Factual Entertainment and Reality TV

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Factual Entertainment and Reality TV

Editor’s Introduction

Reality Television surrounds us, having become a local and international force in television programming seemingly overnight. People—well, all of us, really—have a fascination with watching our neighbors, with watching the “unscripted” behaviors of others like ourselves, with keeping up with how ordinary people behave or might behave. Though the more recent history of Reality TV may result from economic forces, Beck, Hellmueller, and Aeschbacher remind us that the reality model of television goes back almost to the beginning of programming in the United States, with the Candid Camera program. The recent popularity of Reality TV has prompted much more academic attention than the genre had received in its first 40 years.

The last 10 years have witnessed a sustained interest in Reality TV in the academic community. Beck, Hellmueller, and Aeschbacher introduce that academic attention to Reality TV in this issue of COMMUNICATION RESEARCH TRENDS. For each of them, the topic forms a part of a larger, on-going, research project at the University of Fribourg-Freiburg under the overall direction of Professor Louis Bosshart. Bosshart and his students have investigated the roles of entertainment, broadly defined (including sports), of fame, of “well-known-ness,” and of audience emotional engagement with the ordinary in popular culture. In 2003, Beck explored entertainment and sports in TRENDS (Vol. 23, No. 4). Seven years later, in 2010, Hellmueller and Aeschbacher reviewed the extensive academic literature on fame, calling attention to media and celebrity and how the two mutually reinforce and depend on each other (Vol. 29, No. 4). This review, then, expands on the others and draws several strands together to show how the cultural attention to entertainment, fame, and emotion has coalesced into the popular culture of Reality television.

By situating the phenomenon in the history of broadcasting and, more specifically, in the international and national worlds of television broadcasting, they argue that humans share a curiosity about others and about social comparison. They also firmly anchor the growth of Reality TV in the shifting business models of broadcasters around the work: of Eastern European television set free from state control, of Western European television acting independently of government oversight, and of U.S. television trying to cut costs and maintain ratings. This global market logic suggests one set of forces that seems to act in similar ways in all markets—leading to the rather rapid deployment of Reality TV—though the specific kinds of programming vary according to the local tastes. In some ways, this redefines the “glocalization” model, seeing it at work on two quite different levels: the global at the business level and the local at the cultural level.

Their close consideration of the literature leads them to document how the “genre” of Reality TV actually describes more a “meta-genre” or overarching general concept; the review discovers five different kinds of television programming that fit well into the Reality TV model, based on the subject matters portrayed in the various shows. Their review also considers the research on the audience. Why is Reality TV so powerful? Surprisingly (or perhaps not surprisingly, if we think about it), the usual reason cited for the genre’s popularity—voyeurism—finds little support in the literature. They point out that human motivations are more complex and varied, with different audience segments enjoying reality programming for different reasons, something consistent with past research on uses and gratifications. They also point to a critical literature that readers may not know as well: Reality TV plays a particular kind of economic role, reinforcing the recent neo-liberal economic model by rewarding those participants who best follow its assumptions.

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1. Introduction

In 2008, the Popular Mechanics magazine named The Truman Show as one of the 10 “most prophetic science-fiction movies ever” (Popular Mechanics, 2008, March 28). Peter Weir’s movie starring Jim Carrey as an average guy, who has been bought by a company as an infant, is unknowingly filmed 24 hours per day for a popular TV show, and realizes at the age of 30 that his whole life has been a televised lie, was released in 1998. Soon afterwards, the world saw the breakthrough of a new kind of factual entertainment shows that also pretended to depict real people in real situations and captured their intimate moments with the camera: Big Brother, Survivor and others were an instant success and became the prototypes of the reality TV genre already parodied in The Truman Show.

The new formats introduced around the year 2000 had several predecessors already featuring some of their characteristics. For example, the makers of The Truman Show must have been familiar with the MTV series The Real World, which documented the everyday life of ordinary people since the early 1990s; hence, they didn’t need much imagination to create a fictional over-the-top version of a reality TV show. But they were prophetic with their assumption that reality TV was not a short-lived boom, and they anticipated the discussions about authenticity and ethical problems of the genre that were initiated by the popular shows of the early 21st century. Even the storyline of The Truman Show later appeared in an actual format: In 2003, Spike TV aired The Joe Schmo Show featuring a regular guy tricked into participating in a fake reality show.

Almost 15 years after The Truman Show and more than a decade after the beginning of the reality TV boom, the genre still flourishes. As of May 2012, 13 seasons of Big Brother and 24 seasons of Survivor have aired in the U.S., and CBS is preparing the next seasons of both shows (CBS, 2012). These pioneer formats still attract millions of viewers, although their audience rates have dropped over the years. They now have to compete with a huge number of new reality-based entertainment formats introduced during the past decade. To name a few, casting shows such as the Idol, Topmodel, and Got Talent series have revived and modernized the genre of the televised talent contest by giving a deeper insight in the candidates’ lives; dating game shows such as The Bachelor allow the viewers to share romantic moments with the participants; makeover and coaching programs provide advice for a better life in an entertaining way. New variations of the classical reality show depicting ordinary people’s everyday life are also popular. Since 2009, millions of Americans have followed the adventures of “Snooki,” “JWoww,” “The Situation,” and their friends in the MTV show Jersey Shore, and even President Obama publicly joked about the frequent solarium visits of the Jersey Shore cast in a speech at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner (Djang, 2010). Jersey Shore also demonstrates that people may gain celebrity status by participating in a reality TV show; to name only a few examples more, one could mention successful casting show contestants such as pop singers Kelly Clarkson (American Idol, 2002) and Leona Lewis (The X-Factor, U.K., 2006), former British Big Brother candidate Jade Goody, whose death from cancer at age 27 was extensively covered by the media in early 2009 (Walter, 2010), or Kim Kardashian, whose TV show brought her enough fame to get her own wax figure at Madame Tussauds in New York (Vena, 2010).

But success of reality TV is not limited to particular countries—it has become a global phenomenon. Local versions of the Big Brother format, which was originally developed in the Netherlands, of the
British Idol, and of the American Topmodel series, as well as of many other factual entertainment programs, have successfully aired on all continents. Factual entertainment is thus very attractive for viewers and has gained importance since the end of the last century—the audience is obviously interested in watching “real” events and “real” persons in television entertainment. The fact that some of these programs are controversially discussed due to concerns over their effects on society or criticized for voyeurism, contrived settings, or commercialism, may even have increased this interest. Both success and controversy of the new factual entertainment programs have also made them an important research topic for social scientists. The goal of this essay is to provide an overview of the most important findings in studies about factual entertainment and reality TV published in the past decade.

The research and literature review is divided in three parts. The first part, dealing with the concept of reality TV, starts with a discussion about definitions of reality TV in contrast to other forms of entertainment and documentaries, then traces the history of factual entertainment in the 20th century and makes an attempt to map the current reality TV landscape by presenting the various subgenres and their development. The second part deals with reality TV as a global phenomenon and discusses why non-fictional entertaining television formats could become successful all over the world and which strategies are applied to adapt them to local markets with different viewer habits and preferences. The third part finally gives an overview of studies about the audience of reality TV programs: Why do these programs attract such a wide range of audiences? Which gratifications are sought and obtained when people watch particular formats? What do viewers think about the authenticity of reality TV shows? The role of reality TV programs in promoting neoliberal values and imparting them to their audience will also be discussed in this part.

2. The Concept of Reality TV

Big Brother, American Idol, and Jersey Shore—the reality TV genre is waxing locally and globally. Reality TV as a contemporary media phenomenon is the focus of this part. Particularly, the following section examines components of reality TV, the development of the genre, and its definitional framework; finally, it provides a discussion of current manifestations of reality TV. Major subgenres in the current reality TV landscape and their development in the past decade are further presented. In fact, since the end of the 1990s, reality TV has undergone an enormous diversification, with dozens of new formats introduced every year. Hence, this essay provides an overview of a complex and dynamic research field.

A. General characteristics of the genre

While there is more or less consensus which programs can be categorized as reality TV, it seems difficult to find a common definition for such programs like Rescue 911, The Real World, Big Brother, Survivor, Top Model, The Bachelor, Wife Swap, Judge Judy, The Osbournes, or 1900 House. Reality TV can in fact be seen as a meta-genre including various subgenres. While early reality TV formats such as The Real World focused on “real life” and the portrayal of “ordinary,” non-prominent people, these characteristics are no longer typical for the genre. Instead of an “attempt to ‘capture’ ‘a life lived,’” recent formats of the genre can rather be seen as “televisual arenas of formatted environments in which the more traditional observational rhetoric of documentary jostles for space with the discourses of display and performance” (Holmes & Jermyn, 2004, p. 5).

In essence, reality TV is known for ordinary people being engaged in unscripted action and interaction (Nabi, 2007, p. 373), but some shows focusing on celebrities are also considered to be part of the genre. In any case, participants of reality TV shows may gain celebrity status due to television exposure, forming a new stratum of “ordinary” or “temporary” celebrity (Grindstaff, 2011; Riley, 2010; Hellmueller & Aeschbacher, 2010, pp. 12-16; Holmes, 2004). Nabi and colleagues provide a very general definition of the genre and describe it as “programs that film real people as they live out events in their lives, contrived or otherwise, as they occur” (2003, p. 304). Several key elements characterize such programs: (a) people portraying themselves, (b) filmed at least in part in their living or working environment rather than on a set, (c) without a script (or at least pretend-
ing to be without a script), (d) with events placed in a
narrative context, (e) for the primary purpose of enter-

The genre transcends the boundaries of classical
television genres by means of documentary elements,
merging information with entertainment, and reality
with fiction (Krüger, 2010, p. 158). Reality shows dif-
er from classical documentaries in regard to their main
intention: Instead of stressing journalistic inquiry or
intending to stimulate political debates, they are prima-
arily made for entertainment and diversion (Corner,
2009, pp. 48-50). This intention leads to the use of
more or less staged or artificial environments (pp. 45-
46). The event covered by the broadcast is initiated by
the medium itself, which is not the case in convention-
al documentaries (Krüger, 2010, p. 159).

On the other hand, the primary distinction of real-
ity TV from fictional entertainment is the fixation on
“authentic” personalities, situations, problems, and
narratives. But while program makers promise to
depict reality, the plots of reality-based formats are
influenced by the participants’ awareness of being
filmed and by the necessity for the producers to cut
down the filmed footage to the length of a TV broad-
cast. Ganz-Blättler (2005, p. 27) argues that little is left
to chance in reality TV formats: Like in fictional ent-
tertainment, location and cast are carefully selected
before the shooting. But there are two main differences
to fictional formats. The actors are non-professional
and thus cheaper for the producers (but less control-
lable), and in most cases they act without a script. Still,
a common characteristic of reality TV programs
remains their claim to provide viewers an “unmediated,
voyeuristic, and yet often playful look into what might
be called the ‘entertaining real’” (Murray & Ouellette,
2009, p. 5).

The claimed “authenticity” may also be seen as a
primary selling point of the genre. In order to gain pub-
lic attention for their reality TV shows, TV channels
often present them as extraordinary media events,
stressing their importance and uniqueness. Possible
means for this “eventization” (Holmes & Jermy, 2004,
p. 3) are the extensive use of program trailers;
features about the show in news broadcasts; talk show
appearances of hosts, makers, or participants; and in
some cases even spin-off magazines providing a deeper
insight into the participants’ lives. Other media,
especially the tabloid press, regularly cover develop-
ments in reality TV shows. The shows are particularly
newsworthy if they provide dramatic contents and
moral controversies. The producers intend such contro-
versies because they raise public interest and aware-
ness. Along with dramatization, stereotyping, focus on
emotions, and intimate details, calculated breaking of
taboo has thus become one of the typical strategies of
reality TV producers (Klaus & Lücke, 2003, p. 208).
As a consequence, a “perfume of scandal” can be
observed around many shows of the genre (Biltereyst,
2004, p. 7). However, in most cases the public dis-
sussion on controversial reality TV formats calms down
after the initial phase of a broadcast. In essence, if a
show is successful enough to be aired over several sea-
sons, it is no longer disputed.

Public interest is also given by the interactivity of
some shows, allowing the viewers to feel that they can
take part and influence the content of the show. This is
especially the case in gamedocs such as Big Brother or
in casting shows using televoting to evict candidates
and to select the winner (e.g., Holmes, 2004). But there
are also many popular reality TV formats without the
possibility of televoting, e.g., programs without com-
petition among the participants or contests in which the
winner is elected solely by a jury. However, many real-
ity-based formats involve their audience by discussing
developments and candidates in online forums or, more
recently, on social media pages, and providing other
interactive features on the Internet, thus serving also as
a testing ground for media convergence (Murray &
Ouellette 2009, p. 2; Andrejevic, 2008; Tincknell &
Raghuram, 2002, pp. 262-265; Foster, 2004). Although
the possibilities to involve viewers actively have
become much more sophisticated over the years,
Griffen-Foley (2004, p. 544) refers to a long tradition
of interactive media: As early as the late 19th century,
print media invited their audience to participate in dis-
cussions and send in their own contributions, in order
to foster a sense of audience engagement and to create
a loyal community among viewers.

B. The origins of reality TV—a history of factual
entertainment on television

TV formats portraying ordinary people in
unscripted situations are almost as old as TV itself.
Allen Funt’s Candid Camera about people confronted
with funny, unusual situations and filmed with a hid-
den camera, first aired in 1948, is often seen as a pro-
totype of reality TV programming (Clissold, 2004;
McCarthy, 2009). In the beginning, some critics con-
demned his show as an invasion of privacy, but with
the same recording technologies as used for espionage
and surveillance, and playing with topics such as unquestioned authorities or uncontrollable machines, the show obviously fitted the zeitgeist of the Cold War era and became a long lasting success. The appeal of the program could also be explained—similarly to later reality TV shows—with the voyeuristic focus on unguarded, unscripted, and “intimate” experiences of other people, presented from unseen, unacknowledged vantage points.

Elements of modern reality TV can be discovered in both non-fictional entertainment shows (broadcast contests, quiz and game shows, talk shows) and documentaries about ordinary people. Thus, a history of reality TV would not be complete without a brief insight in the development of these genres with their long tradition. Like Candid Camera, the first talent contests in U.S. television date back to the late 1940s. Notable beauty and musical contests have been televised since the 1950s: The Miss America pageant was first broadcast in 1954 (Riverol, 1992, p. 49), and the annual Eurovision Song Contest, with an estimated average of 125 million viewers in recent years one of the world’s most popular non-sports events on television (EBU, 2012), started in 1956. While in the early years, the winners of such contests were mostly elected by a jury, the first forms of voting by the viewers appeared in the 1970s, and the widespread use of this interactive element, which has become so important in many modern reality TV shows, started in the 1990s, after the capacity of telephone networks had been remarkably improved. At Eurovision Song Contest, an international telephonic and SMS voting all over Europe was introduced in 1997 (EBU, 2012).

Quiz and game shows, giving ordinary people the possibility to present their knowledge and skills to a wide audience, were also very popular in the early years of television. In the U.S. they almost disappeared from prime time after many of the higher stake shows had been discovered to be rigged in the late 1950s, but shows with lower winning prizes soon made a comeback on daytime TV. In many other countries these shows had a much more permanent presence on both public service and private channels (Bourdon, 2004, pp. 287-289). But it was not before the 1990s when a worldwide renaissance of high stake prime time quiz shows was initiated by Who Wants to Be A Millionaire?, a British format created in 1998 and subsequently licensed or optioned in more than 100 countries (Cooper-Chen, 2005, pp. 237-238; Boddy, 2001, p. 81).

Besides classical trivia-based formats, some game shows included stunts and wacky games; others concentrated on general knowledge or even culture, vocabulary, and mathematics (Boddy, 2001, p. 80; Bourdon, 2004, p. 288). Shows such as Queen for a Day (NBC/ABC, 1956-1964) or Strike It Rich (CBS, 1951-1958), where the candidates had to describe an object or service they desperately needed and were awarded with personalized prizes, already anticipated elements of confessional talk shows and make-over programs (Watts 2009, p. 303). Dating shows such as The Dating Game (first on ABC, 1965) were another subgenre in which the candidates had to sacrifice some of their privacy (Gray, 2009, p. 261; James, 2003). With the game element omitted, it was a short step from such shows to the confessional talk show genre, focusing on ordinary people instead of the celebrity guests that appeared in the classical talk show formats. This subgenre, presenting intimate stories and often touching taboos, was mainly introduced by The Phil Donahue Show in 1967. The concept was popularized by The Oprah Winfrey Show (1986-2011) and became very successful in American and European daytime programs in the 1990s, after the focus of many shows had shifted from personal issues connected with social injustice to interpersonal conflicts, but declined in popularity afterwards (Shattuc, 2001). While confessional talk shows are not always seen as a subgenre of reality TV, they feature typical elements of the genre like helping ordinary people to screen presence and establishing problems of everyday life as communication topics (Grimm, 2010, p. 219).

Besides non-fictional entertainment shows, another important ancestry line in the genealogy of reality TV refers to documentaries. McCarthy (2009, p. 35) argues that in Candid Camera and other projects, Allen Funt wanted to document the behavior of “the average man in a crisis.” His work attracted the attention of social scientists that started using hidden cameras for their research, including Stanley Milgram who became famous for his controversial experiments on obedience to authorities held at Yale University in the early 1960s. The scientific background of the wish to depict “real” life and “real” actions of ordinary people may be an explanation why some public service channels, with their mission of popular education (Bourdon, 2004, p. 285), were among the pioneers in the field of documentaries seen as precursors of modern reality TV formats. This stands in contrast to the present-day perception that reality TV formats as cheap, commercial-
ized and sometimes ethically controversial programs are mainly broadcast by private TV stations.

*An American Family*, broadcast on PBS from 1971 to 1973, is often discussed as one of the first reality TV programs (Murray, 2009, p. 66). Originally intended to be a chronicle of the daily life of a typical American family, the 12-part series documented the separation of the parents Bill and Pat Loud, as well as the coming-out of their homosexual son Lance. The program stood in the tradition of observational (“fly-on-the-wall”) documentaries introduced in the 1960s (Bruzzi, 2001b), but also borrowed structural elements of drama and soap opera with the intention to question the conventional depictions of family life in fictional entertainment (Kompare, 2009, p. 107). The series was very popular, but also provoked scandalized reactions: The Louds were criticized as either symbols of the cultural fallout of the 1960s or as victims of a manipulative sociological experiment conducted by unscrupulous producers (p. 102). Three decades later, a similar format demonstrated the fluid boundaries between documentary and reality TV: *American High*, a series about the lives of 14 high school students, was sold as a reality program since its first appearance on Fox in August 2000. In the following year, PBS picked up the program and marketed it as a documentary series (Murray, 2009, p. 70). From the present-day perspective, *An American Family* and later formats depicting people in their usual, more or less extraordinary living or professional environment may be categorized as *docusaops*. Docusaops differ from conventional documentaries as they prioritize entertainment over social commentary and take advantage of structural and dramaturgical elements known from soap operas such as the focus on character personality, short narrative sequences, intercuts of multiple plot lines, mini cliff-hangers and the use of a musical soundtrack (Bruzzi, 2001a, p. 132; Bruzzi, 2000, p. 89; Kilborn, 2003, p. 89-121).

Crime appeal programs were another early form of reality TV. A pioneer in this field was the German show *Aktenzeichen XY...Ungelöst*, which started on the public-service channel ZDF in 1967. The program consisted of film clips reconstructing serious unsolved crimes, interviews with police officers and victims’ families, images of suspects, and appeals to the viewers to phone in and to volunteer information. The format was later sold to other countries, including the United Kingdom (*Crimewatch*, BBC, since 1984) and the U.S.A. (*America’s Most Wanted*, Fox, since 1988). These programs were often criticized as cheap and voyeuristic—similar to the discussion about later controversial reality TV programs (Jermyn, 2004, p. 71; Bourdon, 2004, p. 298). Nevertheless, they remained on air for decades and paved the way for other formats showing police and other emergency forces at work, such as *Cops* (Fox, since 1989), *Rescue 911* (CBS, 1989-1996) and international adaptations such as the British 999 (BBC, 1992-2003) and the German *Notruf* (RTL, 1992-2006). These magazine-style programs combining camcorder or surveillance footage, eyewitness testimonies, reconstructed scenes, and expert statements were the first for which contemporary scientists and media actually used the term “reality TV” in the public discussion. They have also applied this term for talk shows, docusaops, and a new format, “constructed” documentaries only since the mid-1990s (Dovey, 2001, p. 135).

The earliest notable examples for this new form were the Dutch series *Nummer 28* (1991) and the very similar American *The Real World* (MTV, since 1992). Both formats entail many of the textual characteristics, which are defining the current form of reality TV. For example, young adults were cast in a manner to ignite conflict and dramatic narrative development and placed in a setting filled with cameras and microphones, and the producers employed rapid editing techniques in an overall serial structure (Murray & Ouellette, 2009, pp. 4-5). All these elements reappeared some years later in *Survivor* (first as *Expedition Robinson* on SVT, Sweden, 1997) and *Big Brother* (first on Veronica, Netherlands, 1999), the two formats initiating the boom of reality TV in the beginning of the 21st century. Both programs combined the voyeuristic aspect of the reality program with the competitive element of the game show (Tincknell & Raghuram, 2002, p. 201). In spite, if not because, of controversial discussions in the media, the new shows had immediate success and were sold to many other countries. In the following years, dozens of new formats fitting the definitions of reality television mentioned above—and first of all, sold as reality formats by the producers—were introduced all over the world and led to a massive diversification of the genre, since they combined elements of other genres and introduced new elements.

**C. Reality TV in the 21st century—a wide range of subgenres**

Various typologies to classify the subgenres of reality TV have been proposed during the past years.
Murray and Ouellette (2009, p. 5) identified eight established subgenres: gamedocs, dating programs, makeover programs, docusoaps, talent contests, court programs, reality sitcoms, and celebrity variations of other programs. As rather new tendencies, they name the growing importance of charity programs and lifestyle games with expert guidance, as well as the introduction of spoof shows. Hill, Weibull, and Nilsson (2007, p. 18) outlined infotainment, docusoap, lifestyle, reality game shows, and lifestyle experiment programs as main categories of reality TV. Nabi et al. (2006, p. 433) proposed a categorization based on six main topics: romance, crime, informational, reality-drama, competition/game, and talent. From the industry perspective, Fitzgerald (2003) proposed a similar categorization distinguishing talent and survival competitions, personal makeover, home makeover, get-rich-quick schemes, docudramas, and “Mr. Right” programs.

Thanks to these typologies, several overlapping categories may be discovered, including dating, game/competition, and drama/soaps. But most categorizations fail to capture the full range of reality programming, since new programs are developed every season. Furthermore, simple typologies often do not articulate program characteristics defining each category, so it remains arguable which category new formats qualify for. Finally, many formats could be seen in two or more categories: For instance, there is a strong element of competition in many dating formats, and gamedocs feature elements of docusoaps (Nabi, 2007, pp. 373-374).

Nabi (2007) attempted to map the reality TV landscape more systematically. She asked the participants of her survey to rate reality TV programs along attributes such as competitive, romantic, realistic, funny, or suspenseful. As a result, she identified romance and competition as the “two characteristics most salient to audiences when thinking about reality-based programming” (Nabi, 2007, p. 383) and as key dimensions distinguishing among reality programs. With the exception of dating programs, no other clearly differentiated group emerged on her two-dimensional scheme of reality TV, which means that in the viewers’ eyes, the boundaries between and among subgenres are rather fluid.

Klaus and Lücke (2003, p. 199) chose a different approach to characterize various subgenres of reality TV and to bring them in a systematic order: They distinguished “narrative” and “performative” reality TV. Narrative reality TV refers to formats entertaining the viewers by an authentic or staged rendition of extraordinary, real, or close-to-reality events with non-prominent actors, whereas formats providing a stage for uncommon performances with a direct impact on the participants’ lives fall into the category of performative reality TV. By this definition, the latter category includes all reality TV formats with competitive elements. Klaus and Lücke also distinguished “docusoaps” portraying people in their usual living environment and “reality soaps” bringing them in a new, uncommon environment. The following overview and characterization of the most important subgenres is based on the work by Lünenborg et al. (2011), who refined and updated Klaus and Lücke’s typology.

**Telling “real” stories: narrative reality TV.** Narrative reality TV includes some of the early forms of reality TV such as the news magazine programs based around emergency service activities, and docusoaps about people of any professional or private background. According to Lünenborg et al. (2011, p. 21), other subgenres of narrative reality TV are real life comedy such as the MTV series Jackass (2000-2002), court programs (Judge Judy, CBS, since 1996), and personal help shows about people in social professions helping other people (e.g., Die Jugendberaterin and Die Streetworker, both on ProSieben, Germany, 2002-2004).

Docusoaps remained successful throughout the first decade of the 21st century. Notable American examples include the Real Housewives series (first as The Real Housewives of Orange County on Bravo, 2006), inspired by the fictional ABC series Desperate Housewives and following the lives of affluent housewives in American suburbs; Jon & Kate Plus 8 (Discovery Health/TLC, 2007-2011), portraying a family with sextuplets and twins; Laguna Beach (MTV, 2004-2006) about teenagers in California filmed in a rather narrative than documentary style; and its spin-off The Hills (2006-2010). Another series dealing with young people partying on the beach became MTV’s biggest reality TV success so far: Jersey Shore, following eight housemates—mostly of Italian-American origin—spending their summer at the Jersey Shore and on other beaches, started in December 2009 and set record ratings of up to 8.45 million viewers per show (Gorman, 2011). The series introduced new terms, acronyms, and phrases into American popular culture and caused controversies regarding the portrayal of Italian-American stereo-
types. Unlike in The Real World, but like in some other more recent formats, the cast of Jersey Shore did not change with the start of a new season. As a result, the participants’ notoriety does not fade after the end of a season, as it is the case in many other reality TV formats, but is continuously revived. The Jersey Shore protagonists have thus become well-established media celebrities. However, as of the end of the fourth season in autumn 2011, their celebrity status is still no issue in the show itself. In the meantime, Jersey Shore has become a field of academic research of its own, with universities organizing classes and conferences focusing on the series (e.g., University of Chicago, 2011; Caramanico, 2011).

Besides docuseries about “ordinary” people possibly becoming celebrities in the course of the broadcast, the early 21st century also saw the introduction of celebrity docuseries, giving an insight into the daily life of already prominent people. Sometimes these shows are made in a humorous way, using narrative conventions of the sitcom genre. The Osbournes (MTV, 2002-2005), depicting the life of rock star Ozzy Osbourne and his family, may thus be categorized as a docuseries (Dhoest, 2004), but also, more precisely, as a docusitcom or reality sitcom (Gillan, 2004; Murray & Ouellette, 2009, p. 5). Other MTV series documented the life of pop singer couple Jessica Simpson and Nick Lachay (Newlyweds: Nick and Jessica, 2003-2005) and the beginning of the musical career of Ashlee Simpson, Jessica’s younger sister (The Ashlee Simpson Show, 2004-2005). Success of such celebrity shows is not determined by the initial celebrity status of the portrayed personality, and this status may change in the course of the series: Kim Kardashian, the main protagonist of Keeping Up with the Kardashians (E!, since 2007), had mainly gained notoriety for suing a pornographic film company after the publication of a private sex tape; but she developed her career as a model, actress, and businesswoman parallel to the broadcast of her show, which offered a platform to promote her commercial projects. In any case, the celebrity docuseries or docusitcom can be seen as a means for more or less prominent people to keep the attention of the media and the audience.

In contradiction to the claim to depict “real life,” not every format in the field of narrative reality TV is unscripted. Producers of reality TV formats—including The Hills and Jersey Shore—are regularly accused by viewers, former participants, or former collaborators that parts of their shows are scripted, and possibly faked scenes are discussed in Internet forums and specialized blogs like Realityblurred.com, sometimes also in the popular press. But in several formats, the existence of a script is openly admitted: Court programs and personal help shows usually present fictional cases; what counts is that the experts are “real” (Grimm, 2010, p. 222). Since 2009, pseudo-documentaries dealing with crime suspects (Verdachtsfälle, RTL), families in trouble (Familien im Brennpunkt, RTL), young holiday makers (X-Diaries, RTL2), or other everyday stories, written by screenwriters, staged with non-professional actors, and respecting formal conventions of the documentary genre, reached market shares up to 30% in Germany (Lünenborg et al., 2011, p. 24). The only formal difference to conventional, unscripted docuseries is a discrete indication of the fictionality in the end credits. For the producers, these formats have two advantages: (1) Regarding the need for more sensational and extraordinary stories, it has become easier to cast actors than to find interesting people willing and able to tell their story on television; and (2) the makers can insert statements and confessions which would hardly be made in public by real people, especially in contexts of crime (Brauck, 2009, p. 87). The success of these broadcasts proves that viewers obviously don’t care much about the lack of authenticity.

Documenting an important change in life: dating and makeover programs. Like docuseries, dating and makeover programs usually depict the participants’ actual living environment, but they are intended to have a direct impact on their lives. Contrary to earlier dating shows, modern representatives of the genre such as Blind Date (syndication, 1999-2006), Fifth Wheel (syndication, 2001-2004), or Elimidate (syndication, 2001-2006) are considered to be more “sexualized” with dates involving plenty of drinking, competitive stripping, bumping and grinding, and making out; while these programs played well in the late evening slots, serialized dating game shows with a strong competitive element such as The Bachelor (ABC, since 2002) became successful on prime time TV (Gray, 2009, p. 262). Another serialized dating program is the docuseries-like Farmer Wants a Wife, where farmers are presented with women from the city. This format was developed by Fremantle in the United Kingdom and premiered on ITV in 2001, but the German-speaking Swiss public television had already portrayed and accompanied farmers looking for a wife much earli-

Finding Miss Perfect or Mr. Right has not remained the only change in a person’s life documented by reality TV. Along with the serialized dating shows, lifestyle makeover shows, in which aspects of the everyday life of ordinary people are improved with the aid of experts, have also become quite popular (Murray & Ouellette, 2009, p. 5). These shows deal with personal appearance (What Not to Wear, first on BBC, U.K., 2001; The Swan, Fox, 2004; Extreme Makeover, ABC, 2002-2007), homes (Changing Rooms, first on BBC, U.K., 1996; Extreme Makeover: Home Edition, ABC, 2003-2012), or vehicles (Pimp My Ride, MTV, 2004-2007), which makes them a field to study lifestyle ideals in different cultures or pressure to conformity in lifestyle issues (e.g., Franco, 2008; Lewis, 2010 & 2011; Palmer, 2004). Coaching shows follow a similar concept of documenting an improvement in life, but they focus on serious personal problems and propose positive alternatives for acting (Grimm, 2010, p. 221). Unlike in the personal help shows already mentioned, the presented cases are not fictional. The prototype of this subgenre was Supernanny (first on Channel 4, U.K., 2004) trying to solve parent-child conflicts; other formats such as Raus aus den Schulden (RTL, Germany, since 2007) concern the financial situation of families and individuals.

**Getting along in new settings: reality soaps, swap documentaries, and living history programs.** The *reality soap* is defined by Lünenborg et al. (2011, p. 28) as a dramatized version of the docusoap: The participants act in artificial settings under extraordinary conditions, and the plot is formed by their interactions in a new situation. They have to get along with themselves, with the other participants, and with the role of the media. In many cases, competition between the participants is a central element, which increases the probability of conflicts among them. These conflicts are extensively discussed in the show (Thornborrow & Morris, 2004). Reality soaps with competing participants thus combine the agenda of a talk show with the style of a documentary and the format of a game show (Tincknell & Raghuram, 2002, p. 205).

*The Real World,* bringing together different people in a new environment, can be seen as the prototypical reality soap, but the best known format of the subgenre is undoubtedly the Endemol production *Big Brother,* first broadcast in the Netherlands in 1999 and subsequently aired in more than 40 different countries. The original concept consisted of 10 to 16 competitors living together in an apartment, isolated from the outside world, continuously watched by cameras, and trying to win a cash prize by doing their best in the games proposed by the producers and thus avoiding eviction by the viewers’ periodic televoting (Aslama, 2009, pp. 81-82; Tincknell & Raghuram, 2002, p. 202). This concept was refined and varied in later seasons by additional rules and elements provoking conflicts, such as the separation of the participants in “rich” and “poor” groups, the introduction of secret missions, moles, or identical twins pretending to be a single person. Other gamedoc formats focused on rather specialized settings or aspects: In *The Farm* (first on TV4, Sweden, 2001), the contestants lived and worked together on a farm, raising animals and doing agricultural work. *Survivor,* first aired two years before *Big Brother,* tested the participants’ skills to get along in the wilderness of a tropical island. *Fear Factor* (first on Veronica, Netherlands, 1998) concentrated rather on game elements: The contestants had to face trials of courage testing their physical ability and stunts meant to challenge them mentally, e.g., eating vile animal parts, immersing one’s head or entire body in animals considered to be disgusting or intimidating, or retrieving hidden objects in disgusting substances. *I’m a Celebrity, Get Me out of Here!* (first on ITV, U.K., 2002) combined elements of *Survivor* and *Fear Factor* by bringing together participants in a jungle camp where they not only had to struggle with the limitations of living in the wilderness, but also with mentally challenging games in the style of the *Fear Factor* stunts. Another characteristic of the format, the choice of celebrities as participants, brought two advantages: Viewers may be more interested in the show because they are already familiar with the characters, and since prominent participants are presumably more aware of the role of the media and the consequences of their appearance on television than ordinary people, there are fewer objections against particularly sensational or disgusting show elements (Lünenborg et al., 2011, p. 29). *Big Brother, The Farm,* and other reality soaps were thus also aired as celebrity formats in many countries. However, many candidates presented as celebrities had only gained notoriety thanks to previous participation in other reality TV shows.

A variation of the reality soap with less stress on competition is the *swap documentary* or “lifestyle experiment program” (Hill, Weibull, & Nilsson, 2007,
p. 24) such as *Wife Swap* (first on Channel 4, U.K., 2003), *Holiday Showdown* (first on ITV, U.K., 2003), or, as a celebrity format, *The Simple Life* with Paris and Nicole Hilton (Fox, 2003-2007). Accompanied by cameras, the participants change their usual living environment for a new environment. The main idea of these formats is to confront different ways of life, which may result in funny or conflict-laden situations (Lünenborg et al., 2011, 30). Finally, a particular form of reality soaps are *living history formats* in which the participants act in historical settings. These formats give an insight into everyday life in former times and focus on the differences between then and now and on the problems of modern people trying to use skills which were important in the past. Due to this educational function, living history formats, unlike other modern forms of reality TV, are seen in accordance with the tasks of public service television and therefore became a domain of public service broadcasters: *Living in the Past*, a BBC documentary following the creation of an Iron Age settlement by a group of volunteers, dates back to 1978 (Duguid, 2010). More recently, living history formats were introduced by Channel 4 in the United Kingdom (*1900 House*, 1999), PBS in the U.S.A. (*Frontier House*, 2002), ARD in Germany (*Schwarzwaldhaus 1902*, 2002), France 3 in France (*Retour vers le néolithique*, 2003), and many others. The simple rural life of the 19th and early 20th century and survival in prehistoric times were particularly popular motives for these formats. Contrary to gamedocs set in a difficult living environment, there is usually no competition among the participants in living history formats (West, 2010).

Making a dream come true: casting shows. Like reality soaps, casting shows have proved to be a particularly successful subgenre of reality TV. Their aim is to discover new singing, acting, or other talents presenting themselves in front of a jury. In contrast to conventional talent contests, the depiction of the selection process has become much more important in modern casting shows. The programs do not only focus on the candidates’ performances, but also on their behavior and emotions behind the stage, their families and their living environment, the discussions inside the jury, and the conflicts between jury and candidates. As a result, the casting show can be seen as a hybrid format merging elements of talent contest, docusoap, reality soap, and comedy (Lünenborg et al., 2011, pp. 25-27). Strong “eventization” can be observed in many casting shows: Cross-promotion for spin-off magazines and merchandizing products (e.g., CDs and DVDs), as well as extensive media coverage about the candidates and the jury are quite frequent. In addition to revenues from TV spots, sponsoring, product placement, and merchandizing, televoting may be an important source to finance a casting show, since many formats (but not all) are interactive, with the winner being elected by the viewers. From an economic point of view, casting shows are thus particularly profitable for media companies (Jenkins, 2009).

The first modern casting show was *Popstars*, developed by producer Jonathan Dowling in New Zealand and first aired there in 1999 before being franchised in more than 30 countries all over the world. The aim of the show was to cast members for an all-girl pop group. An even greater and longer-lasting international success was the *Idol* series created by Simon Fuller and produced by Fremantle, first aired as *Pop Idol* in the United Kingdom in 2001. All over the world, more than 40 adaptations of this singing contest with single artists competing against each other have been aired, including *American Idol* in the U.S.A. and transnational versions in Africa, the Arab World, and Latin America (Livio, 2010, pp. 169-170). In some countries, very similar non-licensed derivations of the *Idol* format were broadcast, such as the Austrian *Starmania* (2002-2009) and its Swiss adaptation *MusicStar* (2003-2009) (Beck & Jecker 2012, pp. 360-361). More recent casting shows for singers such as *The X-Factor* (first on ITV, U.K., 2004) and *The Voice* (first on RTL 4, Netherlands, 2010) lay more stress on the role of the jury members, who don’t only evaluate the performances, but also act as coaches or mentors for the candidates.

While singing contests were the earliest and probably most typical form of casting shows, the subgenre soon diversified: The *Top Model* series, featuring young women competing for a contract with a major modeling agency, started in the U.S.A. in 2003 and became a similar international success like the *Idol* format. In the *Got Talent* series (in the U.S.A. since 2005, in the U.K., where the show was developed by Simon Cowell, since 2006), any extraordinary show talent can be presented in front of a jury. Casting shows have also been made for comedians (*Last Comic Standing*, NBC, 2003-2010), dancers (*So You Think You Can Dance*, Fox, since 2005), chefs (*Hell’s Kitchen*, first on ITV, U.K., 2004), business jobs (*The Apprentice*, first on NBC, 2004), fashion designers (*Project Runway*,...
Bravo/Lifetime, since 2004), and even mentalists (The Next Uri Geller, first in Israel in 2007). Particular research has been done about the depiction of work ethic in such formats (e.g., Hendershot, 2009). Dancing with the Stars (first as Strictly Come Dancing on BBC, U.K., 2004) pairs celebrities with professional dancers competing in ballroom and Latin dances and can thus be seen as a casting show format involving celebrities as candidates. In Hit Me, Baby, One More Time (first on ITV, U.K., 2004), former pop stars trying to make a comeback competed against each other.

**Hoaxing the real: spoof shows.** The boom of reality TV has also led to the introduction of spoof shows. While formats such as The Joe Schmo Show (Spike TV, 2003-2004), a gamedoc in which all but one participant were actors playing stereotypes of common reality TV show contestants, can be seen as humorous parodies for the entertainment of savvy viewers (Hearn, 2009), some spoof shows were intended to animate the critical discussion about the reality TV genre or about a social issue. One of the best-known examples is the Dutch Big Donor Show about three contestants striving to receive the kidney of a supposedly terminally ill woman, produced by Endemol in 2007. The announcement of the show triggered a debate on the current state of television, and some members of the Dutch parliament considered banning the broadcast. The revelation of the hoax created even more accusations of ratings-driven sensationalism, but Endemol claimed that the goal was to cast a critical eye on the situation of patients awaiting organ transplants (Murray & Ouellette, 2009, p. 1).

Some years earlier, when Survivor and Big Brother had become an instant success on private television, most European public service channels refused to air such formats, judging them unsuitable with their mandate and their quality standards. In summer 2001, it was thus a surprise when TSR, the public service broadcaster in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, introduced Génération 01, a Big-Brother-like series with particularly hard conditions for the contestants. But the show was a fake: All “contestants” were in fact actors, and their actions were fully scripted. TSR wanted to reveal this in the final episode in order to start a discussion about the boundaries between reality and fiction in reality TV formats, but journalists from Tribune de Genève, a regional newspaper from Geneva, became suspicious, investigated, and published the facts while the series was still running. In the following discussion, TSR was harshly criticized for having fooled the audience and other media when announcing the show (Clavien, 2003, pp. 109-111).

The controversies about the Dutch and the earlier Swiss spoof show do not only illustrate the high media interest in reality TV formats, but also document how the public perception of programs between reality and fiction has changed with the viewers’ growing experience with the genre. While in 2001, some media still saw a scandal in the mere fact that Génération 01 was faked, the main controversy about the Big Donor Show from 2007 was caused by the provocative, taboo-touching setting of the show. Unlike these examples, more recent “scripted reality” formats, which are in fact also faked, have no longer provoked similar public discussions.

### 3. Globalization of Factual Entertainment Formats

The popularity of factual entertainment formats such as Idol is “more than just another trend in an industry perennially hungry for hit shows and eager to follow them” (Waisbord, 2004, p. 360). It is a trend geared by the globalization of the business model of television. Scholars (e.g., Waisbord, 2004) argue that the commercialization and homogenization of media systems served as the bases for successful exports and imports of formats across the globe. As soon as media organizations adapted principles of a market model of journalism such as private ownership and profit-orient-
because the shows are adapted to a local culture and available to a local audience. Hence, their success rests upon their integration into a particular culture. In essence, the industry today is dominated by global television formats. That was not always the case. Before the 1990s, when television was more a protected industry with “regulatory stonewalls” (Waisbord, 2004, p. 360), producers of European public service channels often imported the idea or elements, but not the format of American shows. In many cases, the concepts of U.S. game shows were “dissolved” in long-lasting variety shows made to appeal to the whole family (Bourdon, 2004, p. 296). For example, Teleboy in Switzerland (1974-1981) and Verstehen Sie Spass? in Germany (since 1980) were Saturday night prime time shows combining hidden camera clips in the style of Candid Camera, games, and entertaining show elements.

The hesitation of European producers to integrate foreign formats in their own programming reflects the importance of cultural and system level influences on TV programming (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). In other words, the success and the integration of factual entertainment formats still remain tied to local and national cultures.

One of the contemporary paradigms in comparative media research results from such a paradoxical co-existence of the differences and the universal (i.e., the West and the Global) in media structures and content across the globe (Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009): National borders may no longer draw distinctions between one media culture and another, but diversities in media cultures might be based more on cultural, linguistic, or ethnic criteria, which may cross national borders.

Media system analyses resonate well with such an approach. Distinctive media traditions developed because of the dependencies of the media field on economic and political pressures (Benson & Hallin, 2007; Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011). Hallin and Mancini (2004) provide ample evidence that different philosophies have lead to different concepts of media systems. Contrary to the U.S., western European countries have long been skeptical of a free media market and seek to improve diversity by assigning a specific role to the state as a regulative force to enhance the media’s role as a social institution. Such media system differences are mirrored in media freedom rankings, which are annually published by non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House, for example. On the other hand, endogenous and exogenous forces of change are also at play. Privatization of television and convergence toward the U.S. model are affecting media systems, which has led scholars to conclude that distinctions have disappeared while a global ideal is appearing (Benson & Hallin, 2007).

Without a doubt, the success of television formats was dependent on the globalization of the economics of the television industry (Waisbord, 2004). After media systems were commercialized, economic interests stimulated an appeal to increase financial resources—an attractive move for media corporations to position themselves in a global market. Revenues no longer depended on a single market, but expanded to global markets. Furthermore, as soon as commercial principles dominated a wide global market, formatted programs could be adopted elsewhere. For example, Britain’s Pearson Television’s hit Who Wants to Be a Millionaire has been sold to over 100 countries including Afghanistan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (BBC online, 2006). On the other hand, a number of non-Western companies also became important producers and exporters of television programming. For example, Latin American started exporting products to Europe and the United States. But the U.S. influence remains strong. And, with new entrants participating in the global exchange of audiovisual products, enormous inequalities still exist on a global scale (Waisbord, 2004).

A. Global market logic—cultural adaptation?

Global market logics consist of the aim of selling audiences to advertisers. The higher their audience share, the more attractive is their programming to advertisers, which eventually determines the organizations’ position in comparisons to its competitors. If television stations buy a format, they, on the other hand, also save money as game shows or other reality TV formats do not require the acquisition of professional actors. For example, NBC’s game show Twenty one costs three times less than an episode of Law and Order (Waisbord, 2004). And, they provide low risks for a media company since in a way they provide a history of success and knowledge because of their experiences with adaptation processes in other countries. Furthermore, they draw a lot of their fans onto their website, which increases audience engagement and attracts advertisers in a long run.

Because media organizations are embedded in a particular culture, the standardization and adaptation processes of TV formats is also a battle among com-
peting ideas to what extent a format should be adapted to a local culture or whether a global product should be part of a certain media culture at all. In fact, some European countries indeed have quotas that primarily aim to curb the import of Hollywood programs (Tunstall & Machin, 1999). Hence, similarities and differences that come with a globalization of TV formatting have to be looked at in their interplay, rather than deciding whether global or local trumps in a particular case. As Waisbord (2004) argues, global media trends and the national are not antithetical, but integrated.

How can a global product then be integrated in a local culture and attract local viewers? This bears on the underlining question whether a global economy may transform a local culture into a globalized television culture. On the other hand, the local and national cultures may still pull the economy of TV formatting in an opposite direction by influencing its success in a local market. Such a discussion reflects internal struggles of a media industry of how “the globalization of the business model of television and the efforts of international and domestic companies deal with the resilience of national cultures” (Waisbord, 2004, p. 360).

While economic global successes of TV formats are discussed widely, discussions on cultural adaptations seem to be more complex. To begin with, culture is defined as networks of knowledge (Hong, 2009). As a knowledge tradition, culture is shared among a collection of interconnected individuals (often demarcated by race, ethnicity, or nationality) to form a common ground for communication. Culture is transmitted from one generation to the next while undergoing continuous modifications by newer social orders. Such a definition prevents conflating culture with racial, ethnic, or national groups. While those groups are agents of culture, the causal potential does not reside in them. Rather “networks of shared knowledge are activated in a probabilistic manner in certain social contexts” (Hong, 2009, p. 4).

Indeed, factual entertainment represents networks of shared knowledge and functions as a cultural transmitter, as a binding force in certain social contexts. In other words, embedded in a meaning, which may be understood only to members of a certain social context (particularly evident in humor used in such shows), their content offers representation of cultural values, beliefs, and processes of perception for a particular culture.

Research into intercultural communication has revealed that perceptions of cultural similarity affect with whom people initiate and maintain communicati-

tion (King, 1976; McCroskey, 1966; McCroskey & Young, 1981; Neuliep, Hintz, & McCroskey, 2005; Wheless, 1974). Furthermore, research shows that consumers respond to advertising messages congruent with their culture and with people who reflect its values (e.g., Paek, 2005). In a cultural context, a celebrity for example, functions as a cultural hero. Viewers identify with reality stars because such stars represent a high amount of culturally shared norms and values like national celebrities or heroes (de Mooij, 2010; Shearman, 2008; Ting-Toomey & Chung, 2005). For example, Roger Federer represents such a prototype Swiss celebrity. He embodies values like modesty, being natural, and cultural diversity (by speaking a variety of languages), which are values praised and recognized in a Swiss culture.

B. Do global products travel to local viewers?

Following the shared-meaning of culture argument above, it seems not surprising that viewers still prefer domestic and regional content to foreign programs and that the cultural adaptation to foreign product is rather slow (Langdale, 1997). However, in line with the cultural argument, the distinction whether formats are successful or not bears on the question whether formats are imported from countries that share “cultural proximity” (i.e., similar values) or come from countries that share less cultural proximity (i.e., dissimilar values).

Because of the complexity, globalization phenomena linked with localization forces have long called for a better term to reflect global-local encounters. More than 10 years ago, Kraidy (1999) argued that “the term ‘glocalization’ obtained by telescoping ‘globalization’ and ‘localization’ is a more heuristic concept that takes into account the local, national, regional, and global contexts of intercultural communicative processes” (p. 472). The intersection of globalization and localization is thus conceptualized as a hybridity, which becomes the rule rather than the exception. Distinctions based on the two poles—local audiences and global media—foremost serve heuristic categorization in understanding a global TV market. However, practical inquiries preserve a glocalization logic, i.e., an understanding of global products embedded in a local cultures.

In recent years, scholars followed glocalization claims to analyze how global narratives are operating in a local context to established discourses of national identities (e.g., Price, 2010; Baltruschat, 2009). For
example, Price (2010) looked at popular Australian myth in reality formats and argued that reality TV serves as a means to construct Australian identity; it reinforces “dominant ideas of culture and values with televisual conventions of factuality and entertainment” (Price, 2010, p. 458).

In a Canadian case, Baltruschat (2009) discusses how glocalization processes led to the production of Canadian Idol—an adaptation of the international success of Idol. The combination of the U.K. and the U.S. versions was adapted to a Canadian market with the addition of Canadian contestants and cultural references. Depiction of local stories, references to national symbols and cultural signifiers worked well in adapting to a Canadian culture. Such cultural signifiers include “opening shots of historic Canadian sites, performing the national anthem as part of televised auditions, and staging media events, as well as a variety of online interactive elements” (Baltruschat, 2009, p. 54).

Different cultural nuances can also be accommodated by content factors. For example, Hetsroni and Tukachinsky (2003) compared the themes of questions asked in the quiz show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? in America, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Results showed that questions mirrored cultural differences between the countries: In the U.S. case, questions focused on popular culture, whereas the Saudi quiz overemphasized national identity. Hence, we observe key elements being standardized among formats such as narratives of formats. But more in-depth, formats are also embedded into a culture by overemphasizing dominant cultural values, manifested in “cultural signifiers.”

In conclusion, global formats may well succeed because they are flexible to cultural differences. In essence, standardized narratives of factual entertainment formats provide the opportunity to accommodate local cultural frames by adapting its content to a local culture, which echoes glocalization claims—integrating global formats for local audiences.

4. Reality TV from the Audience Perspective

Why do reality TV formats attract a wide range of audiences? They claim to depict real people and real events, but their “reality” is manipulated for dramaturgical reasons by edited and reconstructed scenes, by careful selection of cast and settings, and sometimes by scripted elements. Our overview of studies dealing with reality TV from the audience perspective thus starts with findings on how viewers perceive and judge the authenticity of reality TV programs. Another important research field is the viewers’ motivation for watching these programs; numerous analyses have been made about the appeal of reality TV for viewers in general or concerning particular subgenres. Many of these studies are still exploratory, limited to specific social groups (often students or adolescents) or regions. Lots of research still has to be done, especially in the field of intercultural differences in the reception of reality TV formats. Yet the existing studies provide a first overview of which gratifications may be obtained by watching reality TV. The final section of this part will focus on the role of reality TV programs in imparting particular values to their audience: Various scholars have discussed how

the settings of these programs reflect and promote the principles of neoliberalism.

A. Perception of authenticity, criticism, and concerns about reality TV

It is often assumed that regular viewers of reality TV have become quite savvy and skeptical when judging how much is actually “real” in these programs (Murray & Ouellette, 2009, p. 6). Although authenticity is desired by the viewers and earnestly promoted by the producers, various scholars argue that in the “post-documentary context” (Corner, 2009, p. 53) of reality TV, consumers are not so much interested in absolute truth, but enjoy “the ironic mixture of the factitious and the spontaneous” (Rose & Wood, 2005, p. 286). Empirical support for this position is provided by an Associated Press/TV Guide poll from 2005: The participants indicated that “they did not believe reality TV was real, but they also didn’t care that much” (Murray & Ouellette, 2009, p. 8). In fact, 25% of the 1002 adults polled assumed that reality shows are totally made up, and 57% believed that they show some truth, but are mostly distorted. But only 30% said that it mat-
Alice Hall (2003, 2006, 2009) conducted focus group interviews in order to analyze the perception of the authenticity of reality TV programs more in-depth. Among the various criteria contributing to audiences’ perceptions of realism, she considered two as particularly relevant to reality programs: typicality, i.e., the perception that a media text portrays events or characteristics that are representative of a particular population, and factuality, i.e., the perception that a media text accurately represents a specific real-world event or person. In the discussion of typicality of reality programs, many respondents argued that the cast members and situations they represent were strikingly unrepresentative. They were more likely to accept the factuality of the programs, tending to expect non-actors in unscripted situations, but acknowledging that these situations were often contrived and that the presence of the camera may have influenced the cast’s behavior (Hall, 2009, p. 209).

In their study based on in-depth interviews with 15 adult reality TV viewers, Rose and Wood (2005) found that the programs are seen as a mix of authentic and fictional elements. In order to consider the programs as authentic, the viewers have to negotiate the paradoxes and contradictions inherent in the genre and to reconcile the tensions between what is subjectively real and fictional. The highest satisfaction with the authenticity of a program is reached if these contradictions are experienced as resonant and engaging rather than as bewildering or confusing (p. 294). But the perception of the authenticity of a particular format can change in the course of time. In group discussions with college students, Lundy, Ruth, and Park (2008) found that situations and characters in reality TV programs were considered as more and more unreal and exaggerated over the years. The participants explained this development as a strategy of the broadcasters to attract more viewers, but criticized that the original premise of reality TV was distorted. Still, they thought that “reality TV is set up to make people believe that these things on the reality shows can actually happen” (p. 217).

While these findings show that adult viewers seem to have a rather savvy and reflexive approach towards the authenticity of reality TV, a German survey focusing on children and adolescents came to a different conclusion: Götz (2012) interviewed pupils from 6 to 18 years old about the scripted docuseries Familien im Brennpunkt, a format presenting fictitious cases of family troubles in documentary style. 30% of the 294 respondents familiar with the series believed that real families were filmed in their everyday life, 48% thought that real cases were staged with actors, and only 22% gave the correct answer that the stories were entirely fictional. The detailed analysis showed that only among the respondents older than 16 years, a majority was aware of the way the show was produced (p. 6). The stories in Familien im Brennpunkt are highly dramatized, with conflicts between “good” and “evil” persons, and concentrate on particular social milieus. Due to the documentary style, they may have a higher impact on the children’s perception of reality than openly fictional entertainment. As an example, 60% of the 6- to 14-year-olds agreed to the statement: “Since I watch Familien im Brennpunkt, I know that many people are really mean” (p. 7).

Effects of reality TV such as a distorted perception of reality may be a concern for producers, but also for viewers and scholars alike. Regarding the concerns over the effects of reality TV often discussed in public, Cohen and Weimann (2008, p. 285) also mentioned the power of reality TV to invade privacy, considering that viewers enjoy watching other people’s highly personal experiences, the commercial nature of the shows serving as marketing vehicles and attracting the audience to advertisers, and the “escape from reality” that such shows provide. In their survey of television viewers in Israel, the authors found that the more people watched reality TV shows, the more they thought that these shows have an impact and should be regulated and limited. However, criticism of the shows was not related to the intensity of watching. The main criticisms were that the shows are faked, voyeuristic, and exploitative (Cohen & Weimann, 2008, pp. 392-394).

All in all, adult reality TV viewers can be seen as a rather “active” audience reflecting on the authenticity of the programs and expressing criticism and concerns. As already mentioned in Part 2, the consumers are also “active” due to the interactivity of many reality TV shows, participating in televoting, and discussing the latest developments in online forums and on social media platforms. The authenticity of characters and situations is a widely discussed topic. Viewers’ activities on the Internet may also influence the general perception and the outcomes of a show, which makes the show less predictable for the producers. As an example, Enli (2009) mentioned the case of singer Susan Boyle in the second season of Britain’s Got Talent. Boyle’s fame was largely based on viewers’ dis-
tributing the video of her stunning performance on social media platforms. She gained celebrity status even outside the United Kingdom, but soon some people questioned her status as a true amateur, and stories about prima donna behavior ruined her image. This may have been a reason why, in spite of all praise for her talent, she ended up being only second in the final competition; the audience preferred to award the members of a dance group who, after the media hype around Boyle, were obviously seen as more authentic representatives of ordinary people with an extraordinary talent (p. 488).

B. Motives for watching factual entertainment content

The appeal of reality TV programs to viewers has been explored by various researchers on the theoretical basis of the uses and gratifications approach (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1974; Palmgreen, Wenner, & Rosengren, 1985), which assumes that viewers are frequently, but not always, actively engaged in the selection of media content. Their use of media programs can be either instrumental, i.e., in order to obtain gratifications meeting cognitive, affective, or social needs, or ritualized, i.e., out of habit. In an exploratory survey with 157 college students, Papacharissi and Mendelson (2007) found that habitually passing time was the most important motive for watching reality TV programs—this activity had become a ritual in the daily routine of many respondents. So in many cases, the mode of engagement with reality TV was rather passive, and designed to fill time when no other activities are available. The second most salient motive was capturing the appeal of reality content and reality characters in opposition to fictional programs, followed by relaxation and social interaction (pp. 365-367). Another general survey about the motives of watching reality TV programs was conducted by Ebersole and Woods (2007), who surveyed 530 college and university students in the United States and Canada and identified five factors that explained program choice preference: personal identification with real characters, entertainment, mood change, passing time, and vicarious participation. The authors also found that the most popular programs were watched by the viewers because they found them “humorous,” i.e., they were amused, or humored, by the “stupidity” of the characters and their actions (pp. 34-36).

Other studies also imply that superiority motives may drive the appeal of reality TV. Reiss and Wiltz (2004) centered their analysis on 16 basic needs and found that in comparison to non-viewers, reality TV viewers are in general more status-oriented, i.e., they have an over-average need to feel self-important. This need may be gratified by the feeling that they are more important than the ordinary people portrayed in reality TV shows, and they can fantasize that they could also gain celebrity status when they see people like themselves on TV. Furthermore, reality TV viewers are more motivated by vengeance than are non-viewers, a desire that is closely associated with enjoyment of competition (pp. 373-374). In a more recent study focusing on teens and pre-teens, Patino, Kaltcheva, and Smith (2011, p. 293) noted that adolescents striving for popularity and physical attractiveness are particularly likely to feel connected to reality TV, which leads to the assumption that satiating social and personal integrative needs may be an important motivation to watch reality-based programs, at least for this group.

Regarding the lay hypothesis that reality TV is popular because it appeals to the voyeuristic nature of the population, Papacharissi and Mendelson (2007) and Nabi et al. (2003) in a similar study showed that voyeurism is present as a motive to watch these programs, but that it is not the key motive. This may be partly caused by respondents who are reluctant to report voyeuristic tendencies for fear that it might be perceived as socially undesirable, but Nabi et al. (2003, pp. 324-325) explained four reasons why voyeurism may in fact be less important than other motives: First, viewers watch with some knowledge that the targets are generally aware of their presence; second, the potential of fulfilling a voyeur’s sense of illicit pleasure is limited by constraints on TV stations regarding the broadcast of explicit sexual material; third, the data of the survey indicate that people watch not to see sexual behavior per se, but to watch interpersonal interaction and because they are curious about other people’s lives; and fourth, regular viewers often watch for motivations based on personal identity, which seems inconsistent with motives of voyeurs. However, the measure of voyeurism used for these studies emphasized sexual gratifications that viewers may derive from consuming reality programs and, as Andrejevic (2009, p. 321) argued, there may be “much more revealing scenes of love and rage” in fictional formats. If a different conceptualization of voyeurism is applied, one that defines it not as a sexual deviance, but as a commonly occurring...
fascination with access to private details of other people’s lives, a “non-pathological” voyeurism is likely to be an important gratification for reality TV viewers (Baruh, 2009, p. 207). As a result of a study combining a survey administered to television viewers and a content analysis of 15 different reality TV formats, Baruh (2009, p. 190) suggested that scenes which adopt a “fly on the wall” perspective, take place in private settings, contain nudity, and/or include gossip contribute to the voyeuristic appeal of a reality TV program.

A differentiation between regular and casual viewers has to be made, since gratifications obtained from reality TV depend on the amount of TV watching. The more people watch TV for entertainment, relaxation, as a habitual pasttime and as a basis for social interactions with others, the more likely they are to develop a greater affinity for reality TV programs. In other words, the reality genre is rather unlikely to attract new audiences or lead to high consumption of TV unless those tendencies are already pronounced (Papacharissi & Mendelson, 2007, pp. 367-368). In comparison to casual viewers, regular reality TV viewers receive stronger and more varied gratifications; not surprisingly, parasocial interaction is a particularly important motive for regular viewers who have the possibility to develop parasocial relationships with participants in serialized shows (Nabi et al., 2003, p. 320-322). An important condition for positive parasocial ties is the ability to name a favorite reality TV character. Ho (2006, p. 20) found in her survey that respondents who had chosen a favorite character developed quite strong ties and found the shows much more appealing than people who didn’t name a favorite character. The latter group scored higher in their beliefs that reality TV contestants are motivated by selfish goals, such as acquiring fame and winning prize money. Viewers who do not watch reality TV regularly enough to have favorite characters thus often have a stereotyped perception of the protagonists in these shows, which may explain why they are not interested in the genre.

The appeal of reality TV shows also depends on how realistic they are judged by the viewers. People enjoying reality TV for its entertaining and relaxing value tend to perceive the content of reality shows as more realistic than people with less affinity to the genre. This implies that in order to obtain the gratification of entertainment by watching reality TV, people first have to accept the realism of its content (Papacharissi & Mendelson, 2007, p. 367). Although most consumers do not believe that the programs are entirely real, they likely find them more real than other types of programming (Nabi et al., 2003, p. 327).

The uses and gratifications paradigm can be linked to another construct explaining the appeal of entertainment programs: the notion of enjoyment. In their study comparing viewers’ enjoyment of fictional and reality programs, Nabi et al. (2006, p. 425) considered not only a set of gratifications previously sought or obtained from TV programming, such as parasocial relationships or learning, but also other factors that might associate with the enjoyment of entertainment programs. Program interest and enjoyment may be caused by perceptions of drama and suspense, as well as by emotional reactions as suggested by the mood management theory (e.g., Zillmann, 1988). On this basis, the researchers depict a differentiated view of emotional and cognitive assessments predicting enjoyment. While for fiction, suspense and pensiveness enhanced, and surprise detracted from enjoyment, for reality TV in general voyeurism, happiness, surprise, and relief positively associated with, and anger detracted from enjoyment (Nabi et al., 2006, p. 431). A more detailed analysis however revealed that each reality TV subgenre evinced different patterns of gratification, and that reality programs may differ as much from one another as they may differ from fiction. For instance, suspense is positively related to enjoyment of casting shows where viewers can guess the winner, but it is negatively associated with enjoyment of crime programs such as America’s Most Wanted, in which it may be upsetting to see that the portrayed criminals are still on the loose. Voyeurism was identified as a significant predictor of enjoyment for several reality TV subgenres (reality-drama, romance, and game), but not for fictional programs, so the attraction of watching real people may still be a key feature for viewers preferring reality TV to fictional contents (pp. 440-442).

C. Case studies for various subgenres

The diversity of the genre and different predictors of enjoyment for various subgenres have led to a wide range of more specific studies about the appeal of particular reality TV programs for their viewers. Only a few examples can be presented in this context. In a comparative study, Barton (2009) analyzed a corporate-themed casting show (The Apprentice), a serialized dating game show (The Bachelor), and a gamdoc with contestants battling extreme conditions (Survivor) by examining the differences between grat-
ifications sought and gratifications obtained by the viewers. The results show that personal utility (relaxation, escapism, uniqueness of the program) is seen as a more important gratification for all three formats than social utility (keeping up with others who watch the show, talking about it), which may reflect the fact that reality shows have become more and more individualized and specific with the ongoing diversification of the genre (pp. 473-474). Perceived realism does not determine the appeal of each analyzed show to the same extent. While this factor is rather important in Survivor, this is not the case in The Bachelor, which features a highly unlikely plot (25 women competing over one man). Conversely, the romantic elements in this show result in a higher level of obtained gratifications in terms of social utility than the minimalist conditions in Survivor (pp. 469-470).

Due to their high audience ratings and their combination of elements from various other genres, casting shows are a particularly popular research field. Several German researchers have analyzed how adolescents as a very important target group (Hackenberg & Hajok, 2010, p. 60; Hajok & Selg, 2010, p. 61) perceive these shows. According to Klaus and O’Connor (2010), the main functions of casting shows for adolescents are providing topics for conversation, providing topics for discussions about ethical questions, and satiating integrative needs in cultural and social fields such as nation, race, class, or gender. Seeking entertainment, fun and thrill, and avoiding boredom are the main motives for watching the shows; while girls have a stronger interest in the outcomes of the competition (Götz & Gather, 2010, p. 53), boys like to watch the candidates’ behavior and to trash talk about them (Hajok & Selg, 2010, p. 61). Most 12- to 17-year-old viewers are aware of the commercial intentions of casting shows; pupils on a lower education level are more likely to believe that the producers want to organize a fair competition and to give the candidates “a real chance” (Götz & Gather, 2010, pp. 54-58).

Dover and Hill (2007) analyzed lifestyle and makeover programs by looking at their production and reception. Viewers associated such programs rather with light entertainment than with factual information and a didactic approach: “Those who enjoy makeover shows do so because of the programs’ emotional and entertaining content; they do not tend to have high expectations of watching informative or true-to-life content” (p. 24). In the reception of coaching shows such as Supernanny, cognitive motives seem to play a more important role. Viewers compare the protagonists’ everyday life with their own one, feel relieved to see that other people have similar, or more serious, problems, and like to know how other people can solve their problems. Voyeurism and experiencing superiority over the helpless protagonists portrayed in these shows are also present as motives, but less important (Grimm, 2010, p. 245; Lauber & Würfel, 2010, p. 68).

Supernanny was also the topic of a study comparing the reception of a reality TV program in various countries. Grimm (2010) found that the recommendations given by the nannies did not represent the same parenting style in all analyzed countries and that the success of the format varied. The British original, propagating an authoritarian parenting style, and the German program with medium authoritarian and democratic tendencies were very successful, as well as the Spanish and Brazilian versions boosting rather democratic-permissive recommendations. In contrast, audience ratings of the Austrian program, recommending a distinctly more democratic parenting style than the program of the German neighbors, stayed below expectations, and the show was cancelled after three seasons. Viewers’ expectations regarding the recommendations given by the nanny may thus depend on specific educational traditions in their country (pp. 229-235).

D. Reality TV, neoliberalism, and “technologies of the self”

Sociologist David Grazian argued that “the narrative conventions of reality TV echo the most central policymaking paradigm in America in the past decade: the neoliberal agenda” (2010, p. 68). In this context, various scholars have discussed the role of reality TV in communicating and supporting neoliberal values. Neoliberalism can be defined as a range of discourses absolutely legitimating the market, but delegitimizing institutional forces seeking to counter the market, such as the state and the social (Couldry, 2008, p. 4). This worldview has generated specific trends which have accelerated globally since the 1980s, such as spending cuts on public services, economic deregulation, privatization of state-owned institutions in the name of efficiency, and the elimination of the concept of public good or community, replacing it with individual responsibility (Ouellette, 2009, p. 225). The importance of entrepreneurial liberty leads to an organization of social resources and human labor, which requires of its participants continuous loyalty and the acceptance of permanent sur-
veillance in order to optimize products and to allow closely targeted marketing. For example, it may affect an individual’s personal life in a way that employees have to be flexible in their working hours and “always available” for the company. But the system also demands accepting the fragility and impermanence of the opportunities it provides (Couldry, 2008, p. 3).

In fact, similarities between these characteristics and the settings of competitive reality TV shows are obvious: Contestants are provided with tasks, which they must fulfill on their own, and for which they have to take full responsibility for success or failure. At the same time, they are under constant surveillance, and even in cases of a good performance, they can be easily expelled from the show. In his analysis of Big Brother, Couldry (2008, p. 9-11) stated that the show legitimates the concept of constant surveillance, since this concept is the precondition for the viewers’ pleasure to see the candidates in intimate situations. Furthermore, he argued that the performance “values” of Big Brother are striking for their fit with the demands imposed by neoliberal practice on workers. First, candidates have to obey an absolute and unquestionable external authority, the media producers; second, team conformity is also demanded, since the acceptance of compulsory teamwork is a basic rule of the game; third, candidates have to be “passionate” and to show a positive attitude, but must remain “authentic” to have success in the game—which reminds one of guidelines for employees as made for example by the British supermarket chain Asda, requiring emotional investment and demanding that every smile must be “a real smile” (The Observer, July 11, 2004); finally, in spite of all social dimensions of the show, the contestants are judged against each other as individuals.

Constant self-improvement is often suggested as the only reliable protection from the uncertainty about employment stability and opportunities in a neoliberal economy demanding flexibility, ongoing corporate reinvention, and a shift from production to branding (McGee, 2005, p. 13; Ouellette & Hay, 2008, pp. 99-100). The boom of the self-help industry with specialized literature, as well as contributions in magazines, the tabloid press, and TV broadcasts in the early 21st century contributed to that trend. For example, in the field of reality TV, makeover and casting shows present work on the self as a prerequisite for personal and professional success. The most obvious examples of self-fashioning on television are beauty and style makeover programs. Sender (2006), in her study about Queer Eye for a Straight Guy, as well as Ouellette and Hay (2008) in a more comprehensive analysis, discussed the role of these formats promoting “technologies of the self” with which candidates should be able to engineer better, more fulfilling lives.

In a similar way, coaching formats such as Supernanny or Honey We’re Killing the Kids represent an entrepreneurial ethic of self-care, using a combination of disciplinary and self-help strategies to enable individuals to overcome their problems (Ouellette & Hay, 2008, p. 6). Another form of crisis intervention by television is the subgenre of charity programs (Extreme Makeover: Home Edition, Three Wishes, Miracle Workers), where private resources (money, volunteerism, skills) are mobilized in order to remedy personal hardship without state assistance. Reality TV may thus adopt functions of public welfare programs that have been cut back. However, only the most “deserving” cases of need, as determined by casting departments, are assisted (pp. 5-6).

5. Conclusion and Discussion

Reality TV as a research field is foremost complex and dynamic, as it has undergone an enormous diversification since the 1990s. Dozens of new formats were introduced every year. With this essay, we attempted to conceptualize reality TV as a meta-genre that includes various subgenres. Hence, examining the meta-genre’s components, which may also apply to subgenres, most often serves the purpose to provide a theoretical definition of reality TV. Such components include, for example, featuring ordinary people who are engaged in unscripted actions. In the viewers’ perception, there is also more or less consensus about which formats are reality TV, but the boundaries between the subgenres are rather fluid. Nabi (2007) suggests mapping the reality TV landscape along the dimensions “romance” and “competition,” whereas Klaus and Lücke (2003) distinguish between “narrative” and “performative” reality TV.
It seems important that reality TV’s primary intent is to entertain an audience. The shows are less concerned about providing a journalistic function such as stimulating a political debate or to educate. It may well be that these are secondary goals, but reality TV’s main goal is to engage their audiences to attract advertisers. Interestingly, research shows that personal utility (relaxation, escapism, uniqueness of the program) is perceived as more important gratification than social utility (keeping up with others who watch the show, talking about it). Diversifications of the genre may have led to a more individualized approach of reality TV and to it being less a matter of social utility.

Our analysis of a worldwide boom and diversification of reality TV since the 1990s has revealed a complex interplay of factors that paved the way for the success of reality TV, locally and globally. First of all, technological developments allowed a multiplication of the available TV programs in the last two decades of the 20th century. This was caused by the development of cable and satellite TV, then by the introduction of digital channels. In countries where public-service channels previously were in a monopoly or predominant position, new commercial broadcasters could now enter the market. In order to conquer a good position in this market, the new players required popular and remarkable, but also comparatively cheap, programs to fill the additional program space. Reality TV formats fulfilled these needs: They are entertaining, they can be marketed as unique due to the authenticity of the participants, and they allow new forms of advertisement, merchandising, and audience participation in order to finance the production costs. At the same time, production costs are rather low since no scriptwriters and professional actors are needed, and the footage can be filmed with a new generation of compact and inexpensive cameras.

The overview of the genre further shows that modern reality TV formats are usually hybrids of existing genres: The docusoap as the prototypical reality TV genre, which is itself a mixture of documentary and fictional soap opera, is combined with game and talk show elements in reality soaps such as Big Brother or Survivor, with the classical talent contest and the variety show in casting shows, or with the traditional dating show in modern dating programs. In order to maintain high viewer interest, new combinations and variations are permanently developed: Mixing genres is seen as a strategy to reach audiences as large as possible (Lünenborg et al., 2011, p. 14).

Tendencies of the past years included the introduction of new settings and the increasing importance of celebrities as participants or coaches in reality TV programs. The settings in most newer formats tend to be much less artificial than in Big Brother or Survivor, and the success of makeover and coaching shows, as well as the more extensive use of coaching elements in recent casting shows, may reflect a growing importance of expert guidance and authoritative recommendations for the public (Grimm, 2010, p. 222). Public interest is particularly raised by dramatization of the content, e.g., by the choice of settings and the casting of participants in a conflict-provoking manner. A new stage of dramatization has been reached with scripted reality formats telling fictional stories but pretending for them to be “real.” But the diversification of the genre has also left space for countertendencies, for example, spoof shows parodying extreme developments or formats intending to go “back to the essentials” such as casting shows with a stronger focus on the candidates’ talents than on their looks or their behavior behind the stage. This may be illustrated for instance by the introduction of blind auditions in The Voice.

But essentially, global success and diversification of reality TV have only become possible thanks to new production routines in the television industry. Unlike fictional TV series, reality TV formats are just “global program frameworks that can be adopted on a national level in order to fit into different cultures” (Bondebjerg, 2002, p. 159). Most of them are not produced by the TV stations themselves, but by independent production companies developing the concepts and selling them to interested broadcasters all over the world. This new model allowed broadcasters to adopt formats, which have proven to be successful elsewhere instead of taking the risk to develop them on their own, which may be an essential advantage in a highly competitive market. As Andrejevic (2004, p. 12) concisely explains, “reality TV fits well the dictates of global media production insofar as it combines a local cast and local viewer participation with a customizable transnational format. What is exported is not the content itself but a recipe for creating a local version of an internationally successful TV show.”

As our investigation shows, narratives of reality TV shows are not perceived as “real” in any case. In fact, 25% of an adult poll suggests perception of reality TV as made-up shows. A total of 57% believed that they show some truth, but are mostly distorted. But
only 30% said that it mattered whether the shows are real or not (Bauder 2005). On the other hand, voyeurism is put forward as a significant predictor of enjoyment for several reality TV subgenres. Hence, it may well be that viewers enjoy watching “real” people and not actors even though they believe the narratives are made-up. Viewers may identify more with reality TV participants because they embody similar lifestyles. In other words, such exposure experiences may be more easily integrated into their own lives than fictional programs based on more escape motives.

Hence, we suggest further study particularly on such differences between fictional and reality TV based programs to better understand what motives drive audiences to watch such shows and how media concepts and theories such as parasocial interaction, parasocial relationships, or social identification may differ between the two. Interestingly, as outlined in this review, cognitive development, age, and education influence how viewers perceive and conceptualize reality TV programs. Hence, we may well be much more prepared to understand audience’s reaction to such programs by studying individual differences and how they influence the motives of exposure, the perception of the content, and the effects of watching reality TV programs.

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Book Reviews


Organizational Rhetoric offers a response to the “flippant use of rhetoric as a label,” as well as alternative views that “depict rhetoric as a set of complex processes through which people construct distinctive views of reality, persuade others to share their beliefs and values, and create distinctive social, political, and economic structures that are legitimized through strategic discourse” (p. ix). Specifically, Conrad examines rhetoric in the context of organizations. In making choices, Conrad decided to focus on three paradoxes, the guidelines and constraints that they impose on organizational rhetors, and, in turn, how they are managed through rhetoric (p. xii). The three paradoxes include (1) the uses of rhetoric, (2) the rhetoric of economics, and (3) organizations and the power relationships that exist within them. Conrad organized the content in five chapters and strongly recommends that each chapter be read in two sittings. Thus, in the table of contents, he includes a series of six asterisks, which indicate the point in each chapter at which readers should take a break and reflect on what they have read (p. xiii). In addition, “each chapter includes a short-term research project, entitled ‘weekend-fun,’ designed to allow readers to personalize the key issues being discussed in the chapter” (p. xii).

Chapter 1 (“What is Rhetoric? What is Organizational Rhetoric? Why are They Important?”) “focuses on the paradox of democracy and examines the ways in which organizations have strategically used the courts and state-state competition to construct a political-economic structure that has been labeled the ‘American System’: one composed of large, weakly regulated, and politically influential corporations” (p. xii). The chapter opens with core concepts such as (1) rhetoric and its use have inherently involved issues of power and social control; (2) rhetoric involves issues of truth and claims of superior knowledge; (3) rhetorical situations are composed of beliefs, values, and assumptions; and (4) the pri-
mary structure surrounding organizational rhetoric in the United States has been called the “American System” (pp. 1-2). The chapter offers a response to the three questions in its title beginning with autocracy, democracy, and the functions of rhetoric to address the first question. The second question is answered by addressing essential issues in the study of organizational rhetoric through the lens of the “American System.” Conrad argues that there are three important ideas for readers to take away from this chapter: (1) studying organizational rhetoric involves analyzing fundamental issues about the nature of society and of the systems that comprise it; (2) social/economic/political systems are complex creations which, once established and legitimized, guide, and constrain future rhetoric; and (3) rhetoric and its effects are ambiguous and unpredictable (pp. 31-33).

Chapter 2 (“Creating Topoi for Organizational Rhetoric”) “examines the ideas that accompany, support, and are supported by the structure of the American system, focusing on the ideology of free-market fundamentalism” (p. 33). Specifically, Conrad argues that myths—(a) myths of opportunity and mobility, (b) the myth of the organizational imperative and dependency relationships, and (c) the mythology of free-market fundamentalism—“provide valuable topoi for organizational rhetors” (p. 77).

Chapter 3 (“Constructing the Leadership Mythos”) “examines the development of a dominant mythology about leaders/leadership and workers/followership” (p. 33). Conrad begins this chapter by discussing “the presumptions, practices, and rhetoric of managerialism” (p. 85). He argues that because multiple inconsistent definitions of leadership exist, “the key question for scholars of organizational rhetoric and for practitioners alike is not ‘what is leadership?’—but how do interested parties (1) use rhetoric to construct preferred depictions of leaders, leadership, followers, and followership; and (2) use those definitions to legitimatize their actions, power, and rewards” (p. 92). Conrad also clearly develops the concepts of cult leadership and resistance leadership.

Chapter 4 (“Organizational Rhetoric and Public Policymaking”) “traces the processes through which organizational rhetors influence public policymaking” (p. 33). Specifically, Conrad presents “a model of public policymaking that focuses on the concept of strategic maneuvering” (p. 130). In addition, Conrad uses two dominant theories of how public policies are enacted—streams and windows—as a foundation to discuss (a) how open windows provide opportunities for rhetoric; and (b) how and why windows close.

Chapter 5 (“Rhetoric and the Management of Organizational Identities, Images, and Crises”) “explores the role that rhetoric plays in the construction and defense of organizational identities and image” (p. 133). Within this chapter a foundation is clearly laid by discussing four key concepts—identity, image, reputation, and crisis. Then Conrad effectively examines “two tightly inter-related processes: the creation and modification of organizational identities and image, and the strategic management of identity-related crises” (p. 169).

This book is successful in getting readers to think critically about domination and resistance. This book will be useful in any rhetoric course that explores both classical and contemporary rhetorical theory. It can provide learners an opportunity to engage with illustrations of rhetorical theory as it applies to messages by, about, and surrounding organization. Finally, the book will be useful in advanced organizational communication, persuasion, and campaign courses where the design of messages can be challenged at different levels.

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No matter how quickly the profession of journalism changes its media, journalists themselves cling to a core of values and practices, things that David Craig argues define “excellence.” In his survey of excellence in online journalism Craig aims “to focus on what excellent journalism looks like in an era of rapid change in the media industry and in communication technology” (p. 1). He does not ambition a “technical manual” or a “nuts-and-bolts treatment of online work” (p. ix), choosing instead to provide a kind of inductive approach for students in a book that might well complement the traditional textbooks. Though he presents the material grouped in key concepts, he assembled it through extensive research, interviewing leading journalists who represent a variety of roles and a variety of...
“publications” in the online world. This feature makes the book always interesting, but another makes the book extremely valuable.

For Craig, excellence in journalism must rest on an ethics of journalism. After an introductory chapter, which more or less serves to present in outline form the rest of the book, he turns to an “ethical lens for looking at excellence.” Borrowing from the work of the ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre and its application to journalism by Sandra Borden, Craig describes a “virtue ethics” that provides a groundwork for journalism. Journalism constitutes a “practice,” a social context. In MacIntyre’s definition:

By a “practice” I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goals internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (quoted pp. 15-16)

Throughout Chapter 2 Craig takes this definition one element at a time and thereby provides a very accessible discussion of its key terms: practice, “telos” (or end), internal goods, standards of excellence, virtues, external goods, and institutions. Even for students without a background in philosophy or ethics, the concepts should remain clear and easily applicable to their future career in journalism. Then, taking up his research, he distills four standards from current online practice that will form the ethical backbone for his discussion. He turns to them in each of the subsequent chapters. The chapters follow a similar pattern: the introduction of the standard, some illustrative discussion drawn from the experience of his informants, the ethical application, and a number of examples of what he means.

Chapter 3 presents the first standard: “speed and accuracy with depth in breaking news” (p. 25). No surprise here, but Craig situates this value of journalism in the ways in which different media interpret it. For example, the speed and accuracy demanded of a daily newspaper will differ from that demanded of a radio station and—the point of his book—that demanded of online reporting.

Chapter 4 discusses “comprehensiveness in content.” As he does with the relevant ideas in other chapters, he draws key points together into a table. Here he outlines the overarching elements of comprehensiveness: information, enduring background (that is, material that will stay available to the readers over time), dialogue with the audience, different levels of material, a combination of forms (textual, photographic, auditory, video, etc.), and so on. He then spells out each in turn, with examples and comments from his sources. The online medium poses challenges in time and staffing pressures; the nature of the online medium itself can both help and hinder such comprehensiveness, so Craig asks the journalists how they do it.

Chapter 5 offers one solution: open-ended story development. An online story never quite ends. Journalists and their institutions continually update their work: The key is how to do this effectively and how to engage the readers, creating a community of sources and a public dialogue. Among best practices, he singles out the BBC coverage of the London subway bombings in 2005 and the CNN reporting on the Virginia Tech shootings in 2007. Here, too, the journalists face challenges. From the ethical perspective, some of these arise from the external goods sought by the journalism institutions—not least the profit and quality pressures that companies face.

The last key standard is “the centrality of conversation.” The online world forms a lively two-way medium, with readers taking part and engaging the reporters in real time. Such a goal has become unwieldy for daily newspapers, weekly news magazines, and broadcast properties. But the online journalist must foster the conversation. Blogging becomes one solution proposed by Craig’s informants and here, too, he offers a series of best practices and challenges.

Because so much of his discussion has drawn on representatives of “the big guys,” news organizations like the New York Times or Wall Street Journal online, Craig devotes Chapter 7 to independent and community journalism. How do citizen journalists manifest excellence in journalism? This chapter tells their stories. The next and final chapter looks to the future. How will big and small news organizations cooperate and coexist? What business models might work?

Excellence in Online Journalism provides a great deal of concrete information for students. Its grounding in the tradition of journalism ethics makes it particularly valuable since the ethics become so well integrated into the practice. Students should easily learn that becoming an ethical reporter will make them a better
reporter. Those teaching online journalism will do their students a good service by considering this book.

In addition to the charts, interviews, and case studies, each chapter has extensive references. The book has an index and a detailed table of contents.

—Paul A. Soukup, S.J.
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Of the many areas of communication studies, students typically flock to courses in interpersonal communication, seeing in them practical guides to friendship, relationships, and life rather than fascinating approaches to some of the most complex aspects of communication. Perhaps this is only natural, as our interests form not with theory but with practice and over time move to a deeper desire to understand our communication behaviors. Randy Fujishin’s *Natural Bridges* offers a thorough introduction to interpersonal communication from the former perspective. Written for students in an introductory course, it takes a conversational, life-coaching stance: How can a young person become a better communicator with friends, family, loved ones? What practical advice can we glean from communication theory to make life better? His first words in Chapter 1 signal the approach of the book:

During your journey on earth you will encounter many people and you will have an impact on each individual you meet along the way. Whether it’s a neighborhood acquaintance, a colleague at work, a good friend, a family member, or even a stranger on a bridge, you will either enlarge or diminish the person each time you interact. (p. 1)

This approach puts Fujishin in the role of a trusted older mentor, one who will safely guide students through interpersonal communication on a very practical level.

The book addresses the key areas of interpersonal communication in 10 chapters, making it ideal for a course on the quarter system, with its 10-week term. Each chapter follows a similar design: a story, a commentary on the story, examples of key concepts, definitions of each, explanation, and exercises. Chapter 1 explains what interpersonal communication entails, defining verbal and nonverbal communication, offering three very traditional models of communication (linear, interactional, and transactional), explaining six principles of communication, and discussing the qualities of effective interpersonal communication. Subsequent chapters break these areas down into more detail.

Chapter 2 draws on psychological studies to examine perception and its different factors. Fujishin provides practical ways to increase the accuracy of perception. He then turns to self-concept as a kind of self-perception and suggests ways for the student to become more self-reflective. Chapter 3 looks at verbal communication, identifying keys principles and levels of communication (surface talk, reporting facts, giving opinions, and sharing feelings). Building on this, the chapter ends with the idea of self-disclosure and its importance in relationships. The next chapter turns to nonverbal communication. Following the same pattern, it sketches seven principles of nonverbal communication before cataloguing types of nonverbal communication and suggesting how to use nonverbal communication effectively.

Chapter 5 explains the listening process and provides a number of exercises to promote active listening as a way to become a better interpersonal communicator. This chapter offers an abundance of advice in examples of listening styles, asking questions, and improving behavior. Chapter 6 continues the themes, applying them to conversation. Identifying three types of conversation, Fujishin offers principles for each. The goal here is to help the student master the art of conversation in order to become a better friend, colleague, family member.

Key to all these things is interpersonal regard, what Fujishin treats under the heading of “encouragement” or “enlarging others.” Chapter 7 looks at such practical skills as acknowledging others, remembering their names, looking for the best in other people, complimenting others, handling negatives, and supporting others. Chapter 8 presents the opposite side of this: how to deal with conflict. Fujishin begins with a list of “myths of conflict,” urging students to see conflict in positive terms, at least in relational outcomes. He ends the chapter with very good advice on asking for and granting forgiveness.

Chapter 9 looks specifically at relationships, particularly intimate relationships. Fujishin identifies stages of relationship and what occurs in each. Here too
They provide an abundance of practical advice—the older mentor guiding younger people through key life areas that families and other key people may never have addressed in their lives.

Finally, the book concludes with a look at workplace communication. Not all communication nor all relationships are intimate. Most of people’s lives take place in mundane settings, yet these too demand interpersonal skills.

All in all, the book gives an abundance of advice. While based on communication studies, it cites none of them (there is no bibliography or reference list); that is not the purpose of the book. The book succeeds well as a practical life guide and will certainly benefit students who come to college somewhat naive or unreflective in their life experience. One hopes that this practical learning will lead them to desire to learn more about communication: how do we know these things? How can we learn more about these things?

The book should prove very helpful in an introductory course, providing that the instructor can use it as a general guide and supplement it with other material. Its lists of concepts and ideas tend to reduce complex things to simple bullet items; these need more development. The book works well, though, for individual student reading, discussion, and trying out the various exercises.

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As I began this review of Hendricks and Kaid’s new book on new technologies in presidential campaigns, the 2012 election e-mails had already begun rolling in. Just a day after Mitt Romney became the presumptive GOP candidate, the Obama campaign issued this e-mail:

The other side thinks they can win by trashing me. But the outcome of this election will ultimately have more to do with what you do. Don’t wait—donate $3 or more today: https://donate.barackobama.com/Ready Thank you, Barack.

And from Romney, in part, a few days later:

Friend, you’ve probably seen the emails by now, but I just wanted to remind you that the deadline to enter for a chance to grab a bite with Ann Romney is tonight at midnight. You can read more about it from Mitt below. This is an awesome opportunity and I know Ann is really looking forward to meeting the winner.

Game on. The 2012 Presidential election will feature unprecedented use of multiple communication channels for all manner of campaign activity. To prepare for the onslaught, scholars should read the 12 essays in the volume that reviews the use of new technologies, (including e-mails just like those above) and new voices in 2008.

In the first section, “New Technologies,” the essays draw from three major media channels: Twitter, the Internet, and e-mail. Monica Ancu reviews Twitter-use by the McCain and Obama campaigns. Her content analysis of Obama’s 261 tweets and McCain’s 27 tweets found that Obama mainly tweeted information about his campaign while McCain primarily tweeted information about his forthcoming campaign ads and links to his web site. Ancu reports that Obama garnered 115,000 followers compared to McCain’s 3,000.

Towner and Dulio, in an essay titled “Web 2.0 Election,” acknowledge that the web is no longer in its infancy as a media choice, and address the question of how the Internet affects “political knowledge, interest, and participation” (p. 23). They propose six hypotheses regarding levels of attention to presidential candidate websites and video sharing web sites as predictors of factual knowledge, issues stance knowledge, and likes and dislikes of candidates. The study differentiates between different types of online information and the effects on knowledge.

Williams and Serge focus on candidates’ use of e-mail in the 2008 election. The authors examine all e-mails sent from the official campaign web sites between Labor Day and Election Day (n=68 for Obama, and n=63 for McCain). Six questions guide the research including the extent to which the e-mails were used for attacks on opponents, interactivity of e-mail, and so on. One result showed that virtually all e-mails included a link to another site and a call for participation in the campaign. Other strategies, both in nature of the hyperlink and message strategy showed wider variation.

The essays in the next section, “New Voices and New Voters,” shift from technology as a primary...
rising voices. The Internet has opened the doors for public discourse and has become a platform for new voices. Some studies have even suggested that the Internet is now a traditional source of news and information.

Kirk and Schill summarize their study of dial testing (real-time reactions of viewers presented on screen) after working with CNN. Drawing on the social emotional model, the researchers studied the arousal of anger and pride in readers of blogs written by citizens in support of or against particular candidates. The researchers found that attacks by bloggers on a reader’s candidate induced anger while attacks on non-preferred candidates invoked pride. The level of these emotions was tempered by the readers’ strength of candidate preference.

Yun, Jasperson, and Chapa study “ethno technology.” Their aim was to “ask whether young racial and ethnic minority voters respond differently to political advertising messages from [Obama and McCain] than young majority voters” (p. 103).

The third section (“New Technologies and New Voices in Debates”) presents studies on presidential and vice-presidential debates. Kirk and Schill summarize their study of dial testing (real-time reactions of viewers presented on screen) after working with CNN. After a brief history of dial testing (and the conclusion that debate viewers are no longer content with static debate analysis featuring closed-ended questions from journalists), the researchers present their findings that dial testing increases viewer attention, improves the debate experience for many different kinds of people, and that journalists’ coverage of the debates was affected by dial testing. The researchers did note, in addition to favorable outcomes, that dial testing (at times referred to as “squiggles” or “CNN’s Thingamajig”) was sometimes viewed negatively.

Brubaker situates her study of presidential debates in agenda setting theory. She conducted a content analysis of the Democratic and Republican YouTube debates to compare the types of citizen-generated questions to the most important questions on voters’ minds. She presents a full categorization of questions and Gallup poll responses.

In a study of the vice presidential debate between Joe Biden and Sarah Palin, McKinney and Banwart draw from expectancy violations theory to assess (1) how perceptions of candidates before the debate (expectations) affected post-debate evaluations, and (2) issue competencies of the candidates, “particularly the two candidates’ perceived expertise and expressed concern for stereotypical masculine (military/economic) and feminine (compassion/women’s) issues” (p. 172). The researchers used a feeling thermometer and a measure of gender stereotypic issue competencies. Their study indicated that viewers’ ratings of candidates after the debates were significantly higher for both candidates, even when broken down into specific gender ratings. In most cases, both candidates were evaluated higher on issue competency as well after the debates.

Two essays in the final section on “Media Representations and Voter Engagement” present research on media representations of candidates. Miles, Kaid and Sharp address the media bias question by comparing reactions of viewers to separate documentaries on Sarah Palin shown on Fox News Channel (FNC) and CNN. Even the titles of the films (FNC’s An American Woman and CNN’s Palin Revealed) suggest a potential bias. The researchers lay out several hypotheses to undergird their study of image evaluation, voter learning, and cynicism. One interesting finding was that Democrats, Independents, and Republicans rated their image of Sarah Palin higher after viewing the Fox documentary.

Painter, Nashmi, Stromback, Fernandes, Xiang, and Kim study “Obamania around the world.” This very complete analysis of news stories from two newspapers in each of six countries (four continents) presents a content analysis from the start of the Democratic National Convention until the election.

The essays in this volume are decidedly social scientific in their methodological approach to various subjects; all essays use quantitative methods. They set the stage for election 2012 which will doubtless be an even richer and more complex political season for more studies on new technologies, new voters, and new
voicing. The text should be valuable to scholars in political science and communication as a primer for what will surely be exponential growth in technological innovation in presidential elections for years to come.

—Pete Bicak
Rockhurst University


This book results from a conference organized by the BBC in September 2007. In consequence, the chapters come from a variety of broadcasters, policy makers, and researchers from the United Kingdom and elsewhere who attended the Repositioning Public Service Broadcasting: The BBC Charter Renewal and its Global Aftermath conference.

In their preface, Lowe and Nissen note that the BBC has been the organization to whom other broadcasters turn when considering the design of regulation or industry structure. They underline that it has long been the case that, with no query, big countries and markets are turned to by smaller ones when they are looking for models, perhaps particularly public service broadcasting ones, for their own country. The editors here ask whether it is possible that a country with a few million people and therefore a low total income and a GDP that is half or less of a big country’s, to have the same or similar possibilities or needs (p. 7). This is a very valid question. The authors contend (p. 8) that it is increasingly the case that the models of large markets/countries are being stipulated as the norm in all countries. The research project of which this book is representative proves that there are certain factors that “inscribe the character of a media system in a particular socially and historically situated context” (p. 9).

Amongst these factors are population and economy, language and the operations of transnational media companies. In this field, size does matter and using Robert Picard’s chapter, included here, Lowe and Nissen take a figure of a population of above 20 million as the benchmark of just what it is that constitutes a “big country.” This figure concurs with some European Commission analysis, published in 2009. They add that although they have chosen countries as units for their analyses, there are exceptions

While the reader may here be querying why television is being considered at a time when many think television is “old hat,” the editors note that what constitutes the notion “broadcasting” will vary according to the personal experience of whosoever it is that is discussing it. The experience of writers may be limited to one society or another also. They also acknowledge that new media is not so new now and that radio and other electronic media are included in analyses where this helps to clarify an argument (p. 13). It is hoped that by focusing on issues rather than on the countries involved the reader will be able to develop a “richer appreciation of nuances and with potentially higher degrees of generalization” (p. 14).

A variety of topics are addressed here, including the market’s character as a context of society; the availability of resources and financial conditions; the supranational, national, and regional interests with which national systems have to contend; the ways in which the content of broadcasting is bought or produced; policy and regulation; and the structures and dynamics of the market system in which broadcasting occurs. There are two resultant major and overarching questions:

• How does a country remain in control of its own audiovisual destiny, and
• How does it deal with challenges brought on by external media influence? (p. 15)

The editors and contributors did not wish to be partisan in relation to public service broadcasting, despite the fact that many contributors work specifically in this area, and believe that their deliberations are neither for nor against the concept that we call public service broadcasting. Many contributors are very well-known in this particular academic field.

The first chapter is written by the editors and Christian Edelvold Berg. They relate the book’s contents to previous work in their efforts to consider television as a market and also in terms of business strategies and regulation. They conclude that in this field, size does matter but other facets must be taken into consideration. The second chapter studies 31 nations in Europe in order to show their sizes and resources, in terms of how money; their market(s) structures, scopes, and services; their operations; and their costs relate. The author encourages the editors in their conviction that size is very important in a number of ways.

Christian Edelvold Berg, in Chapter 3, “Sizing Up Size on TV Markets: Why David would Lose to Goliath,” indicates that markets of particular sizes have
particular characteristics. The differences that are key here relate, Berg believes, to “relative market leverage,” which he gives us to understand is what the editors describe as “an expression of a market’s inability to allocate resources efficiently.” He uses quantitative analysis in order to develop his point.

In the fourth chapter John D. Jackson, Yon Hsu, Geoffrey Lealand, Brian O’Neill, Michael Foley, and Christian Steininger provide an overview of the socio-cultural contexts of media markets using Austria, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and Taiwan as examples while also considering the implications that arise from possible dependency on neighboring countries with larger markets: Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and China. For his contribution, in the fifth chapter, Josef Trappel reflects on the structural conditions and performance of television in small countries, proposing ways in which small countries need different forms of regulation and governance than do larger ones.

As Eric Svendsen, points out in the sixth chapter, when broadcasting started in different countries in the first half of the 20th century, a strong development of the public service broadcasting notion became evident in Western Europe, while in the east there was state broadcasting. After the fall of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a liberalization of markets and television became ever more transnational. Here, Svendsen contemplates the fulfillment of European Union policy which legislated for 50% of programming having a European origin. He decides that this might be described as a “dead letter,” since the notion has not been legally enforced, nor has it been respected. However, Svendsen does suggest that this competition policy has been used by companies in the public sector to put pressure on public service broadcasting providers. This, in turn, means that the policy has gone against the interests of broadcasters in small countries. In the next chapter, Chris Hanretty scrutinizes governance, particularly in relation to small countries and evaluates the ways in which both the private and public television sectors are regulated in such countries and how this affects the independence of those in the public sector. In Chapter 8 Tom Moring and Sebastian Godenhjelm examine the ways in which a country’s general culture shapes its television production, since developing a knowledge and appreciation of an existent socio-cultural order is one of the most difficult tasks with which those who themselves make policy must contend.

In the ninth chapter, Professor Annette Hill and Professor Jeanette Steemers have written around two concepts without which television and broadcasting would cease to exist: the political economy of the TV industry and the audience. By this approach they intend to deepen our understanding of the relationships between production and reception, both in small countries and those with a larger market and audience, thus highlighting the problems that smaller countries experience through the lack of money to experiment, research, and develop programming. Where a successful program or format comes from a small country, this often means that the production company becomes “eaten up” by a company from a larger country, rather like fish in a pond may be eaten by larger fish. I suppose here an example, if not related to television, would be Estonia’s development of Skype.

This is an interesting and timely book, which would be useful to anyone interested in the television industry, whatever their approach. It has an extensive bibliography, which would be of great help those just starting to research in this area and for students of media, media management or media economics.

—Maria Way  
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It may come as a surprise, but Jack Lule’s book is a not an afterthought in our field. In fact, what is surprising is that it has taken so long for a book like Lule’s to be published. Globalization has been around for two decades and media studies for many more. What this book does that no one has quite done until now is to make a direct case for media’s role in globalization studies. The book makes the argument quite explicitly what many theories of globalization have done over the years only in passing (think of Giddens, 2001, for example; or Robertson, 1992). Rantenen (2005) has come the closest to making the case for media’s central role in the globalizing project, but not in the compelling way that Lule’s book has done. Lule is a journalist who writes for a wider reading audience, but he does not write down to his audience since he also brings into the chapters of this brief book a wide
Lule opens his book with three vignettes of people who have changed the world through use of media—Wael Ghonim (Egypt’s Arab Spring), Martin Luther, and Oprah Winfrey—to argue that their influence was due to Facebook, the printing press, and television. He makes his case early and directly in this chapter as well: “I will argue that globalization could not occur without media, that globalization and media act in concert and cohort, and that the two have partnered throughout the whole of human history” (p. 5). The last phrase calls for clarification which Lule makes almost immediately:

Could global trade have evolved without a flow of information on markets, prices, commodities, and more? [Think information theory in economics.] Could empires have stretched across the world without communication throughout them? [Think of Harold Innis’ last two books 60 years ago.] Could religion, poetry, film, fiction, cuisine, and fashion have developed as they have without the intermingling of media and culture? Globalization and media have proceeded together through time. (p. 5)

He goes on to trace the recent origin of the term globalization with a reference to Theodore Levitt’s early article on “The Globalization of Markets” in the 1983 Harvard Business Review. He notes that from that date until now growth in the use of the term has been exponential (a Google search in 2012 found 15.1 million cites). He makes a claim that from his perspective globalization is as old as human prehistory when humans left Africa, but he admits that there is a case to made by people like Appadurai and Giddens that globalization is perhaps very recent. He finishes the chapter with an analysis of metaphors about globalization in the current discourse because he believes that metaphors “can organize people’s thinking” and that “leaders, groups, and institutions often try to control metaphoric language” (p. 30).

The author devotes Chapter 3 to a history of media in globalization. The difference from what usually passes as a history of media with stops at Guttenberg, the telegraph, film, radio, TV, etc. is that Lule takes up the debate on technological determinism first with a brief but well documented review where he comes down on the side of human agency vs. technological or social determinisms in society’s outcomes. Still, he notes that in some ways both kinds of determinisms have some compelling data for their positions. In his review of media history, Lule looks at media in a very broad sense of human communication beginning with speech, invention of writing, print, etc., all with the interest of seeing how these different forms of human communication came to influence humankind’s increasing movement and interchange that he calls globalization. The one question that comes up here is the claim that human speech is a medium, but it is only a passing question. The author makes a compelling case for the latter and does a good summary of the role of writing as well before getting to Gutenberg.

The premise for an original Chapter 4 in a media book is stated simply:

This chapter looks at one of the crucial but sometimes overlooked dimensions of globalization and media. Globalization is made possible by the work of imagination. That is, people have needed to be able to truly imagine the world—and imagine themselves acting in the world—for globalization to proceed. (p. 51)
Some globalization scholars like Robertson (1992) and Appadurai (1990) had made more of this than others, and someone like Anderson (1983) with his “imagined communities” makes reference to print media, but the media scholars have not done enough to exploit this insight. What the author focuses on in this chapter are two writers who took media technology seriously and imaginatively, Marshall McLuhan and the historian Lewis Mumford, to grasp how they understood the role of media in creating a Global Village or a dystopian Global Village of Babel as Mumford at the end of a long career in 1970 seemed to think of it. These two imaginaries of the world of media technology are contrasted, but Lule seems to agree more with Mumford’s view. At the end, however, he concedes that “globalization and the media result from the actions of people, and those actions can be halted or altered” (p. 65).

Chapter 5 on media and economic globalization seems the least original chapter in the book. Lule goes over a number of old controversies relatively well known to our field: Telling the story of inequality and the oligopoly by using Nestle or Nike is to summarize old exposé stories from the news of the last three decades. The brief examination of Disney, Murdoch, or Time Warner as big and bad oligopolies again seems to recount what has been said by many in the communication field as it has examined economic globalization. Still, the author defines the dark side of media globalization before moving on to the politics of media globalization. Chapter 6 is a somewhat longer treatment of politics because it focuses on the author’s professional experience and identity as a journalist. The chapter covers the killing of journalists and other less direct means of censoring political news. Using both professionals working in international agencies like UNESCO to protect journalists as well as stories of journalists being killed or censored, Lule makes a point about the political side of global power by governments and businesses to limit the reporting of news that goes against their interests. He includes some positive stories of new media’s power to counter the political power of governments to control journalists, but argues that the forces of political power mostly overwhelm the journalist who seeks to uncover abuses of that power.

Chapter 7 on culture and globalization turns out to be somewhat less dark than the previous one. The thesis centers on the theory of Jan Nederveen Pieterse that argues that there are three positions on the influence of globalization on culture: cultural convergence (where cultural imperialism takes over); cultural hybridity (where cultural blending and mixing creates a mélange) and cultural differentialism (where strong cultures are destined to clash and struggle to maintain their identities—sometimes at great cost). Using the global spread of McDonald’s restaurants as an enduring example, Lule seems to clearly choose the hybridity theory of cultural negotiation though he gives a nod to convergence. At the end of the chapter he uses the example of the “tank man” in Tiananmen Square as a case of disputed interpretations to argue that negotiation of meaning in media may depend on the eye of the beholder, whether western/U.S. perspectives or that of nationalist Chinese.

Finally, the author concludes his brief book with two examples of positive use of media for helping the poor in Pakistan and Africa. Roshaneh Zafar, a U.S. trained economist, was inspired to return to her country to found a successful non-profit to make micro loans to women. Ken Banks was a hi-tech specialist in the U.K. who went to Africa to found a non-profit to use cell phones for many good causes. It seems from the ending that the author is more the optimist than the pessimist after an interesting and enlightening tour of globalization and the media.

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References


Throughout a long career, including 25 years as dean of the Annenberg School of Communications at
the University of Pennsylvania, George Gerbner (1919-2005) helped to define, shape, and legitimize communication study in the United States and, indirectly, throughout the world. Known best for the "cultural indicators" and "violence profile" projects, his work goes well beyond these to a larger sense of cultural investigation, exploring how mass media play a role in society. Michael Morgan, a former student and a long-time colleague, uses Gerbner’s life in communication research as a springboard to understanding contemporary communication theory. This book, then, combines personal biography with critical communication theory, seeing the latter through an examination of the former.

For Gerbner, the power of the mass media resides in its cultural role—a role almost hidden because it appears so transparent. Morgan begins his account with two quotations from Gerbner that capture this sense of media power:

People learn best not what their teachers think they teach or what their preachers think they preach, but what their cultures in fact cultivate.

For the first time in human history a child is born into a home in which television is on for an average of about seven hours a day. And for the first time in human history most of the stories about people, life, and values are told not by parents, schools, churches, or others in the community who have something to tell, but by a group of distant conglomerates that have something to sell. (p. 1)

People do learn from their environments, from the stories they hear, something Gerbner more or less took for granted, a sense first developed by his youthful interest in folk tales. When it came to media stories, Gerbner classified these into three types: stories about how things work, about how things are, and about what to do (p. 2). We learn from fiction, from news, and from persuasion. Living in the first generation in which storytelling became “industrialized,” Gerbner sought to understand the process—how it worked, how it affected people, how it changed the world. Because the industrial process—the mass production of stories—separated people from a more organic sense of story, these new stories put society at risk due to their extrinsic nature.

Drawn to a social-psychological investigation of the media, Gerbner completed his Ph.D. in 1955 with a dissertation on “a general model of communicational.” Influenced by Lasswell and others, he outlined a 10-step model: “(1) Someone (2) perceives an event (3) and reacts (4) in a situation (5) through some means (6) to make available materials (7) in some form (8) and context (9) conveying content (10) of some consequence” (p. 11). The model proved flexible enough to include internal and external communication; to encompass beliefs, knowledge, truth, and freedom; and to accommodate interpersonal, corporate, and governmental interests. Gerbner favored a process view of communication and regarded mass media as part of that process. Because of these media’s influences on popular culture, Gerbner explored a number of methodologies to critically understand them. Using what today we would call both qualitative and quantitative tools, he eventually struck on a detailed content analysis method, correlated with sociological indicators.

Consistent with the interest in stories, Gerbner began his research career with an examination of communication and education: “the educational implications of the revolution in communication and popular culture” in the 1950s and 1960s (p. 26). In exploring this connection, he began to work out a theoretical model of media influence, one that sought to capture the complexity of a world that went beyond the contemporary media influence models. At the same time he tried out various ways to capture data that might support his model. Looking at everything from “confession” magazines to images of mental health in the media, he began more and more careful analyses of media content. Gradually these efforts brought him to the study of ideology, of the things not explicitly seen or heard in the mass media, but which shape them at their roots. “He became convinced that scholars needed to focus on the repetitive, formulaic patterns expressed in aggregate systems of messages, rather than on specific messages” (p. 51).

What became the cultural indicators project grew out of his research in the 1960s (Chapter 3). “Gerbner’s concerns with the production, nature, and consequences of mass-mediated messages clearly suggested a three-pronged focus: (1) the institutions that create the messages (their production: institutional process analysis), (2) the messages themselves (their nature: message system analysis), and (3) the impacts and contributions of the messages (their consequences and functions: cultivation analysis)” (p. 56). Morgan carefully describes how Gerbner theorized each of these and how he proposed that each worked in concert with
the others. Cultural Indicators provided a long-term, comprehensive analysis of the (American) national and media worlds. The project itself received an external impetus when the Media Task Force of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, set up in the face of widespread civic unrest in the United States, selected Gerbner in late 1968 to produce a report on media content (p. 66). In an accelerated, two-month project, Gerbner developed a methodology based on his theoretical foundation and sampled national television programming for violence. That impetus guided the work of Gerbner and his colleagues for the next 30 years, constituting one of the longest-running, if not the longest-running, research projects in communication studies. (Morgan gives an indication: “The 2010 ‘Bibliography of Publications related to the Cultural Indicators Project’ contains over 550 entries; over 125 studies related to cultivation have been published since 2000,” p. 143.)

Morgan devotes the next two chapters to a detailed description of, first, the violence profile project and, second, the more general cultural indicators project. His explanation of the two provides a careful analysis of the methodologies and the findings; here he is careful to help the reader understand each of the key definitions, the theory, the sampling method, the data aggregation, and the questions the research addressed. Many of the critics of the violence profiles focused on what Morgan terms the “wrong question,” often seeking to refute the studies based on their own assumptions regarding media influence. The book proves exceptionally valuable here, as Morgan gives a much more detailed account of the research than appears in the typical communication textbook. The methodology aims to get at something closer to evidence in support of critical theory than of media influence. Morgan does the same with cultivation analysis. While the project does address violence, it goes far beyond violence in examining U.S. culture. Coupled with sociological data from the National Social Survey, Gerbner’s studies use careful statistical methods to examine how different groups react to or incorporate media themes (ideologies). Key to this concept is Gerbner’s construct of “mainstreaming”—how groups move to or away from the cultural mainstream of ideas and how these movements correlate with media use (pp. 99ff). The research group applied the overall concept not only to violence but also to women (gender and sex roles), minorities in American culture, politics, health and medicine, aging, science, and religion. The material in this chapter would provide an accessible and thorough introduction for any communication and mass media course.

Morgan readily admits that Gerbner’s work has its critics. Noting that Gerbner himself welcomed criticism, since it led to the clarification and development of ideas, he devotes his final chapter to “critiques, advances, and critical contributions.” Key issues relate to interpretation of the data, determination of measurement algorithms, the use of correlations, and the cognitive processes of viewers. With each, Morgan recounts how Gerbner and his team refined the studies and explained their goals and methods.

Toward the end of his career (after he left the Annenberg School in the 1990s), Gerbner founded the Cultural Environment Movement, a media reform group. Here he argued more forcefully that the mass media shape the intellectual and cultural environment and that only an environmental perspective will adequately allow people to grasp the big picture of U.S. society and its challenges.

Morgan packs a huge amount of information in this relatively slim (176 page) book. He writes clearly and manages to introduce both a key figure in communication research and a major theoretical strand of that research. Every student of communication or media studies should read this book.

As one would expect, the book contains a lengthy reference list and an index. The latter seems a bit thin; however, the chapters and their headings provide a clear guide to the book’s contents.

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The story of soap operas is more than 75 years old, but the genre keeps on evolving—and involving more and more audiences around the world. The present volume updates the theory and practice for the beginning of the new millennium with older stories of telenovelas in Latin America and soaps in the U.S. but adds new stories about Israeli soap opera exports, about Syrian contributions to the Arab speaking world where there are now 500 satellite stations in the region showing their version of narrative serials, about how
Afghanistan women learn feminist ideas from Indian serials, and a reminder for readers that Korea has had a long national tradition that became the “Korean Wave” in East Asia more recently. The four sections of the book contain four chapters each.

Section 1 begins with Mari Casteneda’s political economic analysis of the telenovela in historical perspective, but she points to the changing market place because of recent digitization. By contrast Jaime Gomez brings an interview-based comparison of two Latino/a telenovela creators, an industry leader in Colombia (creator of one of the most popular serials in Pedro the Show Off) and American Cristina Ibarra whose personal story was told in telenovela style in the last decade. He does a service by distilling the different production practices of each. Chapters 3 and 4 recount both the Korean Wave of soaps emerging from that country in the past 10 years or so as well as a little known effort by Israel to be producers and exporters as well as importers of telenovelas, a fascinating process for a country that had not had this tradition of narrative television production before.

Section 2 consists of two relatively better known accounts of how the telenovela emerged in Brazil and Mexico by Cacilda Regio and Melixa Abad-Izquierdo, and two new accounts of recent cultural productions in Italy and Kenya. Daniela Cardini echoes the work by the author of Chapter 4 on Israeli soaps; she shows that Italy has had some difficulty in producing its own narrative serials. Nevertheless, both the public and commercial sides of Italian television have produced a limited number of sophisticated and popular serials. The question is whether this genre can continue this interesting but expensive path into the future. Kenya has had a relatively long history of narrative television production, but it also has been a large importer of foreign entertainment programs. The other peculiar background note in Kenya is that there have been a number of social-educational soaps from the Entertainment-Education tradition which have sensitized all producers to the needs of audiences that go beyond entertainment.

Section 3 again contains four chapters, and these are focused by and large on a critique of soaps and telenovelas that contain blatant sexual content that are not only anti-feminist but that promote unsafe sex and danger of HIV/AIDS contagion. There is a more social scientific approach in several of these chapters that summarize research that indicates that despite claims to the contrary by producers, many soaps and telenovelas contain risky content.

The final section highlights the notion of hybridity in contrast to the older notion of Cultural Imperialism. But theory does not drive any of the last four chapters to any great degree. Martin Ponti describes the shift that has taken place in Brazil where the older TV Globo dominance has been somewhat challenged by the SBT network’s cheaper and more lower class telenovelas. In another chapter, Wazhmah Osman recounts how Indian serials have become popular with Afghan women over the past decade, and he wonders whether they can last when foreign military finally withdraw. The dilemma is that although Indian soaps are seen as trashy, women, nevertheless, seem to gain useful cultural and feminist lessons. No one knows how strict a religious backlash will occur in the future. A final chapter on the major role of Syrian musalsals (the briefer format for Arab serial dramas, especially for the period of Ramadan viewing) indicates that the Arab speaking world has added an alternative to the traditional productions from Egypt, especially those from Syria. One can only guess what the Arab Spring might do to the content of these productions that until a year ago carefully avoided religion and most politics. The fact that the Arab world has been inundated with so many more channels for television news and entertainment over the past 15 years indicates that whatever happens, television will be a growing phenomenon in the lives and politics of people in the region in the future.

—Emile McAnany
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In recent years the concept of the nation has come under scrutiny again in an age of globalization and increased migration. In the United Kingdom there have been many who have questioned whether there is now a cohesive idea of what it is to be British when so many have immigrated into our country. This book is thus a useful and timely volume from Nordicom.

Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring suggest that “the nation” is a resilient concept around which dis-
course can be organized. Politics, sports, and cultural events, both in news and fiction, are largely organized around what we call the nation. If a population is to know what a nation is, then its majority must be able to imagine what this means (p. 9). The editors suggest that this important concept has been under-investigated and by producing this book they intend to attempt to make the academic constituency take the “nation concept” more seriously. The nation from which we come, after all, affects the way we live our lives—whether we are at home or abroad. Our broadcast media, state or privately owned, are the purveyors of the notions that make up our ideas of what we understand to be the nation, even in an age of multinational media companies, perhaps an excellent example of “the glocal,” since even multinationals produce local programming. Despite this, we see/hear many programs from overseas. Many present day nations also have borders which are quite arbitrary. They may be the result of colonially placed boundaries (Uganda, for instance), of wars (e.g., the countries of the former Yugoslavia), or themselves be federated states—yet we understand them as nations.

Here, the book is divided into three sections: the making of nations, nations and empires revisited, and national selves and others. Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring highlight the fact that there are many themes which can be considered in any of these sections or, indeed, in all of them. One of the most salient, they believe is memory/remembrance (p. 13), since the nation is closely connected to historical trajectories (following Hobsbawm, 1996). In the first section how nations have been constructed, formulated, and practiced as part of this “slippery concept” are considered (p. 15). Terhi Rantanen thus studies how “methodological nationalism” is fashioned utilizing news flow studies that were undertaken between the 1950s and 1980s. She relates news flows to propaganda, communications, development, and media imperialism. She recounts the relationship of these concepts to particular international organizations. Rantanen asks whether we might now ask ourselves if there was ever such a thing as a national or international news flow but also, perhaps more provocatively, whether these news flows ever made sense. Those who have lived in more than one country, as Rantanen has, may well be able to relate to this idea.

Britta Timm Knudsen contemplates how Danish media are nostalgic about the past and concepts of nationhood. This performance and cultivation of the past Knudsen believes can only be comprehended in relation to a rupture from it. Series relating to Denmark’s national heritage are, she suggests, possibly best understood as “hyper-modern performers of communities” (p. 15). She adds that such performances are playful rather than “aggressively nationalistic” (ibid).

Once again, Nordicom has produced a book that is timely, interesting and relates to a very topical subject.

—Maria Way

Reference


The title of this book puts an emphasis on the first word of the title: Refiguring. It is not a straightforward history in the ordinary sense but a “rehabilitation project” of the term “mass communication” that the author argues was both a creation of the last century and an abandonment by the end of the century. What we have in this book is a reconceptualizing of the term in a rhetorical tradition with results that are quite original if sometimes opaque for the reader. What Simonson undertakes is to redefine the phrase as to how the notion of communication with a large number of people (i.e., mass communication) can be traced back to historical figures that helped give meaning to the term that was only created in the 20th century. Thus he identifies Paul of Tarsus; Walt Whitman; Charles Cooley, a sociologist who first helped define communication theory early in the 20th century; David Sarnoff, who spearheaded the radio broadcast model of mass communication in the 1920s and 1930s; and Robert Merton, another sociologist who collaborated for a decade in the 1940s at Colombia University with Paul Lazarsfeld to help refine the term as it was introduced as an academic field at mid-century.

The first chapter begins to trace the term, “mass communication,” from the use by David Sarnoff to promote the new NBC radio network in the 1920s more as a rhetorical or PR term. It was in the 1930s that the term was adopted by different scholars to
designate radio broadcasting and then retrospectively newspapers and film as well and the beginning of television. After a brief overview of the field up to World War II, Simonson argues for expanding the term in ways that he believes were “repressed” by the identification of radio, press, film, and television as the appropriate purview of the field that was beginning to unfold. He seems to believe that term of “mass communication” is no longer relevant to what might better be termed media studies today, with the old media being displaced by the new. In lieu of this mass media focus, he begins to explore the term and develop a theoretical approach that expands and changes the term that goes beyond media and into what one could call communication studies that somehow involve a large number of people. Thus he seeks out historical figures who might be called mass communicators.

Paul of Tarsus is his first model—and a very successful one at that. Much of the chapter reflects Simonson’s reading of the abundant recent literature on Paul and his mission in the first century of our era. But the author argues that Paul was not a particularly effective orator himself but that his view of communicating with the masses was more perhaps through his letters which were rhetorically superb. The focus of the chapter is on the First letter to the Corinthians where Paul argues for the Body of Christ as the symbolic reality for uniting the emerging communities of believers throughout the Roman world. He makes much of the connection of the two senses of the Body of Christ, both in an ecclesial and a liturgical sense of the sacred meal shared by the community in Corinth and their spiritual connection with all other believers far and near. This chapter begins to redefine mass communication in a basic way.

Chapter 2 on Whitman suggests that the book struggles with focus as it can be read as a series of separate essays about different mass communicators who carried out their work in profoundly different ways in very different contexts. As in the first chapter, the author tends to focus on a single text for inspiration. Here it is the first four editions of Leaves of Grass published in the 1850s when Whitman was hitting his stride. The first half of the chapter deals with Whitman’s biographical details up to the first publication of Leaves of Grass, but Simonson’s interpretation of this poem is as rhetorical polytheistic praise of the masses that Whitman wishes to communicate to his readers. The thesis of mass communication in Whitman seems labored, and with little reference to the text itself, the interpretation seems to come more from the author than from the poet.

When the author comes to Charles Cooley some of the previous difficulties seem to ease because we are on the firmer ground of mass communication as the term was parsed in the first part of the 20th century by Lippman, Lasswell, Sarnoff, Lazarsfeld, and others. As Simonson states early in the chapter, “Cooley was the one [among many early scholars in the emerging field] who led the way in the academic study of communication so named, during the earliest phase in North America, from the 1890s through the 1910s. Cooley’s was the first significant social theory of communication in the United States . . .” (p. 92). But the author admits that Cooley did not use the term mass communication as such but his interest in transportation and other technologies that were seen to connect people makes the claim for Cooley’s inclusion more understandable.

The final formal chapter (there is an Afterword) concerns itself with Robert Merton, a well known name in sociology from his long tenure at Columbia University from 1940 until his retirement. Why Merton may seem an odd choice for mass communication history was that he only worked for a decade in the field (1940-1950) and is largely ignored by most historians of the field (Rogers, 1994, devotes only four pages to the collaboration with Lazarsfeld in his history). Simonson does not clearly make the case for Merton’s inclusion, but one reason that Merton is interesting is that he has not been studied much in our field. In any case, the author continues his narrative of how mass communication history evolved and how his chosen models incorporated their given “faiths” into communication careers. For Merton, it was a skeptical faith in reason and scientific method, and Simonson makes a good deal of Merton’s change of names as a young man from a Jewish and Eastern European one to a very mainstream-sounding one. The chapter seems oddly critical at times of Merton and his remove from politics, and even from Manhattan to the suburbs, and, indeed, from the newly emerging field of mass communication by 1949 as the field was being created academically.

The Afterword about a fair in rural Pennsylvania seems a complicated and less revealing way of summarizing or concluding what is an original and often intriguing way of defining mass communication over time. There are copious footnotes that demonstrate the
serious scholarship of the author as well as a bibliography and index.

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Reference


Gadi Wolfsfeld, a professor in the departments of political science and communication at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, provides a brief, but helpful, introduction to political communication study in this volume. His approach divides politics and media into three general categories: political actors (the sources of news), the news industry, and media effects (or the audience for political news). He breaks these down, in turn, into five key principles:

- Political power can usually be translated into power over the news media (p. 2 and Chapter 1).
- When the authorities lose control over the political environments they also lose control over the news (p. 3 and Chapter 2).
- There is no such thing as objective journalism (nor can there be) (p. 4 and Chapter 3).
- The media are dedicated more than anything else to telling a good story and this can often have a major impact on the political process (p. 4 and Chapter 4).
- The most important effects of the news media on citizens tend to be unintentional and unnoticed (p. 5 and Chapter 5).

Within this structure, Wolfsfeld presents a wide range of studies and research into political communication.

Illustrating the argument with examples drawn primarily from U.S. politics, Wolfsfeld first examines how power works in complex media-saturated societies. As he argues, “power comes in many forms” (p. 11), including the power to compel media coverage. Less powerful participants have to attract coverage, a situation changed only slightly by the new media. Though less powerful groups can have a web, Facebook, or Twitter presence, for example, they still remain less likely to gain traction for long in the larger cultural discourses.

The corollary to Wolfsfeld’s first principle lies in the ways in which political actors seek to control the news, something that they cannot always manage, as events overtake policy makers or political actors. Wolfsfeld illustrates this with examples as diverse as controlling important events, controlling the flow of information (or losing control as in the case of leaks), and controlling a consensus. In each of these arenas of control, the media resist the actions of political actors by trying to establish a separate agenda, something Wolfsfeld characterizes as the “politics-media-politics cycle” (pp. 30-34). Political actors seek to shape consensus through the media; if they succeed, the media sources reinforce the consensus. However, media reporting may weaken consensus and lead to a different political outcome. The initially contrasting examples of the Vietnam War reporting and the Iraq War reporting illustrate the cycle, as does the role of new media in the Abu Ghraib prison story.

The second section of the book, dealing with news media, addresses topics such as news objectivity, cultural bias, news frames, and ideological bias. Here, too, Wolfsfeld adds information on how such traditional communication concepts play out in the new media. Another built-in source of news media’s inescapable involvement in the stories they report comes from how they tell stories—the very process of narrative. After reviewing the research, Wolfsfeld notes how newer forms, such as infotainment, have changed the narrative paradigms and can affect political communication as well.

The third part of the book looks to the audience, asking how the media affect people. Summarizing a huge body of research on media effects, Wolfsfeld tries to show how the more significant effects often remain unconscious. He illustrates these by an examination of framing, agenda setting, priming, learning and persuasion, and influence theories.

Making Sense of Media and Politics provides a wealth of introductory information and, in so doing, would serve well in a first course on political communication. However, faculty would need to supplement the book with more in-depth explanations of key concepts. Because many of the key ideas (for example, agenda setting) have long histories in communication research, Wolfsfeld assumes that the reader knows about them—something which may not apply to introductory students.
The book has good documentation (end notes), a substantial nine-page reference list, and an index. In addition, each chapter concludes with “questions for thought and discussion.”

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Briefly Noted


This edited collection examines copyright from a number of perspectives from the international copyright system to that of different jurisdictions: the United States (both theory and digital application), Russia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. A final section includes chapters examining the economic implications of copyright for print, television, and film.


This collection examines communication from a broad international and interdisciplinary perspective, featuring essays on discourse analysis, fiction, dialogue, social communication, neuroscience, ethnomethodology and language games, pragmatics, sociology (Luhmann’s approach), and computer-mediated interaction. It provides an excellent counterpoint to media studies approaches, which tend to restrict communication to only one area.


Lum has assembled a wonderful introduction to and discussion of the key figures on whose thought the media ecology group draws: Neil Postman, Lewis Mumford, Jacques Ellul, Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, James Carey, Benjamin Lee Whorf, Susanne Langer, Eric Havelock, and Walter Ong. The contributors themselves form a veritable who’s who of the media ecology world. Each introduces a different key idea in media ecology by examining those who proposed the ideas. This is an important collection for anyone interested in media ecology.


This research report from Volda University College documents a study of “the relationship between planned education and upbringing at home and school, and the ‘parallel school’ of the media- and computer industry” (p. 9). The project, based on content analyses and survey research, examines values in Norwegian schools and media, and parents’ and children’s reaction to media materials.


This specialized collection addresses developments in linguistics and language learning. Processing instruction “is the pedagogical intervention that draws insights from a model of input processing.” Input processing, in turn, “refers to the strategies and mechanisms learners use to link linguistic form with its meaning and/or function” (p. 1).


This workbook-style presentation introduces writing for online sources. Sections address theories, philosophy, style, methods, and techniques of online writing; the use of pictures, graphics, audio, and video; improving one’s writing; legal and ethical concerns (libel, privacy, copyright, sensationalism, conflict of interest); and writing exercises and style tests.