Gandhi and the Popes: From Pius XI to Francis*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014. Pp. xv, 244. ISBN 978-3-631-65789-8 (cloth) $72.95; 978-3-653-97514-7 (e-Pub) $72.95; 978-3-653-05175-9 (PDF) $72.95.

Though Gandhi never met any of the Popes, Gonsalves claims that a clear line of influence and mutual knowledge runs between Gandhi and various popes. And, though the book bears the title, *Gandhi and the Popes*, it deals more directly with Gandhi and one pope, namely the current Pope, Francis.

Gandhi had requested a meeting with Pope Pius XI in 1931, on his return from a conference in London to India; however, this meeting never took place given the timing of the request and perhaps some Italian politics. Encouraged by a complimentary article about Gandhi in the *L'Osservatore Romano*, the official Vatican newspaper, Gandhi had requested the audience. Unfortunately, the Pope did not receive visitors on a Sunday. Gonsalves notes that the complimentary article certainly indicated the respect that the pope had for Gandhi, a respect manifested in the writings of subsequent popes. In 1931, the overall interactions between Gandhi and the pope took place, of course, in the context of the campaign for independence for India from British colonial rule.

Gonsalves structures this study simply: an introduction, an overview of papal comments on Gandhi, a lengthy comparison of Gandhi and Pope Francis, and a discussion of influences linking Gandhi and the Catholic Church. The introductory chapter discusses

the Vatican commentaries, the colonialism of the British Empire, the situation of Roman Catholics in India, and the situation of the Vatican vis-à-vis the Italian state after the Lateran Treaty. He includes notes from the commentaries of people who knew Gandhi and who were aware of his desire to meet the Pope. Gonsalves also includes an account of a meeting between Gandhi and Mussolini, scheduled by the Italian government after the desired audience with Pope Pius XI fell through. Here he includes both an account of that meeting based on contemporary notes and the debate about its wisdom, from the notes of Gandhi's advisers. Much of this first chapter, then, gives the context of Gandhi's visit to Europe, how he was received in Europe before World War II, and how the various actors perceived Gandhi's movement for Indian independence.

To fulfill the promise of the title of the book, *Gandhi and the Popes*, Gonsalves reviews the different Vatican statements about Gandhi between 1931 and the present: the article already mentioned in *L'Osservatore Romano*; a statement of Pope Pius XII on the assassination of Gandhi and commendation of Gandhi offered by the Pope; and statements or writings by Pope John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II. Gonsalves sees Pope John XXIII's teaching in the encyclical *Pacem in Terris* as influenced by Gandhi. He writes that the same holds true for Pope Paul VI's writings and perhaps some of the documents of the Second Vatican Council, particularly those dealing with non-Christian religions. Here he comments that Paul VI highlighted the themes of nonviolence so typical of Gandhi's movement. Closer to the contemporary time, Pope John Paul II also shows familiarity with Gandhi. Gonsalves argues that John Paul II had read Gandhi's autobiography probably during the time he was an archbishop in Poland. Later John Paul II specifically mentions Gandhi during his preparations for a visit to India, terming it a spiritual journey in which he stopped at the tomb of Gandhi. Gonzalez quotes some of the statements that John Paul II made at the tomb. Similarly, Gonsalves notes that Pope Benedict XVI also cites Gandhi and the role that Gandhi played in promoting nonviolence.

By far the largest part of the book deals with Pope Francis. Gonsalves drafted the book during the first year of the pontificate of Pope Francis and clearly has a great admiration for this pope and his style of leadership. He sees a great affinity to Gandhi, though he remains uncertain as to how much Francis may have read any of Gandhi's work or been directly influenced

by him. He looks at the similarities between the two figures—particularly at what he calls the nonverbal and symbolic actions which he argues are quite similar. Gonsalves offers an analysis based in media theory as well as in what he calls "prophetic symbolic actions." Much of this chapter looks at the initial style of Pope Francis and here Gonsalves may appear overly optimistic in concluding that the first year of the papacy is influenced by Gandhi. He identifies a number of ways in which he finds an affinity between the two men including "subverting tradition," "living in the midst of his people," "strength revealed in weakness," and "self engendered revolutions." Gonsalves also makes a great deal of the fact that then Cardinal Bergolio chose the name Francis, after St. Francis of Assisi. He points out that one of Gandhi's British followers "acknowledges the strong correspondence between Gandhi and St. Francis. He was astonished to discover that living with Gandhi was like walking in the footsteps of St. Francis and experiencing the weight of the challenge" (p. 84). In all of this Gonsalves feels that the Pope Francis has had a major effect on the history of the Catholic Church, an observation that may draw too much from the first year of the pontificate.

The next several chapters examine similarities between Gandhi and Pope Francis. Chapter 4 "Francis and Gandhi on Religion," examines what each has written or said about religion. Gonsalves considers topics such as "why religion," "on experiencing God," "what does it mean to be human?," "Faith and reason," "religion—an engagement with the world?," "religion, politics, and economics," and "an option for the poor?" Gonsalves continues in this vein by looking at other areas such as the role of religion and morality, religion and dialogue, and religion and education. In each of these he juxtaposes various quotations from the two men to show some level of similarity in their thoughts. However Gonsalves cannot demonstrate a direct influence of Gandhi on Pope Francis. The very simple fact of the similarity of their thought may or may not result from any direct influence; it could indeed flow simply from an acceptance of a certain common social thought that would appear in any religious setting. That noted, the chapter offers an interesting exercise in reading the different approaches that Gandhi and Pope Francis take to these religious topics.

The next section of the book deals directly with the question of influence. Gonsalves begins by asking "was Gandhi influenced by Christ?" (p. 121). In this area, he has access to a great deal of writing about

Gandhi, Gandhi's life, and Gandhi's relationship with Christianity. Gandhi spoke and wrote about his impressions about Christianity and how Christ's teaching could be interpreted through his own Hindu practice. Without a doubt Gandhi did find things like the Sermon on the Mount incredibly powerful. Gandhi also saw Jesus as a great religious leader but as a non-Christian, did not accept him as divine. In one letter, Gandhi did indicate that he saw Jesus in the line of avatars of the divinity much as he regarded other religious figures. The chapter continues to discuss both how Gandhi understood the person of Jesus and the teaching of Jesus as well as the reactions to this from what he calls "Hindu orthodoxy." Gonsalves also points out that many within the Hindu tradition found it difficult to accept Gandhi's insistent opposition to the caste system, for which Gandhi did acknowledge some influence from Christianity.

Gonsalves next turns to the opposite question as to whether or not Gandhi influenced Pope Francis. He does find many Catholic thinkers, leaders, and activists who explicitly acknowledge Gandhi's influence and describes the importance of Gandhi in their thinking. But Pope Frances does not do so. So Gonsalves tries to build the case that Pope Francis would have experienced Gandhi's thought in some way during his Jesuit formation. The young Bergolio completed the Jesuit course of study during a time of emphasis on Catholic social doctrine. As a member of the Society of Jesus, Bergolio would have studied this carefully. Gonsalves builds the case by presenting the history of Catholic social doctrine, a Church teaching that developed starting in the late 19th century through an encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, one largely drafted by his Jesuit teachers and advisers from the Gregorian University in Rome or from the newspaper *La Civiltà Cattolica*. To set the scene Gonsalves provides a brief history of the Society of Jesus, explaining why Jesuits might have an interest in the social justice teaching of the church. Gonsalves carefully traces of the growing importance of social justice in the Catholic Church and among the Jesuits themselves, not only through the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XII but also among the Jesuits themselves. Here he cites the figure of Father Jean Baptiste Janssens, S.J., superior general of the Jesuits from 1946 until 1964. Janssens himself had experience (in his native Belgium) working for the poor, combating discrimination, and rescuing victims of the Nazis during World War II. (Gonsalves remarks that the *Yad Vashem*, the Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes

Remembrance Authority named Janssens as "righteous among the nations" in acknowledging his work.) Janssens worked diligently to include the idea of the social apostolate and contemporary social justice concerns in the teaching and practice of the Jesuits throughout the time of his generalate, an enterprise continued by his successor Fr. Pedro Arrupe, S.J., and enshrined by various general congregations (the governing bodies of the Jesuits). More relevant to this history, Gonsalves tells the story of Father Jerome D'Souza, S.J., one of Janssens's advisers. D'Souza, a Jesuit from India, admired Gandhi and knew his writings well; in fact, D'Souza served in both the independence movement and the work of the Indian government. He had become a prominent academic within India in the 1940s and later served as a delegate to the Indian constitutional assembly. He also worked as a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations as well as to UNESCO. He and Father Janssens worked together, with Janssens appointing D'Souza to an advisory role in the central Jesuit government. Gonsalves points out that D'Souza had quite actively promoted the thought of Gandhi in Catholic circles. He cites a radio broadcast after the death of Gandhi entitled "Delhi during the tragic days." He quotes a long passage from this address to indicate D'Souza's tone:

> All his life long Mahatma Gandhi lived among the multitudes. This lover of solitude and silence, for whom prayer to God and listening to the "still small voice of conscience" was like the breath of life, could nevertheless not tear himself away from the multitude. Love of man, passion for justice, and the recognition of man's dignity, belief in the equality of the poorest and the most abandoned with the richest and the most powerful, dominated his entire life. And in return he was loved as few men in history have been loved. Wherever he went the crowds followed him, gazed on him, and pushed themselves into silence at the sight of him; crowds and those endless tireless journeys of his from one end of the country to another; crowds at his prayer meetings, crowds waiting outside wherever he lived. He died in the midst of a crowd. [...]
> What does it feel like, to be in India without Mahatma Gandhi? Suppose you had in the garden outside your house a beautiful mighty tree that dominated your landscape, mingled its members with the sounds of your household, while its shadows played about your walls and grounds the livelong day, and its green foliage softened the garish light in a thousand sweet and

subtle ways; supposed such a tree [was] felled by one swift stroke of lightning, how would you feel in and around your house, the shadows of the whispers gone, the crude and pitiless sunlight beating upon every nook and crevice, your entire dwelling exposed to the harshness of wind and sky? That is what India our great household is like, without the mighty, the magnanimous presence of Mahatma Gandhi. (pp. 155–156)

Father D'Souza certainly showed a great knowledge of Gandhi's teaching and helped promote the influence of Gandhi among Catholics in India. He also managed to connect this to the social teaching of the Catholic Church—or, perhaps, to connect the social teaching of the Catholic Church to the practice of Gandhi. Going on to describe the history of that social teaching of the Catholic Church and the role of D'Souza among the Jesuits, Gonsalves concludes that the future Pope Francis, as a Jesuit novice and student, would certainly have been exposed to this thinking, given the role of social centers run by the Jesuits in Latin America. The centers coordinated works and promoted studies of Catholic social teaching, certainly influenced by the work of Father D'Souza. But did this mean that the young Father Bergolio knew the work of Gandhi? Gonsalves' case remains circumstantial. Bergolio may have known something of Gandhi; Bergolio may have had some formative experience in the social justice centers; Bergolio may have seen a connection to Gandhi. However it is equally plausible that Bergolio came to his sense of apostolic concern for the poor through other sources. Perhaps the Gospels themselves or the growing role of liberation theology in Latin America shaped him. Though Bergolio did not completely embrace all parts of liberation theology he certainly would have known it well, given his time and service in Argentina.

So, the relationship between Gandhi and this pope, Pope Francis, comes down to the choice of the name of Francis, some of the symbolic actions Pope Francis enacted early in his pontificate—whether consciously or unconsciously—and the writings that indicate his sensitivity to Catholic social teaching. The larger question of *Gandhi and the Popes* indicates at least some awareness one way or another in the *L'Osservatore Romano* article during the pontificate of Pius XI, the appreciation of Gandhi by Pius XII, some hints of shared awareness and a mention of Gandhi in the writings of Pope John XXIII, a more explicit statement by Pope Paul VI, and the longer acknowledgment of Gandhi during the visit to India by Pope John Paul II.

In addition to the argument that Gonsalves makes, he provides a great deal of documentation. The book contains eight appendices. The first appendix contains the complete text of the *L'Osservatore Romano* article of November 27, 1931. The second appendix has excerpts from John XXIII's encyclical *Pacem in Terris* where Gonsalves sees a connection to Gandhi. The third appendix goes through the writings of Pope Paul VI listing the references to Gandhi, whether in homilies, letters, statements at various general audiences, or from encyclicals.

Appendix 4 contains references to Gandhi in the writings of Pope John Paul II. These include both comments from some of his writings as Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as well as his prayer for the journey to India as John Paul II and then the longer address at the monument to Gandhi during his visit to India. Finally, this appendix has the text of John Paul II's references to Gandhi at an audience on his return from the trip to India. Appendix 5 contains the statements of Pope Benedict XVI which refer to Gandhi including one where he writes, "Let us think of the great figure of Mahatma Gandhi: although he remained firmly bound to his own religion, the Sermon on the Mount was a fundamental reference point for him which shaped his whole life" (p. 198).

Appendix 6 turns to some of the more specific documents dealing with India from the Jesuits. Here we find a letter from Father Jean Baptiste Janssens to the Jesuit superiors there, as well as his instruction on the social apostolate which Gonsalves feels is deeply influenced by Gandhi. Appendix 7 contains a statement by Father Jerome D'Souza looking at how Christian ministry among the Jesuits should be adapted to the reality of India, including the teaching of philosophy and theology in the seminary and the external manner of living of the Jesuit missionaries.

Appendix 8 contains a essay by Gonsalves himself discussing the Gandhian way of the Jesuits, in which he indicates the ways in which Gandhi's thought may well have influenced the Society of Jesus, as shown in the documents of its 32nd general congregation.

In addition to these appendices the book also contains a glossary of Sanskrit or Indian vocabulary used in the book, a bibliography, and an index.

The book raises interesting questions and poses thoughtful possibilities. However, much of the reasoning remains circumstantial as to the extent of influence of Gandhi on the popes. Even if Gonsalves cannot

completely establish his thesis, he does provide a wealth of material that teaches a great deal about the Catholic Church and Gandhi over the last 70 years.

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Sumser, John. *The Conflict Between Secular and Religious Narratives in the United States: Wittgenstein, Social Construction, and Communication.* Maryland: Lexington Books Lanham, 2016. Pp. 168. ISBN 978-1-4985-2208-3 (cloth) $80.00; 978-1-4985-2209-0 (eBook) $76.00.

My conservative, Christian fundamentalist, working class mom stopped by my house. She was excited about an event televised on her evangelical network. Mr. Trump, she told me in a trembling voice, is on "their" side. She finds POTUS a powerful speaker when addressing his supporters, and now she is newly fired up about "the gays and their agenda." She assures me that while she will be nice to the LGBTQ community, she has had it up to here (eyeball level). I recognize contradictions and have many arguments at the ready, but praise be, I just finished *The Conflict Between Secular and Religious Narratives in the United States: Wittgenstein, Social Construction, and Communication*. Within a preface, six chapters and a conclusion, John Sumser details a comparison of secular and fundamentalist ways of thinking and reasoning commonly found in American cultural discourse. The book offers a deep, practical analysis of why, try as they might, secular and religious interlocutors continually struggle to reach mutual understanding or mutual influence. I now clearly understand why attempts to offer a reasoned response to my mother's political and social views is not an effective choice.

Sumser's book is centrally a book about communication. He discusses the function of narrative, language, argument, and meaning. He shows "how various perspectives shape the social narratives of life, how religion is woven in, and how meaning changes across time and across groups" (p. 7). I was not drawn to this book to further my theological and philosophical knowledge, though I learned enough to understand the arguments. As Sumser discusses the study of religion, he clarifies that his book is about the study of the way people *talk* about religion, the way people use religion to make sense of the world, not the study of "the nature

of the cosmos" (p. 14), which is ideal for those who study and teach communication.

Early on Sumser explores definitions of religion. He uses Emile Durkheim's practical approach to this endeavor because any definition of religion has to resonate with how regular people think about religion. From there, Sumser explores the many ways different thinkers approach such a task. He introduces distinctions such as the difference between the sacred and profane and the difference between thinking of heaven as an imaginary place versus an actual place. Sumser introduces the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein in a way that gives enough information about Wittgenstein's thought to develop his argument about how to think of secular and religious narratives in productive ways. Wittgenstein complicates the idea of categories. If religion is a category, it is, like other categories, complex. Therefore, it is more useful to think of categories as family resemblances. In this way, religions "form a family. Some have gods, some do not" (p. 9). Wittgenstein's philosophy is incorporated through the entire book rather than introducing it heavily in an early chapter with an expectation that the reader remembers how to apply it later.

The book's title includes conflict. Sumser explains the problems that stem from an instability of meaning and an absence of shared stories in contemporary culture. He points out the decline of institutions and the rise in our ability to share ideas. He defines ontological insecurity and security and the relationship of each orientation to a civil society. "We are on our own in a world without solid footing and so we assert ourselves, our beliefs, and our gods in an effort to find some ground" (p. xi). Conflict between secular and religious reasoning, Sumser writes, is at the core of the culture wars in America. He uses the extremes of Christian fundamentalism and secular materialist rationality to illustrate the different styles of reasoning and their futility when considered as oppositional.

The section on social construction explains how we use communication to create reality and meaning. From there, narrative theory is introduced. To explain the difference between narrative thinking and secular rationality, Sumser uses the distinction between logic and rhetoric. Logic has rules for thinking that do not entertain contradictions, so that if something is one thing, it cannot also be another (bread is bread, not also body). Rhetoric has rules for thinking that are tolerant of contradictions because they "can live suspended in narrative webs of meaning without cancelling each

other out" (p. 31). His memorable example is the Virgin of Guadalupe. In 2009, a man in California saw an image on a rock that he deemed the Virgin of Guadalupe. Sumser identifies the different reactions (secular and religious) that accompanied the news story to show the narrative frameworks expressed. For example, a secular response asks how the man can be so daft while the religious response is about the importance of this man's beliefs and a follow up promise to pray for the skeptic. The Virgin story becomes a useful touchstone to explain competing narratives throughout the book.

Sumser introduces critical theory because of the need to focus on how inequality is embedded and reproduced in the major social narratives of culture. "Gross inequities in society can be buried in narratives of meritocracy, natural and moral superiority, or God's will" (p. 44). Through a comparison of two creation stories—one from the Bible and one found in the Hindu religion—Sumser shows the importance of examining the assumptions and consequences of myths. Myths, as Sumser describes, "hit an odd part of our brain where normal rules of sense-making do not apply" (p. 55). This makes the application of narrative rationality impossible. Using a British philosopher, Sumser says, "the difference between religion, on one hand, and philosophy or science on the other, is that the myths and metaphors in secular thinking are self-conscious" (p. 92).

In the latter half of the book, Sumser reminds the reader of the earlier concepts, which is especially helpful as his argument begins to connect making sense of the world with different explanations of culture and economics (e.g., Marx and Weber). Sumser also shows the complexities involved in literal, allegorical, and commonsensical interpretations. "The ideas of interpretation and literalness are, themselves, enormously deep pools of confusion" (p. 88). These complexities are also why communicating across difference is harder than it seems like it should be.

Necessarily, Sumser gives atheism the same treatment he gives religion. He discusses the divisions, definitions, philosophies, and kinds of ethical atheism. He points out that atheist positions are as divisive as fundamentalist positions. He is able to show how the value narratives of atheists and religionists "do not collide head on but rather resemble ships that pass in the night, never making contact but sliding by in a fog of cross-purposes; you cannot use a great tennis serve to beat someone in bowling because the two things are unrelated" (p. 116)."

The last chapter is application. Sumser uses real religious debates by ordinary people found in online controversies as a way to show how people use secular and religious worldviews to construct their reality and to demonstrate how the types of narratives and their assumptions function (p. 123). Concretely, he illustrates that the way these groups talk to each other "prevents agreement" and "the way deeply held beliefs create miscommunication" (p. 129).

Sometimes authors with personable writing styles narrow their audience through what can feel like attempts to charm or befriend a reader. While conversational, personable, accessible, and intelligent, Sumser's writing style feels as intimate as a lecture, though the book form works well because Sumser draws broad types of sources to support his arguments: fiction, poetry, academic, and philosophical. The book format allows readers who are not accustomed to this style an opportunity to re-read, and of course, underline. This is the second book I have heavily underlined and thoroughly enjoyed by this author.

There are greater pedagogical and scholarly uses beyond my stated profit. The book would be a good central text or companion text for an upper-division undergraduate communication course, be it narrative theory, philosophy of communication, conflict, argumentation, or communication and society. Helpfully, Sumser makes use of the many polls that have been conducted on Americans and religion to illustrate the difficulty of measuring Americans' belief in a god. He lightheartedly dissects the flaws of these surveys, which would be useful in a research methods course.

Anyone with a desire to understand why communication is not a panacea should read this book because it offers a clear understanding of how communication scholars approach phenomena as well as an enlightened understanding of why the cultural wars over topics like gay rights and abortion that occur in religious and secular narratives in public discourse will never satisfactorily resolve. By the end, I had a better understanding and was immediately able to communicate more productively when faced with fundamentalist expressions.

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SunWolf. *God Thinking: Every Juror's Moral Brain, Religious Beliefs, and the Effects on a Trial Verdict.* LexisNexis, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-7698-8322-9 (paper) $59.00; 978-0-7698-8323-6 (e-Book) $59.00.

As a trial attorney, Dr. SunWolf is extremely credible in writing about the misconceptions of attorneys in what they think jurors base their decisions on in court, and how jurors act. Dr. SunWolf writes about how religion plays a big role in juror's decision making. For example, she explains how religious teachings such as the psychology of good and evil can have an impact on juror's opinions and, ultimately, on the verdicts in court.

Part 1, "Good and Evil in Every Juror's Mind" focuses on how science connects to religion and decision making. Chapter 1, "The Social Psychology of Good and Evil" discusses concepts such as free will and the psychology of good and evil. The book describes the difficulty in changing people's opinions on free will, therefore making an attorney's argument unlikely to change a jury's feelings on free will.

The chapter also discusses the psychology of good as well. Dr. SunWolf writes about "Chronic Helpers," or, people who consistently help others rather than occasionally. In court, being a helper or bystander can play an important role in decision making. The book states, "people weigh the costs and rewards of helping, with feelings of obligation conflicting with egocentrism" (p. 6). When choosing to help others or not, how much empathy a person has, their gender, whether they are a parent or not, and their aptness to act kindly can all have impacts on this decision.

Next, the book looks at the psychology of evil. It discusses the psychology behind unique cases, such as those of abuse, and cases that remind jurors of past historical events. It also dives into the neuroscience behind why people do evil things and, more specifically, lack self-control. In addition, this chapter discusses Ingroups and Outgroups, or the "us versus them" mentality that can affect cases, such as those involving discrimination or racism. Lastly, Dr. SunWolf raises the topic of lying when it comes to how jurors perceive lies in court.

After the psychology of good and evil, this book goes on to talk about vengeance and forgiveness. Vengeance and forgiveness are both normal, adaptive human qualities that appear wired into our brains. Interestingly, Dr. SunWolf also discusses how many religions have a form of the golden rule—to do to others as

you would like to have done to you. Lastly, the book points out that people do have the capacity for Fair Play, or acting kind. At the end of Chapter 1, Dr. SunWolf begins to ask questions of how jurors who have done evil acts and lied judge those who have done the same.

Chapter 2 explores "Brain Science: The Biology of Right and Wrong Thinking." The first part of this chapter explains how faith appears hard-wired, asking the question, why do people believe in invisible things? It gives the explanation that, from studies done on identical twins and persons with very similar upbringings, researchers found that "spirituality does not result from outside influences or the influence of parents, teachers, priests, imams, ministers, or rabbis" (p. 20). Dr. SunWolf also touches on self-transcendence and differentiates between spirituality and religiousness. Studies of attendance at religious services found that "elements of religiosity are more likely to be learned than inherited" (p. 20). The second part of the chapter, "Brain Science and the Biology of Belief" starts off by discussing the biology of belief, or how our brains quickly form and deepen beliefs. Dr. SunWolf explains how dopamine (sometimes known as the pleasure chemical) "may be the most directly related to the neural correlates of belief" (p. 21). In addition, she points out how beliefs form a pattern, are hard to shake, and are functional in our lives. She also ties all of this to the question of why bad things happen to good people. She writes, "suffering triggers God-thinking, as our evolved cognitive systems are inherently unsatisfied with the amoral randomness of horrific events" (p. 24). Essentially, our brains are wired to look for explanations when unsatisfied. The last part of this chapter, "Where Morality Lives: Every Juror's Moral Brain," is very significant to the theme of this book. It discusses moral psychology, an emerging topic of study. Psychology distinctions are very important when studying the courts. An example from the chapter describes the difficulty of the oft-stated request to jurors to keep an "open mind"; Dr. SunWolf notes the impossibility of the request since our brains make judgements instantaneously. This chapter also touches on permissible killings and how people solve moral issues with emotions and judging what is right and wrong. This judgement of right and wrong is called neuroethics. When deciding between right and wrong, and a person chooses the "wrong" option, the person feels guilt and shame. Interestingly, moral brains can change what one previously judged as right or wrong. Dr. SunWolf states:

the moral mind of a juror, driven by emotion, can be influenced by compassion and empathy or, on the darker side, by fear and guilt. These emotions are ripe for (appropriate) harvesting by attorneys as bridges to trigger a juror's moral thinking, in the midst of legal-fact finding tasks. (p. 27)

This is particularly important to take into consideration with jurors and the courts.

The following chapter, "Neurotheology and the Ethical Brain," discusses the emerging field of neurotheology, where neuroscience end philosophy are entwined. This chapter breaks down faith-based and evidence-based platforms of thinking, and asks whether science should study religion. It discusses how folk religion turned into organized religion and states, "religion offers profound team spirit and opportunities for second chances. Therein lies religion's longevity and strength" (p. 32).

The third section of this chapter takes a deeper look at the science of moral dilemmas. While the influence of science has increased, religious influence has also increased, making these two go hand in hand. The chapter cites the work of Marc Hauser of Harvard University for his "Moral Sense Test" (p. 33). When taking this test, a person listens to various moral dilemmas and gives answers. A diverse group of people have taken this test, and the results show that "most people morally reason more or less the same way. What differs, however, is how they interpret their responses; only 30% of participants gave significant justification for their responses" (p. 34). A key topic in this chapter addresses the concept of why people cannot always be good. People know what it means to be good, but can be swayed by moral, ethical, and religions ideas to justify and interpret different answers to moral dilemmas. Overall, attorneys seeking to understand jurors' reasoning must recognize moral thinking. People have an instinct for faith, and naturally, that is taken into the court rooms. The book states, "In a trial, the party that best fits the issues, choices, and fair play journey to verdict to jurors will have the best chance of a successful outcome. How much of your trial preparation time takes that task into account?" (p. 35). The book then transitions into Part 2, where Dr. SunWolf compares religious spaces such as churches and the element of storytelling to courtrooms and courtroom interactions.

Chapter 4 ("Religion in our Jury Pools") discusses religion in the U.S., voir dire, jury selection, and the importance of individual congregants. First, the book outlines the major religions in the U.S., which are diverse and growing. Some statistics about religion in the U.S.: 28% of American adults have left the faith they were raised with for another or none; 16% of Americans practice no religion; 51% of Americans are Protestant. This chapter goes onto explain some aspects of the dynamic nature of religion in the U.S. A potential juror's moral mind is very complex. Understanding religions and the histories, current events, social issues, and scientific views can change cross-examination. The book points out, "Some people stop listening to people who belong to religions they do not respect" (p. 51). Therefore, attorneys must have "Perspective-taking," or the ability to think in another person's shoes. This chapter contains examples of questions on jurors' religious beliefs that go beyond just naming their religion, and are necessary in trials with relevant issues.

Chapter 5, "Trial Events that Intersect with Religion" discusses how many aspects of the court can collide with a juror's religious beliefs. Conflicting times and dates of trials can interfere with a juror's religious obligations; jurors can have different perceptions of witnesses' religious oaths. In addition, what a person deems credible or sufficient evidence can change based on the juror's religious beliefs. What jurors notice, their opinions on science, and whether they believe in causation, or "The En'Shallah Effect" all matter. This chapter asks many questions that make the reader think, such as, "will a juror worry about how God will judge the juror's vote?" (p. 58). In addition, it points out the importance of a juror's religion when it comes down to the verdict. For example, a consideration of the amount of compassion a juror has for strangers and those close to the juror may affect how the juror judges the evidence in a case. This takes on greater importance in cases involving the death penalty, civil verdicts for money damages, and verdicts that include punishment. Empathy, guilt, and the bystander effect are all reasons jurors take responsibility to help those involved in a trial. When they must make the decision and weight the price of sin, the level of certainty in a juror's mind plays a key role.

Part III, "Trial Tools that Acknowledge Juror God-Thinking," asks the question "what might be done differently, more effectively, more successfully in our trials?" (p. 69) and replies that spiritual opinions should be explored in a public group repeatedly during a trial. Dr. SunWolf points out, "Harvesting

juror God-thinking requires regularly engaging in God-talk with people we do not know much about" (p. 69). The following, "Jury Selection: Discovering the Moral Minds in a Jury Pool," begins this process by discussing "Voir Dire to Harvest and Explore a Juror's Moral Mind." The chapter includes tips and guides to jury questions to understand the juror's moral mind. In addition, this chapter categorizes the concepts of good and evil, sins, revenge and redemption, forgiveness, good Samaritans and pro-social behavior, causation: fate, choice, responsibility, heaven and hell, death, other religions, the potential juror's religion, prayer, miracles, temptation, credibility and religion, religion in science/medicine, and compassion. Each category has various example questions that an attorney could present to jurors. There are variety of ways a juror's answers could interfere with their ability to apply the law. Due to this, this chapter includes a summary of consistent case law, a "10-step challenge for cause dance" and a sample approach to developing a challenge for cause as applied to religious beliefs, as well as three situations where this takes place. The final part of this chapter discusses rethinking questionnaire items that harvest God-thinking experiences, including a list of national groups with activist spiritual missions, narrative versus column formatting, and an example of a specific cause. Lastly, it includes suggested questionnaire items to outline the previous points and examples.

Chapter 7, "Motions: Requests that Make a Difference," covers all requests that can be made, and may make a difference with jurors. These include requests for questionnaires that deal with a potential juror's religion, voir dire by court on issues dealing with a juror's religious beliefs, opportunity to voir dire on specific religious beliefs, specific accommodations for jurors based on their religious beliefs and practices, and instructions to jurors limiting the religious material or discussions that might occur during trial or deliberations.

"Appellate Courts: God and Religion on Appeal" is the title of Chapter 8. This chapter raises interesting points, noting for example, "The formidable task of keeping the jurors' religion out of *the verdict* has been consistently abandoned by the appellate courts" (p. 116). It goes on to explain that books, quotations, prayer, readings, and notes are all allowed into the jury room on a regular basis. The book states, "jurors will bring their religions into their own thinking and as

tools to influence other jurors" (p. 117). To exclude irregular behaviors that could threaten the legitimacy of a case, judges appreciate relevant motions to put rules into place.

The final chapter, "Pre-Trial Investigations that Reveal Religious Landscapes" offers advice for attorneys going into a trial. Since people can anticipate that values may collide in each juror's moral mind, it is important that before a trial, one knows of the various religious groups within the jury. On specific issues, such as the death penalty, it can be hard to know where other's and even one's own religion stands. This chapter points out tools that the court can use to understand better each juror's religious background, such as a Religious Scene Investigation (RSI). Examples suggested here include having a geographic map of various religious groups in the area, gathering information on the religious leaders, knowing how the religious group engages in the community, and constructing a field visit to attend a service. In addition to the RSI, religious beliefs of important people in a trial such as the client and eye witnesses can bring forth knowledge of why events unfolded the way that they did.

The Afterthoughts section of this book enlightens the reader on how important and applicable the themes of this book are, with quotes from real cases that have patterns of God-thinking. It brings up the "red queen effect" or, the problem that comes with staying stagnant. Dr. SunWolf suggests that readers keep aware of the Moral Mutability Principle, the fact that religion changes with "economic and social times, scholarly insights, personal experiences, geographical travel, and exposure to the beliefs and values of divergent others" (p. 125). Dr. SunWolf ends this book by acknowledging that juror's moral minds both constrain the courtroom as well as bring out new possibilities of understanding.

This book is perfect for anyone involved in the courts, religious studies, or those curious about learning how the two are intertwined. It offers a variety of resources for further exploration. The book is easy to follow, full of intriguing information, and covers a variety of topics under this subject.

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Briefly Noted

Hope Culver, Sherri, and **Paulette Kerr** (Eds.). *Global Citizenship in a Digital World.* Götenberg, Sweden: NORDICOM, 2014. (Pp. 404). ISBN 978-91-86523-97-8 (paper) 250.00 Kr. (PDF also available from http://www.nordicom.gu.se/en/publikationer/global-citizenship-digital-world)

This second yearbook on media and information literacy and intercultural dialogue comes from the NORDICOM Clearinghouse on Children, Youth, and Media. The book's emphasis on media and information literacy advances the long-held interest that NORDICOM and other research centers have had in media education (or media literacy), adding to it a focus on contemporary and digital media. Taking its lead from a UNESCO program, the group has added the idea of intercultural dialogue. A global conference brought together a network of media literacy researchers from around the world to share findings on using new technologies to promote dialogue among peoples and countries, with a particular emphasis on young people.

The yearbook, drawing on papers from the conference, presents its material in five sections. The first, "Global Citizenship," presents essays on ideas such as video production as a way of reinforcing citizenship through media literacy, the interaction between media literacy and framing, and developing media literacy programs in different countries. Each chapter in this section focuses on a particular country and a particular approach. These include:

- Ehab H. Gomaa, "Video Production as a Tool to Reinforce Media Literacy and Citizenship in Egypt"
- Fatimata Ly-Fall, "The Interaction Between Framing and Media Literacy: An approach for promoting participatory democracy in Africa"
- Manisha Pathak-Shelat, "Constructing Online Spaces for Intercultural Dialogue: Media literacy initiatives for global citizenship"
- Daniel Schofield, "Reflexivity and Global Citizenship in High School Students' Mediagraphies"
- Chido Onumah, "Developing Media and Information Literacy: A case study of Nigeria"

The second section, "New Media, New Approaches," focuses on various new media techniques, again from around the world. Individual chapters focus on things like civic engagement or how to move to teaching information literacy from the traditional media literacy programs. Other more specific case studies examine teaching techniques. The chapters here include the following:

- Carolyn Wilson and Matthew Johnson, "Media Literacy, Digital Technologies, and Civic Engagement: A Canadian perspective"
- Catherine Bouko, "Affinity Spaces on Facebook: A quantitative discourse analysis towards intercultural dialogue"
- Claudia R. Wiedeman, Amy M. Carnes, and Kori Street, "Fostering Intercultural Dialogue at the Intersection of Digital Media and Genocide Survivor Testimony"
- Alice Y. L. Lee, "Moving from ML to MIL: Comparison between the Hong Kong and Mainland China experiences"
- Melissa Wall, David Baines, and Devadas Rajaram, "Pop-Up Newsroom as News Literacy: Covering poverty through a global reporting project"

The third section, "Youth Engagement," presents studies of how teachers and others have engaged young people in their various programs. As in the other parts of the book, the section focuses on case studies from around the world. These include:

- Esther Chin and Ingrid Volkmer, "Migration and 'Reflexive Cosmopolitanism' among Singaporeans in Melbourne"
- Usha Harris, "Virtual Partnerships: Implications for mediated intercultural dialogue in a student-led online project"
- Naomi Lightman and Michael Hoechsmann, "I Wouldn't Have Had a Clue How to Start: Reflections on empowerment and social engagement by former youth journalists"
- Ibrahim Saleh, "Whatever Happened to South African Youth? New media and new politics and new activism"
- Ed Madison and H. Leslie Steeves, "Intercultural Dialogue Through Immersive Learning: Media internships in Ghana, West Africa"

A number of contributors to the book focus on the role of the educator. The fourth section, "Education and Educators' Changing Role," presents six essays. These look at programs in places ranging from Jamaica to Japan. Each one of these essays suggests ways in which the role of teaching and teachers has shifted along with the new media technologies. The digital technologies not only pose a new challenge to the ways in which stu-

dents absorb information but also add to the global quality of that information.

- Hopeton S. Dunn, Richardo Williams, and Sheena Johnson-Brown, "Promoting Media Literacy in Jamaican Schools: Broadcasting regulator embracing a new role"
- Masato Wada and Yosuke Morimoto, "An Implementation and Evaluation of 'Media and Information Literacy Curriculum for Teachers' in Japan"
- Melda N. Yildiz, "Different Cultures, Similar Challenges: Integrating multilingual multicultural multimedia in media literacy education"
- Kyoko Murakami, "A Brief Mapping of Media and Information Literacy Education in Japan"
- Anamaria Neag, "From Schools to Startups? A report on media literacy education in Hungary"
- K. V. Nagaraj, Vedabhyas Kundu, and Ashes Kr. Nayak, "Marginalization of Media Literacy in Indian Public Sphere: A contextual analysis"

The last section of the book, "Media and Information Literacy," looks specifically at the programs and their characteristics in different regions. These range from Australia to Europe to North Africa to China. Here individual researchers and teachers present case studies of what has worked in their regions. These include:

- Michael Dezuanni, Kelli McGraw, and Christine Bruce, "Media and Information Literacy at Queensland University of Technology and in Australia"

- José Manuel Pérez Tornero, "How the Economic Crisis in Europe Promotes Media Literacy"
- Patricia Moran, "Poem Codes"
- Samy Tayie, "Towards an Increased Awareness about Media and Information Literacy in Egypt"
- Li Xiguang and Guo Xiaoke, "Model Curricula for Chinese Journalism Education"
- Sherri Hope Culver, "Adapting to Changes: Communication and media in higher education"
- Paulette A. Kerr, "Strategic Promotion and Expansion of Information Literacy Education: Professional development and outreach programmes"
- Abdelhamid Nfissi, "Information Literacy in the Digital Age: Morocco as a case study"

As in any set of selections or yearbook, the value lies in the scope of the material presented, and here it lies particularly the case studies and the international quality of these case studies. Once again, NORDICOM continues to provide valuable materials for those interested in media literacy.

The book features both introductory and concluding sections that provide the context for the materials. A final section offers information about the contributors, giving some background about their work as well as their contact information for those who might which to follow up on individual projects. Each chapter has its own reference list. Unfortunately, there is no index to the book; the reader must content himself or herself with using the table of contents to find a way to and through the particular materials.