Post-Authoritarian Communication

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## COMMUNICATION RESEARCH TRENDS

Published four times a year by the Centre for the Study of Communication and Culture (CSCC). Copyright 1996. ISSN 0144-4646

Publisher: Paul J. Duffy, SJ
Editor: William E. Biernatzi, SJ
Associate Editor for Latin America, Spain & Portugal: José Martinez de Toda y Terrero, SJ
Copy Editor: Marcia Wynne Deering

Subscription:
- Annual Subscription (Vol. 17) US $35
- Set of Volumes No. 1-8 US $90
- Set of Volumes No. 9-16 US $125
- Complete set and Vol. 17 US $220

Payment by MasterCard, Visa or US$ preferred.
For payment by MasterCard or Visa, send full account number, expiration date, name on account and signature.

Checks and/or International Money Orders (drawn on USA Banks - Add $10 for non-USA Banks) should be made payable to "CSCC" and sent to CSCC-SLU, XH 325, P.O. Box 56907, St. Louis, MO 63156-0907 USA.

Transfer by Wire to: Mercantile Bank, N.A., ABA #081000210 for credit to "Saint Louis University, Account Number 100-14-75456, Attention: Mary Bradbury (CSCC)."

Address all correspondence to:
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E-Mail: CSCC@SLU.EDU

Printing: A Graphic Resource, St. Louis, MO, USA

The Centre for the Study of Communication and Culture (CSCC), at Saint Louis University, is an international service of the Society of Jesus established in 1977.

Executive Director: Paul J. Duffy, SJ
International Board of Advisors: Brendan Callaghan, SJ (London), Jean Bianchi (Lyon), Thomas Connelly (Glasgow), Nim Gonzalez, SJ (Manila), Henk Hoekstra, O.Carm. (Amsterdam), Luis Nuñez Gomés (Mexico City), Gaston Roberge, SJ (Rome), Carlos Valle (London), Robert A. White, SJ (Rome).
Post-Authoritarian Communication

I. Introduction: Definitions

The breakup of the Soviet Union brought to prominence the question: How do the mass media adapt to their newfound freedom as governments move from authoritarian to more liberal forms of rule? The most striking recent examples of that movement are in former communist states, but "authoritarianism" describes other governments and ideologies as well. These include colonialism, absolute monarchies, fascism, military rule, and various other forms of dictatorship and extreme centralism. The change in question is a political transition to freer, democratic participation in government by the mass of the population. Places where recent changes of this kind have occurred, apart from Eastern and Central Europe, include most Latin American countries, South Africa, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Spain.

Extending our time-frame backwards in history we can include under the heading "post-authoritarian" many countries that have been freed from colonial rule since the Second World War, as well as the three defeated Axis powers: Germany, Italy and Japan. Many post-colonial developments have resulted in stable democracies — the largest example being India — but in many other countries the liberation from colonial rule resulted in less freedom, rather than more, as strongmen and dictators imposed their will on the people and prohibited popular participation in government or in meaningful social movements.

Going back still further, we can include longstanding western democracies, such as Britain, the United States, and France, which won their freedom — by gradual evolution, violent revolution, or a combination of both processes — from prior conditions of authoritarian rule.

A wide-ranging look at research into examples from these various categories may yield some insights into what happens to communication during political liberalization processes in general.

II. Stable Democracies as Post-Authoritarian Political Structures


The USA as a Benchmark Case

The United States of America can hardly be regarded as a country which has recently emerged from a condition of either foreign-imposed or domestic authoritarian rule. Yet it did gain its independence precisely at the time when the first mass medium — the newspaper — was beginning to have a noteworthy effect on society and politics. Consequently, a brief look at research on that period of US communication history as well as its subsequent development can serve as something of a model or benchmark for considering similar developments in later times, in other places, and involving different mass media.

The British government exercised tight control over printing in its American colonies in the 18th century, as it did in Britain itself — first through the Stationers' Company, then the Censorship Act, and finally after 1712, by a series of Stamp Acts which taxed each sheet of paper used in publishing (Lahav 1989: 246-247). The effectiveness of that control became increasingly problematic, however, as presses became more numerous and as populations increased in lands far removed from London. The press helped stimulate the spirit of rebellion in the colonies, and at the end of the Revolutionary War, in 1783, it could claim to have played a significant, even central role in achieving national independence (Humphrey 1996: 2).

Constitutional Debates

The numbers of newspapers increased rapidly, from only 35 in 1783, to 234 in 1800, to 329 in 1809, and to over 1,200 by 1833. Although the interests of the papers tended to shift to state and local issues after the 13 colonies' collaborative struggle was completed, the
obvious weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation, which served as the first constitution, soon attracted widespread journalistic comment and calls for a new form of government (ibid., pg. 3).

Debates over the form the new constitution should take divided the country and the press politically, between "Federalists" and "anti-Federalists." In the 1790s, the "party press," identified with one or other faction, emerged. Protected by the first amendment to the Constitution, the freedom of the press quickly became abused, with rampant libel, slander and misrepresentation.

The abuses led to the passage of the " Alien and Sedition Acts " of 1798, a draconian effort to control the press that not only was quickly repealed but also brought about the end of the previously dominant Federalist Party, which had promoted the measure and used it to silence its opponents. This controversy had the happy effect of helping "establish the idea that disagreements and differences of opinion were part of the political system..." and helped create an "acceptance of diversity of opinion," which "provided the basis for an amazing growth of the press in the early nineteenth century" as it came to reflect an increasing heterogeneity of political and other ideas (ibid., pg. 68).

**Institutional Changes**

Another innovation of the 1790s was the role of the editor and the beginnings of the separation between clearly labelled "editorials" (the editor's opinions) and "news" which at least claimed to report the facts with greater objectivity, even though that reporting was at first strongly slanted in support of the party favored by each editor (pg. 51).

War with Britain, from 1812 to 1815, reemphasized the importance of information to the general population (pg. 81). A decline in partisanship after the war further moderated the temper of the mass media, as did the growing significance of westward expansion. Although the close relationship between the administration of President Andrew Jackson (1824-1833) and the Washington Globe appeared to revive partisanship, Humphrey feels that it actually "sowed the seeds of the final dissolution of the partisan press," because of opposition to the government's views in other newspapers and because the increasing variety of issues and voices fragmented the press (pg. 128).

The contents of the increasingly commercialized papers broadened to include other issues besides politics, and their political interests evolved towards the role of "fourth estate" or "watchdog of the government," rather than automatic endorsement of government positions (pg. 129). Furthermore, the increased use of the hand-operated cylinder press, in the 1820s, and the steam-powered cylinder press, in the 1830s, along with other technological innovations, raised the numbers of copies a newspaper could print and circulate, resulting in the "penny press" of the 1830s and 1840s and, in it, the birth of the modern newspaper industry. Widespread literacy and a nationwide thirst for news was reinforced by improving transportation and communication, which in turn improved both news gathering and the circulation of papers. Readers and advertisers became more important factors than political patronage in the viability of newspapers (pg. 149).

**Propaganda**

The commercialization of the press moved it away from being identified as "pure" propaganda, but it in no way diminished the intensity of propaganda efforts by any and all factions in American society, as Richard Alan Nelson documents in his chronology of propaganda in the area of what is now the United States from 1492 to 1995 (Nelson 1996: 1-114). The escalating complexity of issues involved in public and private propaganda, advertising, and journalistic objectivity is illustrated in the later phases of the chronology and in Nelson's glossary of U.S. propaganda (ibid., pp. 115-276), and in his extensive list of references (pp. 277-304).

**Objectivity**


The possibility of objectivity in any sort of knowledge has been ridiculed by the deconstructionists of this "postmodern" era, and probably more so in regard to journalism than in most other areas. This strikes at the heart of the factuality and reliability of news reporting which many journalists and most of their readers had regarded, at least in the past century or so, as journalism's most important assets. Even the most vigorous advocates of journalistic objectivity must nevertheless admit that their quest for readers and advertisers creates imperatives which tend to channel media interests in certain directions and to impose a de facto "censorship" on the views the media express. Ognianova and Endersby, of the University of Missouri-Columbia, apply the "spatial theory of
decision making" to the "journalistic convention of objectivity" in order to answer the question posed by J. Turow in 1982, "Why do they (journalists) have the goal of objectivity?" (Ognianova and Endersby 1996: 1 quoting J. Turow 1982). The theory is based on the premise that political and economic behavior is a response to market pressures, in which "voters and consumers...will choose the alternative nearest to their personal preferences." Consequently, the authors hypothesize that, given a free choice, "audience members choose the news outlet or news reporter they see nearest to their personal views" (Ognianova and Endersby 1996: 1).

The Appeal of the Center

Since a centrist ideological position appeals to the greatest proportion of the American audience, journalists tend to take that same position in order to increase their market share (Ognianova and Endersby 1996: 1). Objectivity, or at least the appearance of objectivity, thus can be seen "as a tactical process in news reporting intended for mass media institutions to create a perception of centrist ideology and to attract and preserve a mass audience" (ibid., pg. 3). The authors trace this tactic for maximizing the media audience back to the "penny press" of the mid-1830s, when the commercial nature of the American press became paramount (pg. 11). Objectivity became a means to attract readers. It provided an appeal to a high standard of truth and reliability while, at the same time, it "legitimized the objective of reaching a mass audience" (pg. 12).

The study's analysis of 1974 survey data (with "several reasons to believe that data collected today would yield similar results") supports the view that "mass media organizations, and in particular television news organizations represented by their anchors, are positioned in the middle of the ideological spectrum of their audience" (pg. 22). Although political ideology is an important component of this centrist tendency in both audience and media, other social influences also show the same tendency. The authors suggest that this self-placement of the media is a fully conscious and deliberate effort to maximize their audience (pp. 22-23).

Professional Standards


The Sociology of Journalists

David H. Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit carried out an extensive survey of American journalists in 1982-83 (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986), which was intended to build on groundwork laid by Johnstone, Slawski and Bowman, in their earlier study (1976). The present book (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996) is based on a complementary survey done in 1992.

In his Foreword, Everette E. Dennis points to the need for this continuing line of research:

the only reason the public should care about research on journalists is that there is good cause to wonder whether there is any relationship between who these journalists are and what we ultimately get from them in our news products. (In Weaver and Wilhoit 1996: x)

Although journalists are sometimes regarded as cultural elites, the findings of the 1992 study were ambiguous.

On the one hand, they did not seem very elitist or removed from the general public in terms of region, age, gender, marital/family status, income, opinions of their audiences, or opinions about their roles. On the other hand, they did seem to differ from the public by being more White, less religious, more liberal politically, more highly educated and more willing to sanction questionable reporting methods... (ibid., pp. 238-239)

There were relatively few changes to report between journalists in the earlier surveys and the 1992 study. They still generally accepted descriptions of the high standards and exalted goals which should characterize their profession — much as those were stated by Jefferson and others in the early nineteenth century. But there is still cause for concern. The authors perceived a growing discontent, "because of declining support among many media owners and the public for serving a self-governing citizenry with news and truth" (pg. 243). Rather, the owners and public have focussed more on profits and entertainment than on the pursuit of truth. As Trevor R. Brown points out in his "Afterword", "One has the uneasy feeling that the world of journalism that Weaver and Wilhoit mapped has changed sufficiently since 1992 to raise the urgency they expressed from a one-alarm to at least a three-alarm" (ibid.).
III. Russia

Chronology

The period of Soviet and Russian history from the first glimmers of glasnost ("openness" — but see Ganley 1996: 49-53, for a discussion of what it meant to Gorbachev), in 1985, to the present, has involved a succession of momentous events which has been not only fast-breaking, but also easily confusing to the non-expert. Ellen Mickiewicz, a long-time student of Soviet and Russian affairs, as Professor of Public Policy Studies and Director of the De Witt Wallace Center for Communications and Journalism at Duke University, has provided a helpful chronology of "Selected Events At the End of the Soviet Era" (Mickiewicz 1997: 319-322). Selecting from Mickiewicz's chronology and with a few additions, the following can provide some sense of how the most important events fit together:

March 1985: Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR. Two months later, at the suggestion of his wife, Raisa, he had a video shown on nationwide television of his discussions with party officials in Leningrad. While the content of the video was not earthshaking, the fact of such a conference being shown on the mass media was unprecedented. Gorbachev, himself, called it "the first step of glasnost" (Mickiewicz 1997: 10-11).

1986-87: Innovative television news and opinion programs began to be aired nationwide, testing the limits of glasnost.

February 1989: The last Soviet troops left Afghanistan.

March 1989: First competitive parliamentary elections were held.

June 1989: Live TV coverage of parliamentary sessions for 95 hours over a three-week period served as a "school for democracy," but frightened the Politburo (Mickiewicz 1997: 91).

April-July 1989: First Lithuania and Estonia, then Latvia declared sovereignty. Increasing unrest in Georgia, etc.

1990: New Law on the Press abolished censorship and gave individuals and organizations "the right to found a mass information medium" (as quoted by Ganley 1996: 91).

January 1990: TSN — Moscow Television News Service — began broadcasting as an alternative to the main news program, Vremya.

May 1990: Anti-Communist demonstrators at May Day parade were inadvertently broadcast live nationwide.

January 1991: Ministry of Interior troops attacked a TV tower in Lithuania.

June 1991: Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia. Leningrad was renamed St. Petersburg.

August 1991: An attempted coup by hardline Communists was defeated. Gorbachev retained the USSR Presidency, but Boris Yeltsin gained de facto authority. Intensive foreign media coverage of the coup by "at least one thousand" foreign reporters provided more information to the USSR than domestic media (Ganley 1996: 195).

December 1991: Dissolution of the USSR.

February 1992: Publication of the Press Law for Russia, which forbade censorship, but prohibited certain categories of speech (advocating violent overthrow of constitution; arousing religious differences; social, class and ethnic intolerance; and war propaganda [Mickiewicz 1997: 227]).

1993: TV6 and NTV, the first wholly non-governmental TV channels in Russia, began operation.

September-October 1993: Attempt by Russian Congress of People's Deputies to unseat Yeltsin included a bloody but unsuccessful assault on television studios in the Moscow district of Ostankino. Yeltsin credited TV Channel Two with saving the situation: "the Russian channel, the only one that stayed on the air was what saved Moscow and Russia" (as quoted by Mickiewicz 1997: 127).

August 1994: The last Russian troops were
withdrawn from the Baltic States.

September 1994+: Chechnya separatist movement.

December 1994: Russian troops invaded Chechnya.

1995: Independent broadcasting of the Chechnya war criticized Russian government policies and occasioned unsuccessful efforts to muzzle broadcasters.

December 1995: Communists won one-third of the seats in the Russian State Duma election.

June and July 1996: Yeltsin won a two-round presidential election over Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov. Media gave Yeltsin temporary support (e.g., by helping conceal his heart attack from the public), but government-media tensions resumed after the second election.

August 1996: Chechnya peace was negotiated by Alexander Lebed.

October 1996: Lebed was fired by Yeltsin.

The Importance of Media in the Transition


Changes in telecommunications technology were certainly not the sole factor in the collapse of Communist control in the Soviet Union or in the breakup of the Union, itself, but as all three of the books cited above make abundantly clear, they were a major factor in both processes.

Marshall I. Goldman, in the Foreword to Ganley’s book, singles out television, in particular. It became an instant source of images about world events. Explanations of the images were then supplied from foreign radio broadcasts and by the increasingly free domestic media under the policy of glasnost (openness), after 1985. "In the end," he says, "it turned out that more information about the outside world as well as more information about the inside world helped to bring down the Communist party and the Soviet government" (in Ganley 1996: xi).

Ellen Mickiewicz highlights the unique position of television in the process of transition. She says that "television at the end of the Soviet Union was just about the only institution left standing," and consequently, "the medium became the battle ground, literally and figuratively, for those who would retain or gain political power." In post-Soviet Russia, too, a country "virtually totally penetrated by its signals, television was called upon to make extraordinary things happen" (Mickiewicz 1997: ix).

Communist Control of Media
Intensive efforts had been made by the Communist government since just after the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1917, to control all means of communication and every possible source of information. Turpin describes "Lenin’s definition of the newspaper as collective propagandist, agitator, and organizer" (Turpin 1995: 14, citing Gayle D. Hollander 1972). Party loyalty, ideology, patriotism, "Truthfulness (to Leninist theory)," populism, accessibility to the masses, and criticism and self-criticism served as criteria for publishability. These criteria were enforced by "Glavlit — the Chief Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs" (later the "Chief Administration for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press"), which was responsible for prior censorship of all published materials. It was reinforced by several other monitoring and control agencies.

The mass media were conceived of according to a simple, stimulus-response model, with the Moscow TV tower likened, by the poet Andrei Voznesensky, to a "syringe for ideological injections" (as quoted by Mickiewicz 1997: 14). Communist Party theoreticians realized the importance — and danger — of an active audience by the late 1970s, but the "ideological syringe" image seemed to persist among many party and government leaders well into the period of glasnost, even as the audience became increasingly active and critical (ibid., pp. 27-31).

Mikhail Nenashev, who headed State Television from May 1989 to November 1990, saw the "astonishing lack of understanding" of the dynamics of television and its audience among government and Party leadership, especially Gorbachev’s advisors, as a major
factor in their failure to realize what was happening in the country (Mickiewicz 1997: 48).

This extraordinary devotion to the stimulus-response model of communication, the total lack of interest in the way the message was received or assimilated, and the notion that power flows unimpeded from the airwaves was deluded and static. Experts and specialists knew that, but the country's political leaders were not open to those arguments. (ibid.)

The old control apparatus remained fully operative until Gorbachev suddenly turned Lenin on his head, in February 1986, with a statement he alleged to be a "Leninist answer: Communists want the truth, always and under all circumstances" (Turpin 1995: 14-15).

Technological Lag

Although the Soviet Union excelled in military and space technology, its civilian economy and industrial base were antiquated and controlled by largely incompetent bureaucrats. Computerization — already becoming an essential of modernization worldwide by the late 1970s — was restricted by fear that the technology would be used against the state. Communication satellites were under the control of the military. No independent alternatives existed to the government-controlled radio and television networks, run by the State Committee for Television and Radio (Gosteleradio) (Ganley 1996: 5). Schools of journalism were chiefly "ideological schools," designed to inculcate strict adherence to the party line (ibid., pg. 7, quoting a Soviet-era academic, Elena Androunas [1993: 30]). The KGB had no qualms about using "journalistic cover" in its operations, and one former Izvestia correspondent claimed, in 1991, "'that every second Soviet journalist working in a foreign country is a KGB agent'" (Ganley 1996: 7, quoting The Washington Post, August 29, 1991).

Ganley relates some statistics descriptive of the poor state of Soviet communications in the 1980s. Telephones totalled only 28 million in the early 1980s — one for every 10 persons, and phones were in only 23% of urban and 7% of rural households. Multiple reasons were given for this, including the low priority assigned to consumer commodities and services, difficulty of mass producing sophisticated equipment, import restrictions, and internal security fears (Ganley 1996: pg. 17).

Changes Under Glasnost

Fax and Interfax

The fax machine entered the Soviet Union about the time it was beginning to become popular in the West — the late 1980s. Although numbers increased slowly, "by 1990, perestroika had 'become a revolution by fax'" (Ganley 1996: 23), due to the intensive use of the existing machines for purposes of rapid, uncontrolled dissemination of political information. The greater reliability of faxes over the postal service became a factor, as well. In 1993, a Russian journalist told me (the CRT editor): "If you want to contact me, always fax, never depend on the mail."

The Interfax news agency, initiated as a Soviet, French, and Italian joint venture — chiefly a source of Soviet domestic news for foreign journalists — depended from the start on fax transmission to its customers, thus freeing itself from dependence on paper and printing equipment whose supply is so often used by governments to control news media. With 50 full-time staff and 200 domestic stringers throughout the Soviet republics, Interfax soon became, in the words of one American journalist, "well-nigh indispensable for foreign journalists" (Ganley 1996: 60, citing Barker and Mahoney 1991).

Like other mass media during the period of glasnost, however, Interfax remained dependent on the Communist Party-controlled government for most of its infrastructure, such as access to communication lines. The threat of strangulation therefore continued to be present until the final overthrow of the Communists.

Broadcasting

The highly secretive State Committee for Television and Radio (Gosteleradio) continued to control broadcasting, in conjunction with the Communist Party Central Committee, until 1991. In the mid-1980s, the television system consisted of about 6,500 low-power terrestrial stations, many of which received their network material from powerful satellites. About 7,000 leased, legal "backyard" dishes could receive direct satellite broadcasts (Ganley 1996: 69-70). In addition, some people began illegally to make their own satellite dishes in order to receive foreign-originated broadcasts. Such dishes were estimated to total 15,000 by 1990, when they became legal. These dishes were often used to tape foreign films from the satellite broadcasts for black market distribution. A vigorous business arose converting the Soviets' SECAM-only VCRs to play PAL tapes originating from broadcasts of Britain, Germany, Italy, and other countries (pp. 71, 77-78).
The major official newscast "Vremya" ("Time") had become a ritual for Soviet households, the evening being divided into "before Vremya" and "after Vremya." It was strictly controlled by the Communist Party, had no competition for its time slot, and was used as an effective means of nationwide indoctrination prior to glasnost (Ganley 1996: 70-71). Vremya's nightly audience in 1986 "was estimated at about 150 million people" (Mickiewicz 1997: 24).

An innovation, in 1987, was the program "Vzglyad" ("View," or "An Oblique Glance"), an informally staged and innovative program with guests interviewed on a wide variety of subjects, some of them controversial. The program survived despite considerable harassment from the Party. It was joined by Moscow Television News Service, or "TSN," whose informative, concise reporting and attractive anchor persons and production qualities soon outshone "Vremya" as a popular news source (Ganley 1996: 72-75).

Official policies towards these programs fluctuated, reflecting both indecision and splits within the reform leadership (Mickiewicz 1997: 31-41).

Presenting the Soviet Self

Turpin's book presents an ethnographic content analysis contrasting English-language Soviet news sources — Novosti Press Agency and its two publications, the magazine Soviet Life (for circulation in the United States) and the newspaper Moscow News — according to the ways they presented the "image" of the country and its people under, respectively, the Brezhnev and Gorbachev regimes. For example, Soviet Life under Brezhnev, during the surveyed period of 1972-1974, "presents an optimal picture of Soviet society..." a veritable "heaven on earth" (Turpin 1995: 35-54). Advanced Soviet technology and science were emphasized. By the period from 1988 to 1990, under Gorbachev, Soviet Life stressed problems of various kinds in Soviet society and the need for changes to fulfill the promise of socialism. The management of the magazine recognized that its American readership consisted of people relatively well-acquainted with the realities of the Soviet Union who expected serious, in-depth articles, not transparent propaganda. It did divide the prominent figures of recent Soviet history into "good guys" trying to orchestrate needed reforms — represented by Lenin and Gorbachev — and "bad guys" who had corrupted socialism and mismanaged the country — such as Stalin and Brezhnev (pp. 56-66).

Backfire

In opening the windows of Soviet society to meaningful discussion and open criticism, Gorbachev used the mass media as his main instrument in "the manufacturing of dissent that was integral to Gorbachev's early success." The Soviet Press Law of 1990 was designed to codify glasnost as it pertained to the mass media. It abolished prior censorship (with some exceptions), and gave individuals and organizations the right to "found" mass media independent of state ownership (Ganley 1996: 89-92).

The Party could no longer exercise the full control to which it had grown accustomed. Differences among the leadership, which formerly had been hidden, became public as they increasingly affected television broadcast programming and caused sometimes-abrupt replacements of anchors and reporters (Mickiewicz 1997: 36). The flood of free expression had already begun to go beyond what Gorbachev himself had intended, as is indicated by his criticisms of negative press coverage in 1989 (Ganley 1996: 87-88). The Press Law of 1990 breached the dike.

Despite its inadequacies, the 1990 media law 'has to be seen as a legal benchmark,' according to David Wedgwood Benn, 'because it broke new ground in several respects.' That is, 'it effectively legitimized the expression of anti-communist opinions. It created some of the preconditions for genuine media independence... [and] it gave a role to the courts in settling disputes over the law's interpretation.' (Ganley 1996: 94-95, quoting Benn 1992).

Among other developments, the law's provision that publications with less than 1,000 circulation need not be registered effectively legitimized samizdat, the secretly circulated typewritten works which had become such an important feature of the underground literary and philosophical life of the USSR (Ganley 1996: 95).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union gradually lost control of media outlets in 1991, their control passing to the Russian Republic, under Boris Yeltsin. Frustrated by limitations on his access to broadcast media, Yeltsin had initiated Radio Russia, in December 1990, and began television broadcasting on Channel Two, as Russian Television and Radio (RTR) on May 13, 1991 (Mickiewicz 1997: 97). Yeltsin is quoted as saying his earlier exclusion from media access was really an advantage, because it gave him "a martyr's
halo, which gets brighter every day" (Ganley 1996: 100). Efforts by Gorbachev and others in the central government to undo the "damage" only aroused greater resistance (ibid., 107-124).

The hardline coup attempt against Gorbachev, foiled by his rival, Yeltsin, in August 1991 was the last straw. Ganley describes the significance of both Yeltsin's skillful use of the mass media and the coup plotters' bungled use of the media, as well as their failure to realize the degree of resistance they would face among a majority of the population. She says,

It seems generally agreed that the biggest blunder of the plotters was not only allowing Yeltsin to remain at large, but failing to cut off his communications within the Soviet Union and with the rest of the world. (1996: 132)

Mickiewicz comments that "Television's finest hour had not been in August 1991" (1997: 110). Despite individual acts of defiance and even heroism by some broadcasters and editors, state television was shown to be closely allied to political power, lacking independence from political pressures — whether those pressures were exerted by the coup leaders or by Yeltsin. Many of the entrenched employees of the old system necessarily survived the coup and subsequent transition to new leadership; so many of the old habits persisted into the post-Soviet period (ibid.).

Turpin highlights the role of the centrally controlled mass media, under both Brezhnev and Gorbachev, in "constructing reality" (cf., Berger and Luckman 1967) for Soviet society and in "reinventing the Soviet self" (Turpin 1995: 152-153). When the Party lost its central role of the media, diverse and conflicting interpretations of what constituted social "reality" were bound to arise in Soviet society.

The New Structure of Communication

"Russian Media in Transition": Four Papers Presented at the Conference of the International Association for Mass Communication Research (IAMCR), Sydney, Australia, 18-22 August 1996:

Elena Vartanova, Associate Professor, Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University. "Corporate Transformation of the Russian Mass Media." (Vartanova 1996)

Svetlana Kolesnik, Associate Professor, Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University. "Content Control on TV in Russia." (Kolesnik 1996)

Andrei G. Richter, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University. "Politics and Regulation of the Media: 1996 Elections in Historical Context." (Richter 1996)

Yassen N. Zassoursky, Professor and Dean, Faculty of Journalism, UNESCO Chair of Journalism and Mass Communication, Moscow State University. "Freedom and Responsibility in the Russian Media." (Zassoursky 1996)

Media Vitality in Contemporary Russia

Elena Vartanova says that "the Russian media economy has by now reached a kind of stability it previously lacked" (Vartanova 1996). In the five years since the introduction of private ownership and entrepreneurship in the media many media enterprises have sprung up. Some, inevitably, have had to struggle for survival, but "there is a new trend of emergence of powerful media companies that have become able to secure their position and even to expand their activities" (ibid.).

As they emerged from government or Communist Party control, newspapers generally came under the control of journalists, rather than "outside," non-journalist owners. Only 8.6% of newspaper owners (share-holders) are private individuals, while 20% of newspaper "founders" are political parties or public organizations. The majority of the papers are now run by either local or regional administrations or by corporations or associations consisting of the papers' own employees (ibid.). The government of the Russian Federation still owns most of the means of production, including all newsprint production plants and the distribution network.

An especially wide range of ownership types can be found among the Moscow media, ranging from state-owned newspapers and broadcasting companies, through stock companies to fully private newspaper chains. Some unprofitable media enterprises still are given subsidies to keep them viable; although the fairness of the selection process has been questioned. In general, the development of large media enterprises is encouraged by the government, but policies remain ambivalent, hindering normal market operations. Economics of scale have not developed, due to various factors such as high postal costs, while the failure of advertising and circulation revenues to meet production costs has created a tendency for newspapers, in particular, to come under the control of banks and other large enterprises which can absorb temporary losses, while at the same time using the media in a quest for political power (ibid.).
Content Control

The USSR Press Law of 1990 was replaced, after the coup, by the Russian Mass Media Law of 1991 (published February 8, 1992, according to Mickiewicz 1997: 226). In spite of its all-inclusive title, it was intended mainly to regulate the press, with a broadcasting law to come later. By 1996, no comprehensive broadcasting law had been adopted, although a statute for radio and television licensing was passed in December 1994 (Kolesnik 1996).

The Commission on Broadcasting, under the Ministry of Communication, has an advisory role. It prescribes certain regulations on content, and each license defines the broadcast parameters of that station. But Kolesnik asks, "Who cares about the channel description in the license?" (ibid.). An analysis of programming of 27 Moscow radio stations revealed that at least 6 did not observe their licensing conditions. Since the Commission has no monitoring capability, the situation in other parts of the country is unknown (ibid.). "Checkbook broadcasting" seems to dominate, in many cases, as the cheapest possible programming is broadcast for the highest possible profits. Pirate videos and copies of satellite material made without payment are common programming contents. "But the Russian public is not happy, and our broadcasting is criticized for bad taste, banality and portrayal of violence" (ibid.).

Kolesnik notes the near-exclusion of any consideration of the public interest in the commercialized broadcast media. He summarizes that,

The peculiarity of the broadcasting development in Russia is in very rapid transition from the total ideological control over the media towards absolute absence of any control. (ibid.)

State television, which might be expected to preserve a public service function, has been brought close to bankruptcy, due to lack of adequate appropriations. One leading station received only 30% of its needed operating funds at the beginning of 1996 (ibid.). Economic and political factors cause major distortions.

The author sees a considerable retrenchment in media freedom over the two years, 1994-1996. A joint study conducted by Moscow State University and Middle Tennessee University in 1994, indicated that Russian journalists at that time showed no significant difference from American journalists in feeling free to express their views in the presence of their editors-in-chief. Although no comparable survey was conducted in 1996, many describe the climate within the media as one of "overwhelming hostility," caused by extreme control over content by editors and owners. Individuals fear being fired, and media institutions fear loss of state support. Much of the repression is traced to the drive to reelect Boris Yeltsin and anti-communist Duma members (ibid.).

Politics and Media Regulation in the 1996 Elections

According to Andrei G. Richter, liberalization of election procedures in the USSR could be traced back at least to 1978, in the Brezhnev era. It accelerated under Gorbachev, and a fully free election was held, in Russia, under Yeltsin in 1993, including equal media opportunities for candidates on state-run or state-subsidized media. Election regulations visualized the media as conduits for direct access of candidates to the public, with no commentary, analysis, or searching questions allowed from television journalists. Richter feels that this restriction on media commentary limited the ability of the public to assess the candidates' comparability (Richter 1996).

Subsequent laws and regulations have confirmed the media's silent role in elections. Election news must be presented without commentary in a separate spot in news broadcasts, and it may not be interrupted by commercials. Commercial media are not required to grant air time to candidates, but state and municipal channels must grant it on an equal basis to all candidates who request it. Publication of poll results and similar election-related research is prohibited for three days prior to election day. During a campaign...

...it is forbidden for journalists or officials of mass media who are candidates or confidants of a candidate, or members of election commissions, to conduct television and radio news programs, and to participate in coverage of election campaign through a given mass media. (ibid.)

Despite all these efforts to guarantee access and equal treatment,

the lion's share of coverage still went to the party favored by the President's administration... The choice of the Yeltsin administration was strongly advantaged, especially on the Public Russian TV (ORT). (ibid.)

Freedom and Responsibility

The balance between freedom and responsibility in
any society where press freedom prevails always is a difficult balance to maintain. The current Russian situation in this regard shows some parallels to that of the United States in the comparable period, from 1783 to the resolution of the Alien and Sedition Acts crisis, in 1801 (Humphrey 1996: 57-69). Nevertheless, all historical situations are unique, despite such similarities.

The Russian media landscape was changed drastically by the abolition of censorship, with an abundance of new media outlets appearing. Yassen N. Zassoursky notes the "extremely important role in the democratization of the Russian society" played by these new, free and independent media. He says that

The freedom of the press has become one of the most important, if not the most important achievements and successes of the newly born Russian democracy. (Zassoursky 1996)

Although some of the abuses of that freedom which Zassoursky describes — sensationalism, unverified stories, intrusion into private lives, economic dependency — and the resulting criticisms are reminiscent of the "partisan press" period in the early United States (Humphrey 1996: 41-55), the sheer magnitude of the contemporary Russian media industry immeasurably outweighs that of the American broadsheets of the 1970s in volume, societal impact, and the speed with which messages reach the whole population.

Zassoursky feels that dependency is one of the most serious problems of Russian journalism. He singles out five aspects of media responsibility: social responsibility, responsibility to the state, responsibility to the owner or publisher, responsibility to the profession, and responsibility to the audience. Social responsibility, and responsibility to the profession and to the audience "promote free and responsible media and at least their relative independence and autonomy." But problems easily arise with responsibilities to the state and to the owner or publisher, since this can be interpreted in ways which "make media just instruments or mouthpieces of either government or media moguls" (Zassoursky 1996).

All five forms of responsibility can be discerned in media activities during the Duma election of 1995 and the Russian Presidential elections of 1996; but excessive expressions of party loyalties led to confrontations. "As a result media did little to heal the divisions in the Russian society and moreover contributed in many cases to increase the social tensions" (ibid.).

Most of the media supported the pro-government party in 1995 and President Yeltsin in 1996, but the election results did not follow the media's lead: the Communists and right-wing gaining dominance in the Duma and Yeltsin being forced into a second round of voting before winning by only a narrow margin in 1996. The Moscow News summed up the latter election results with the headline, "Yeltsin Wins, Media Loses" (Rykovtsveva 1996: 26).

Zassoursky feels that, both in Russia and in a parallel election outcome in Ukraine, the media lost credibility with the public because of their servile attitude towards their respective incumbent governments. Journalism had reverted to "the Bolshevik tradition of turning media into a source of propaganda" (Zassoursky 1996). In addition to various structural activities reflecting the "heritage of authoritarianism" — including opening "an agency of the regional press to promote the coverage of the President in regional and local media" and all-expense-paid tours for journalists to Moscow for interviews and briefings with administration officials — the press showed "intolerant and uncompromising attitudes towards opponents" thereby pushing the latter towards extreme responses. "Red-scare" rhetoric dominated the pro-Yeltsin media, while the newspaper Zavtra, which supported the Communist candidate Zyuganov, was "notorious for its xenophobic nationalist outbursts" (ibid.).

Russian media are subjected to many continuing pressures. Many newspapers are owned by the journalists themselves, who must seek external support to survive — and thereby lose much of their independence. The two elections highlighted the dangers of state control of media, causing serious losses in their credibility. Gradually rising levels of media ownership by banks and other non-media institutions may increase the threat of "check-book journalism." Excessive self-censorship to avoid financially embarrassing conflicts with powerful persons and institutions is a subtle, but pervasive problem (ibid.).

Zassoursky nevertheless sees hope:

The difficult emergence of the new democratic media culture is none the less irreversible, though there are various pressures to substitute freedom with responsibility instead of promoting freedom and responsibility. (ibid.)
News Agencies

Rantanen and Vartanova (1995) remark that it is easy to see why the official Soviet news agency, TASS, lost its international role with the fall of the Soviet Union, since it was little more than a propaganda organ. TASS was replaced by the official Russian government agency ITAR-TASS. Domestically, ITAR-TASS has faced competition from the two private agencies, Postfactum and Interfax, which had been founded in 1989, during the period of glasnost/perestroika, but the authors note, with some surprise, that ITAR-TASS remains dominant in the domestic market (pg. 206).

Rantanen and Vartanova cite the opening up of the Soviet economy, and the consequent demand for accurate economic news as a major factor in the foundation of the first two private agencies, especially Postfactum. Interfax originated within the staff of the state-owned broadcasting company, Gosteleradio, chiefly in response to the demand of foreign businessmen for reliable economic news not available through the government agencies (pp. 211-212). An additional enabling factor was the proliferation of fax machines and computers, which made inexpensive technology available to individuals and private groups, in contrast to the expensive technology controlled by the state, which previously had been necessary for the operation of a news agency (pp. 210-211).

Interfax started with foreign interest and assistance, and it founded offices in Germany, Britain and the United States, in 1991, as well as in Mongolia and several former Soviet republics (pp. 212-213).

After 1991, news agencies multiplied rapidly, and by 1993 "there were 16 national and 30 regional news agencies operating in Russia" (pg. 213). Most of these were small and/or highly specialized (ibid.).

The state agency, ITAR-TASS, functions in a similar manner for the Russian government as TASS had done for the Soviet government, according to Rantanen and Vartanova (1995: 214).

As far as the news it delivers is concerned, ITAR-TASS claims to have adopted a more Western style, to have broadened its scope...and to have become faster than before. The Western journalists we interviewed confirmed that ITAR-TASS is definitely faster than the old TASS, but that it has lost some of its former accuracy and reliability. ..ITAR-TASS...provides a larger selection of news which, however, contains more inaccuracies, sometimes quite major ones. (ibid.)

Another Russian government service, RIA, is a descendent of APN (Novosti), which formerly was mainly a feature and photographic service. RIA has expanded its activities, and now appears to compete with ITAR-TASS for the same domestic and foreign markets, despite their essentially identical ownership (pp. 214-215). Because of their government financial and infrastructure support, and because they remain the principal regular source of foreign news, the two government agencies dominate news distribution in Russia. A study by Postfactum showed that, in February 1993, ITAR-TASS had almost 50% of the total news market, Postfactum had 16%, RIA 15%, Nega 13%, and Interfax 6%. Television news, however, used Interfax more than ITAR-TASS. The two government agencies provided 60% of the news broadcast by radio stations (pg. 216). Some newspapers use news from foreign agencies, but Russia's shaky economy has made them slow to penetrate the country's news market, although Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP), and Associated Press have large newsgathering staffs in Russia (pg. 217). The authors summarized the Russian situation at the time of writing, as follows:

The media market is unstable and changes rapidly. Still, the separate studies concerning both the supply and the use of news agency material confirm the same result: the state agencies still dominate the market. (Rantanen and Vartanova 1995: 216)

Rantanen and Vartanova see a future of inevitable consolidation among the private news agencies, with extinction for at least some of them (pg. 218).

Television: Later Developments

Pluralism entered Soviet television in May 1991, when the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company (Rossija) took over one of the five channels operated by the Communist-Party- dominated State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) of the Soviet Union. After the August 1991 coup attempt the Russian Federation took over
Gosteleradio and continued to operate the parallel services. Both reached audiences in most of the former Soviet Union, and beyond (McNair 1996: 489).

Private involvement in television began to emerge in 1992, as shares of two state channels were sold to private investors, and the state monopoly of both production and broadcasting was quickly broken. TV6, the first wholly private channel, began broadcasting in 1993, initially with investment by Turner Broadcasting Corporation, of the United States, which later withdrew. Channel 4 (NTV), a second wholly private channel, also began broadcasting in 1993. Currently, only ORT (channel 2) is wholly state-owned. The Russian government nevertheless has a share in the two largest channels and the fourth largest (pp. 490-491).

The author cites a body of opinion which credits Channel 1 with doing much to cushion the negative effects of the 1991 coup (pg. 492); although other authorities are not so sanguine. Mickiewicz, for example, quotes Yegor Yakovlev, who became head of State Television after the 1991 coup attempt, as regretting his decision not to accept the resignations of the dozen or so deputy chairmen of the organization at that time. "Four years later, he said 'I should have fired them all. They were infected with the bacillus of intrigue'" (Mickiewicz 1997: 110).

An effort was made to keep both Channel 1 and Rossiya (channel 2) as "all-union" channels, without excessive Russification, and therefore with greater appeal to other nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); but that effort met with considerable resistance. Its importance as a political weapon in the struggle for control of the Russian government caused the withering away of the all-union model (McNair 1996: 493).

The political infighting over television is said to have affected quality, as managers were changed frequently for political reasons (pp. 493-494). NTV and Rossiya, in particular, came into conflict with President Yeltsin over the Chechnya conflict, while "Ostankino" — the "Ostankino Radio and Television Company," which had taken over the assets of Gosteleradio after the 1991 coup attempt and now broadcast on Channel 1 — remained generally loyal to him. All major political factions struggled to gain as much influence as possible over television.

In addition to the political turmoil, Russian broadcasters “have also been struggling to cope with rapid transition to a harsh and anarchic market economy in which the traditional cushion of state funding is no longer available. Surprisingly, advertising revenue has been forthcoming. In the absence of rules about how much advertising could be accepted, top-rated shows might devote one-third of their total air time to advertising (pg. 495). But much advertising income is alleged to be stolen by employees, through graft, bribes and other manipulation. Russian television is said by some observers to have a hidden economy, "run like a mafia organization" (pg. 496).

'Mafia-like' ways of doing business among Russia's broadcasters were not always evidence of corruption, of course, but could be interpreted as creative efforts to negotiate a system which made normal business arrangements and relationships extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pursue. Russian television, like other sectors of the economy, was functioning in a primitive market, poised uncomfortably between the monolithic, bureaucratic structure of the past, and the capitalism, 'red in tooth and claw', of the present. (McNair 1996: 496)

Major differences in the content of pre- and post-coup television content include rampant advertising, "formal and informal," and the large amount of imported material, much of it of low quality. Domestically-produced drama has disappeared, and domestically-produced pornography has taken its place, along with talk shows and other formats with low production costs. The author sees some hope in the independent TV producers, who still command significant technical and creative resources, "if organizational and financial structures can be found which are capable of supporting them" (pg. 497).

The threat of all this to Russian culture is evident and is used by xenophobic elements. McNair feels cautiously optimistic, while acknowledging that "Russian television remains in limbo," leading a "knife-edge existence" which cannot last forever. Closer relations and collaboration with producers in other European countries (pg. 498). But it could easily get even worse, instead of better.

**Foreign Aid?**

Since 1990 various foreign government agencies, non-profit foundations and organizations, and special interest groups, have "invaded" Russia and the other former communist countries of Eastern Europe and undertaken various forms of involvement in the mass media of the region.

This issue was addressed by a panel organized at the annual meeting of the International Communication
Association, in Montreal, Canada, May 25, 1997. The preliminary statement of the panel's topic was extremely negative towards these efforts, on the grounds that they are historically and culturally insensitive, have "unacceptable strings" attached, and often involve huge consultancy fees and lucrative contracts which the "aid recipients" cannot afford. For names and addresses of participants in the panel discussion, see the entry under "Russia" in the "Current Research" section, below (ICA 1997: 178-179).

IV. Central and Eastern Europe


The Rise of Press Freedom

The book edited by Manaev and Pryliuk

...is the edited proceedings of a conference held in Minsk during the last weeks of the existence of the old Soviet Union and it specifically seeks to establish a dialogue at this meeting point of East and West in space and time. (McQuail 1995: 283)

Freedom of the press had begun to spread in those countries by the time of the conference, and had already begun to evoke mixed reactions among observers in countries such as Belarus, Ukraine and Romania. Those reactions are expressed in particular detail in the volume. Although welcoming media freedom, many were disillusioned with its limited effects on their societies and were fearful that "the old ways of state control and media management are not banished forever" (McQuail 1995: 283-284). One participant expressed a willingness to face any abuses which might arise in a totally free media market rather than any return to state control (pp. 284).

Ukraine

The Ukrainian Media Bulletin: Quarterly Digest. Düsseldorf, Germany: TACIS Democracy Programme of the European Union/European Institute for the Media. September 1996 was No. 3(7). (Contact: EIM, 13 Kaistraße, 40221 Düsseldorf, Germany. Fax: +49 211 90 10 456). Cited as "UMB."

With over fifty-million population Ukraine is the second largest country "born" out of the former Soviet Union. Conditions in Ukraine since the breakup of the USSR show many parallels to those in Russia for the same period. Diplomatic conflicts with Russia have arisen over control of the Crimea and the division of the ships of the Soviet Black Sea fleet. Nuclear disarmament has proceeded smoothly, for the most part, but the allegedly dangerous condition of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant has continued to cause concern throughout Europe.

As is the case with most other former Soviet republics, Ukraine has faced the challenge of developing new media legislation more appropriate to that of its new, democratic situation. A law on television and radio was passed in 1993. The basic constitutional foundation remains uncertain, however, because of continuing conflicts between the president and parliament (Robillard 1995: 241 and 243), which are reminiscent of those between Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Duma. A National Council on Television and Radio has overall responsibility for all broadcasting (ibid., 244-245). The continuing reception of Russian television in Ukraine is regarded as an "important
factor" with which Ukraine's fledgling broadcasters must contend (ibid., pg. 241).

Dmitry Kotelenets (in UMB 1996: 1-2) describes the parliamentary appointment of a "Temporary Deputy Investigation Committee," organized to investigate private broadcasting companies as well as the State TV and Radio Company (RRT), and the Chairman of the State Committee on TV and Radio Broadcasting, Zinovi Kulyk. Kotelenets regards the investigation as part of the ongoing struggle between parliament and president for control of broadcasting, with foreign investment in Ukrainian television companies as a relatively vulnerable target.

Companies are allowed to have one-third foreign capital investment. With that help, some of the Ukrainian broadcasters have produced quality programming, although other productions have been, at best, mediocre.

Andri Kapustin (in UMB 1996:3-4) discusses non-state television enterprises in the country's second largest city, Kharkiv. In the spring of 1996, Kharkiv had five private TV broadcasting companies and about ten "so-called" production studios (pg. 3), and a total of eleven channels' schedules are listed in the local press (pg. 4).

One of the first of the non-state companies was financed, in 1991, in the following way, according to Kapustin:

The company managed to obtain money from Kharkiv residents in the form of non-interest credits for unlimited period of time and repayable with commercial announcements and pirate copies of Western movies instead of dividends. (ibid.)

Kapustin feels that Kharkiv is one of the best-served cities in the former Soviet Union in terms of its television diversity and general high quality. This is partly due to innovative initiatives, as well as to the presence of high-quality local talent. Financial success of the stations has been varied. Some stations have been forced into rebroadcasting excessive amounts of material from outside sources, with one of them almost filling its air time with Russian-language programming from Moscow's TV-6.

Belarus

Although the name of the state television and radio company was changed in 1994, from State TV and Radio Committee to National TV and Radio Company, broadcasting in Belarus, according to Belarus journalist Vitaliy Taras (in UMB 1996:9) remains a state monopoly, essentially under the personal control of the president, A. Lukashenko. A ban on public speeches on National TV by parliamentary candidates in the 1995 elections was strictly enforced (ibid.).

Non-state broadcasting companies do exist, but the power of their transmitters is very limited, and their licenses are issued by a presidentially-appointed committee, the State Frequency Committee, and sometimes have been arbitrarily suspended, according to Taras (ibid., 10). In any event, according to Robillard (1995: 17), "the so-called independent channels are in the hands of the political powers that be." Russian correspondents have been subjected to pressures, and even violence, when they tried to report certain events in Belarus in an unbiased way (Taras in UMB 1996: 10).

In short, the situation of Belarus communication very much resembles that of the Soviet Union before the beginning of glasnost.

The Baltic States

Towards a Civic Society (Hayer, Lauk and Vihalemm 1993) discusses the three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — whose struggle for independence from Russia played such a key role in the collapse of Soviet communism — a process in which the conflict over control of mass media was central.

Contrary to the remarks made above about the relative lack of contribution of the media to the great changes affecting the Soviet Union and some of Eastern Europe, the authors of this study argue that "the mass media was the chief mechanism responsible for the shift by the Baltic societies from the Soviet period to the transition to independence in 1990"..." (McQuail 1995: 285, quoting Hayer, Lauk and Vihalemm 1993: 226)

Estonian audiences had been primed for media freedom by their easy reception of television from Finland, whose language is related to Estonian. In January 1989, Estonia was able to receive 15 hours of Finnish television daily, including US, Italian and Japanese-originated programs (Mickiewicz 1997: 99).

In March 1990, Lithuania had unilaterally declared independence from the Soviet Union, and at least seven other republics were refusing to send conscripts to the Soviet army. In the Baltic states, the media were the focus of the independence movement. For example, Gorbachev concentrated troops in Lithuania and, in
January 1991, they occupied the Vilnius broadcasting station. This action had repercussions in Moscow, where Tatyana Mitkova, a news reader on the news program TSN, exerted her rights under the new Soviet Press Law and refused to read a script, specially rewritten by the deputy head of Soviet television, which Mitkova felt distorted the Lithuanian situation (Ganley 1996: 110; Mickiewicz 1997: 101-102). Many other media in Moscow, Leningrad and across the Soviet Union reacted so strongly to the government's anti-media actions and other excesses in the Baltic states that Gorbachev clamped down on the press in general, and in doing so lost the trust of the intelligentsia and much of the general public (Ganley 1996: 113-114).

Intercultural Non-Communication in Historical Context

The contributors to Casmir's book (1995) treat the recent changes in Central and Eastern European societies and media from a cultural and historical perspective. Timothy Stephen emphasizes how consideration of cultural and historical forces has been pushed into the background both by the preoccupation with political hegemonies and by a social science penchant for considering only short-term causal factors (in Casmir 1995: 5-6). Many therefore were surprised when the end of Communist domination seemed to open a Pandora's Box, allowing traditional conceptualizations and old enmities to emerge as potent as ever. Questions of intercultural communication suddenly assumed significance in areas where cultural barriers had appeared to be of little importance.

The editor points out in his preface that much of the geopolitical map of the region had been imposed by force, with no reference to the cultures of the ethnic groups subsumed under such artificial composites as the USSR or Yugoslavia (Casmir 1995: xi).

Germany


A process superficially opposite yet fundamentally similar to that in the former USSR took place in Germany, where a defeated country seemingly having a more or less homogeneous culture was cut in two by the occupation zones of the victors along lines which made of it two mutually-hostile countries for 45 years. Casmir emphasizes that the homogeneity of Germany which was split by the allied victory actually was a complex meld of linguistically-related cultures that had moved sporadically towards unity for 2,000 years, but in many ways had failed to realize it. The most recent attempt to impose unity — Hitler's effort to found a "Thousand-year Reich," with "one people, one empire, one leader" (Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer) — collapsed after only twelve years (Casmir 1995: 31-42).

So, it should not have been surprising to those with a knowledge of that history when the cries of "We are one people!" (Wir sind ein Volk!), which greeted reunification in 1989, were soon replaced by an atmosphere of resentment and distrust, and even with a revival of racism and Nazi-style violence among disaffected East German youth. The 45 years of division, with its sharp social and political differences, had created two new cultural alignments which were more in keeping with Germany's long history of disunity than with the transitory periods of unity experienced in more recent times. Casmir feels that the media, in particular, did a poor job in preparing Germans for the challenge of integration they faced when the Wall fell. As a consequence they have seemed unable to see cultural diversity in a positive light, and may face a long period of tensions, such as plagued the South and North of the United States for a century after the end of its Civil War (Casmir 1995: 52-54).

With reference to Germany and to the whole of post-Communist Europe, Casmir says that

One of the most important, if not the most important lesson to be learned is that many traditional foundations that the state could provide in the past no longer exist or can no longer be trusted. Thus people, almost automatically, return to those factors that shaped their societies over the centuries, all of them culturally and historically significant, even if they have become 'mere' mythology, and though they supposedly had little relevance to the building and maintenance of modern states. (Casmir 1995: 317)

Czech president Václav Havel summed up the phenomenon as it affected his own country, Germany, and all the ex-Communist countries, as follows:

The sudden outburst of freedom has not only untied the strait jacket made by Communism, it has also unveiled the centuries-old, often thorny history of
nations. People are now remembering their past kings and emperors, the states they formed far back in their past and the borders of those states... (as quoted by Casmir [1995: 317-318], from Kober 1993: 77.)

Lutz M. Hagen, of the Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, has outlined the press situation in the former German Democratic Republic and developments since reunification. In the GDR, the press was centrally controlled, with 70% of newspaper circulation accounted for by publications of the communist party (the "Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED), 21% was by publications of "mass organizations," and only 9% by the remaining 21 papers, all of which were published by the "Block Parties" — the tame "opposition" parties. "Only those who proved to be reliable supporters of the SED and the state ideology could become journalists" (Hagen 1997: 7).

At the time of reunification a public institution, the National Trust Company ("Treuhandanstalt"), was established to supervise privatization or closure of former state enterprises in the East. media enterprises were treated much like other companies, simply being sold to the highest bidder. In most cases, newspapers and magazines ended up in the hands of large media corporations from West Germany. As a result, newspapers in the "newly founded German states" are now even less diversified than they had been under the GDR.

Only three of the original seven national newspapers have survived... The regional and local markets are almost totally dominated by the former district papers of the SED...: their circulation accounts for more than 90 percent of the total circulation. (Hagen 1997: 9-10)

The state radio and television organizations of the GDR were closed at the time of reunification, and "two new public broadcasting institutions ("Landesrundfunkanstalten") were founded after the model of the public broadcasting system in the Federal Republic of Germany" (pg. 8). Several private radio stations have been established, and western television and radio are received in the east. Although West German TV is a popular in the East, western magazines are not, according to the author, and some western magazine publishers have developed successful editions with content tailored to eastern audiences (pg. 9).

The 1993-1994 studies reported on by Hagen were designed to find differences in content of newspapers in West Germany and the former-GDR and in attitudes among journalists from the two regions. In 1993, most East German journalists were people who had been working there under the GDR, although top-level managers from the West had been installed in the papers by their new western owners. Nevertheless, few significant differences were found, either in their attitudes or in newspaper contents (Hagen 1997: 24); although Eastern journalists were felt to be more cautious in stating their opinions than were those in the West (pg. 19).

Hungary

Mary M. McKinley, concentrating on Hungary but generalizing to all the European post-Communist countries, stresses how the long experience of a centralized economy and society under an authoritarian government has resulted in a degree of cultural conditioning which makes the direct translation of seemingly ordinary concepts into English problematic in the extreme, even among people who know English with a high degree of technical proficiency (in Casmir 1995: 115-131).

Something of this cultural discordance may contribute to the Hungarian disgust with Western advertising, described by Carl C. Rohde and Carsten R. C. Pellican. According to them, advertising tried to supply the narratives, images and symbols Hungarians needed for a renewed legitimation of their society. But the expected good results were not forthcoming — for economic and other reasons — so the chief result was disillusionment (in Casmir 1995: 161).

Poland

In Poland, where opposition to Communist rule began early, the mass media have contributed as much to "demassification" as to "massification," according to Scott R. Olson. According to him, Polish communication culture is typified by five cultural attributes, with their attendant values: "the idealization and romanticization of the peasant and the countryside, the love of liberty, Christianity, chivalry, and Western classicism" (in Casmir 1995: 169).

These attributes are reinforced in the Polish media and manifested themselves in "an explosion of democracy." This took place in the context of mass media exposure which involved a "democratization of transmission, that is a decentralization and redistribution of the means by which messages are communicated," and "a diversification of reception, the absence of singular and simple responses in the ways
audience members understand and interpret these messages" (ibid., pg. 173).

The democratization of transmission began in Poland after Khrushchev’s quiet advocacy of "moderate liberalization" and the Poznan demonstrations of 1956. The spread of television and a wider variety of programming in the 1960s accelerated the process, until the government clamped down in the "re-Stalinization" of 1968, in which the state’s accomplishments were exaggerated by internal propaganda. But the disparities between televised and experienced "realities" sparked increasing unrest. It broke out in open resistance in the Gdansk shipyard strike of 1980 (pp. 181-182).

After communism, the tendencies towards diversification literally exploded in Poland, as all media expanded in number and variety of contents. But, again, expectations far outran realities, with resulting disillusion. Furthermore, the attributes of the underlying communication culture have played a role which encouraged an "atomization of Polish public opinion" (pg. 186).

Bulgaria

Dina Jordanova emphasizes the influence of Bulgaria’s preservation of its Slavic/Orthodox heritage despite five centuries of Ottoman Turkish domination from 1396 to 1878 (in Casmir 1995: 228). The country has long been marginal to Western European interests, but Bulgarian nationalist historians have described their country as "a shield for Europe" against Islamic expansionism. Bulgaria’s more recent domination by the USSR relieved some of Bulgarians’ fear of "the Turks," but the fall of Communism pulled away that support, forcing the country to look to the West as a replacement. The fear of Islamic invasion is not shared by Western Europe, although Bulgarian mass media hint that it is, but that fear may be even stronger in Serbia than in Bulgaria, creating an affinity which has sometimes led to suspicions in the West of clandestine Bulgarian support for the Serbian war effort in Bosnia (pp. 232-233)

Ursula Ruston noted the huge problems faced by Bulgaria’s press, including paper shortages in the face of greatly increased demand for newspapers. Paper prices increased twenty to thirty times during a "price liberalization" move by the government in January 1991, simultaneously with the imposition of a 22% value-added tax. These costs placed a special burden on newly established non-governmental newspapers (Ruston 1991: 47).

Ruston also points out that the long history of media repression in Bulgaria had made the concept of the press as an independent, objective information source somewhat difficult to grasp — by government, opposition, the general public and the journalists themselves (Ruston 1991: 48).

Serbia/Croatia/Bosnia

The resurgence of ethnic divisions in the wake of communist hegemony has been most violent in the region which formerly constituted Yugoslavia. A religious and political boundary cut across the area when the Roman Empire was divided between Rome and Constantinople, in the 4th Century, AD, and it became a three-way split as Turkey occupied varying portions of it after the fall of Byzantium, in 1456. Bosnia was continually occupied by the Ottoman Turks from 1463 to 1878, when it came under effective Austro-Hungarian control. After the First World War, the diverse peoples of the region were artificially welded together into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and that unity was preserved under the Communist government from 1945 to 1991, when it evaporated in the heat of armed conflict.

The principal ethnic parties to the conflict were Roman Catholic Croatians, Orthodox Serbs, and Muslim Bosnians. Slovenians and Macedonians found themselves mercifully insulated from the main conflict, and the Montenegrins, remaining part of Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, were engaged only peripherally and sporadically. Although the initial centers of fighting were in Croatia, it eventually became concentrated in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the three main groups all were strongly represented. Many thousands died, and among them were many victims of genocide, euphemistically referred to as "ethnic cleansing."

In Casmir’s book (1995: 277-311) Donald E. Williams describes some of the cultural factors in the conflict, as well as some descriptions of atrocities collected by Helsinki Watch, a nongovernmental organization to monitor human rights violations in Europe.

Serbia has continually been the sustaining force behind the attempts of the Bosnian Serbs to dominate the other two ethnic groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina. That has been true despite what has been called "the pro-opposition orientation of the majority of Serbian citizens" inside the residual or reconstituted Yugoslavia (Bačević 1996: 167 [abstract]). Ljiljana J. Bačević, of the University of Belgrade, cites the ruling party’s
ability to dominate the media and to exclude the opposition from equal media access as one of the major factors which has maintained the party in power despite its lack of popularity.

Although multiparty elections have been held in Serbia since 1990, all conditions, including those affecting media access, have favored the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), successor to the Communist Party. "Therefore, the election results surprised only the poorly informed foreign public and unrealistic leaders of opposition parties" (Baćević 1996: 167).

Under the previous political system, all key elements of the media system were controlled by the state. During the period of liberalization, in 1989 and 1990, laws were passed allowing

..privately owned media, but financial inadequacy of all economic subjects, with the exception of the state, resulted in the existence of only one independent and politically alternative media — the Radio and NTV (Independent Television-ITV) Studio B. (Baćević 1996: 168)

Although equal time was provided to opposition parties on the state broadcasting media the ruling party is said to have used not only its assigned time but also large additional amounts of broadcast time to advertise itself, in violation of the law. Just prior to the 1990 elections the opposition managed to establish two independent stations. After the election, demonstrations for media freedom broke out, and they were suppressed by the police and army, with loss of life. The broadcasts of the two independent stations also were temporarily suspended. A new, and more strict, Law on Public Information was enacted in mid-1991. Provisions for exceptions to some of its sterner requirements proved to be 'mere illusions,' according to the author. Uncooperative journalists were subjected to restrictive criteria which effectively barred them from practicing their profession (pg. 169). Some Serbian journalists have shown great personal courage in their efforts to maintain professional standards in their reporting under these conditions.

Despite growing poverty and inflation, the government media received ample state financing (pg. 170). A 1994 draft of a new law on broadcasting, presented to the Assembly by the opposition was rejected by the ruling party's majority vote.

A new private company with strong links to the ruling party began broadcasting with up-to-date equipment and high technical standards at the beginning of 1995. In its efforts to build a market it has adopted a relatively even-handed political stance in order to attract viewers. Meanwhile, however, the independent television station, ITV Studio B, suffered financial problems and internal conflicts which enabled the government to take over a majority role in its ownership by February 1996 (pg. 172). All these advantages in the mass media themselves, as well as various other social, political and psychological advantages, have given the SPS a power position which it will be difficult for the opposition to offset (pg. 177).

V. Spain


Television

The sharpest relatively recent transitions from authoritarian to more participatory systems of government in Western Europe have been in Spain and Portugal. In Spain, democratization began after the death of Francisco Franco, in 1975, and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.

King Juan Carlos took the throne seven days after Franco's death, and a new, democratic Constitution was adopted in 1978. Article 20 of the Constitution required an element of popular participation even in state radio and television — at least for "social and political groups" (Corominas and López 1996: 151) — although in practice such participation has been limited (ibid., pp. 158-164).

One nationwide state TV channel had been operating since 1956, and a second since 1964, several regional channels were established under the control of regional governments in the 1980s (pg. 152). Commercial television also began in the 1980s. The liberalization process was gradual and subject to both economic and political pitfalls.

As in the former USSR and Yugoslavia, ethnic divisions have assumed considerable importance in
post-authoritarian Spain. Basque separatists have continued a long-running campaign of violence, despite a high degree of home rule granted to them and to Catalonia, in 1979. Catalan manifestations of autonomy have been more moderate, but strongly emphasized within a generally acknowledged framework of Spanish citizenship.

Corominas and López trace the resurgence of independent local mass media critical of the government to Catalonia, where an independent and critical press grew up, partly under Church protection, during the later years of the Franco regime. Free local radio stations appeared soon after Franco’s death, but were later suppressed. Soon, however, they were replaced by illegal, but tolerated municipal stations after the democratization of town and city halls in 1979. These stations, now totaling more than 180 in Catalonia alone, were legalized in 1991 (Corominas and López 1996: 149). The authors note with regret, however, that the earlier participation of ordinary citizens in many aspects of the running of the stations became greatly reduced after legalization, and many of the stations have lost their former public service aspect (ibid.).

Again without benefit of legislation, local television — strongly in Catalonia, and "to a much lesser degree" in the rest of Spain — sprang up after 1980, on much the same participatory and democratic pattern as municipal radio. Many of the Catalan stations formed a self-regulating body in 1985, with non-profit operation as one of its principles and "standardization of the Catalan language" as one of its purposes (ibid., pg. 150).

After their legalization the local television stations began to go through the same process as local radio: professionalization, introduction of non-local programming, commercialization, and reduction in public participation and access; although the authors claim they "are still among the most important means of participation and, above all, of access" (pg. 151).

In recent years, Spanish television has developed in ways comparable to other Western European television systems. Currently, four nationwide networks — two private and two government — are supplemented by seven regional companies and a few independent stations, plus satellite, cable and pay-per-view.

As in Britain and other countries with dual systems, Spanish public service television has been caught up in the pattern of competition generated by the quest of the commercial stations for advertising revenues.

The fierce competition within Spanish television has without a doubt prompted public television stations to place quantitative aims in the foreground, offering few concessions to those 'public service' responsibilities such as access and participation on the part of the citizens that might mean a drop in ratings. (Corominas and López 1996: 164)

Corbella (1995) notes that the biggest developments in Catalan media took place in the 1980s, with a levelling-off in the 1990s, due in part to poor economic conditions, beginning in late 1992. He says that little public interest had been generated in Internet or computers, again due to economic conditions (pp. 16-17). Catalan-language broadcasting faced competition from Spanish-language broadcasting, which included advertising oriented especially to Catalan audiences (pg. 19).

Press

After the victory of Francisco Franco’s forces in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) the government seized many newspapers and kept control of more than forty, using them as propaganda organs until Franco’s death, in 1975. The post-Franco government continued to own the papers for nine more years. Although censorship was abolished by the Press Law of 1966, even most privately-owned newspapers and book publishers continued to follow the government’s political line, guided by such policies as "voluntary consultation." Essentially the same policies survived even into the post-Franco Socialist government, until 1983, when government officials were ordered "to stop sending editorials and ideological instructions to the newspaper editors" (Zalbide Bengoa 1997: 156-157).

Although the "Movement Press," under Franco, had a significant number of newspapers, only one sold over 50,000 copies per day, and their market declined from about 30 percent of all newspaper readership in the period from 1945 to 1955, to 11.4 percent by 1970. They showed "a total lack of profit" (ibid., pg. 157)

Although the Socialist Workers Party, together with the Communists and the labor unions, favored retaining the papers under government ownership, the Centrist party (UCD) as well as the private newspaper editors advocated privatization of the government papers. Six papers, with a cumulative deficit, since 1975, equivalent to nearly US$25 million, were closed in 1979 and two more in 1980. According to the 1978 Constitution, these last two, in the Basque Country, would have had to be transferred to the control of the regional government had they not been closed, and one reason for closure seems, in the author’s view, to have
been the threat they then would have posed to national unity (pg. 158).

A law passed by the UCD government in 1982 required disposal of all the government papers by auction within two years. Opposition to this broke out not only on the political left but also among former owners and employees whose papers had been confiscated in the Civil War (pg. 159). The controversy became stalled in the courts until after the Socialists took power, in 1983. After considerable discussion and compromise, the papers were auctioned, with preference given to the papers’ own workers, by 1984. Some were closed, due to lack of buyers, and the various political parties, about evenly divided between Left and Right, acquired several papers, most of which had been losing money, while most of the profitable papers went to private buyers (pp. 161-162).

Henceforth, Spanish governments would have to make their wishes known through newspapers they did not directly control.

VI. China and Taiwan


Index on Censorship, Special Issue: "Hong Kong Goes Back." Vol. 26, No. 1 (1997) [Cited as "Index 1997".]

Post-Authoritarian?

When can a country be regarded as post-authoritarian? All states must have authority structures or they will quickly fall apart; so none can ever be totally non-authoritarian. Nevertheless, there are situations which seem to totally preclude participation by any but an elite — party members, upper socio-economic class, etc. — and there are others, such as we have seen in post-revolutionary America and post-Soviet Russia, in which a strong surge of participatory democracy is unmistakable.

The process of democratization in Taiwan has been much more gradual, but in recent years it has also come to be generally acknowledged, as certifiably free elections have taken place and freedom of speech and the press now suffer less governmental interference than in the past.

Mainland China, on the other hand, has gone through many shifts in its policies since the extreme repression of the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1969). Periods of relative openness and free speech have been followed by crackdowns to restore centralized controls. The so-called "Tienamen Incident," in 1989, was the most spectacular and violent example of this, ending a period of "reform and opening" which had begun in 1979 (Liu Binyan, in Index 1997: 95), but the pattern has been repeated many times in the past two decades. Consequently, any identification of China as "post-authoritarian" has to be hedged in by numerous distinctions and qualifications. Nevertheless, by comparison with the days of the Cultural Revolution, at least, the Chinese people are considerably — if still only relatively — more free.

China Now

As China prepares to take over the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, July 1, 1997, many have tried to evaluate conditions on the Mainland and to estimate the possible effects of the takeover on Hong Kong and on China itself.

Wanning Sun quotes Leonard L. Chu as noting an inverse proportion between Chinese Communism's success in communicating its ideology to its people, on the one hand, and its social and economic development, on the other (Chu 1986: 14; as quoted by Sun 1996: 40). Sun believes that, "In fact, this is exactly what has happened during the past two decades" (Sun 1996: 40). Ironically, the Beijing hierarchy's "failure to communicate" has coincided with tremendous developments in the country's communication networks and consequently in the Chinese people's ability to communicate. From 1976 to 1986 the numbers of mainland Chinese with access to television increased from 18 million to 580 million (Sun 1996: 41). Now, TV is estimated to have reached 300 million households (Screen Digest 1997: 93) — or practically 100% saturation.

Just as important as increased access to mass media has been the diversification which has taken place in their content. Sun reports her amazement when, upon returning to China in 1994 after a five-year absence in Australia, she found that

Magazines displayed by street vendors featured topics usually associated with western tabloid journalism, including sports, cars, bathing suits, popular music stars, and military espionage stories. (Sun 1996: 43)
Even more striking were the sensational stories about the private lives of Mao Tse-tung and other former national leaders, "which had been until recently a taboo subject in China" (ibid.). Whereas previously the media had had only one function, "propaganda" — (xuan chuan) a word with a positive connotation in the Chinese political vocabulary (Sun 1996: 44) — functional diversification has now become a key feature of the Chinese press. Freer communication inevitably "created a powerful centrifugal force in society, at the same time making it possible for new associations and new communities to be born" (Sun 1996: 42; quoting A. P. L. Liu 1991: 97-98). Liu, Sun, and many other observers see this as significantly undermining the national unity previously cemented together by the propaganda organs.

Financial self-sufficiency of the press and broadcasting has been so much stressed that advertising has proliferated. A large proportion of newspaper space often is devoted to advertising, concentrating on medicines, alcohol, cosmetics, and household electrical appliances. This market orientation has led to commodification of the news in pursuit of audiences. "Infotainment" is becoming a threat to the integrity of the media in China as well as in the West (Sun 1996: 43).

Sun concludes her article with the summary statement that

Yet, even if a more enlightened reign replaced the Jiang regime overnight, it would still be enormously difficult for the centre to direct a revival in China. China does not lack the spark to ignite a huge fire, but it does lack the torch that will lead it forward. (pg. 97)

The loss of a sense of direction which affects the Communist leadership also extends to the opposition elements, on whom any hope for coherent changes would depend, according to Liu.

The Influence of "Kong-Tai"

Geremie R. Barmé describes how Mainland China has been flooded by cultural influences in recent years, not so much directly from the West or Japan as from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The formerly "stentorian tones of Central People's Broadcasting" have softened, and the mellowing has extended to replacement of the drab "Maoist" costumes with colorful fashions. Chinese increasingly look to the south for culture, and less to Beijing, according to Barmé (Barmé in Index 1997:154). "The incursion from the south began with music, film theme songs and cinema; and it continued with cinema and a boom in literature." (ibid., 155).

The influence of Hong Kong and Taiwan even has a name: "Kong-Tai" in Cantonese. As Barmé describes the process,

Kong-Tai has digested the global culture of Euro-America and Japan for 'Chinese' delectation and has developed a form of product presentation and placement that appeals directly to mainland customers.

Yet the islands (Hong Kong and Taiwan) provide much more than this. For the cultural world of the mainland they are a source of off-shore funding and predigested cultural information, as well as being sites for exhibition and publication and a launching pad to the West — or at least the consumers of southeast Asia. (ibid., pp. 158-159)

Xenophobia Replaces Ideology

Sensing its delicate position and especially its loss of ideological unity, the Beijing government has fallen back on appeals to nationalism and xenophobia, which have proven successful in the past in rallying China's people against foreign enemies, real or imaginary. Symptomatic of the success of nationalistic appeals is the book, *China Can Say No: Political and Sentimental Options in the Post Cold War Era* (Zhang, et al. 1996). The book's two principal authors are not Communist
Party members, and their argument is overwhelmingly nationalistic and xenophobic — aimed chiefly against the United States and Britain — not based on Communist ideology. The effectiveness of this approach is suggested by the fact that the book sold 100,000 copies in the first month, and that another volume from the same authors, China Can Still Say No, directed against Japan, and several imitations by others have recently been published (Jasper Becker, and quotations from Zhang, et al., 1996; in Index 1997: 58-59 and 60-63, respectively).

Although Chen Xiaoming, as a member of the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, might be expected to adhere to the "Party line," he expresses great misgivings about the reversion of the younger generation to right-wing nationalism. He acknowledges that

By the late 1980s, Chinese ideology had become fragmented: officials, intellectuals and ordinary people no longer shared common ground. 'Patriotism' has become the official unifying ideology of the 1990s. (Chen Xiaoming in Index 1997: 64)

Chen feels that the economic success of the 1980s and early 1990s has fueled this attitude, among businessmen as well as intellectuals. He says that it is difficult to see how the youth leaders of the late 80s, who advocated westernization, can now turn around and be so anti-western, but he sees a reason in the contemporary "spiritual" vacuum:

The loss of spiritual values has made the '30-something' generation even more pragmatic when dealing with ideology and selecting values. The call to 'oppose western imperialist hegemony' has filled the vacuum left by the collapse of faith and given rise to cultural pride and vanity. (Chen Xiaoming in Index 1997: 66).

Chen calls the present-day extreme nationalists, "latter-day Red Guards," and says that they are "giving ultra-right expression to the left-wing attitudes that have always existed in Chinese society" (pg. 66).

In the same issue of Index on Censorship, Isabel Hilton describes how the resurgence of Chinese nationalism has resulted in a redoubled attack on Tibetan independence movements and intensified vilification of the Dalai Lama (in Index 1997: 67-70).

Cinema

A special tragedy linked to the revival of hardline attitudes in the Beijing government has been the damage done to the Chinese film industry, which had shown such artistic promise in recent years. Rey Chow's book explores some of the outstanding examples of that flowering, contextualizing them in contemporary Chinese culture and seeing in them a special kind of ethnography of that culture. Going beyond that analysis, Chow shows how the films present a unique perspective on human nature which should be allowed to interact with the intellectual life of the rest of the world to produce insights that will benefit all. Commenting on the films of Chen Kaige, she asks,

Will the enthusiastic 'opening' of China mean the opening of its intellectual life, or will Chinese intellectual life continue to be one of those jealously guarded areas of Chinese 'essence' that must remain aloof to the barbaric forces from the outside? What will happen to the work that has been started by directors such as Chen, and to the innovative critical insights that have only begun to be recognized? At a paradoxical historical moment like the present one, Chen's 1980s films, all of which confront the destructiveness of Chinese culture as human culture, speak with particular poignancy. (Chow 1996: 80)

Tony Rayns remarks that "A year is a long time in the Chinese film business. Much has changed in the past 12 months (see Index 6/1995)." (Rayns in Index 1997: 89). Even Chinese domestic film-going has dropped off, apparently due to the decreasing attractiveness of the films being produced under the current repressive policies. Hong Kong and Taiwan audiences also have declined, at least partly because of the diminished quality of the mainland films available.

Chinese-language films currently have a lower share of the Hong Kong market than at any time since the mid-1960s, and the audience in Taiwan appears to have lost all interest in seeing Chinese films" (Raynes 1996: 89).

Rayns traces much of the problem to changes in the bureaucrats heading the communications, film and propaganda offices of the Beijing government. High officials have called for more "patriotic" films but then expressed dissatisfaction with the ones that appeared, creating confusion about what kinds of films they will
approve. Top directors, such as Chen Kaige, Zhang Yimou, and Tian Zhuangzhuang, have encountered such serious problems with censors that some of them have retired from the industry, at least temporarily (pp. 91-92). Some, such as Zhang Yimou, have been producing only for export for a long time — the mystery being how they can organize their production activities in the face of seemingly absolute government condemnation (pg. 92).

Hong Kong's film industry also has gone into eclipse, with a number of its leading figures heading for Hollywood. The author traces this to a "self-censorship" which has dominated all Hong Kong media since the agreement for the colony's return to China was announced.

No filmmaker has wanted to commit career suicide by rocking the boat; the mixture of repressed anger and weary resignation with which the film community thinks about China matches society at large rather closely. (Tony Rayns in Index 1997: 94).

Taiwan

The transformation of Taiwan's politics "marks perhaps the first democratic experiment in Chinese history" according to Chin-Chuan Lee (1993: 1). It has, however, been a complex process, in many respects centered on a struggle over press freedom.

In a preliminary historical sketch, Lee notes that Taiwan was first settled by Chinese in the mid-seventeenth century, then was taken over by the Japanese in 1895. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, overthrew the Ch'ing dynasty monarchy on the mainland in 1911, but only gained control of Taiwan in 1945, after the Japanese defeat in World War II. Liberated from Japanese oppression, the Taiwanese found themselves subjected to an even greater tyranny under the KMT, which had been structured according to a Bolshevik pattern, despite the democratic ideals expressed by its founder, Sun Yat Sen. Rebellion by Taiwanese against Mainlanders was put down ruthlessly, and the defeat of the KMT forces on the Mainland brought large numbers of Mainlanders to the island refuge — the last bastion of the Republic of China.

The Mainlanders ran the island to suit themselves, with the Taiwanese deprived of political rights. Resistance was controlled by "the world's longest martial law," from 1949 to 1987 (Lee 1993: 3). Lee describes the press policy of the Taiwan government just prior to 1987 as a case of incorporation involving a simultaneous and intermittent interplay of state repression and cooption — with obvious yet rigorous rewards and punishments accrued to press owners. (Lee 1993: 3)

The press was subservient to the state, but had much freedom in non-political matters. The three television channels were allotted, respectively, to the party, the government, and the military; and most radio stations also were government-controlled. Only 31 newspapers were allowed to publish from 1951, when a ban on new licenses was imposed, until 1987. Many of these were nominally private, but allied to the government or party (ibid., pp. 3-5). Although some independent political magazines popped up during the period of martial law, most had only brief lives before being suppressed (pp. 6-8).

Dangwai Magazines: An Alternative Press
Opposition politicians, allowed to function in local elections, were not allowed to form parties, but instead developed a loose organization called Dangwai — "outside the party." "More than a dozen" Dangwai magazines, published between 1981 and 1986, served as the chief expression of the opposition movement (pp. 7 and 18).

The end of martial law in Taiwan may have been influenced by economic success, with consequent increases in foreign contact by many people, and also by American pressure, but Lee feels that the fall of Ferdinand Marcos, in the Philippines in 1986, and of Chun Doo-hwan, in Korea, after popular revolts, caused President Chiang Ching-kuo to reevaluate the previous repressive policies of his government, and finally to order the restoration of constitutional rule and democracy (Lee 1993: 27).

When the Dangwei politicians formed an illegal party and offered to go to jail en masse for their effort, Chiang relented and allowed an opposition party to be formed. Finally, martial law was abolished in 1987. The transition to democracy was perhaps made easier by the discrepancy between the KMT's repressive behavior and the liberal principles of Sun Yat Sen to which the party had continued to give lip service — a discrepancy increasingly pointed out by the opposition (pg. 29). Another factor was Taiwan's journalism education which is a wholesale importation from the United States, whose media are closely followed and whose norms
of professionalism and press freedom have long been almost uncritically accepted by working journalists as the cardinal principles of their craft. (Lee 1993: 31)

Out of their frustration at having to work under political restraints on their own mainstream papers, many journalists trained in the American tradition had secretly contributed their services to the financially hard-pressed Dangwai magazines.

Whatever the newspapers refused to published found their way to the Dangwai magazines... In this sense, the Dangwai magazines were living in symbiosis with their strange bed-fellows for fifteen years, until their functions were taken over by a liberated press in 1986. (Lee 1993: 31-32).

The small magazines lost their political function as more effective means of expression, such as mainstream newspapers, were liberated from military controls.

VII. South Korea

Background
The end of Japanese control of the Korean peninsula at the close of the Second World War was followed by its division into Communist North and non-Communist South, and by war between the two from 1950 to 1953. The formally democratic, but actually quite authoritarian government of President Syngman Rhee (Rhee Sung-man) was overthrown by a student-led popular revolution in 1960, but the new democratic government was in turn overthrown by a military coup in 1961.

The resulting military government under General Park Chung-hee, brought about a dramatic economic transformation which moved the country rapidly towards the status of an industrialized country. Meanwhile, the regime remained authoritarian, with intermittent periods of martial law, as students, religious leaders, and others protested various occasions of injustice and repression. Under Park's successors, Generals Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, the nation moved solidly into the "First World," economically - including a belated, but eventually strong development of a communications infrastructure - and substantial political liberalization took place under both domestic and foreign pressures. Finally, free elections were held, in 1987, and some shuffling of party loyalties by formerly opposition figures led to a solidly civilian government in the early 1990s. The genuine character of the democratic transition is indicated by the conviction and jailing of the two living former presidents — Chun and Roh — for their involvement in coups and acts of repression, and perhaps even more by firm legal action against more recent instances of corruption among officials in the current government and their relatives and against representatives of the huge conglomerates which dominate the country's economy.

Cinema
As Robinson points out, government cinema policies over the years have been disastrous. Efforts to stimulate domestic production actually weakened the industry, resulting in large numbers of low quality productions. Limits were put on foreign film imports, but few Korean films could compete in quality with those that were imported. The rise of television paralleled further declines in film production (Robinson 1996: 141). US pressures led to increasing numbers of imports. Foreign companies were allowed to compete directly as importers. In 1987, 176 foreign films were imported, and in 1989 this rose to 264. "...Over half the South Korean audience attended imported films in 1980, over two-thirds in 1986 and almost three-quarters by 1987" (Robinson 1996: 145, citing Variety 1988). The number of films produced in South Korea in 1980 was 91. This rose to 116 in 1990, but declined to 65 in 1994 (Screen Digest 1995: 191). The average Korean went to 1.1 films in cinema theaters in 1994, paying the equivalent of US$4.86 for a ticket (Screen Digest 1996: 201 and 205).

Overview
Robinson summarizes the Republic's communication situation circa 1990, saying it

...has an advanced telecommunication system, a burgeoning electronics industry and a quite adequate media infrastructure despite some on-going press restrictions. It has long struggled to produce films and is now beginning to emphasise video production. (Robinson 1996: 149)

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But she notes that the path "to get to this point of informatisation has been a singular and often contradictory one." Development has been both helped and restricted by United States influence, by the proximity of Japan, by the ever-problematic military confrontation with North Korea, and by the pervasive influence of the military. But she notes that these factors have "given the country a unified economic purpose that has sped its entrance into world economic competition and the information age" (pg. 149).

VIII. South Africa


From Apartheid to National Unity

In South Africa, the transition to participatory democracy has been long in coming, but it finally succeeded, in 1994, as a repressive minority government gave way to a more representative government. Despite continuing confrontations, some of them bloody, after 1990 substantial liberalization diluted the rigid policies of the Afrikaner-dominated government. The African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) reached an agreement which resulted in the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) after the ANC victory in the first free elections in April 1994.

Even though ownership of the press remained much the same as before, the establishment of the new government required radical changes in its mode of operation. The balance of power between the ANC and the NP — with minority participation by the Inkatha Freedom Party of the Zulus — was delicate, and neither side wished to endanger it. Suddenly, what has been called "development communication," or what Louw calls the "New World Information Order" approach, of "positive reporting" came to dominate most news publishing in the country. The trend was spearheaded by the South African Broadcasting Corporation, but "more surprising has been the way the press quickly fell in line with the new hegemony's ideological requirements" (Louw 1996: 79).

The largest press group, Argus Newspapers, formerly controlled by the gold mining industry, passed to the control of Tony O'Reilly, in 1994, and immediately "adopted an ardently pro-GNU stance, leaning in particular towards the ANC component of the GNU" (pg. 79). In Louw's opinion, the "new hegemony" that has emerged is more uniform than anything that existed prior to 1993 (pg. 80).

Conservative white publishers go along with government policies because "the NP, as GNU partner, has committed itself to the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Plan." Liberal editors, on the other hand, may themselves want the Plan to succeed, but they also could be intimidated by subtle and not-so-subtle threats of future repression. "..A perception exists that if the press does not go along with the new hegemony's wishes, appeals may give way to threats and then action" (Louw 1996: 78).

One ANC leader flatly equated "critical journalism with 'counter-revolutionary activities'." He also said that the "Truth Commission (created to investigate apartheid crimes) would seek to unearth the way in which the old order had 'infiltrated' the press, and how this continued to influence the press' reportage." (Louw 1996: 78-79).

Public Broadcasting

A hope in South Africa, as in many other countries, is for a truly independent public service broadcasting organization which will truly serve the public rather than limited political or economic interests. With the possibility of political change beginning to develop in 1990, the need for research aimed at the development of public service broadcasting became evident. In response, the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies of the University of Natal undertook a series of policy-oriented studies to give direction to national media development. Mpho's book reports on one of these, which is directly concerned with how to realize public service broadcasting in a context where politico-ideological pressures and economic pressures "to commodify anything and everything" combine to subvert the very basis of the concept (Keyan Gray
Tomaselli in Mpofu et al. 1996: 3). Realizing the need for knowledge founded solidly on research in order to carry out their roles effectively, officials of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) cooperated fully in the project (pp. 5-6). Alum Mpofu found a special challenge in the South African situation, "where our notion of the 'public' and 'community' is often highly contested," and consequently, "it is difficult to define conclusively the role of public service" (Mpofu in Mpofu et al. 1996: 7). Accessibility to the "whole spectrum of public life" is one dimension of public service broadcasting which sets it off from commercial broadcasting, which is controlled chiefly by profit considerations. Public service broadcasting must be more pluralistic and culturally responsible than commercial broadcasting can be (pg. 8). Various other principles on which Mpofu feels public broadcasting must be based include universality of payment, distance from vested interests, a special relationship to national identity and community, ability to reflect minority interests as well as those of the majority, high programming quality, and editorial freedom — safeguarded from arbitrary interference and guided by norms of media professionalism (pp. 9-16).

SABC has gone through considerable reorganization in recent years. At the time of the study, it operated three TV services, broadcasting in English, Afrikaans, and five African languages, as well as 22 radio stations, broadcasting in 11 languages. In addition, it carries the private "M-Net," an encrypted subscription entertainment TV service operated by the print media conglomerates (pg. 21). SABC experienced a "crisis of legitimacy" in 1994, resulting from "a complex aggregation of mostly antagonistic political forces." Local content imperatives, the tension between demands for plural access and centralized control, and market forces which threatened the public service ethos, combined with other forces to intensify the crisis.

Some reorganization efforts, prior to May 1993, were criticized as efforts by the NP to "ensure that this hitherto monolithic power bloc did not fall into the effective use of the post-apartheid government" (pg. 29). A broad-based coalition, called the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting, was organized to resist these efforts, and a totally new SABC board was appointed, but it, too, allegedly was inordinately influenced by the NP (ibid.).

Despite further reorganization, which succeeded in limiting the NP's influence, the SABC still "seemed to be ambivalent over its role as a public broadcaster." One source of this ambivalence is that the Corporation still depends heavily on advertising for its support (pg. 29). (Other sources say the Corporation is 72% dependent on advertising income and receives only 28% of its budget from license fees.) The researchers felt that "it is essentially the programming ethic and not the source of funding that determines the achievement of public service objectives." True as that may be in theory, "The stress on the commercial motive, the maximisation of audiences for advertisers, was a disturbing feature which research interviews revealed" (pg. 31).

**Influence to the North?**

A panel discussion, titled, "Sunset or Sunrise Journalism: The Rebirth of the New World Information Order in Africa," was held at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, in Montreal, Canada, on May 26, 1997. The panelists reviewed the signs of the development of a free press in other countries of Africa — notably Zambia and Namibia — but also noted that in many more places journalists are being threatened and killed for failing to practice "sunshine journalism," which puts the authorities in a favorable light, regardless of their crimes.

The preliminary statement of the panel's topic called for it to focus on the different threats to press freedom in Africa's three areas: the Muslim North, the traditional black areas from the Sahara to the Zambezi River, and the formerly white-ruled South. (For names and addresses of panelists, see "Africa (more than one country)" under "Current Research," below.) (ICA 1997: 199-200).

**IX. Latin America**


**A Quiet Transition**

The transition to more participatory democracy in Latin America during the past two decades has been much less sharply defined than the changes in Eastern Europe. For the most part, it has left socio-economic
class divisions intact. When violent confrontations have ceased the opposing factions often have entered into compromise political arrangements — as, for example, in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile and Guatemala — with relatively little effect on underlying patterns of economic control.

There likewise has been little radical change in either the persons leading research on communications in the region or in their characteristically theoretical and speculative approach to research. What has changed is the perspective from which many of those researchers view the Latin American situation and the conclusions they draw from their observations.

The current picture of communication studies in Latin America as a whole has been described by Philip Schlesinger and Nancy Morris in a recent review article (1997). They sketch the political context in the following terms:

Now, with the exception of Cuba, all Latin American countries have elected governments, although some of them, such as Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, are somewhat precarious and threatened from within. (1997: 5)

They note that, despite a history of media-government relations ranging from mutual support to ideological conflict and outright control, Latin American mass media are now, "for the most part privately owned and free-market oriented" (ibid., citing Elizabeth Fox 1996: 184). In many or most cases, however, they are closely allied with the government and underlying socio-economic power structures.

Cultural Identity

Cultural identity is a recurring theme in Latin American communication research. Part of this concern is the cultural heterogeneity of countries whose populations are composed of Aboriginal American, European, and sometimes African elements. The influence of North America also has been strong, inspiring the frequent use of a dependency model in Latin American research.

...The dependency approach concluded that communications systems were 'conditioned by US communication interests' and that the resulting dominance was ultimately destructive to local cultures and identities" (pg. 5, quoting Luis Ramiro Beltrán S. 1976: 127).

The "dependency framework, an important and original contribution of Latin American scholarship" (Schlesinger and Morris 1997: 5), was linked to the idea of cultural imperialism, the "contention that imported cultural forms would weaken a country's sense of itself and erode national identity" (pg. 6). Both were popular models among Latin American communication theorists in the 1970s and 1980s, but more recently "have been somewhat displaced by the notion of 'globalization'" (ibid.). Globalization is regarded as a worldwide interdependence and interconnection with much less implication of purposeful control than was carried by "cultural imperialism" (ibid.). Some Latin American communication scholars see dependency, in its new form of globalization, as a continuing threat to their countries' cultural integrity. Some, such as Peru's Rafael Roncagliolo, call for continuing government intervention through policies which will limit foreign influence in the media (Schlesinger and Morris 1997: 7, citing Roncagliolo 1994).

But much depends on one's point of view, and sometimes on the relative competitiveness of each country's media industry in the international market. José Marques de Melo, a Brazilian, has emphasized the success both Brazil and Mexico have enjoyed in their export of telenovelas and music (Schlesinger and Morris 1997: 7, citing Marques de Melo 1995). The major media producers in both countries — Globo in Brazil and Televisa in Mexico — achieved much of their early success by working closely with authoritarian regimes. Now, even in a more participatory and competitive political environment, they still enjoy favorable relationships with their respective governments (Schlesinger and Morris 1997: 7).

While many Latin American authorities write in terms of the whole region — especially when dealing with themes of cultural identity and dependency — the authors describe the work of Jorge González, of Colima University, in Mexico, as "being carried out within a resolutely national frame of reference" (pg. 8). González's empirical studies stress the situational dimension of cultural institutions, with the family as "the focal point for an encounter with the most fundamental cultural goods" (pg. 8).

The authors discern a major new development in the region's communication studies as emphasizing the power of popular culture to circumvent the globalizing influence of imported media. Intrinsic to this perspective is the role of alternative media, many of which grew up as responses to the censorship imposed by repressive regimes. They continue to fill a function in expressing cultural identities in response to the homogenizing influence of quasi-monopolistic and foreign-influenced national mass media (ibid.).

The State In Question

In the heterogeneous societies of the different
countries of Latin America the identification of what constitutes cultural identity looms as a problem for those struggling to preserve it. Many have abandoned the simplistic equation between cultural identity and national identity. For example, Jesús Martín-Barbero has

queried the very categories of the nation and the state, asking whether a focus on public policymaking was the best way into an understanding of the workings of popular culture. (pg. 9)

State policy-making is held to be inconsequential in the face of combined antinational fragmenting and segmenting pressures, especially youth-oriented music and video. "These combined pressures mean that there are no ways of defining the boundaries of a common national culture, policed by the sovereignty of the state" (pg. 10). The authors would resist discounting the role of the state entirely, however. Among other reasons for this is that economic nationalism remains a local political reality. "And economic nationalism requires a political instrument" (pg. 15).

Martín-Barbero's work shares in some of the perspective of the European and North American "ethnographic" approach to communication studies, when he calls for attention

..to the mediations — not the media or the text — namely, that we analyse how the popular classes interpret symbolic products. In short, meanings are not simply decoded according to the intentions of the dominant culture. (Schlesinger & Morris 1997: 9. Cf., Martín-Barbero 1993 and 1993/4, et al.)

Continuities in Latin American Research

Enrique Bustamante (1997) comments favorably on the ability of Latin American researchers "to examine the place of the communications researcher and continually to reevaluate findings and question the role of research in society," in addition to having "a genuine capacity for self-criticism. Furthermore, they have been able to transcend "communication taken as 'an object of study'" to explore the implications for communication of the other social sciences (1997: 41).

These qualities are evident in the studies cited by Schlesinger and Morris, and the continuities which have prevailed in Latin American communication studies through periods of political disruption which could have introduced disruptive elements into them. Intensive interaction with each other has enabled the major theorists to build on each others' work, as well as on the work of North American and European scholars.

Broadcasting

Elizabeth Fox has provided a survey of the contemporary state of radio and television broadcasting in Latin America. She concentrates on eight countries: Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.

She remarks that both external and internal forces have combined to create different broadcasting structures in the different countries of the region, but the diversity of factors nevertheless has resulted in some common traits.

These different arrangements and institutional developments paved the way for the monopolisation of domestic media resources, the lack of participation in the media by social actors, and the unequal balance between social service and commercial gain present in most media operations in Latin America. (Fox 1997: 2)

The beginnings of broadcasting in Latin America were shaped by United States commercial models, with little or no public service dimension (ibid., pg. 130). For the most part development has continued along those lines, with broadcasting institutions allied to each country's elite power structure. This has resulted in broadcasting systems which, for the most part are commercial, monopolistic and undemocratic, with little opportunity for popular participation.

Pressures for greater participation have generally been short-lived. Fox sees the "toughest challenge" to creating democratic media in Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, where the strongest private monopolies exist. Uruguay and Chile show the greatest potential for the development of open systems. Although foreign -- mostly United States -- influence is pervasive, the author feels that the growth of more equitable broadcasting policies depends more on domestic political and economic factors than on foreign involvement or disengagement.

The challenge is to provide a different relationship or accommodation regarding the media and their control among the different domestic actors. This accommodation would mean a new conception of the rights and obligations of the state...and of the increasingly autonomous, powerful, and transnational domestic media industries. (Fox 1997: 34)
Perspective

This survey of some of the countries and regions which have gone through transitions from more authoritarian to more participatory and democratic forms of government reveals some parallels and common elements, in spite of obvious differences.

Some aspects of the political and communication situation in the newly-independent United States of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that of post-communist Russia are especially striking, with allowances made for the vast differences in scale and the huge developments of communication technologies which have intervened. In both countries, the role of the mass media was critical in initiating the moves towards greater freedom and in expediting the revolutionary process.

Both countries experienced periods of uncertainty and regression from the original ideals of their liberation movements. The press in the United States began as a highly subjective mouthpiece for special interests, and later went through a period of disorder and corrupt practices as its organizational structures developed and ethical standards — including the ideal of objectivity — were formulated. Russia has been experiencing a parallel evolutionary process in all its mass media. Over time, the United States was able to surmount those difficulties, but in today’s Russia the outcome still hangs in the balance. Furthermore, Russia has never had a tradition of democratic political participation, while the American colonies had the luxury of being able to incubate their democracies at the local and regional levels for a century-and-a-half before facing the task of forming a democratic government on a national scale.

The instantaneous character of modern communication and its sheer massiveness — 150 million Soviet citizens routinely viewing the news program Vremya every night towards the end of the communist era, for example — places far greater pressure on the Russian leadership, media and people than was even conceivable in eighteenth century America, where news might normally take two weeks to travel the length of the thirteen colonies.

Another parallel is the shift from a partisan press to media which took a more disinterested and professional view of national politics. This shift took place in the United States in the era of the "penny press," as newspapers became self-supporting and therefore dependent on cultivating a reputation for reliability among their readership. Russian media are moving in that direction, but they have not yet completed the transition, largely due to anomalies in the economy which force the media to seek patrons among government, party, or business interests, simply in order to survive. Independence is nevertheless a yearned-for goal of many Russian journalists.

Affluence also has been a factor in media freedom and diversification in other countries discussed above, including Korea, Taiwan, and even mainland China. As media become more financially independent from political or other "patrons" they tend to move toward politically centrist positions, where they will appeal to the largest or commercially most lucrative audiences. Of course many factors — especially shaky economies with unemployment and social unrest — can nevertheless upset the balance needed to bring about such a mainstreaming tendency.

As is suggested by some of the material cited, especially that from Catalonia, increasing freedom of media with consequent commercialization and growth in the size of media enterprises can militate against direct popular participation in the media. Grassroots involvement in small, alternative, illegal media, tends to dissolve as those media are legalized and professionalized. Conscious efforts to ensure space for public, nonprofessional contributions to mass media contents seem necessary to help assure the maximum contribution of those media to a fully democratic society.

A factor in most of the post-authoritarian countries discussed which was not present in the development of the press in the early United States is foreign involvement. East German mass media were simply absorbed into the West German media system, very often with ownership passing to large and long-established media conglomerates. Russia and many Eastern European countries have been literally "invaded" by both commercial and non-commercial Western media institutions, agencies and interests. Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong all have been influenced by US-trained journalists and media educators, who have shaped those countries' media according to recognizably American patterns. Mainland China has not been immune to either this influence or to the effects of a broader commercialization, which is shaking the country’s ideological consensus to its foundations.

Most African countries cannot yet be called "post-authoritarian" with any degree of accuracy. The outstanding exception is South Africa, which appears to be going through both political and media transitions not altogether unlike those of contemporary Russia and, more remotely, the United States of 200 years ago. South African leaders, in a pattern reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson, are asking the press for greater sympathy as they struggle with the tasks of nation building. But "sunshine journalism" creates a tension
with the critical role journalism must play in a
democracy. A happy medium needs to be sought,
where justifiable criticism is meted out and accepted,
while needless undermining of government and the
common good is avoided.

Although the fundamental economic power structures
in Latin America have remained much the same as in
the past, genuinely democratic political institutions
have come to be superimposed on them in most Latin
American countries during the past two decades. This
democratization has been accompanied by the
development of a freer mass media atmosphere.
Another favorable element in Latin America is the
presence of a strong tradition of communication
studies. Latin American communications scholars have
shown a remarkable ability to criticize their earlier
work and to shift their theoretical paradigms as needed
to better adapt to changing political, social and
economic realities — both domestically and
internationally.

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Current Research

In the following entries, "ICA 97" refers to a paper or other presentation at the International Communication Association Annual Conference, in Montreal, Canada, May 22-26, 1997.

*Trends* does not usually depend so heavily on a single source for information in this section, but the 1997 ICA meeting proved to be such a rich mine of information from different countries that we have been able to include relevant research from a near-record number of countries and regions in this listing. It is also an indication that the ICA is succeeding in its long-term goal to become truly *international* in fact as well as name.

Africa (more than one country)

**George Claassen** (University of Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa, Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa; Tel: +27 21 80 83 487; Fax: +27 21 80 83 487; e-mail: <GNC@MATIES.SUN.ACA.ZA>) chaired a panel on "Sunset or Sunrise Journalism: The Rebirth of the New World Information Order in Africa," at ICA 97. Panelists were C. Anthony Giffard (University of Washington, Box 353740, Seattle, WA, 98195, USA; Tel: +1 206 543 2660; Fax: +1 206 543 9285; e-mail: <giffard@u.washington.edu>) and Eronini R. Megwa (Peninsula Technikon, P.O. Box 906, Bellville 7535, Cape Town, South Africa; University Tel: +27 02 16 56 69 11).

Hemant Shah (School Of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, 53711, USA; Tel: +1 608 263 2928; e-mail: <HGSHAH@FACSTAFF.WISC.EDU>) chaired a session at ICA 97 on, "Media Development Issues in Selected African Nations." Among the presenters were Bala Musa (Regent University, 5944 104 Jake Sears Cir., Virginia Beach, VA, 23464, USA; Tel: +1 757 579 4353; e-mail: <balamus@regent.edu>) and Lyombe Eko (Southern Illinois University, 187-1 Evergreen Ter., Carbondale, IL, 62901, USA; Tel: +1 618 526 3361; Fax: +1 618 453 5200; e-mail: <ediosok@siucvmb.siu.edu>) — see also, South Africa for other papers in this session. Leslie Snyder (University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA) was the Respondent for the session.

Austria

**Ursula Maier-Rabler** (University of Salzburg, Department of Journalism and Communication, Rudolfskai 42, A-5020 Salzburg; Tel: +43 662 8044 4163; Fax: +43 662 8044 4190; e-mail: <mairab@edvz.sbg.ac.at>) presented a paper, "Cultural Differences in National Information Policies: Comparisons Between US and Europe and Within Europe," at ICA 97.

Belarus

**Larissa G. Titarenko** (Byelorussian State University, Skaruny Prospekt 4, 220080 Minsk; University Tel: +7 (0172) 20 94 15) has been involved in research on changes in the value orientations of youth in Byelorussia and Belarus extending from the mid-1980s to 1993.

Bosnia

**Igor Shaurenko** (University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia MO, 65211 USA; University Tel: +1 314 882 2121) delivered a paper, "The New York Times Forum on Bosnia: An Attempt in On-line Mediation," at ICA 97.

Brazil

**Patricia Aufderheide** (American University, 10908 Clermont Ave., P.O. Box 346, Garrett Park, MD 20896, USA; Tel: +1 202 885 2069; Fax: +1 202 885 2099; e-mail: <paulfeder@american.edu>) presented a paper, "Challenges to Telecommunications Policy Reform: The Brazilian Case," at ICA 97.

**Mauro Pereira Porto** (Univ. of California, San Diego, 3845 E Miramar St., La Jolla, CA, 92037, USA; Tel: +1 619 534 4410; Fax: +1 619 534 4410; e-mail: <MPORT@WEBER.UCSD.EDU>) delivered a paper, "Telenovelas and Politics in the 1994 Brazilian Presidential Election," at ICA 97.

Bulgaria

**Anelia Dimitrova** (University of Northern Iowa, Dept. of Comm Studies, 257 CAC, Cedar Falls, IA, 50614, USA; Tel: +1 319 273 5899; e-mail: <dimitrova@uni.edu>) presented a paper, "Ideology, Political Power, and the Press: Trans-formations of Bulgarian Communist Party and its Political Tribune Before the First Free Elections in 1990," at ICA 97.

**Milena Karagyozova** (Iowa State University, Ames, IA, 50011, USA; University Tel: +1 515 294 1840) presented a paper, "American Television Serials and Social Stereotypes of Americans in Bulgaria," at ICA 97.

Canada

**Jody Berland** (York Univ., 4700 Kele St, North York, Ont.M3J 1P3, Canada; University Tel: +1 416 736 2100) presented a paper, "Cultural Technologies and the 'Evolution' of Technological Cultures," at ICA 97.

Caribbean Region

**Rita Atwood** (California State University, Fresno, Dept of Mass Comm & Journalism, Mail Stop 10, Fresno, CA, 93740, USA; Tel: +1 209 278 4868; e-mail: <rita_atwood@cstudenet.csufresno.edu>) chaired a panel on, "Media and Politics in the Caribbean Basin," at ICA 97. Panelists were: Jose Gaztambide Geigel (University of Puerto Rico, P.O. Box 364984, San Juan, PR 00936-4984; University Tel: +1 809 250 0000), Polly McLean (University of Colorado-Boulder, Boulder, CO, 80309, USA; University Tel: +1 303 492 8908), Silvia Molia (National University of Mexico, Mexico City 04510, Mexico; University Tel: +52 550 5215), John Nichols (Pennsylvania State University, State College, 103 Carnegie Bldg., University Park, PA, 16802, USA; Tel: +1 814 865 3065; Fax: +1 814 863 8044; e-mail: <jsn2@psuvm.psu.edu>) and Josep Rota (Ohio University,
China

Joseph Man Chan (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Dept of Journalism & Communication Studies, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong; Tel: +852 2 60 97 665; Fax: +852 2 60 35 007; e-mail: < BO72779@MAILSERV.CUHK.EDU.HK >) presented a paper, "When Capitalist and Socialist Television Clashes: The Impact of Hong Kong Television on Guangzhou Residents," at ICA 97.

Hualin Chen (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong; Fax: +852 603 5007) and Yu Huang (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong; Fax: +852 2339 7890) presented a paper, "Reversal of Fortune: An Institutional Analysis of the Uneven Development in China's Media Commercialization," at ICA 97.

Jeroen De Kloet (University of Amsterdam, Spui 21, 1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands; Fax: +31 20 525 2086 11) delivered a paper, "To Seek Beautiful Dreams: Rock in China," at ICA 97.

Yi-Hui Huang (University of Maryland, Tulane Dr. #22, Hyattsville, MD, 20783, USA; e-mail: < yhuang@wam.umd.edu >) presented a paper, "Toward the Contemporarity Chinese Philosophy of Public Relations: A Perspective from the Theory of Global Public Relations," at ICA 97.

Zhongdang Pan (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Dept of Journalism & Comm, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong; Tel: +852 2609 8699; Fax: +852 2603 5007; e-mail: < B793797@acs.csc.cuhk.hk >) presented a paper, "Spatial Configuration in China's Journalism Reforms," at ICA 97.

Ben Alfa Petrazzini (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong) delivered a paper, "India and China Awakening to the Information Age: Common Goals, Divergent Strategies," at ICA 97.

Jung-Kuang Sun and Jennie Apter (both of the State University of New York at Buffalo, Amherst, NY, 14260, USA; University Tel: +1 716 636 2901) presented a paper, "Social Communication between Taiwan and Mainland China: Its Role in China's Unification," at ICA 97.

Mei-ling Wang (Philadelphia College of Pharmacy and Science, 4701 Pine St. #C-8, Philadelphia, PA, 19143, USA; e-mail: < MWANG@HSLC.ORG >) delivered a paper, "Creating a Virtual Enemy: The U.S.-China Relations in Print," at ICA 97.

Colombia

Clemencia Rodriguez (University of Texas, San Antonio, 946 W. Gramercy S., San Antonio, TX, 78201, USA; Tel: +1 210 458 5432; Fax: +1 210 458 5366, e-mail: < Clemencia@post3.utsa.edu >) delivered a paper, "Mafia Women, Guerrilla Women: A Discourse of Women and Violence in Colombia," at ICA 97.

Estonia

Jüri Saarniit (University of Tartu, Ülikooli 18, Tartu; University Tel: +7 (01434) 34-866; University Fax: +7 (01434) 35-400) has been involved in a longitudinal study of changes in the value orientations of youth in Estonia, carried out through fifteen national surveys since the mid-1960s.

Finland

Terhi Rantanen (University of Helsinki, Department of Communication, P.O.Box 54, Helsinki, Fin-00014; Tel: +358 0 191 8850; Fax: +358 0 191 8849; e-mail: < TERHI.RANTANEN@CC.HELSINKI.FI >) delivered a paper, "News Agencies in Eastern Europe," at ICA 97.

Germany


Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg (both of the University of Amsterdam, Oude Hooggstraat 24, 1012 CE, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Tel +31 20 52 52 263/+ 31 20 52 52 348; Fax: +31 20 52 52 179; e-mail: < SEMETKO@PSCW.UVA.NL/BALKENBURG@PSCW.UVA.NL >) presented a paper, "The Impact of Media Attentiveness on Political Efficacy: Evidence from East and West German Panel Studies," at ICA 97.

Jan Tonnemacher (Eichstätt University, Ostenstraße 26-28, Eichstätt, University Tel: +49 (08421) 201 University Fax: +49 (08421) 20474) presented a paper on, "Impact of the Internet on Print Journalism in and outside Germany," at ICA 97.

Jurgen Wilke (Johannes Gutenberg University, Institut für Publizistik, 55099, Mainz; Tel: +49 613 139 2539; Fax +49 613 139 4239; e-mail: < wilke@mzdhmz.adv.uni-mainz.de >) presented a paper, "News Agencies in Competition: Histor-ical Roots and the Present Situation in Germany," at ICA 97.

Guyana

Donna Allen (Howard University, 2400 Sixth St, NW, Washington, DC, 20059, USA; University Tel: +1 202 806 2500) presented a paper, "Framing Issues in Terms of Ethnic and Political Conflict: The Case of the Request for an Inquiry into the Walter Rodney Assassination in Guyana," at ICA 97.

Hong Kong

Anthony Y. H. Fung (University of Minnesota, P.O. Box 13386, Dinkytown Station, Minneapolis, MN, 55444, USA; Tel: +1 612 626 7445; Fax: +1 612 626 7460; e-mail:<
fung0011 @gold.tc.umn.edu >) presented a paper on "Political Parties, Elections and Media Frames: Party and Media Dynamics in Transitional Hong Kong," at ICA 97.

Karim Wilkins (University of Texas, 4512 Avenue F., Austin, TX, 78751, USA; Tel: +1 512 471 2007; Fax: +1 512 471 4077; e-mail: <kwillkins@mail.utexas.edu >) chaired a session at ICA 97 on, "Mass Media and Regime Change: The Case of Hong Kong. Presenters of papers at that session included: Lars Willnat (George Washington University, School of Media & Public Affairs, 801 22nd St. NW, Washington, DC, 20052, USA; Tel: +1 202 994 8467; Fax: +1 202 994 5806; e-mail: <lwillnat@gw2.circ.gwu.edu >), Clement So, Joseph Man Chan, Chin-Chuan Lee, and Erica Ma, (all of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Dept of Journalism & Comm, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong; Tel: +852 2609 7708; Fax: +852 2603 5007; e-mail: <clementso@cuhk.edu.hk >), Agnes S. M. Ku (Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong), and Anthony Y. H. Fung (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN USA [see above]).

L. Erwin Atwood (Australia-New Zealand Studies Center, 427 Boucke Building, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA; Tel: +1 (814) 863-1603; Fax: +1 (814) 863-3336; e-mail: <LEA2@PSU.EDU > was Respondent at the session. Karim Wilkins also delivered a paper, "Moving Beyond Modernity: A Study of Media and Identity Among Hong Kong Youth," at another ICA 97 session.

Lars Willnat (George Washington University [as above]) presented a paper, "Reluctance and Hope: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Political Participation in Pre-1997 Hong Kong," at ICA 97.

Hungary
Lynne M. Walters (Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-1122, USA; University Tel: +1 409 845 4331), Ray Hiebert (University of Maryland, 4101 Journalism, College Park, MD, 20742, USA; Tel: +1 301 405 2419; Fax: +1 301 445 3230.), and T. N. Walters (Northeast Louisiana University, 700 University Ave, Monroe, LA, 71209, USA; University Tel: +1 318 342 1000) presented a paper, "Hungarian Journalism Education at the Crossroads: Survival Means Learning 'the Best from Other Countries' While Keeping 'the Best of Ours,'" at ICA 97.

India
Kalyani Chadha (University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA; University Tel: +1 301 405 1000) and Joey Sent (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, 27599, USA; University Tel: +1 919 962 2211) presented a paper, "Tracing the Dynamics Driving Communication Policy Making: The Case of India's New Telecommunications Policy Regime," at ICA 97.

Korea (South)
Mee-Eun Kang (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA) delivered a paper, "Gatekeeping Processes of the International News in Korea," at ICA 97.

Joohoan Kim (University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Walnut St. Annenberg School For Communication, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA; Tel: +1 215 898 4775; Fax: +1 610 519 1506; e-mail: <sjokim@asc.upenn.edu >) and Eun-Keong Han (Seoul National University, Seoul; University Tel: +82 2 877 1601), presented a paper, "Political Politeness in the Language Using Contexts: A Pragmatic Analysis on the Presidential Debates," at ICA 97. Joohoan Kim also collaborated with Jong-Yung Yoon (Stanford University, P.O. Box 2131, Stanford, CA, 94309, USA; e-mail: <yoon@leland.stanford.edu >) in presenting a paper on "Digitalized Personal Information and the Crisis of Privacy: The Problems of Electronic National Identification Card Project and Land Registry Project in South Korea," at ICA 97.

Myoung-Hye Kim (Dong Eui University, 303 Seosangdong, Kimhae, Kyong nam 621-030, South Korea; Tel: +82 51 89 01 313; Fax: +82 52 52 24 118; e-mail: <po306Chollian.dacom.co.kr >) and Hoonsoon Kim (Ewha Women's University, 11-1 Dihjyon-dong, Seodaimoon-gu, Seoul; University Tel: +82 2 362 6151 60) delivered a paper on "The Patriarchal Narrative Strategies of Korean Television Dramas" at ICA 97.

Jongsoo Lee and Tackwhan Kim (both of the Korean Press Institute, 12FL, Press Center, 25, 1-ka, Taepyang-ro, Chung-gn, Seoul, South Korea; Tel: +82 2 398 16 07; Fax: +82 2 737 71 70; e-mail: <minlee@chollian.dacom.co.kr >) presented a paper, "Election and Civic Journalism: A Case Study in South Korea," at ICA 97.

Kyungia Lee (Kyung-Hee University, 1 Hoiki-dong, Dongdaemun-ku, Seoul; University Tel: +82 2 961 0114) presented a paper on "The Role of Men and Women in Korean Television News" at ICA 97.

Insung Whang (Daedjin University, Seoul) and Eung-Jun Min (Rhode Island College, 600 Mount Pleasant Ave, Providence, RI, 02908-1924, USA; Tel: +1 401 456 8720; Fax: +1 401 456 8379; e-mail: <emin@grog.ric.edu >) presented a paper, "'Us Versus Them': Narrative Analysis of Television News on the Homeless," at ICA 97.

Sunny Yoon (Korean Broadcasting Institute, Eun Pung Ku Pulgwang Dong, Misung Apt.11-1401, Seoul 121 South Korea; Tel: +82 2 580 3865; e-mail: <syoon@mm.ewha.ac.kr >) delivered a paper on "Love and Self-Identity: An Ethnographic Study of Korean Television Drama Audience" at ICA 97.

Latin America (more than one country)
Rosental Calmon Alves (University of Texas, Austin, TX, 78712, USA; University Tel: +1 512 471 1232) delivered a
paper on "The Newly Democratized Media in Latin America: A Review of Progress and Constraints" at ICA 97.

Gonzalo Soruco (University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33124, USA; University Tel: +1 305 284 2211) delivered a paper, "The New Mass Media and Public Opinion in Latin America," at ICA 97.

Silvio R. Waisbord (Rutgers University, Dept. of Communications, 4 Huntington St, New Brunswick, NJ, 08903, USA; Tel: +1 908 932 8483; Fax: +1 908 932 6916; e-mail: < waisbord@scils.rutgers.edu >) delivered papers on, "Media, National Identity and the Politics of Space: Latin America in the Global Scene," "Cultural Boundaries and Identity in Latin America," and "Reason and Morality: The Modernity of Journalism in Latin America," at ICA 97.

Latvia
Talis Tisenkopfs (Latvian Academy of Sciences, Turgēvienela 19, 226524 Riga; Academy Tel: +37 01322 53 61; Fax: +7 (0132) 22 87 84) has studied life issues and orientations towards the future of street boys and "young business-minded people" in post-Soviet Latvia.

Mexico
Eduardo Barrera (University of Texas, El Paso, TX, 79996, USA; University Tel: +1 915 747 5000) delivered a paper, "Rewriting the Rules of the Game: Journalism and the Mexican State after the Crisis," at ICA 97.

Monica Gendreau (Universidad de Las Americas, Puebla, CHOLUL, Pue 72820, Mexico; Tel: +52 2 231 0811 x340; Fax +52 2 231 0811 x340; e-mail: < gendreau@uiajac.pue.uia.mx >) and Gimenez M. Gilberto (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City 04510, Mexico; University Tel: +55 05 215) presented a paper, "A Central Community among Multiple Peripheral Communities: Economic and Cultural Globalization Effects on Traditional Rural Communities in Central Mexico," at ICA 97.

Lilia Perez Chavolla and Rohan Samarajiva (both of Ohio State University, Department of Communication, Ohio State U, 3016 Derby Hall, 154N. Oval Mall, Columbus, OH, 43210-1339, USA; Tel: +1 614 292 3713; Fax: +1 614 292 2055; e-mail: < ROHAN+@OSU.EDU >) delivered a paper, "Institutional Reform of Telecommunication and Improved Performance in Mexico: A Causal Analysis," at ICA 97.

Norway
Philip Schlesinger (University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland, UK; University Tel: +44 (0786) 73171; University Fax: +44 (0786) 63000) is leading a study of the Norwegian Research Council’s ARENA Program (Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-State) on questions of theory and public policy related to cultural identity and communication.

Philippines
Consuelo Campbell (Michigan State University, 961 Crimson Ct, East Lansing, MI, 48823, USA; e-mail: < CAMPBE26@STU.MSU.EDU >) delivered a paper, "The Effect of Political Patronage and Corruption on the Performance of a Telecommunications Company: The Case of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, 1967-1992," at ICA 97.

Russia
Barbara Ruth Burke (University of Minnesota at Morris, 600 E 4th St, Morris, MN, 56267-2132, USA) and Philo Washburn (Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA) presented a paper, "The Symbolic Construction of Russia and the United States on Russian Television," at ICA 97.

Charlotte F. Cole, Anna Gureina, and Beth A. Richman (all of Children’s Television Workshop, One Lincoln Plz., New York, NY 10023 USA; Tel: +1 (212) 875 6492; Fax: +1 (212) 875 6107 and Chava E. Tidhar (Israel Educational TV; 35 Sheshet Hayamim St., Ramat-Hasharon 47147, Israel; Tel: +97 23 64 27 089; Fax: +97 23 54 96 579) presented a paper, "Sesame Street Around the World: Curriculum Development and Formative Research in Russia, Israel and the Palestinian Territories," at ICA 97.

Joy Morrison (University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 4410 Woodrider Dr., AK, 99709, USA; Tel: +1 907 474 6245; Fax +1 907 474 6369; e-mail: < fjjfm@aurora.alaska.edu >) chaired a panel, "Questioning US Assistance to Russian, Central and Eastern European Media: Is Our Free Press/First Amendment Model Ideal for Democracy?" at ICA 97. Members of the panel were Robert W. McChesney (University of Wisconsin, School of Journalism & Mass Communication, 5115 Vilas Hall, Madison, WI, 53706, USA; Tel: +1 608 263 4365; Fax: +1 608 262 1361; e-mail: < RWMCCHES@FACSTAFF.WISC.EDU >).

Svetlana Kolesnichenko (Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University, Prospect Marxa 20, Moscow 103009, Russia; Tel: +7 095 203 2889; Fax: +7 095 203 2889), and John Hochheimer (Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY, 14850, USA; University Tel: +1 607 274 3011). [See also, further discussion in the review article, above.]

Michael Palmer (University of Paris 3, Sorbonne Nouvelle, 17 rue de la Sorbonne, 75230 Paris Cedex 05, France; University Fax: +33 143 25 74 71) presented a paper on "Controlling the Bear: The Evaluation of News Agency Copy from Russia — 1904-06, 1989-91," at ICA 97.

Elena Vartanova (Moscow State University, Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University, Prospect Marxa 20, Moscow 103009, Russia; Tel: +7 095 203 2889; Fax: +7 095 203 2889) delivered a paper, "News Agencies in Post-Soviet Russia," at ICA 97.
Singapore

Peng Hwa Ang (Nanyang Technological University, School of Comm Studies, Singapore 639798, Singapore; Tel: +65 79 96 109; Fax: +65 79 24 329; e-mail: < tphang@ntu.edu.sg >) and Albert C. Gunther (University of Wisconsin, AG. Journalism, 440 Henry Mall, Madison, WI, 53706, USA; Tel: +1 608 262 1506; Fax: +1 608 265 3042) presented a paper, "Toward a Framework for the Development of Community Standards of Censorship: A Case Study of Singapore," at ICA 97.

South Africa

Arnold S. De Beer (Potchefstroom University, Potchefstroom, Transvaal, 2520 South Africa; Tel: +27 148 299 1642; Fax: +27 148 299 1651; e-mail: < komasdeb@puknet.puk.agza >) presented a paper on "The South African Media as Conflict Generator or Facilitator of Peace in Anti-and Post-Apartheid Democratization Process," at ICA 97.

Robert B. Horwitz (University of California, San Diego, Dpt. of Communication, 0503; 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA,92093-503, USA; Tel: +1 619 534 7027; Fax +1 619 534 7315; e-mail: < RHORWITZ@UCDS.EDU >) presented a paper on, "Telecommunications Reform in the New South Africa," at ICA 97.

Elaine Steyn and Arnold S. De Beer (both of Potchefstroom University, Potchefstroom, Transvaal, 2520 South Africa; Tel: +27 148 299 1642; Fax: +27 148 299 1651; e-mail: < komasdeb@puknet.puk.agza >) delivered a paper, "Media Policy Development: Some Trends in Post-Communist Societies and Post-Apartheid South Africa" at ICA 97.

Sri Lanka

Darlen Hantzis (Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN, 47809, USA; University Tel: +1 812 237 6311) presented a paper, "Dressing Up/Dressing As: Postcoloniality and the Performance of 'Sri Lankan' Identities," at ICA 97.

Taiwan

Li-Li Chin (San Jose State University, 19841 Scotland Dr., Sartoga, CA, 95070, USA; Tel: +1 408 924 5678; e-mail: < lechin@pcinlinux.scu.edu >) presented a paper on "The Talking Culture of TECO: Communication Patterns in a Taiwanese Organization During a time of Change," at ICA 97.

Pei-Chi Chung (Indiana University; 403 Redbud Hill Apts., Bloomington, IN, 47406 USA; Tel: +1 812 857 5197) delivered a paper, "The Discourses of Taiwanese Nationalism in Computer-Based Communication: The Case Study of a Taiwan-Related Discussion Group," at ICA 97.

Mine-Ping Sun (National Chengchi University, Wenshan 11623 Taipei; University Tel: +886 2 939 3091; University Fax: +886 2 939 8043) delivered a paper, "A New TV Environment and Family Relationship of Taiwanese Adolescents: Results from the Triangular Research Method," at ICA 97.

Bella Mody and Ho-Chen Hung (both of Michigan State University, Department of Telecommunication, East Lansing, MI, 48827-1212, USA; Tel: +1 517 432 3378; Fax: +1 517 355 1292; e-mail: < MODY@PILOT.MSU.EDU >) presented a paper, "Women, Work and Patriarchy: The Facts and Television Fiction in Taiwan," at ICA 97.

Shujen Wang (Westfield State College, 11 Arnold Ave, #2D, Northampton, MA, 01060, USA; Tel: +1 413 572 5746; Fax: +1 572 5612; e-mail: < SWANG@MECN.MASS.EDU >) presented a paper, "Defining Taiwan: Political Ads, National Identity, and Conflict Memories," at ICA 97.

Ukraine

Jean Grow-Von Dorn (University of Wisconsin at Madison; 1215 E. Jardin St., Appleton, WI 54911 USA; Tel: +1 414 954 0676; Fax: +1 414 954 0676; e-mail: < growup@aol.com >) delivered a paper on "Advertising in Ukraine: Cultural Perspectives," at ICA 97.

United Kingdom

David Morley (Goldsmith College, University of London, Lewisham Way, New Cross, London SE14 6NW, UK; Tel: +44 181 692 7171; Fax: +44 181 694 8911) presented a paper, "Europe—Sans Papier," at ICA 97.

Philip Schlesinger and Nancy Morris (both of University of Stirling, Dept. of Film & Media Studies, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland, United Kingdom; Tel: +44 178 646 7971; Fax: 44 178 646 6855; e-mail: < N.E.MORRIS@STIRL.AC.UK >) presented a paper, "Communication, Identity and the State in Latin American Cultural Theory," at ICA 97.

United States

Leeva Chung (University of Oklahoma, P.O. Box 3185, Norman, OK, 73070, USA; Tel: +1 405 325 3111; Fax: +1 405 325 7625; e-mail: < leeva@ou.edu >) presented a paper on, "An Analysis of the Hawaiian and Native American Sovereignty Movements: Nation Within Nations?" at ICA 97.

Everette E. Dennis (The Freedom Forum, 1101 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA, 22209, USA; Tel: +1 212 284 8422; Fax: +1 212 284 3535; e-mail: < edennis@freedomforum.org >) delivered a paper, "Beyond the Cold War Paradigm and the Search for 'Variable X',' at ICA 97.

Henry Gonzales (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, 01003, USA; University Tel: +1 413 545 0111) delivered a paper, "Toward a Multicultural Perspective on the Globalization of Culture in the Americas," at ICA 97.

Denise Perry Ferguson (Purdue University, 145 Scranton Ct., Zionsville, IN, 46077, USA; Tel: +1 317 494 3429; Fax: +1 317 873 4879; e-mail: < dpferg@omni.purdue.edu >)
presented a paper, "From Communist Control of Glasnost and Back? Media Freedom and Control on East Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and the Implications for Public Relations," at ICA 97.

**Karla Gower** (University of North Carolina, P.O. Box 2688 Chapel Hill, NC, 27515, USA; University Tel: +1 919 962 1000) delivered a paper, "Patrolling the Border: An Examination of Attempts by Democratic Governments to Restrict the Flow of Information Across Political Boundaries," at ICA 97.

**Heather Hudson** (University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton St., San Francisco, CA, 94117, USA; University Tel: +1 415 666 6886) presented a paper, "Restructuring the Telecommunications Sector in Southeast Asia: Policies and Pitfalls," at ICA 97.

**Divya McMillin** (Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 47405, USA; University Tel: +1 812 855 4848) presented a paper, "Building Blocks: The Role of the Mass Media in Constructing European Regional Identity," at ICA 97.

**Ilia Rodriguez** (University of Minnesota; home: 26 Taft Ave., Providence, RI 02906, USA; Tel: +1 401 831 0928; e-mail: <rodr011@gold.tc.umn.edu>) presented a paper, "Rethinking Communication and Development: High Modernity and the Cold War Paradigm," at ICA 97.

**K. Viswanath** (School of Journalism, Ohio State University, 242 W. 18th Ave., Columbus, OH 43210; Tel: +1 614 292-1319; Fax: +1 614 292-3809; e-mail: <VISHV@OST.EDU>) presented a paper, "Communication and Guided Social Change in the Global Community: Modernization, Dependency, and Social Change in the 'New World Order,'" at ICA 97.

**Shalini Venturelli** (American University, International Communication Division, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, DC, 20016-8071, USA; Tel: +1 202 686 5964; Fax: +1 202 885 2494; e-mail: <sventer@american.edu>) delivered a paper, "The Policy Design of the Global Information Society: Political and Cultural Dimensions," at ICA 97.

**Kyu Ho Youm** (Arizona State University, Cronkite School of Journalism & Telecomm, Tempe, AZ, 85287, USA; Tel: +1 602 965 5011; Fax: +1 602 965 7041; e-mail: <youm@asu.edu>) was respondent at a session on "Censorship, Telecommunications Policy and Information Flow: An International Perspective," at ICA 97.

**Acknowledgements**

Franz-Josef Eilers, SVD (Manila)  
Denis Daly, SJ (St. Louis)  
Barbary DeSouza (St. Louis)  
Julia Floechinger (St. Louis)

**Book Reviews**

Reviewer: W. E. Biernatzki, SJ ("WEB")


John J. Pauly, in his Foreword to *The Conversation of Journalism,* comments that "American journalism is suffering from a profound amnesia," which will not be cured by "clever marketing" (pg. vii). He says that the three authors "offer an alternative. They envision the daily newspaper as a common carrier for civic discourse, a medium for conversation among citizens rather than a conduit for professionally packaged information." (pg. viii)

The idea of a "public journalism," or, in the authors' words, a "conversational journalism," causes hackles to rise among many professional journalists who not only see their own gatekeeping role usurped but also decry the intrusion of unfiltered public opinion into the media, bypassing the standards of professional objectivity — "without fear or favor" — and precision which have helped make the news media "pillars of democracy."

But Pauly points out that the relationship between the media and democracy often has incorrectly been conceived of as that of an information-based society. He lists four reasons why he thinks "a society organized around the principle of information can never be democratic" (pg. xiii). They include confusion of information technology with actual communication, excessive individualism, information overload and consequent anxiety, and the actual marginality of the role of information in democratic social groups.

Rather, Pauly says, "What holds democracy together is not information but a mutual commitment to shared and appropriate ways of knowing" (pp. xiii-xiv). Pauly paraphrases one of the authors' "most striking arguments," that "journalism needs to listen more and speak less" (pg. xvi). The profession
needs to offer democracy more meaning and less information... It could help citizens create a world subject to democratic control, a society of humane pace and scale.

To do so, as Anderson, Dardenne, and Killenberg recommend, journalists may need to relinquish their more grandiose professional aspirations and simply open the pages of the daily newspaper to citizens' voices and concerns. (xvii)

The authors believe that the whole profession of journalism needs to be reconsidered, in the light of increasing complaints about it and "flagging public confidence" in it. A 1993 survey confirmed that "public attitudes towards mainstream news media continue to range from distrust to disdain." Alternative channels — talk shows, entertainment news, etc. — on the other hand, have flourished (pp. 1-2). "Breaking news" lacks depth and perspective. "Gotcha" journalism undermines confidence in public institutions, rather than responsibly fulfilling a watchdog role. Problems are approached through better marketing, rather than better journalism (pp. 3-4).

News delivered with sneers or sarcasm is offensive and reinforces the image of journalists as an effete elite — as supercilious, condescending know-it-alls. ..the one phrase no one ever seems to use is, 'I don't know.' (pg. 5)

A remedy would be to approach the news as a "creative activity," involving the citizens of the community.

Journalists create the news, but they hardly do it alone; they do it in a cultural environment that is itself created by diverse groups. *Journalism is not a communication profession simply because it is communicating news; it is a communication profession primarily by communicating well to create news in the first place.* (pg. 5, authors' italics)

Rather than being a mere "conduit of information," journalism should be thought of as a conversation which is practical and "translates into results you can see and feel!" (pg. 13). The authors say that news is difficult to define. "The most pervasive claim made about U.S. news is its supposed objectivity. Beyond certain verifiable facts, however, news is not and cannot be objective, although it can and must be fair" (pg. 38). They feel that forcing news into a mold of false objectivity "drastically limits its content and expression, discouraging and devaluing participation by the public journalism purports to serve" (ibid.).

The commodification of news also has seriously detracted from its contribution to democratic society.

News content results from economic decisions as much as from any decisions based on what people need to participate in a democratic process...even a notion of 'what people need' can be argued from an economic perspective. (pg. 61)

But turning the news into a lively, participatory conversation with the public could prove to be more economically rewarding than either dull and unpopulr information or sheer "infotainment." Encouraging public participation in creating and reporting the news also could provide a buttress against the media becoming a mere puppet of self-serving advertising masquerading as news (pg. 63).

More public participation could bring about the creation of a "multicultural and multidisciplinary commons," stimulating thought and pushing public discourse to higher intellectual levels (pp. 71-96). It would also create a constant pressure to improve the community in many ways, as suggested by the public's complaints and suggestions, kept responsible by being kept within the community context (pp. 97-123). By emphasizing their listening role, journalists can encourage greater dialogue and democratic participation by the public (pp. 125-144).

The authors also urge journalists to tell more "stories" (pp. 145-171). "News as story forces writers and readers to see beyond straight facts; it forces information into some kind of context and it requires a broader vision and understanding...it is part of the conversation in which people work toward truths and attempt to construct their own realities as they make sense out of the world and themselves" (pp. 170-171). A conversational model of journalism will, in the authors' estimation, also be a more communicative model than a journalism which is a mere monologue (pp. 173-188).

—WEB


This is the first title in media education published within the more general communication series of Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, edited by Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillmann. Advisory editors for media education are Robert Kubey and Renee Hobbs. The research was carried out at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, in 1993, by the first group of Annenberg Research Fellows, consisting of the author, Roger Desmond, Dafna Kamish, Robert Kubey, and Tamar Liebes. Davies notes that members of the group and Fellowship Program director Elihu Katz "debated long and energetically" about the meaning of the group's selected research topic, "media literacy in children" (pg. ix).

Purists have problems with applying the word "literacy" to the uses of the audio-visual electronic media, but enough parallels exist with the use of the written and printed media to justify the broadened application. Nevertheless, there are differences. The author indicates some of them.

Reading and writing, using essentially arbitrary signs, have to be taught and learned; but the understanding and use of one's native oral language "comes naturally." The same thing might be said of the interpretation of pictures — still or
moving — but the mass media add complexity and culturally defined artistic representation to the ways both orality and visual images are expressed which create problems of interpretation beyond the ability of a "natural" learning process to handle. Small children who have experienced many televised trains may have to ask, "Is that a real train?" when standing on a station platform (pg. 1f). Their natural faculties tell them that some things are real and some are not; but the media often create confusion about which is which. It is that confusion with which "media literacy education" has to deal. The child must learn the rules of media representation, but also must "have a body of knowledge about the real world, against which the various symbolic representations of it can be measured" (pg. 5).

Aspects of developmental psychology are discussed in chapter 2, and chapter 3 deals with reality and its perception on TV (pp. 21-34). The genre and the intentions of the producer may have little to do with the relative impact of a program on the child. The Wizard of Oz is less real than the news, but often inspires more fear in children (pg. 22).

Media productions have certain formal features, operating at three levels: the simple referential level portraying real world information, media conventions such as camera cuts and zooms which carry certain structural meanings, and "symbolic forms not unique to the medium" such as complex verbal language or the use of other visual codes" (pg. 36, following Rice, Houston and Wright, Children and the Formal Features of Television [1983]). The Annenberg study concentrated on the second and third levels.

The project is described in chapter 5. The sample consisted of 43 girls and 39 boys from Philadelphia between 6 and 11 years of age. They were interviewed about their responses to "four television programs shown to them on videotape at the time of the interview" (pg. 49).

The "children of all age groups showed a good awareness of TV illusions," regarding superheros' ability to fly, reality of TV fights, and advertising making things look better than they are in reality. But less than half realized that sitcoms were filmed on sets, rather than in real homes. Recognition of the fakery of ads was significantly greater than the opinion that such ads were "not OK" (pg. 53). Older children showed much less belief in mythical figures than did younger children, but both showed about the same awareness of "TV artifice," and all ages "showed good awareness of TV illusions" (pg. 60). Girls scored higher than boys on "prosocial" questions, and heavier TV viewing correlated with lower prosocial scores. Boys scored higher than girls on technical questions — e.g. How do the pictures change? — but only slight age differences were noted in these responses (pg. 61). Four chapters are devoted to comment on the findings regarding the four programs used in the study: Sesame Street, Real News for Kids (about presidential candidate Ross Perot), The Cosby Show, and The Sand Fairy.

Chapter 11 reports qualitatively on interviews conducted with 18 children "about the relationship of art to life" (pp. 124-138). Many of the children expressed indignation about "the misleading nature of commercials" (pg. 136). The children complained most about phoniness on television, in contrast to adults, much of whose "moralistic concern about television, in contrast, is not about phoniness, but about violence, which many children quite like...to make stories more exciting." But the older children were protective towards younger children with regard to violence, and "...children, like adults, believe that watching violence is all right for them, but they disapprove of it for children younger than themselves." (pg. 137).

In her closing chapter, after briefly describing earlier recommendations others have made about a strategy for media literacy education, Davies complains about their omission of the audience — the children — and stresses that

Without an understanding of how children themselves relate to mass media experience, how they interpret it, teach themselves about it, relate it to other experiences in their lives; how they talk, speculate, think, and hypothesize about it, none of these other initiatives is complete. Media education is different from other education and virtually unique as a subject area because many of the pupils are likely to have more direct experience as consumers of the products under review than have their teachers. (pg. 140)

According to the author, "judgments about the reality and credibility of media representations are often inseparable from evaluative judgments about the forms in which they are constructed..." — about the quality of the media themselves.

The quality of the broadcast media in the United States, in Britain, and everywhere (but particularly in the United States, with its almost total dominance of the world media market) is something that media educators should be addressing seriously. It is time to stop attacking the media...and start making them better, because they are definitely not going to go away." (pg. 149) —WEB


The Preface traces the origins of investigative reporting in the United States to "the establishment of the metropolitan newspaper during the early decades of the 1900s." Its search for "the facts" has now been enhanced by the computer, among other new technologies. Government records are especially amenable to computer analyses that can reveal discrepancies and other statistical clues which would be difficult or impossible to find using other means. Trends and patterns in systematically gathered information from non-governmental sources also can reveal secrets (pg. vii).

The "watchdog" function of the "fourth estate" reached its zenith in the often glamorous figure of the investigative reporter of the 20th century. Informants, leaked documents, insight, inductive reasoning, and luck were joined in the 1960s and 1970s by sophisticated technology as tools of the
trade (pg. 2). Consequently, the methods of the investigative reporter changed drastically. The older tools remained in use and necessary, but in many cases computers made possible the analysis of vast amounts of data which otherwise would have remained impenetrable. Of course, American laws guaranteeing public access to official records has made possible investigations there which could not be carried out under more secretive governments (pp. 2 and 4).

Chapters 1-4, after defining the computer assisted investigative reporting (CAIR) process trace its development through the past several decades, from the first uses of mechanical calculators through the fully computerized newsroom, including references to outstanding cases and various legal aspects, such as freedom of information laws. (pp. 1-95).

The remainder of the book deals with methods. Basic CAIR techniques as used in contemporary newsrooms are described in chapter 5 (pp. 96-111). Federal court data is used as an example in describing the analysis of large-scale electronic records (ch. 6, pp. 112-143). Chapter 7 deals with the methods and problems involved in reporting the results of investigations in the mass media (pp. 146-176). Chapter 8 discusses the distinction between computer assisted investigative reporting and social science research, the one hand, and between CAIR and precision journalism. The three methodologies are carefully delineated in chapters 8 and 9, with the latter chapter spelling out a formal methodology for CAIR analyses (pp. 211-237). A brief appendix (pp. 238-243) provides a dictionary of specific analytic techniques used in review of 130 CAIR stories, as they were described in chapter 5. —WEB

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Robinson Crusoe saw a footprint in the sand of his supposedly "desert" island and realized he was not alone, but now had to take account of the presence of other human beings in his previously "solipsistic" environment.

The title is adopted from Crusoe's Footprints by Patrick Brantlinger (1990). In Brantlinger's book, the story of Crusoe is taken as a metaphor for "every form of imperialism and of political division which has divided humankind in history into patrons and servants, dominators and dominated" (pg. 5, quoting Brantlinger).

Here, the metaphor is extended to the mass media experience, in which the audience finds itself, as it were, on its own desert island, confronted by signs, "footprints" marking the presence of others, exposure to a new social context, both promising and threatening (pg. 5). The general theme of the papers which comprise the book is that the mass media grow out of popular culture, and an adequate approach to media education requires an understanding of that relationship.

The book is the fourth in the series, "Mass Media Ed Educazione," and is the result of three years of educational research and practical classroom updating in the methods and theory of media education.

The contributions of the majority of authors, who are Italian, are supplemented by chapters written by Henk Hoekstra, O.Carm., of the Netherlands, on "Audiovisual Language, Culture, Ethical Formation," and by Britain's Len
Masterman, on "Experience and Tendency of Media Education in Europe."

The book's three main parts are titled, "Media and Culture," "Media Ed Education," and "Experience and Objectives." Cases discussed in the third section include Hitchcock films — Rear Window, in particular — Italian television's popular music programs, and the catechetical use of religious films.

Appendices include one titled, "Television Questions the Educator," and others on criteria for constructive use of TV by families, the text of a letter of Pope John Paul II on television and the family (dated January 24, 1994), a discussion of the mass media and the pre-adolescent approaching the year 2000, a review of progress and directions in media education by Roberto Giannatelli, SDB, and a 17-page bibliography citing works on media education in Italian, English, French and German. —WEB


Four questions are examined in this research "to determine how drug-related issues and events, both real and fabricated, and the primary agendas" of news organizations, politicians and the public "drove the issue over time" (pg. vii). The questions are:
1) How did the media structure issues and events?
2) How did the presidents structure issues and events?
3) How did these agendas and those manifested by public opinion relate to each other over time?
4) How did the Reagan and Bush administrations' agendas relate to these agendas and to each other on the drug issue? (pp. 26-27)

The relative priority assigned to the drug issue on the various agendas of people in different roles concerned with the issue has varied over time and in differing circumstances, as have their ways of approaching the problem. The object of the study was to chart the fluctuation of the intensity and interpretation of the drug issue in the public forum, as indicated and influenced by selected factors and actors, especially the presidents, the media and public opinion. It aims to move towards greater predictability of the fluctuations and to correlate them with changes in the various factors involved.

The history of the drug issue in the United States is sketched from 1984 to 1991 (chapter one). The author then describes methods which have been used to measure agendas and their relationships over time, with special attention to the ARIMA (Autoregressive, Integrated, Moving Average) model (chapter two). The operationalization of the research questions, hypotheses, and methodologies of the study is described (chapter three). The ways the media have structured the issue are analyzed (chapter four). The presidents' structuring of the issues is analyzed (chapter five). The ARIMA model is used to analyze the drug issue agendas to determine which of the agendas drove the others over time (chapter six).

In chapter seven, some of the conclusions and implications of the study for understanding the causal relationships of the various agendas. Evidence was found that public opinion focussed on the drug issue prior to media focus on it, suggesting that media attention was initiated by public concern. In turn, there were strong indications that media attention influenced presidential public relations activity concerning the problem. The state of media attention preceded comparable states of presidential action or inactivity on the problem by periods of three months and one month; as the state of public opinion had preceded comparable states of media attention or inattention by periods of four months and one month (pp. 96-98). It was clear that the two presidents were followers, rather than leaders, in dealing with the problem, but the response of Bush was notably quicker than that of Reagan. An important finding of the study was the strong influence of the media in setting the presidential agenda: "For the drug issue, the evidence is clear: The president responded to the media spotlight" (pg. 98).

In the background, however, was the "real-world" situation, typified by "the emergency room," which periodically moved the drug issue in and out of the public attention as changes occurred which caused it to be perceived as more or less severe. Gonzenbach feels that this study supported his findings in an earlier study, that

While the process appears complex and intertwined...the drug issue was a cyclical process driven by the reality of events and the reflected images of information campaigns and press and political concerns. (pg. 100)

Appendix A summarizes public opinion surveys for the period. Appendix B describes ARIMA modeling and analysis. Four pages of references are followed by author and subject indexes. —WEB


Each year, the British Broadcasting Standards Council issues the results of its research on broadcasting content, audience complaints, and public opinion in the UK concerning the broadcast media. This 1995 report focuses on audience opinions about scheduling on British television.

Three studies were conducted. One asked middle-aged adults to signify through hand-held electronic devices their degree of satisfaction with the programs they were watching. In a second study 1,000 respondents were questioned about
various aspects of TV scheduling. In the third study, a few children aged from 8 to 9 and 11 to 12 were asked their attitudes towards the targeting of programming, for comparison with the adult surveys.

All the surveys showed widespread knowledge of the need to schedule programming for different audiences especially children.

The last part of the book (pp. 107-147) consists of essays on the topic "by practising broadcasters and others with, we hope, something highly relevant to say," as the editor puts it (pg. 107).


Auctioneers and sportscasters use special techniques which give them the ability to speak rapidly and fluently, but that ability often is limited to the particular contexts of their work. Kuiper, from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand,

...first examines the contexts in which sportscasters and auctioneers speak and the nature of their speech. [He]...then offers a set of theories to explain how this speech comes to be the way it is. These theories might be testable in the laboratory, but instead, in this study, they are tested in the real world by looking for conditions that should be conducive to smooth talking, and then recording, transcribing, and analyzing the speech produced in such circumstances. (pg. 1)

The research focused on racecourse broadcasts and auctions (of tobacco, wool, antiques, etc.) in Australia, England, New Zealand, and the United States. It is about performance, both in Noam Chomsky's sense of the use of language (in contrast to its structure) and in the more usual sense of special kinds of speech which the speaker, at least, and usually his or her audience regard as worthy of special attention by those who hear it (pg. 2).

Both sportscasters' and auctioneers' performances employ formulaic speech using the resources of a particular speech tradition that assumes a certain level of knowledge of that tradition by the audience. The fastest auctions, for example, take place with the most professional buyers, while the presence of amateurs slows the auctioneer's speech. Increasing processing pressure on the performer, as in a sport with fast action or an auction with intensive bidding, will tend to elicit more formulaic speech, selected by the performer "from a very small dictionary," to ensure fluent communication under conditions of greater difficulty (pg. 73).

An appendix describes the sources and methods of collection and analysis of data used in the book. —WEB


The two Australian authors stress that communication is more than talk. "It helps the individual understand the dynamics of change. In particular, it focuses on enthymematic processes that can be used to effect change" (pg. xvii).

An "enthymematic communicator" is an "individual who thinks systematically and actively engages the world. In short, this book demonstrates the simultaneous potential of communication to both constrain and free the individual" (pp. xvii-xviii). The basic idea comes from Aristotle's Rhetoric, in which the philosopher noted how people fill in the missing parts of a message in ways that make sense to themselves (pg. xviii). Developing this principle, the authors propose a series of "laws" which guide the ways people shape their own meanings out of the limited information and clues derived from the messages they receive. For example, law number 6, the "Law of Narcissistic Strength" says that "the strategic communicator uses what the self idiosyncratically knows" (pg. xx and chapter 3); and law number 15, "Law of Identity Conservation: The self conserves its form through the interpretation of information" (pgs. xxii and chapter 6). Law number 22, the "law of resistance," states that "Unilateral attempts at control inspire proportional resistance" (pg. xxiv and chapter 9).

The enthymematic communicator model is opposed by the author to the simplistic sender-message-receiver model, or "magic bullet approach," which woefully underestimates the wonderful complexity and richness of the phenomena of communicating. The enthymematic perspective forces a greater scrutiny of system processes, it mandates an orientation to others, and it continually adapts to both chaos and order. (pg. 225)

The authors feel that an enthymematic communicator is better positioned to intervene effectively in life situations (pg. 203). —WEB


This undergraduate textbook covers both quantitative and qualitative methods for mass communication research. It does not assume that the reader has a background in either statistics or media theory (pg. xxiii).
The text is divided into five parts, totalling fifteen chapters, covering: 1) social science foundations; 2) data collection for both quantitative and qualitative studies; 3) quantitative analysis techniques; 4) qualitative analysis; and 5) "Branching Out," which includes a chapter on some new directions in research and the limits — including ethical limits — of social science, and a final chapter on writing research reports.

Several boxes in each chapter focus on important concepts in that chapter. Exercises and key words are given at the end of most chapters, and the words are defined in an eighteen-page glossary (pp. 237-255). Other appendices contain tables of random numbers and critical values of Chi-Square, and a two-page list of references.

Each chapter is introduced by a cartoon. —WEB


This yearbook of the Italian public television and radio service (RAI) presents a detailed picture of the network and its context in European and world broadcasting. Introductory pages describe the network's mission and organization, including a description of the restructuring it underwent in 1993.

A substantial section (pp. 31-164) is devoted to a "Statistical Panorama," covering a wide range of topics for 1993, including programming and financial data. Comparative figures for 1992 are frequently supplied, and in some cases they cover the decade 1984-1993. Some comparison is made with other countries, for example investment in advertising (pp. 130-135). Another, "Statistical Summary" section (pp. 165-197) presents data from 1994, with some comparisons with 1993. Aspects of the six services (three television: Raiuno, Raidue, and RaiTre; and three radio: Radiouno, Radiodue, and Radiotre) are then presented separately (pp. 199-280). A section includes texts of relevant documentation, including Laws no. 206, on public radio and television (1993), and 223 on both public and private radio and television (1990), as well as regulations implementing them (pp. 281-359). A chronology lists major events in the history of RAI from 1923 to January 1995 (pp. 361-376). Administrative and union officers are listed on pg. 378, and a final section gives addresses, telephone numbers and fax numbers for RAI offices in Italy and overseas. —WEB


The twelve Nijmegen- and Amsterdam-based contributors to this volume approach media use as social action by the audience. Although they wish to develop a specifically European perspective on audience research, their reference to "social action" is somewhat reminiscent of the social action theories of the American sociologist Talcott Parsons. Renckstorff and McQuail, in their introductory chapter, "Social Action Perspectives in Mass Communication Research..." remark that the conceptualization of the "active audience" has become a central and comparatively stable element of communication theory and research. Few, if any, serious scholars would any longer hold a simplistic stimulus-response notion of communication effects which neglected the role of the audience.

In response to criticisms of the "recent state of the art" of communication research, such as Klaus Krippendorf's call for more attention to developing adequate epistemologies (pg. 4), the authors describe various approaches which have been taken to the field. They discern three models underlying empirical communication research: a "media centred model," an "audience-centred model," and a "culture-centred model" (pg. 9). Similarities of social action theory to the "culture-centred model" are acknowledged, but Renckstorff and McQuail recognize the different origin of their approach: in sociology. They feel that their Media as Social Action (MASA) approach offers a conceptual bridge between opposed schools of research, since it is emphatically interpretive and sensitive to social-cultural contexts, yet at the same time capable of uncovering regularities and suggesting general explanations of audience phenomena. (pg. 17)

Subsequent chapters deal with further amplification of the theoretical perspective, with methodological issues, with a reconceptualization of "information needs," with heavy viewing as social action, with characteristics of non-viewers of television, with television viewing as social activity, with watching foreign TV channels, with viewership of information-oriented programs, with issue involvement in the viewing of TV news, with women's use of TV news, with gender differences in recalling TV news, and with information needs of the elderly.

The volume has an 18-page bibliography, but no index. —WEB


government to block their publication. A Supreme Court decision upheld the newspapers’ right to publish, reaffirming the freedom of the press. At the time that the newspapers were trying to publish excerpts from the 7,000-page document, the government feared publication would result in a serious compromise of national security. Subsequently, such central figures in the government at the time as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not claim that such damage actually occurred (pp. 328-329). Nevertheless there were real fears in the intelligence community that agents would be put at risk and that publication would indirectly have done damage to national security. Concerning that risk the author concludes

All in all, it seems indisputable that the Pentagon study contained information that could have seriously harmed the national security if disclosed. That does not mean, of course, that the threatened injury was of such a magnitude as to justify a prior restraint. In addition the information in question likely formed a small percentage of the overall study. (pg. 329)

Perhaps the most important result of the case was its effect on the internal operation of the Nixon administration. Charles Colson, Nixon’s close political adviser, wrote in his autobiography that the Nixon presidency passed a ‘crossroads of sorts’ during the Pentagon Papers episode (pg. 344). Later, Colson said that, “as a result of the Pentagon Papers episode ‘the ground rules [within the White House] began to change’” (pg. 344, quoting Colson). According to Rudenstein, Nixon’s frustration about the case caused him to distrust the FBI and other agencies and to organize the “Plumbers Unit,” the group under his direct control which later carried out the Watergate burglary that led to the President’s resignation (pp. 346-347).

The author explores the many complexities of the case, including an assumption that the government was trying to exercise “prior restraint,” an assumption which no one questioned when the case was in the courts, but which Rudenstein feels did not clearly apply to this particular situation (pg. 170 and the extended discussion of prior restraint in footnote 4, pp. 377-379)

He nevertheless regards the Court’s final decision as a courageous balancing of risks:

..the Court decided to risk the dangers inherent in a freer press because the alternative resolution — enhancing government power to censor the press — was even more threatening to a stable and vital democracy. (pg. 355) —WEB


This effort "to integrate the various persuasive tools of marketing" (pg. ix) contains 19 papers resulting from the 11th Annual Advertising and Consumer Psychology Conference, held in Chicago, May 14-15, 1992.

The books editors describe integrated marketing communication as

..the strategic coordination of multiple communication voices. Its aim is to optimize the impact of persuasive communication on both consumer and nonconsumer (e.g., trade, professional) audiences by coordinating such elements of the marketing mix as advertising, public relations, promotions, direct marketing, and packaging design. (pg. 1)

The papers are grouped in seven sections dealing with definitions and theory, psychological processes, managing integrated marketing communication, case studies of integrated campaigns, measuring their impact, the role of public relations, and a theoretical summary and conclusions with a research agenda.

Sandra Moriarty, in her theoretical summary, notes that the "synergy — linkages created in a receiver’s mind as a result of messages that connect" — is responsible for the impact of integrated marketing communication, since the structure of messages working together has more power than single messages or several uncoordinated messages (pg. 333). The "key dimensions to integration... can be summarized as a circle of synergy — by repetition and coordination to lock a message concept in memory" (pg. 350).

In his closing chapter (Ch. 19, pp. 355-367) on research about integrated marketing communication, and reacting to the earlier papers, Richard J. Lutz notes that different media have different strengths, a factor which has to be taken into account when orchestrating their integration into a marketing campaign (pg. 357). Measurement of advertising effects in general, and of the effects of integrated marketing in particular is so daunting as to seem almost impossible, since so many stimuli are competing for the consumer’s attention at the same time (pp. 362-363). Field research — observing consumers in action — is seen as essential, as is proper selection of dependent variables and the use of multiple methods — especially methods which reveal the effect of messages which do not involve the consumer at a high level of intensity but do impact him/her in many low-level ways over longer time spans (pp. 362-366).

Ethical considerations do not appear in the index. —WEB
He was the right hand of the Jesuit general, Pedro Arrupe, who tried to integrate social communication more strongly into the life and work of the Jesuits. Arrupe was not after a superficial conformity to modern developments, but rather he was after a deeper understanding between the Church and modern communication development.

What does this mean for the Church, for a community of missionaries, like the Jesuits, and the incarnation of the Christian belief of our time? In 1968 Pedro Arrupe sought out Stefan Bamberger for the general curia of the Jesuits in Rome in order to probe deeper and in an appropriate fashion into communication questions.

Stefan Bamberger was a teacher when he decided to join the Jesuits. Before he was called to Rome he had worked from 1956 to 1967 for the Swiss Catholic Film Office in Zurich, which he headed from 1960 to 1968. He earned his doctorate in sociology with a dissertation on university students and cinema, and thereby qualified himself for his work. In these years he also edited the "Filmberater" and became director of probably the very first cinema archive in the world, the Joseph Joye Archive. He wrote articles and books addressing questions about films, but during his days in Rome he dedicated himself increasingly to group media and communication research.

Pedro Arrupe encouraged him to found a Church center for research on questions about social communication. He was inspired by the conviction that the most modern standards can only be legitimately applied after one has researched deeply and thoroughly and then developed the work in a deliberate and a scholarly manner. So Bamberger, spurred on by the General, brought together a group of experts, which also included non-Jesuits. They met for a few days for reflection and planning in Cavaletti near Rome and in Milwaukee. At the meeting in Cavaletti, Arrupe insisted upon being present for some time.

Out of these deliberations came the "Centre for the Study of Communication and Culture", for which Stefan bought a building in London and of which he became the first director in 1977.

"Goldhurst Terrace" in London became, with its fast growing specialized library, the most important address for all those who were academically concerned with the Church and social communication. Influenced by this initiative and with the support of the rector of that time, who was later to become the Archbishop and Cardinal of Milan, Carlo Martini, the Interdisciplinary Center for Social Communication at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome was founded in 1979.

When Bamberger was appointed to head the Swiss Jesuit province in 1981, which he directed until 1987, he had to give up London and dedicate himself completely to the work of Switzerland, the country where he had been born on Christmas Day 1923. Another, further initiative of his time in Rome was the founding of "Multimedia International," a union of communication secretaries at generalates of religious orders and congregations for mutual support and cooperative effort in the different areas of social communication. It had its office in the General Curia of the Jesuits, in Rome. After his transfer to London, Bamberger remained chairman of Multimedia International for four more years, until 1980.

He managed to build up an international framework within the entire order under the name "Jesuits in Communication" (JESCOM), which is structured geographically by countries and continents. When, in 1975, the 32nd General Congregation of the Jesuits emphasized the need to highlight the dimension of communication, it specified that this should be especially so in the education of youth. This was definitely also a fruit of his presence and efforts. One must also see the first document dedicated solely to communication in the history of the Jesuits, at the 34th General Congregation in 1995, as a late fruit of Bamberger's influence.

The early part of 1990 marked the beginning of a long period of suffering for the dynamic Jesuit. A stroke prevented him from speaking and reading. After intensive efforts recovery began to take place, a brain tumor was discovered, which, although benign, hampered his memory. During August of 1995 his condition rapidly worsened, until finally the Lord freed him from his suffering on January 29, 1997. He found his final resting place in the cemetery at Bad Schoenbrunn Jesuit Retreat House, south of Zurich, where he had spent his final years.

With Stefan Bamberger, one of the pioneers of communication after Vatican II was taken from us. His service will never be forgotten.

First published in Communicatio Socialis (Matthias-Grünwald Verlag, Mainz, Germany). Translated from the German by Julia Ann Floerchinger, a student at Saint Louis University.