TELEVISION REPORTING OF THE GULF WAR

By W. Cordelian

Newsmen and soldiers enter a war situation with almost intrinsically opposed priorities. The soldiers must fight to win. Their imperatives include staying alive, keeping casualties on their own side at a minimum, concealing their forces' intentions and movements from the enemy to ensure maximum advantage, and inflicting enough damage on the enemy to guarantee victory. Newsmen, on the other hand, are supposed to ferret out the truth about the confrontation and to report it as fully as possible to their audiences.

Technologically, the Gulf War of early 1991 was the most thoroughly reported of any war in history. The human factor was an entirely different story. Protests and criticism flew as hot and heavy as bullets and rockets, both during and after the fighting, and journalistic breast-beating, in some quarters, thunders almost as loudly as the bombs.

The War, whatever else may be said about it, was a costly 'laboratory case' for students of the media. It has stimulated much passionate discussion, and even some valuable research projects, and promises to continue to do so. The War affected people. So did the way television and the other mass media reported it. It is this impact on people which prompts Trends to devote special attention to research on television coverage of the War.
I. Reporting War

*Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands*  
(1 Samuel: 18:7)

*How are the mighty fallen! Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice...*  
(2 Samuel, 1: 19-20)

In the earliest available records wars have been  
reported with a profound purpose, and with careful  
thought for the effects of the information. The artful  
re-presentation of struggles helps a nation to identify  
itself (*The Iliad*), leaders to validate their claims to  
supremacy (Julius Caesar’s *Gallic Wars*) and  
administrations to justify censorship (David, above)  
or other limitations of peacetime civil rights.

Nineteenth Century

J. C. Andrews. *The South Reports The Civil War.*  

In recent centuries the English used to signal a  
military victory such as that over the Spanish  
Armada or Wellington’s defeat of Napoleon at  
Waterloo by lighting fires on hilltop beacons, whose  
organised message spread across the country faster  
than would mere wildfire. The nineteenth and  
twentieth centuries saw the arrival of photography,  
electric wire and then broadcast communication, each  
of which contributed to the delivery of images that  
were more immediate for non-participants. This may  
have promoted politically mediated effects, although  
the images may not necessarily have been more  
thruthful. The *London Times* had reports from the  
Crimean war and from base camps in Turkey,  
whence vivid accounts of suffering affected military  
and hospital provisions and plans, while the  
American Civil War was ‘brought home’ across the  
States with a new rapidity (Andrews, 1970).

World War I

J. Carmichael. *First World War Photographers.* New  

World War I involved unprecedented amounts of  
carnage, the truth of which was not fully  
communicated to home publics for fear of pacifism.  
Many photo reports (Carmichael, 1989), books of  
memoirs and histories have kept consciousness of  
that war alive, though such feedback did not serve to  
forestall the Second World War. Carmichael (p.65)  
makes it plain that a central editorial process was at  
work, for example in the influence of the Canadian  
press magnate Beaverbrook over giving full credit to  
his countrymen’s role, as well as to helping the  
British Department of Information in their  
propaganda efforts. Beyond the main ‘theatre’ of war  
the Americans Lowell Thomas and Harry Chase  
produced photographs of T.E.Lawrence which did  
much to create his legendary persona and helped his  
role as spokesperson for the Arab cause at the  
Versailles peace conference.

The ‘home front’ in Britain was also mobilised by  
photo and print journalism as when, in 1917 after a  
catastrophic loss of allied shipping scenes of shipyard  
construction showed how the nation was coping. The  
British Chief Censor Rear Admiral Brownrigg wanted  
to report the loss of the battleship *Audacious* in 1914,  
realising that suppression led to rumour and  
undermined the credibility of official information, but  
he was overruled by the Commander in Chief  
(Carmichael, 1989:118). Many such incidents  
illustrate the same problems that continue to occur  
with reporting war.

World War II

E. E. Dennis. ‘Introduction’. In C. LaMay, M.  
FitzSimon and J. Sahadi (Eds.), *The Media At War:  
The Press and The Persian Gulf Conflict.* New York  
City: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991.

Steibenne, D. ‘The Military and the Media’. In C.  
LaMay, M. FitzSimon and J. Sahadi (Eds.), *The  
Media At War: The Press and The Persian Gulf  
Conflict.* New York City: Gannett Foundation Media  
Center, 1991.

World War II saw the heyday of radio reporting. Air  
raids brought civilian populations under attack and  
third-party journalists could generate considerable  
emotion in describing the scenes. US reporter Ed  
Murrow described the bombing of London. Walter  
Cronkite, David Brinkley and John Chancellor, when  
asked years later about the greatest story in their  
careers all answered ‘World War II of course’ (Dennis,  
1991). To witness battle was an existential prize for  
reporters’ machismo, and to report it while saving  
themselves enhanced the adventure. The more  
thoughtful of reporters have placed this motivation
alongside that of informing the public, while the photographer Don McCullin (1990) has anguished over the ethics of capturing suffering while not doing anything immediately to alleviate it.

Stebenre (1991) states that America first imposed restrictions on reporting security matters almost a year before Pearl Harbour when an Office of Censorship was established. In the Pacific theatre General MacArthur 'required each correspondent's copy to go through a multiple censorship review ... and pressured journalists to produce stories that burnished the image of the troops and their supreme commander' (Stebenne, 1991).

**Vietnam**


In the early stages of the Vietnam war it was decided not to impose compulsory censorship. 'Military officials were anxious to have the press pay more attention to the conflict so as to buttress support for American intervention' (Stebenne, 1991). This reflected the view that was developing (Knightley, 1975) that though 'the first casualty' in war is truth, reporters have historically tended to function as 'cheerleaders' for their own side. As the tide of battle turned, censorship pressures were actually reduced. McDonald (1985) for one, believes that the resulting flow of information, pictures to the fore, did much to turn the public against the war. Hooper (1982: 13) writes 'Hanoi received the unwitting support of the media during the Tet offensive in 1968: the American media had misled the American people ...and when they realised they had misjudged the situation - that in fact it was an American victory - they didn't have the courage or the integrity to admit it'. Braestrup's (1977) extensive research supports this view of General Westmoreland's.

Hooper gives several reasons why the journalists in the field may have contributed to this 'reversed image of reality', mostly to do with inexperience, but adds (p.114) 'the editorial effect in America on copy dispatched from Vietnam and the microcosmic view of television'. He continues: 'the media ...believed that the public had no heart for the war so they tried to interpret the war according to what the public felt. But the more they saw of the war, the more pessimistic they became. So their reporters became more critical and cynical which in turn rubbed off on the public and so the cycle began again'. Hooper's analysis is that of a serving soldier, but indicates why the military arm in western countries became very cautious about front line reporting of subsequent conflicts.

**After Vietnam**


Three localised wars in the 1980s saw American arms in Grenada and Panama (December 1989), and the British in the Falklands, all holding off the journalistic presence. This enabled operations to make considerable progress before any domestic opposition might gather momentum. After the Vietnam war the American military created a panel to study the problem of censorship in war. The report, named for the group's chairman Major General Sidle, set the goal of allowing media coverage 'to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of US forces'. It is not clear from Stebenne's account of this whether 'mission security' implies a political stance, of supporting the goals of a war. However, the principles underlying the guidelines were notably liberal though one of the recommendations, to set up 'media pools' in remote combat zones, led in the Iraq war to much journalistic frustration.

After the Iraq war and considerable journalistic disquiet about fulfilling the mission to inform, Kurtz and Gellman were able to report (1992) that military
officials and news organisations had agreed on nine principles which should govern future war coverage. The first was that 'open and independent reporting' would be the 'principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations', with pools not being the standard mechanism of delivery of information. Military public affairs officers should not interfere with reporting, reporters should have assistance with transport and access 'whenever feasible' and the military should supply and not obstruct the use of communications links and facilities.

The British experience in the Falklands provided an example of how information flow could be influenced by the military, thus supporting the military commitment once it has been made (Morrison and Tumber, 1988). In distinction to World War II and the United Nations' action in Korea, the Falklands war was against an opponent in which many British citizens, including reporters, lived and worked. Britain was provided with direct reports of Argentinian perceptions and feelings which humanised rather than demonised the enemy (Wober, 1982). The Glasgow University Media Group (1985: p.13) reported how the BBC debated whether to refer to 'invasion' or 'repossession' and whether to identify ('we', 'us') with the British forces or to refer to them in the third person. After emphatic political expression of patriotic views (p.127) 'the BBC chairman had to reassure the Prime Minister that "the BBC is not neutral"'. Nevertheless a BBC journalist Robert Harris (1983: 151) referred to 'the lies, the misinformation, the manipulation of public opinion by the authorities; the political intimidation of broadcasters; the ready connivance of the media at their own distortion...' by which he raised a serious question.

The question that Harris evoked concerns a shaping of information, not just by the military whose activities are the original source, but by the press and the broadcasters. Harris had prefaced his remarks by referring to 'the instinctive secrecy of the military and the Civil Service; the prostitution and hysteria of actions of the press...' This, notably, distinguishes within the category of 'the media' between broadcasters (whom he does not blame) and (sections of) the press, about whom he is harsh. Harris implied that a most important locus of selective processing is in the editorial offices of the broadcaster or newspaper.

Boyd-Barrett (1980) discusses the international news agencies as analogous to a central nervous system serving news consciousness, but the brain that knows the result is the editorial team. Studies of news editing (Altheide, 1976; Schlesinger, 1978) show how this 'central processor' is considerably responsible for shaping the 'story' that will contribute to a public awareness, but these authors were not dealing with the special circumstances of wartime. The Glasgow Media Group (1985:13-28) were 'lucky' however to start their work on the threshold of the Falklands war and obtained and reported documents from the BBC's News and Current Affairs management group. The BBC developed its policies as the war progressed - moving against interviews with British bereaved or with Argentine diplomats and finding a fulcrum for its responsibility to present balance in news which lay well within a broadly patriotic perception of the war. This was not always comfortable with front line journalists (see Harris, above) but did not lead afterwards to any major re-appraisal of the broadcasters' performance during hostilities.

Pointers from this brief review of reporting wars before the Iraq conflict:

-Even in liberal democratic countries a war poses a fundamental conflict between the state's ideals of openness and the needs, to which all citizens are tied, to promote success in war.

-The futures of political and military leaders are at stake; pressures are applied towards enhancing their repute.

-Technical means have developed to send pictures as well as words, immediately, across the globe. Pictures' selected nature is less apparent to the viewer than are the minds of the audio or print reporter to the listener or the reader. Pictures have greater credibility but by this token a greater responsibility and a greater propensity to mislead.

-Points at which information is selectively processed include the journalistic pool, close to the events themselves, and soon under much critical scrutiny; and the news editorial rooms. Although closer to the consumer, the editorial function is less visible and has been less studied than pools. Consequently it has received less criticism.
II. The Background To The Iraq War


Kuwait and Iraq

Several writers including Simpson (1991) and Wolton (1992) have introduced their reviews of the war with accounts of the history of relationships between Iraq and Kuwait. Present day international legality is mediated by the United Nations, its ideals and its administrative provisions. These both refer back to the previous international effort at overseeing a world order by the League of Nations. Iraq's borders are based on the three provinces of the Turkish empire namely Mosul (in the north) Baghdad and Basra, which had been placed by the League of Nations under a British mandate. The mandate lasted eleven years until 1932, but one of its legacies was the nature of the boundary with Kuwait.

Kuwait had been a British protectorate in 1914, though also with ill defined borders. These were 'improved' in 1923 when, according to Simpson (p.80), a Major Moore put up a noticeboard in the desert a mile south of the last tree in Safwan, to mark the Iraqi frontier. One principle of delimitation had been a 40 mile radius basis on Kuwait City; another had been a somewhat wider area in which the Emir of Kuwait could levy tribute. In 1932 Iraq wanted to join the League of Nations, but also to annex Kuwait. Britain resisted this, but in 1938 Iraq again repudiated the idea that Kuwait should be independent. In the 1950s Iraq continued to press the possibility that it might lease a strip in the north of Kuwait, though this was rejected by the Emir. During Iraq's war with Iran the Kuwaiti border claim remained in abeyance, but the matter was again explicitly argued immediately after the war ended.

Simpson points out (1991:83) that the Turkish province of Basra 'supposedly' ran Kuwait through the nineteenth century, though in fact the satrap 'let Kuwait go its own way'. In 1756 the local nomads chose Shaikh Sabah as their leader, thus establishing a dynasty which lasts to this day. The rulers remained on good terms with the British, and by 1960 Britain undertook to defend Kuwait if asked to do so, a responsibility which was replaced at Kuwaiti independence in 1961, by a friendship treaty. Among matters which Simpson does not mention is the fact that both Iraq and Kuwait are separate members of the Arab League, implying a mutual recognition of independence, and that they also both belonged to OPEC, the oil producing countries' union.

It is important here to attend to one view of Arab nationalist ideology, explained by al-Khalil (1990). He writes: 'bizarre as it may seem, the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait is genuinely seen by the Ba'ath state as an extension of the total amount of freedom available to the Arab people'. How is this? The quantity of Arabness in a human being was measured by the intensity of this inner feeling of love towards the idea of a single Arab nation. It was not even possible to be an Arab without believing in the imperative of union between all Arabs at the same time. This is the core of Ba'athism'. This implies that the nation state concept entrenched in the United Nations does not correspond fully with a certain Arab outlook; Iraqi Arabs would perceive Kuwaiti Arabs, and also Egyptians and Syrians as brothers in 'one nation'. The fact that Egyptians and Syrians were part of the opposition to Iraq was a tragedy which was partly the outcome of the international status of the regions of the Arab world having been divisively determined by Western powers after the collapse of the Turkish empire. An attempt was made (see below) to see whether British respondents would have any knowledge of this wider Arab nationalism.

A second strand in the tension between Kuwait and Iraq was economic, linked with oil. Kuwait had helped Iraq's war effort against Iran with about $40 billion. Iraq saw that war as partly waged on behalf of Kuwait and other Gulf states, warding off Iranian expansionism, and thus perhaps morally absolving it of an obligation to repay the whole sum. As well, part of the aid had been in oil, drawn from the Rumailah field in the area to which Iraq had made its historic (though not convincing) claim. In 1990 Kuwait increased its oil output thus depressing the world price and cutting Iraq's income when it was striving to recover after the debilitating Iran War.

A third source of Iraqi irritation was the thought that Israel and the United States were conspiring to destroy the nuclear power that Iraq was developing after the earlier bombing of the Osirak reactor by Israel. These considerations were undoubtedly bound up with Saddam Hussein's ambitions to lead the Arab (and Muslim) world in a cleansing of its encumbrance with Israel. Saddam Hussein would thus recreate the glory of the Mesopotamian powers of Assyria and of Babylon. Simpson (1991:90) refers
to a poster proclaiming 'From Nebuchadnezzar to Saddam Hussein' in Babylon, where the Hanging Gardens had recently been rebuilt by Saddam’s regime. More especially he would reconstitute the later Abbasid Islamic empire based on Baghdad.

The Record Of Saddam Hussein


Some writers (e.g. Cockburn, Gerbner, Kellner) appear critical of a ‘demobilisation’ of Saddam Hussein as responsible for the war and suffering that afflicted his own and neighbouring peoples. It might mitigate any such view if the historical antecedents of Iraq’s tension with Kuwait were better - or at all known in ‘the West’. What was widely known, however, was Hussein's record as a tyrant; and though such authors imply that the United States’ realpolitik reasons for intervention in Gulf affairs (containment of Iran, support for Saudi Arabia, balance between Iraq and Syria) were stronger than goals of support for human rights, it is necessary also to confront those of Hussein's actions whose knowledge fuelled the view of Saddam as a latter-day Hitler.

First, Simpson quotes Saddam Hussein’s own words and first hand witnesses of his deeds in reaching and reinforcing his power (1991:26-356). These include a prescription for the indoctrination of children to inform on their parents who may not support the regime, individual murders of opponents, and political purges including a televised show trial in July 1979 after which 22 men were "democratically executed", meaning that senior party members took part in the firing squads. A month later 'something like 500 senior members of the Party were weed ed out for "democratic execution". A beginning had been made' (p.36).

Simpson (pp 47-51) documents the Iraqi gassing of thousands of its own Kurdish unarmed citizens and tells (p.39) of the archway of two giant scimitars from each of which hung a net 'containing hundreds of Iranian helmets ... holed by bullets .... When the Mongol leader Hulagu destroyed Baghdad ... he built a mound of skulls to celebrate his victory. This is Saddam Hussein's mound of skulls. He also had dozens more helmets set into the surface of the roadway ... to enable him to ride over the heads of his enemies'.

Within this context, when Hussein declared in early 1990 that, if there was an attack on Iraqi installations he would 'let our fire consume half of Israel' (editorial in the London Times, 4 April), it was realised that this was not likely to be an idle threat. It was also Hitlerian in that since chemical warfare is indiscriminate such an attack would harm Christian and Muslim Arabs as well as Jews. The threat would certainly be construed in Israel as quite definitely inviting a pre-emptive strike. Thus the stage was set for a conflict with weapons of mass destruction which promised incalculable harm.

The nuclear threat in this instance had to be inferred, and there are signs (below) that it was not widely grasped; however, the grim details of Saddam Hussein's actual bloody and cynical rise to power, subsequent record and future threats were concrete enough and certainly lodged in 'the public mind' as several surveys (below) have shown.

It is important to distinguish between the real record of Saddam and the rhetoric of war criticism which can in some cases be read as implying that demonisation was somehow unfair. Mitchell (1992) writes of a need to take note of the 'public relations war's...attempt to provide a positive ... story line ... Desert Storm was a kind of utopian replay of World War II ... against an enemy portrayed as Hitler incarnate'. Mitchell immediately cautions 'I don't mean to deny, of course, that Saddam Hussein was (and still is) an evil, vicious and dangerous tyrant'; however, he continues, 'his characterisation as Hitler ... has more to do with the strategies of a public relations war than ... with the real aims and consequences of our war in the Middle East .... It allowed the vast majority of the American public to celebrate without qualms the spectacle of mass destruction of unwilling Iraqi conscripts ... and of innocent civilians (and) a kind of blissful amnesia (that Saddam) continues to massacre ethnic minorities within his borders'.

Mitchell's analysis (he is a professor of English at the University of Chicago) does not cite evidence supporting these contentions on public 'celebration' and 'blissful amnesia'. Evidence (see Thomas 1991, below) from before the war indicates that the public were aware of the moral dilemmas surrounding the options before and the 'conclusions' to the war.

The Hitler-Saddam equation raises the question of
what to do, internationally, when a tyrant is seen as grossly infringing civil rights not only of his own citizens, but also threatening those beyond his own borders. The implied notion is that there comes a point when war is justified, preferably brief and accurate but involving and accepting the concomitant human destruction. Several examples between Hitler and Hussein may help students to reflect on the dilemma. These include the deposition of Pol Pot in Cambodia by a Vietnamese force; the condemnation of Ariel Sharon's attempt to cast the PLO in Lebanon in the tyrant role and to expel it; the Tanzanian decision to oust Idi Amin from Uganda; the American move to act against their creature Noriega in Panama; the international neglect of China's culturalism in Tibet and of oppression in Burma, as well as American laissez faire treatment of and sometimes support for various 'petty' Central and South American dictators; and, in the present context, of President Hafez Assad of Syria.

Psychological Dimensions Of The Gulf Conflict


Lloyd Demause, editor of the Journal of Psychohistory sees the Gulf War as a Mental Disorder. Since minds are essentially the property of individuals this raises the question of where the 'national consciousness' may be located, to which no explicit answer is provided in the ten articles in the journal issue on this topic. However, Demause and other contributors make much use of cartoons, and reference to utterances in the press and in broadcasting, so it may not be unfair to infer that wherever the national consciousness may be located, its processes are at least accessible in 'the media'. Demause says that because his access to Iraqi material is limited he will focus on American psychodynamics; so though the colloquium sets out to lay bare the inner origins of a war, which is a two-sided matter, the roots of most of its argument are in the disorder diagnosed as affecting one side in particular.

Demaus's institute has monitored over one hundred magazines and papers and it reports that after the invasion of Kuwait Saddam Hussein was widely reported in cartoons and text as a 'terrifying parent, a child abuser ... '. However, these two images were already common in American accounts for over a year before the invasion. Demause quotes the Washington Post as writing that 'after eight years of optimism America is in ... an ugly spasm of guilt, dread and nostalgia. Once more, America is depressed'; he then says these 'shared dream images' were national wishes characteristic of one who suffered a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) of a kind that regularly occurs after periods of rapid change and prosperity - a sort of guilt-ridden hangover after a binge. These conditions, Demause says, precede wars since (p.8) 'the nation has been sinful ... and ... someone should be made to pay for the period of excess by some sort of a sacrifice'.

Just as individuals suffering from PTSD strike out at others, 'large groups ... can achieve considerable catharsis ... through periodic group healing rituals'. Demause refers to anthropological accounts of rituals of human sacrifice in some cultures; but it is likely that such things occurred in societies where the great majority shared the same beliefs. There is a difficulty in attributing this construction to the American condition, since it has been reported by Thomas (see below) that there was substantial opposition in America towards the war. Nevertheless, Demause continues to develop his thesis that the Gulf war was a form of therapeutic bloodletting psychodrama devised by the American leadership to assuage a national neurosis. Demause makes a serious charge in writing (p.14) that 'the war's real goal was to kill victims, not to protect oil or save American jobs or put an emir back on his throne'.

Demaus concludes that unhealthy American child raising practices (ranging from over neglect, to excessive physical punishment as a social control) are slowly giving way to better behaviour, so that the young were less in favour of the war than were older people. So '...one can expect that the elimination of traumatic childhood for most people could finally mean an end to war ... '. This analysis is supported by Paris Kirkland, a retired artillery officer with service in Korea and Vietnam who interviewed
soldiers about to go to war in Panama. He noted an enthusiasm which had three ingredients: eagerness to be with comrades in a supreme adventure, desire to be a part of an historic event, and excitement at being covered by television. Kirkland does not say whether to withdraw this last item or to handle it differently might affect willingness to fight, or even to enlist, but he does conclude that if the 'painful aspects of childhood are alleviated, the psychological processes that support war will be less intense' (p.63).

Beyond childhood, Bloom goes on to consider the adolescence of a nation: 'Let us pretend that the United States is a very complex individual'; after a childhood in which it severed relations with the mother 'lacking much effective parental influence, the nation grew up wild, independent and undisciplined' (p.88). Bloom sees the United States' adolescence as having started after the Civil War; the Puritan conscience is considered the father-figure, the source of much guilt at having nuclear-bombed Japan. Amongst the maladaptive experiences in the decades since then are the gender-equal 1960s. This is a source of 'ambiguity' which adolescents reject. Further guilt arose following the Vietnam war, seen as an immature attempt to discharge frustrations by hitting a scapegoat. Worst of all was the loss of a dependable enemy whose presence shored up much of the 'stability' of the 1980s; 'when the Berlin wall collapsed we looked through it and saw that the enemy was us ... fortunately the nation quickly found (another) enemy ...' (p.99).

Bloom asks 'can a nation do what an individual does to heal? ... since a nation can be as crazy and dysfunctional as an individual could not the corollary [she means reverse] be true?' Like the other writers in this colloquium she ends on a note of hope because the nation is becoming more thoughtful and self aware.

Beyond all this focus on America as responsible for the war (without consideration given to the personal relations between President Bush and Prime Minister Thatcher in defining what they jointly presented as a just war), Arango examines Saddam Hussein biographically. She writes that he was rejected as a baby (his name means 'sudden shock' or 'jolt of recognition' in Arabic) and left to be brought up by his uncle. Thus 'like Moses, and even Christ, he is without natural parents... (in marrying his cousin) he has obtained an Oedipal triumph - thus ... he is the undisputed victor, having outwon both uncle and primeval Father ... he is therefore invincible.' (p.103). Arango continues: 'for the Arabs, he renews them to the mighty Arab, Saladin, who defeated the invading Christian Crusaders ...' Though this reference to Saladin is problematic since he was a Kurd, whose people have suffered at Saddam's hands, the metaphor may have some validity in the Iraqi President's posture as a hero standing up to the infidel force of the west (and its Arab allies, over whose heads Hussein appealed to the publics of Arabia and Egypt, to frustrate their plans, as reported by Heikal, [see below 1992]). Arango fully acknowledges the bloodstained and repressive record of Saddam Hussein but suggests that perceptions and motivations in the Arab world provide a pattern in which he retains his function in the overall structure of events.

The psychological theories of these writers may be at odds with much of the practice in the fields of cultural analysis and mass communication; but they provide challenging ideas and questions as to how and whether the processes identified might be confirmed by social research. When America is spoken of as an 'adolescent' nation, where does Iraq stand in such a developmental model? How do other nations and leaders interact given that they stand for entities with psychological characteristics which we are asked to accept as valid? These are points of potential contact between the 'psychohistorians' and political and communication scientists, which could fruitfully be pursued.

III. The 'Cold' War In The Gulf

I. A. Boal. 'All Quiet On The Eastern Front'. New Statesman and Society, 16 November, 1990, pp.21-23

Several authors provide calendars of 'events' in the crisis. Simpson's (1991) begins on 2 August 1990 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Wolton (1991) precedes this with two entries referring to 'mid-July' when Iraq accused Kuwait of a 'theft of petrol' and then, on 31 July, of the start of Iraqi-Kuwaiti talks in Jeddah, which were broken off by Iraq the next day.

Both authors note the UN Security Council Resolution No. 661 (6 August) imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. On 8 August Iraq formally announced its annexation of Kuwait. On 10 August the Arab League summit in Cairo 'disintegrated', according to Wolton, with twelve out of twenty-two members condemning Iraq and deciding to send a
Pan-Arab force to Saudi Arabia. Iraq, Libya and the PLO voted against, while the other seven abstained.

It would be useful at this point to be able to cite a considered study of the news, its construction and content in the first eight days of August. No such study is at hand. What invites attention is the construction of an international opposition to Iraq and some understanding of its motives. Three such motives can readily be identified. One is that the nation state itself is ‘holy’ or sacrosanct; Kuwait was thus ‘desecrated’ and in the thought or feeling of the United Nations needed to be reconsecrated as an autonomous state. This motive is based on a conception of a ‘state as an individual person’, requiring internationalised support (where practicable) of its rights and freedoms.

A second motive involves the idea that Iraq may have been intending to invade Saudi Arabia. British television news certainly showed diagrams with arrows stretching south from the Kuwaiti border to Riyadh (though a strike towards Saudi oil wealth may better have headed for nearby Dhahran). Linked with this was the (unstated) thought that Arab armies - despite the massive input of western arms to them - might not provide effective defence for the Saudis. The third motive involved the Hussein/Hitler conflation, with some implication that quite apart from his threat across Iraq’s borders he and his regime needed to be put down to uphold human rights within Iraq itself.

Wolton notes (missing from Simpson’s agenda) that Saddam Hussein was quick to state on 12 August that a ‘global solution’ (thus preceding President Bush’s new world order) was conceivable if the ‘problems of the near east’ were linked with withdrawal by Israel to pre-1967 borders, and of Syria from Lebanon. International mobilisation was sufficiently felt by Iraq (by the end of August 250,000 military personnel had arrived to oppose Iraq) to produce (18 August) its policy of detaining western hostages as human shields. By 28 August Kuwait was declared the 19th province of Iraq and its capital renamed Kadimah. Wolton also chronicles ‘the first world-wide interview with Saddam Hussein’, by Patrick Poivre d’Arvor, in late August.

October sees but one entry in Simpson’s agenda - also in Wolton’s - the Bush-Gorbachev accord in Helsinki, jointly opposing Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Two other developments in September were, however, also important, and both concern the activities and focus of attention of the news services. What they were doing was expressed in the words of Waterhouse and Lichfield (1990) who perceived ‘a gulf in standards between US print and television journalism. The principal US newspapers ... have been models of caution. The networks’ coverage has been woeful, stirring jingoism at home and sending the great network stars ... to prance in front of the news abroad, even to try to mediate in the crisis itself. The apogee of this nonsense was the Dan Rather interview with Saddam Hussein.... Anchors and defence correspondents peppered reports with phrases like "imminent sense in the administration that conflict is approaching"...it was possible to get such an impression, especially from the Pentagon; but other administration officials ... were just as likely to ...steer enquiries away from thoughts of an imminent shooting match. The networks give the impression they have invested a lot in a war and they are damned if they are not going to have one.’

Waterhouse and Lichfield judge, however, that ‘despite the best efforts of the networks, there is no evidence that their graphic coverage has influenced US defence policy or created mass war fever. Rather it has created a climate in which war would be acceptable if it was believed to be essential.’

A scantily developed theme in September was one of the predicament of displaced persons. The United Nations’ office pointed out that refugees are people fleeing their own country into exile; those being ejected from a country of which they are not citizens are ‘technically’ not refugees and do not come under UNRWA care. Several hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis, Egyptians, Filipinos, Libyans, Sudanese and others were fleeing Iraq and Kuwait, and, taking the road between Baghdad and Amman, were stranded in the northern Jordanian desert - not far from where in the early years of the century similar numbers of Armenians ejected from Turkey had died. The current exodus was visible, if in fleeting glimpses on television, though not as developed as was the theme of the western hostages in Iraq. Of the similar number of Soviet personnel in Iraq whose status was problematic given their government’s shift from being Iraq’s ally to finding a consensus with the United States, little or nothing was said.

Another group of whom little was said was that of the Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. According to Ibrahim (1990) the Saudi government ‘suspended residency privileges’ from Yemenis ‘setting off a mass migration of at least 350,000 in the last three weeks’. Bulloch explained that this had started on 22 September with the ‘expulsion of 30 Yemeni and 20 Jordanian diplomats’. While Ibrahim envisaged that ‘the move would force out an estimated one million Yemenis by early summer’ Patrick Cockburn (1990) wrote from Sanaa that ‘by the final deadline on 19 November 635,000 Yemenis had passed through the major border crossings ... the government estimates a further 150,000 refugees crossed unrecorded. Their ejection was sometimes ruthless. Out of some 250
dialysis patients ... 32 died because of interruption to their treatment... almost all returnees (however) complain not so much of physical maltreatment as of being forced to sell their businesses at a fraction of their worth.

It is not being suggested that television deliberately neglected the Yemenite exodus to salvage the Saudis' standing. More likely the expense and lack of the expertise required to report a situation which may not have 'paid off' in suitably distressing pictures kept journalists facing Iraq rather than away from it. Nevertheless at a time when public opinion was 'in the crucible' the absence of any negative impressions of the Arab state providing the land base for action against Iraq may well have been important in preparing the way for an eventual acceptance of the war that came.

October brought Amnesty International's accusations of Iraq's killings and widespread violations of human rights in Kuwait (Simpson: 1991), Israeli distribution of gas masks to civilians following threats of chemical attack, and the UN Security Council's Resolution No. 674 making Iraq responsible for war crimes and reparations.

In early November U.K.'s Trevor McDonald broadcast an interview with Saddam Hussein in which the arcane matter of editorial control briefly surfaced. Like Dan Rather McDonald also accepted Iraqi conditions of no cuts, no editing. According to The Times' Diary (13 November, p.16) a BBC spokesperson said, in explaining their failure to secure a Simpson-Saddam interview 'since there is clear evidence that Saddam has cynically manipulated the media, press and broadcasting must beware becoming victims of propaganda. Our general position with anyone we want to interview is that we reserve the right to edit'. This reveals that editorial work can mould input, presumably in the service of projecting a valid truth - in the hands of those for whom truth is uppermost. Yet many would agree that editors' standpoints can not be taken for granted. It is regrettable therefore that there appear to have been no studies of the 'newsroom in action' in any of the countries principally occupied in the pressure and then the war against Iraq.

From November to January military, moral and intellectual positions concerning war were being developed. One anti-war essay (Boal, 1990) warned that it would be necessary to depose Saddam Hussein but that a subsequent 'appointed' ruler would fail to hold Iraq together or to 'slow down Iraq's nuclear programme'. This essay also raised the spectre of a racist anti-Arabism, thus: 'luckily for Bush, there is one ideological landmark that stays constant... those goddam Arabs, those oil-smooth sheikhs and unshaven terrorists, that bristling, degenerate, hate-filled Other to civilisation as we know it. No doubt it is on the bedrock of this bar-stool orientalism that the polls' support for US policy is founded....'

This is deeply felt, but requires corroboration in at least two matters. One concerns whether there really was an amorphous anti-Arabism, when twelve out of 22 Arab League nations supported the coalition in the UN's name against Iraq. The second is whether there really was a polling majority for the war.

Amongst the reasons holding back the Allied idea of making war were that the Iraqis had one million men, battle hardened in war against Iran; there was Iraq's possession of chemical weapons and Scud rockets with which to deliver them, and of her alleged progress towards a nuclear weapon; there were threats of setting alight oil wells and unleashing a 'nuclear-type winter'; there was also the threat of the West's own advanced information systems which could show one's sons dying in battle as well as of the reluctance of the West to sustain numerous casualties. Finally, there was the idea that sanctions would bring the required departure of Iraq from Kuwait.

The opposite case was strongly put by the retired British General Sir John Hackett in a letter to The Times (28 December, 1990), thus: 'the central problem is the position, power and purpose of Saddam Hussein himself. His clear aim is overlordship of the Arab world, based on obliteration of Israel, strengthened by a stranglehold on 40 per cent of the industrial world's oil resources.... After a major military setback ... the Iraqi army could easily turn on Saddam Hussein .... Only when he is gone ... we may ... get around to having another look at UN Resolution 242 on the occupation of Arab territory by Israel'.

IV. Western Public Opinion In The Approach To War


A Denver Survey

Critics on the ‘left’ say that the Bush administration made a war for its own political advantage and that it ‘massaged’ public opinion through skilled deployment of public relations activity.

Alexander Cockburn (1991) reports polling research by Lewis, Jhally and Morgan (1991), with fieldwork between 2-4 February in Denver, in which ‘the respondents certainly supported the war by a big majority and they were avidly watching TV news …. there was a direct correlation between knowledge and opposition to the war …. Of the light viewers, 16% thought that Kuwait was a democracy, 22% knew what the Intifada is and 40% were aware that Iraq’s was not the only occupation in the Middle East. Of the heavy viewers, 37% thought that Kuwait was a democracy, 10% could identify the Intifada and 23% knew of Middle East occupations other than Iraq’s. …In sum, TV news mostly amplifies the government’s agenda.’ [Editor’s Note: A more developed report on the Denver study will appear as Chapter 18, ‘More Viewing, Less Knowledge,’ by Michael Morgan, Justin Lewis and Sut Jhally, in Mowlana et al. (forthcoming).]

Cockburn’s reading of Lewis et al’s results is based on the notion that heavy viewers of TV have an outlook not wholly shared by light viewers, and that is because TV inculcated it. Examination of the report itself, however, shows a different picture. Its Table 4 shows how answers to the question on the intifada were distributed. The results for overall TV viewing were as Cockburn reported; however, with regard to TV news viewing (not the same as overall TV viewing), 16% of heavy news viewers answered correctly, compared with 11% of light news viewers. In other words the link with news viewing was in the opposite direction to that with overall TV viewing, on which Cockburn based his argument. The same ‘switch over’ occurred with the question on whether the US ambassador beguiled Iraq into thinking there would be no reaction to a take over of Kuwait. Heavy overall viewers were less likely, but heavy news viewers were more likely to have realised that the US may have reassured Iraq. Amongst heavy viewers 23% said that Israel was an occupying power, but among heavy viewers of TV news 33% knew this; at the same time only 1% of heavy general viewers said Syria was an occupying power, while 4% of heavy news viewers said so (Tables 18 and 19). Thus the information systems had certainly failed to make people realise that Syria was occupying Lebanon, though they had helped people to know what Israel was doing. Gerbner’s (forthcoming, 1992) somewhat different perspective puts Gulf War television reporting into the broader perspective of pervasive television violence in which heavy overall viewing correlated with more ready acceptance of the use of military force.

The upshot is that it is certainly not proven from this research that knowledge or warlike attitudes before the outbreak of war were linked with a greater infusion of television news. Thomas (1991) shows that around seven in ten Americans approved sending US troops to Saudi Arabia, in August. By November approval for sending additional troops had fallen to 51%, while in December only 42% agreed that the US should go to war if Iraq refused to leave Kuwait. Seven in ten, in November supported a war to destroy Iraq’s nuclear and chemical weapons facilities. One poll at the start of December asked what respondents would say to President Bush, given 15 minutes to talk to him. Two in ten mentioned waiting for sanctions to take effect and 25% had other peace options; only 12% said ‘take action now, bomb the Iraqis’. Thomas then shows that after January 16th, ‘despite polls showing that the public was divided prior to the use of force in the Gulf, once the President had declared war on Iraq the majority
of the public supported that decision.

Thomas cautions that 'none of the questions ... measured the intensity of public support either for or against war or for giving economic sanctions time to work; nor did they elicit information about support for various types of military action, nor gauge the level of support for the war related to the number of US casualties'. Thomas also reports a press debate on what the polls mean, with 'media filtering the survey data through tainted interpretations. By ... positioning the polling story itself in a more or less prominent place, the media can manipulate supposedly 'objective' scientific data into convenient props for a particular editorial slant'.

An EC View
A fragment from European opinion is the 'flash' issued by the Eurobarometer organisation of the EC Commission (18 October, 1990) which pointed out that 'the vast majority of people say their feelings towards Muslim communities resident in the EC (77%) and the Arab world in general (70%) have not been affected by the Gulf crisis'. They did not editorially comment that in the same tables, while 2% across the EC said that their feelings towards Muslims in the EC had become more favourable, 15% said they were less favourable; the figures for feelings about the Arab world correspondingly were 4% more and 21% less favourable.

A Series of British Surveys
Working in London for the Free Kuwait Campaign, the polling organisation MORI (1991) reported that on 9-10 January three quarters of the public believed Allied Forces should be used to push Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. This was a greater proportion for force than had been found two months before. Even if Iraq unilaterally withdrew from the mainland of Kuwait, but remained in the two disputed Gulf islands, there was still a marked balance (49 to 37 per cent) in favour of using Allied troops. Respondents perceived Kuwait as a rich oil producer, but only small proportions had any negative ideas about the country; thus only 17 per cent thought it had a poor record on human rights and 19 per cent realised it was not a democracy. The survey is one of a number that Kuwaiti agencies supported in the West, as is more fully explained by de Rudder (see below).

A linked set of four surveys with a nationally representative Television Opinion Panel (Weber, 1991a) took place in Britain in the pre-war period. The first survey in August examined knowledge. Asked whether Iraq had said that it might invade Saudi Arabia, 42% correctly replied that it had not; 19% wrongly indicated that it had, which is an inference that may have been assisted by the general tenor of comment at that time. It was pointed out that this illustrated a necessary though little developed function for news services, that while saying what has happened they may also have to explicitly assert that certain things have not occurred. Another question listed four possible aims of American policy; 36% replied correctly that the true aim had been to eject Iraq from Kuwait and to replace the Emir there; only 11% thought the goal was to remove Saddam Hussein as ruler of Iraq. In this, most people avoided the error of mistaking President Bush's expressed feelings for his country's formal policy. After nearly a month's intense coverage of the conflict, one third of the sample who were interested enough to take part in the study did not even guess at the Americans' conflict goal. The overall average knowledge score of 2.7 from a maximum possible of 7 illustrates the modest extent to which viewers can be informed even when there is very extensive coverage of an issue.

As with Lewis et al's American study, knowledge correlated negatively with reported overall weight of viewing (heavier viewers were more ignorant); but the amount of reported viewing of television news coverage correlated positively with knowledge even when the claimed contributions of other sources such as press and radio were mathematically discounted. Thus there is a strong inference that television news did instil knowledge; however, the knowledge 'ceiling' is likely to be low as there is also an early onset of 'fatigue' in feelings that there has been too much conflict coverage. In addition to this, as a later survey (in February) found, 71% felt that they had a good understanding of the conflicts that produced the gulf war, implying that they might not be keen to follow more news programmes on the topic.

Some of the questions pointed to 'information gaps' as well as to 'gluts'. In the first survey, over three quarters of the sample knew that Iraq had gassed its own citizens and that the invasion of Kuwait was President Hussein's own responsibility. Just under half agreed that television news had said enough about the opinions of Iraq's generals and ministers and about how Iraq's food supplies might influence its actions. Close to half also felt that news had not told viewers enough about the history of Iraq's land claims on Kuwait. It is important to observe that people with more knowledge were more aware that the conflict was being attributed as a personal responsibility of Saddam Hussein, that poison gas had been used on Kurdish Iraqis and that Mrs Thatcher had achieved some political advantage. More knowledgeable people were also more inclined to agree with three other, more subtle matters. One was that 'most Arabs will not relax until they see the State of Israel removed'. Another was that 'some
Arabs do not consider other Arabs to be foreigners, in the same way most Westerners are (see Khalil, above). Thirdly, more knowledgeable people felt more strongly that television news had not said enough about the record of the Emir of Kuwait or of Iraq's land claims upon Kuwait.

By the third pre-war survey several attitude items were grouped in respondents' minds into a 'war readiness' concept, while other items formed a group of 'peace possibilities'. Support for the latter set exceeded that for the former. On the brink of war (questions answered in late January, about people's attitudes before the bombing began), around eight in ten agreed with each of two statements that it had been right to attack Iraq and to have sent British forces to do so; seven in ten agreed that the Allies' aim should be to overthrow Saddam Hussein. These ideas were jointly scored as an index of support for a 'just war,' and it emerged that support for this concept in January was significantly linked with a greater amount of consumption of television news in November (Wober, 1991b). The implication of this is that news viewing probably did contribute to a feeling that the war was feasible and necessary. It also connected with a lower degree of anxiety and with a rejection of the idea that the war might be over quickly or that television had tended to be reassuring.

One of the British surveys focussed particularly on the televised interview with Saddam Hussein. Twelve perception statements proved to group into four factors in people's minds. One was labelled 'optimism' and involved three statements, the first saying 'Saddam Hussein apart from his reputation appeared to be a nice man' (with which 35 per cent agreed, though 41% disagreed). The other two said 'the interview gave me some hope that the conflict might be settled without a war' (28% agreed), and 'hope that the present conflict might be settled without sowing the seeds of a future war' (21% agreed). Those who felt the interview had been 'the right thing to do' also tended to agree that Hussein 'seemed a nice man'. Notably, the strong link between an element of optimism that an imminent war might be averted, and not at the cost of expecting a greater war later on, (both of which propositions were rejected by majorities of respondents) shows that many people had grasped the view of some military analysts that the option was simply between war sooner, or later.

**Analyzing American Polls**

Beyond Thomas' study, FitzSimon (1991) provides a summary of American polling data in the crisis period (as well as until the end of the war). She recognizes nine 'types' of questions including evaluation of the press, claimed sources of news, censorship, and infrequent items on 'emotional response to war coverage'. Clearest of all is that the number of polls included from August to December was very small, compared with a huge increase in January with the fighting. Apart from generally favourable replies accepting television as a 'main source' of news, that three out of five thought that CNN was the network doing the best job of covering the war (not corroborated for the pre-war period), that the public largely supported censorship and felt that the news services were doing well, this whole survey of polls does little to suggest that there was much integrated and in-depth study of the nature, development of and influences upon public opinion in the approach to war.

**Summary**

In summary, while some anti-war writers believed that 'the media' (not always particularising between broadcasting and print) had built up public opinion to accept a war, it is less obvious from empirical research that this was so. The Lewis et al survey was interpreted, by themselves and then Gerbner and Cockburn, to imply that television had promoted ignorance and war readiness. But their own data showed that television news viewing was associated with somewhat better knowledge and less war readiness.

Thomas reported that Americans had been in two minds before the war as to whether it should go ahead. Large majorities supported sending troops to the Gulf, though that was not the same as supporting war. Many reasons for shunning war included the supposed strength and ruthlessness of the Iraqi opposition, the human cost of war, and the chances that economic sanctions might succeed.

British studies documented substantial feelings that Arab perspectives had not been sufficiently presented. But one way of doing so, of interviewing Saddam Hussein himself, found many viewers saying that, apart from his record, he appeared to be a 'nice man'. This thought was associated with an optimism that a war, either sooner or later, might be avoided. A two-wave panel analysis of a large national study did indicate, however, that those who watched more television news in November had a greater degree of acceptance for the war when it came in January.
V: The Ground War

The Course Of The War To Liberate Kuwait
It may not be apposite to identify 'the' war as one against Iraq, or less distinctly as in 'the Gulf' since the fighting was part of a larger context. The core of it was, however, to liberate Kuwait and lasted briefly from 17 January to 28 February. Thirty nations formed a Coalition to accomplish a task on behalf of the United Nations, to liberate a member state. It is worth noting that the Coalition force did not wear UN uniforms or insignia let alone function under UN command. Operations from Saudi Arabia were formally under Saudi command, though effectively it was a war commanded by the United States' military, helped by its coalition allies, against Iraq.

The first, air war, phase opened the fighting with Allied bombing of Iraq, which retaliated with Scud missiles fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia, where anxieties persisted throughout that one or more warheads might be armed with chemical or biological weapons. The air war was extensively televised by cameras in the streets of Tel Aviv and Riyadh, in the warheads of American bombs finding their Iraqi targets, in allied airplanes and, from CNN, in certain sites in Iraq. These included the destruction of a factory said by the Americans to be for chemical weapons, but by the Iraqis to have made baby milk; and of the bunker shelter in the Amiriyah district of Baghdad said by the Americans to have been used for military purposes, but seen to have been occupied by many civilians. Other air war scenes were of missiles, plane movements and of captured allied pilots shown on Iraqi television.

Apart from the air war there were Gulf shore scenes of dying sea birds covered with oil; and some footage of a battle when Iraqi forces briefly took the northern Saudi town of Khafji, from which they were ejected with some Saudi and American casualties. Other fighting was naval, with heavy bombardment by American battleships of the Kuwaiti shore, minesweeping and the taking of some islands.

After over a month of heavy bombing of Iraqi military installations (during which, it was later said, there was also much civilian loss) the land war was launched on a front stretching west of Kuwait. This outflanked and overwhelmed the stunned Iraqi defences. Large numbers of prisoners were taken but very many Iraqis died, at the cost of a few allied casualties. Kuwait was swiftly liberated, and from it a large fleet of vehicles fled towards Basra. These were annihilated with the loss of several thousands of lives, said to have included numbers of Kuwaitis and Asians, perhaps intended as hostages by the Iraqis, or possibly collaborators. Western reporters were close upon this massacre, scenes of which were televised; but it was not dwelt upon, though it became a focus of conscientious debate.

Although this war ended with a formal ceasefire, there was continued fighting involving dissident Shias in southern Iraq and Kurds in the north and east. Many Iraqi prisoners were Shias and reluctant to be repatriated. At one point over a million Kurds were displaced into Turkey and Iran, and the Allies had to intervene to protect them. The United Nations continued to press Iraq to disclose its capacities to make weapons of mass destruction and over a year later were still pursuing this matter by inspections and even demolitions. Western reporting has said little about the longer term state of the Kurds in northern Iraq or of Shias in the south, let alone of the prisoners who were sent back to Iraq. Nor was much reported, if at all, about what happened to the flower of the Iraqi air force which had decamped to Iran during the main war, and were interned there.

Reporting The War To Liberate Kuwait
On the first night of the air war CNN's Bernard Shaw, on the ninth floor of Baghdad's Rashid hotel saw and described flashes of bombing and anti-aircraft fire. CNN's pictures were the only outside material available from Baghdad. When Shaw left after some days, CNN's Peter Arnett stayed on and became famous for his reporting. The material was striking for its immediate, real-time and visual aspects and these qualities were why other networks the world over showed CNN material. Apart from Baghdad with its tiny corps of western reporters (one from Spain remained there throughout the war, and Simpson from the BBC was there for some of the time) a very large group (estimates varied from 1400 to 1700) were based in Riyadh and another, though not so large group were in Israel. Broadcast news coverage was extended, and newspapers achieved higher sales.

Many articles rapidly referred to a 'media' or a 'television' war, and realised the hard feelings of other (press) journalists and those who had quit Baghdad. The US Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, was quoted as saying that CNN's coverage was 'the best reporting on what transpired in Baghdad'. Only in much later reflection did people consider whether the narrow though vivid focus of the pictures were any improvement in terms of 'real' information, beyond what a print or radio reporter would have put across. John Naughton of The Observer (20 January 1991, p.16) kept his distance from this adulation. 'As
the networks cleared their schedules for the greatest outside broadcast of all time, we were confronted with a new possibility - that wars will henceforth be conducted live on television. From which point it will be but a small step to having wars conducted ... for television... '

Within a few days the salient images included the fireworks of flak, the 'computer game' pictures of guided missile bombs hitting their targets, battered allied pilots displayed on Iraqi television and at base, reporters and even an Israeli minister wearing gas masks. By 22 January Patriot anti-Scud missile batteries were in place and some film appeared to show Patriots successfully intercepting Scuds (the validity of this was later contested). Extensive television coverage, in spite of its resort to CNN and other war arena film, had to use many 'expert' interviews, including retired military men and academics, but Arab spokespeople were seldom seen. Pictures were shown of Scud missiles being launched - without always saying this was library film from Afghanistan.

Of the oiled sea birds the Financial Times' critic Christopher Dunkley (30 January, p.15) wrote, 'could it be that the broadcasters reckon, subconsciously, that the British will be more shocked by pictures of doomed birds than by pictures of doomed people? ... more charitably, perhaps the cormorants are being used to symbolise Saddam's cynical and immoral attack on all of us via the environment'. When at the end of January TV reports began to show Iraqi civilian casualties, Dunkley (6 Feb, p 21) quoted David Frost as asking 'would allied reporters have sympathetically toured Berlin hospitals in 1944 under the control of members of Goebbels' staff? Of course not.' But he went on, 'I suspect some would have accepted an invitation'. Dunkley may have been wrong about 1944, but the question raises two possibilities. One is that the moral climate of war may indeed have changed in the West, with much conscientious concern for the enemy as another, equal human party with rights and hopes and sensitivity to suffering. The other possibility is that neither this war nor that in Vietnam had involved the western powers in a massively intrusive attack upon themselves (Britain sustained over 20,000 civilian casualties with the German V-bombing in 1944); so in such circumstances pity for the enemy may be more elusive. With regard to Iraq, however, it was a serious concern for several journalists.

A principal polemicist was the Australian journalist John Pilger, writing in the New Statesman and Society. On 8 February he accused the US of deliberately trapping Saddam Hussein into invading Kuwait to continue Cold War military spending in the US. Pilger also said several 'allies' were not enthusiastic supporters of recovering the rights of Kuwait but had merely been paid to join the coalition - Syria and Egypt in particular. On 22 February he asserted that 'the stated aims of this war are fraudulent and are now driven, in part, by the momentum of bloodlust'. Peter Tory, in The Daily Express (9 Feb, p.17) believed 'it is television ... which is keeping us from knowing what is going on. The live briefings by senior officers in the Gulf are exercises in deceit'. An indirect criticism was by John Naughton in The Sunday Times (19 Feb., p 68) that the Soviet Union's crisis whose outcome will have greater implications... has fallen to the bottom of most news bulletins, squeezed out by video-tapes of laser-guided destruction and other techno-porn'.

The bombing of the al-Amiriyah bunker evoked a blizzard of controversy. Several hundred callers in Britain complained to the broadcasters about television coverage. Several press articles pilloried the broadcasters for the pictures, and the British government was said to have indicated its displeasure to the television service (normally an unthinkable form of pressure).

At the end of February Bob McKeown and his cameraman David Green of CBS were the first western journalists to re-enter Kuwait City, a circumstance for which they were nevertheless less widely known and discussed than was Peter Arnett of CNN who had reported all along from Baghdad. Several strong stories now created different and discordant impressions. There was horror at confirmation of Iraqi brutalities in Kuwait and dismay at the firing of the oil wells; there was shock at the destruction of the retreating Iraqis on the Basra road (one BBC journalist who asked a US Senator about this allied 'brutality' was rebutted by him and by several press articles). There was compassion for Iraqi prisoners and, before the next journalistic adventure to Kurdistan, some initial reflections on the record of the war.

In The Observer of 3 March two views were offered: Richard Brooks wrote 'there is little doubt that the real winner has been British broadcasting which ... has kept us glued to our TVs and radios with lively and informative services (p.75). His colleague, on the next page, disagreed: 'the war ... for journalists was by and large a shameful and shaming business .... Most seemed so crippled by the reporting restrictions .... But the tapes ... will stand for ever as a testament to show how television news can be manipulated and controlled by military authorities .... Television did not reveal this as cruelly as radio (which) broadcast military briefings .... live in their entirety, and the ignorance, deference, complacency and laziness displayed by the assembled hacks beggared belief ... studios were packed to the...
VI: Journalists' Assessment Of 'Their' War


B. Zelizer. 'CNN, the Gulf War and Journalistic Practice.' *Journal Of Communication*, 42(1), 1992, pp.66-81.

The emeritus communications researcher Elihu Katz asked about CNN's prominence in the war's reporting, 'Is this the end of journalism?' Others were quick to say no, but in doing this generally had to admit a degree of failure by their accustomed standards of intention to see through deception at the source.

A French Critique

One of the most articulate critics of the war coverage, the French journalist in Washington Chantal de Rudder, asked 'how and why could the freest press in the world be controlled by an unprecedented propaganda and censorship, imposed by Washington?' Her answer is basically 'censorship, the pool system, controlled access, compulsory military escort for the smallest military interview ... America locked up its press'. De Rudder reports that right wing sources such as the pressure group Accuracy In Media (AIM) and the Heritage Foundation (director, Seth Kropsey, ex Pentagon) had financed many studies which set out a position indicating that post-Watergate and post-Vietnam 'journalists had made themselves outliers, that they no longer shared the values of American society'.

Furthermore, according to de Rudder, a greater centralisation of press ownership made it easier to marshal a mainstream opinion; in 1981 '50 companies owned or controlled most of the media in the United States. Ten years later no more than 29'. The Joint Information Bureau 'briefers' were auditioned like actors and trained to convey opinions made to seem like information. Politics was conceived of as a 'product' to be 'sold to the nation via the press .... When a poll on 22 November found that Americans would endorse intervention if it was done to destroy an Iraqi nuclear project, Bush announced that Saddam was on the verge of developing the bomb within a matter of months. An essential strategy was to keep up a flow of "information" through regular press briefings which took the initiative from the journalists. "Psy(cho)logical Op(erations)" were conceived as staged releases of "information" designed as much to tackle the American public as the enemy. One source of "psych-ops" was the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton, hired by the Kuwaitis at a cost of 11 million dollars, to orchestrate opinion'. De Rudder goes beyond suggesting that 'true information' is managed by being released in the administration's chosen way and claims there have been campaigns of 'disinformation', citing 'Iran-gate' as her main example.

A View From Norway

Norway's Rune Ottosen (1991) wrote similarly, describing how military sources took control of information flow in the Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989) and now the Iraq wars. The resulting news picture gave a completely distorted version of the actual events and indicates that journalists had unwittingly helped to deceive world opinion by accepting the conditions laid down for them by the military.
E.B.U. Round-table

In 1991 the European Broadcasting Union's Television Programme Committee hosted a roundtable discussion on journalists' roles in the war. Eason Jordan of CNN was clearly pleased with his organisation's achievements. Jacques Vanderschel of Belgian Radio and Television considered that censorship on the one hand and the audience's supposed demands to 'see what there is to be seen' on the other posed a particular challenge for television newsrooms and programme controllers. His advice was that countries should work together to share the cost burdens of visual coverage. Barlozzetti of Radio Televizione Italiana had offered a similar view.

The veteran print journalist Robert Fisk saw a need to redefine his task which most of his colleagues, he felt, had not realised during the war. Journalists might have to seek a more lonely role outside the suffocating security of the military pools. He noted the preoccupation of television reporters with the present to the neglect of the past, saying 'despite all their archive material ... not a single television channel reminded its viewers last January that President Bush had promised the previous autumn that no offensive military action would be launched from Saudi territory'. He feels that 'here was the moment ... for print journalists to ask more searching questions, ... to do investigation and analysis ... yet we largely did not do that ... the military wanted us to forget that the greatest armies in Christendom were about to pulverise the largest army in the Moslem world ... the military were marketing war and we, to our great discredit, were selling the wretched business for them'.

Foreign Journalists in Jordan

More recently El-Sarayrah and Ayish (1992) have described a survey in which 40 journalists in Amman replied to what were mostly biographic questions. These were all living in hotels, and thus foreign. Though over three quarters of those who replied had either lived or worked in the Middle East '[this] should in no way suggest acquisition of insights into the region's problems'. This is supported by the finding that only 6 per cent of respondents knew Arabic, while over half of them did not seek help from local reporters in making their reports. Over half denied there was 'distorted coverage of the crisis' - perhaps because they did not feel it right to disparage their own efforts, but over one in five agreed there were changes which took place 'in the gate keeping chain'. As for the crucial issue(s) underlying the Gulf crisis, '7.5% of respondents thought it was the Palestinian problem' and equal numbers thought it was the occupation of Kuwait and the presence of US-led forces in the Gulf, while 10 per cent attributed the conflict to oil. This leaves two thirds whose answers on this question were unaccounted for.

An Arab View Of The Gulf War


Mohamed Heikal (1992) is a vastly experienced Egyptian journalist, editor of the major newspaper Al Ahram during President Nasser's era and with close access to President Mubarak and the 'top table' of Egyptian and Arab diplomacy in the 1990s. His book is carefully titled but just his own, but 'An Arab view' of the Gulf War, and deserves a section to itself. He gives a detailed history of the last three decades, a blow by blow account of the crisis months of 1990, and a substantial foundation of Arab-Western history in the time since Napoleon and which sets the essential scene for understanding the present events.

Arabs and the Nation State

He reminds readers that the Arab world emerged from Turkish suzerainty at a time when the concept of the nation state and its boundaries were not as well developed as they are now. At first the world order was dominated by Britain, but she was replaced after the first third of this century by America; Britain's competitors, France, Germany and Russia, and then the Soviet bloc in the Cold War always gave the Arabs some opportunity to jockey with power. But what concerned the Arabs over two centuries was the establishment of their own states, their leadership and how they would manage their wealth and their poverty. For most of the two centuries a sense of autonomous determination of structures, events and relationships was lacking and this was related, in turn, to feelings of resentment at injustice, the prominent focus of which has been the establishment of Israel perceived as an intrusion into the Muslim world (the Dar ul Islam, Dar meaning door, or boundary).

In 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt as an organ of fundamentalism, which Heikal says is a path pursued by public feeling when it feels frustrated by modernist developments. An earlier such movement in Arabia was of the Wahhabis, from amongst whom the Saudi family provided the present monarchy (and name) of Arabia, displacing the Hashemite dynasty, members of which became rulers of Jordan and Iraq. Following a Koranic verse referring to the guardian of the Holy Places the Saudi monarch asserts that his family has one fifth of the nation's (oil) revenue - a source of immense personal wealth and power. The 1974 census showed

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a population of 4 million including 1 million Yemenis, so publication of the census was suppressed as being against the country's dignity. The episode is an indication of the 'top down' model of management of consciousness in such a nation, quite opposite to that in which public opinion surveys play a part as in western nations.

Bargains and Alliances

Alliances up to 1990 included what Heikal refers to as 'The Safari Club' in which 'some pro-western Middle East nations' took part with the CIA, the Gulf Co-operation Council (Saudi and Gulf States) and after 1989 the Arab Co-operation Council (Iraq, Jordan, Yemen and Egypt). These combinations provided the Arab world with its leadership through decades in which it had to adjust to major imbalances between its states in wealth, the opportunities for alliances and patronage provided by the superpowers' cold war, and the interweaving trajectory of Palestinian groups' striving for position. Heikal notes (p.155) that 'the Arab world's principal political institution, the summit ... like a political Trabant, ... produced noise and hot air, but only the most lethargic motion. [It was] a gathering of presidents, kings and sheikhs, none of them appointed by the will of their people ....

What is 'Arab Public Opinion'?

This brings the reader to ask what the will of the Arab peoples is, and what are the ways in which it is expressed not just in 'ordinary' times but also in the extraordinary ones of the Gulf crisis. A careful examination of Heikal's book shows over thirty passages in which he mentions public opinion; but in none of these is there any quotaion of evidence from public opinion polls, nor is there any suggestion that such surveys exist, or that they are frequent. We know from Mytton and Engelmann (1992) at least, that surveys are carried out in Arab countries; but it is not clear from them or in Heikal's account how their results play a part in visibly representing public opinion, by being described in broadcasting and or the press, nor how such opinions play any part in modeling the options available to and followed by the political leadership, especially in the advent of war.

The only survey Heikal explicitly mentions (p.94) is 'of the future of the Arab nation, carried out between 1980 and 1985 by the Centre for Arab Unity Studies and involving more than 500 Arab scholars...'. Yet he refers in many places to the power of public opinion. For example, (p.122) 'the Arab masses ... continued to see strength, not diplomacy as the means of change'; then 'lacking guidance, the masses swayed with every gust of opinion' (p.156). In the fifties and sixties the Arab nation had a sense of direction guided by the idea of Arab nationalism, which gave it the power to influence the masses. By the 1980s each Arab government was steering the media in its own country, creating a chaos of conflicting aims ....' (p.157, evoking the image of the 'top down' model of national consciousness). Nevertheless, Heikal quotes President Mubarak, explaining his chiding of Saddam Hussein when the latter seemed to be offering a way of resolving the crisis after his invasion of Kuwait, saying (p.209) 'I was under pressure from newspaper men in Cairo and public opinion .... Egyptian public opinion was clearly against the invasion'.

However, apparently 'in other Arab capitals public opinion was beginning to waver. For the first few days after the invasion most Arabs were opposed to Iraq's action, but now many were beginning to feel uncomfortable with the dominant Western role in the crisis' (p.225). The potential usefulness of systematic polling and of its potential to show not only what people think but why they do so was inferred by its absence when Heikal wrote (p.239) 'the misgivings of millions of people in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco did not pass unnoticed in the West, but the reasons for their attitude were misunderstood ....'

An unusual device for assessing opinion in an authoritarian regime was then mentioned (p.261) after pointing out that the Ba'ath party had issued a reminder to its members that 'talk of withdrawal would now amount to treason ... [yet] despite the party warning ... the Iraqi leadership tried to assess how people would react to a decision to withdraw. Six Iraqi intellectuals were invited to see Sabawi El-Takriti, the director of Iraqi intelligence and brother of Saddam Hussein. They were asked to be frank and given assurances they would not be harassed if they differed with official views. After a hesitant start they began to speak their minds.... Four of them said that Iraq was facing overwhelming dangers and should withdraw ....'

Tactics in Opinion Moulding

Heikal makes it clear that intricate diplomatic activities could be seen as having come close on several occasions to resolving the conflict without fighting, but that all actors were concerned, among other things to manage public opinion not only on their own, but on opposing sides. Thus Saddam Hussein agreed to appear in western television interviews, and he released hostages when visited by important figures. Not all management was said to be benign. Thus (p.264) 'Bush was briefed on the Iraqi leader's characteristics by ... five American academics of Arab origin ... [who] advised [him] to refer to the Iraqi president as *Saddam* without
adding "Hussein". The effect ... would be to belittle Saddam Hussein in the eyes of Iraqis ... [so] Bush made frequent references to "Saddam" especially when appearing on CNN television which was watched by millions in the Arab world.... He said he was giving "Saddam" every opportunity to "save face" and to "save his skin", comments which the academics had advised would give offence ....

For his part Saddam Hussein at one point tried to undo or avoid damage (p.278) when it was announced in early December that Iraq had accepted Bush’s offer of talks ... with a verse from the Koran which President Sadat had used in 1977 when preparing Egyptian public opinion for his visit to Jerusalem: 'And if they lean to peace, go with it and depend on Allah.' It would be interesting to confirm whether this had been given much prominence in western reports, and if it had, what may have been the effect on western public opinion.

**Propaganda in Combat**

When the war was under way (p.307) Baghdad believed that a Scud attack on Israel would change the whole picture of the war by winning the support of millions of Arabs .... There was elation in every Arab country, not excluding those involved in the coalition. Events showed however that, even if major segments of Arab populations may now have supported Iraq, the leadership in Egypt, Syria and Morocco (coalition partners) kept up with their commitment to Kuwait - or to America. Another Iraqi hope (p.312) 'was that black American soldiers ... would feel that whites had sent them to die in Iraq and would turn against their commanders. An Iraqi radio station broadcast pop songs specifically aimed at the black troops .... The Americans, Israelis and Turks had eleven stations broadcasting to the Iraqi army and people.... Voice of America, Radio Monte Carlo and the BBC ... were widely followed in Iraq .... CNN ... caused shock [after] the bombing of an underground air shelter ... but the effects of CNN's broadcasts were not one-sided. Arabs sympathetic to Iraq were disheartened by ... 'smart' bombs ...such pictures contributed to a feeling that it was useless to struggle against an enemy armed with science-fiction weapons'.

Heikal's conclusion refers to summit structures he has noted in existence, as well as others whose absence he has implied, and the need for which he now makes explicit (p.330); 'Prince Hassan ...[suggested] the need to amalgamate the security arrangements and human and natural resources of Arab countries to create a more unified society ...[but] the prince's approach might work if the Arab world had well-established political institutions and a tradition of respect for state constitutions. The difficulty ... is that secure institutions are possible only when the various groups within society become strong enough to make their presence felt, thus opening the door to dialogue. Until society reaches that maturity, any plan for the future is bound to be imposed by a ruling minority on the majority not necessarily against the majority's wishes, but without genuine popular participation'.

**Surveys in Arab Countries**


Although Heikal did not refer to any systematic surveys of Arab opinion during and after the conflict, Mytton and Engelmann (1992) report that 'surveys were carried out ... in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates'; their agency based in Jordan carried out face to face interviews with quota samples representing those aged 15 and over. The surveys' aims were to establish from which source people first learned of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and subsequently of the start of the air and ground wars, to explore the use of radio, not only in itself but also in relation to that of other message systems, and to learn something about audience attitudes. The latter object was served by group discussions in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan amongst groups selected to represent professionals, students, employees, taxi drivers, farmers (in Egypt) and mothers (in Morocco).

The attitude research focussed on why people used particular stations, and this then brought in the perception of credibility which, in turn, revealed what people thought about the conduct and moral context of the war. This latter harvest is, however, evidently a by-product of the projects.

Unlike in the West, on other important occasions, people in Egypt, Saudi and UAE cities generally first heard of the Iraqi invasion by word of mouth; they then tended to go for more information to the radio (though in Egypt, TV came in for equal attention). Foreign stations were widely used with the BBC generally to the fore, though in certain locations and times Radio Monte Carlo, other Arab stations and Kol (Voice of) Israel also received widespread use. Syrian respondents overwhelmingly reported using local stations and said they attended but little to outside sources.

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Attitudes towards international relations are gleaned incidentally, as when Mytton and Engelmann note that, among Egyptian respondents most felt Voice of America was biased in support of Israel and Kol Israel was thought of as belonging to "the enemy". (However, quantitatively, more Egyptians reported listening to Kol Israel, both during and after the conflict, than to Radio Baghdad). Indeed, listening to Iraq was also very low among other samples' reported sources. Respondents were evidently skilled in the practice of detecting to what extent radio and television reports were true, or 'tampered with'; and respondents felt that the media played a key role in forming ... public opinion ... Reports of the atrocities perpetrated by the Iraqi military in occupied Kuwait were of particular significance. From Jordan 'most people felt that the only way to filter out the facts from the other messages being transmitted by the media was to compare a number of sources'.

While this broadcasting research does not venture far into the realm of political perceptions and attitudes, Syllovics (1992), using a method of analysis of cartoons and texts in Algerian newspapers, does contribute to such knowledge. Themes emerging include the perception that Western (French) and Arab information about the outcome of the war differed: 'freedom of the press, political cartoons, European and Arab television, all offer a multitude of possible interpretations which not only are unenlightening but also confuse meanings and messages ...'. In one vivid example Syllovics cites a cartoon in which 'CNN and its war coverage was seen as 'connerie' or 'lies and idiocies'. Overall, the material Syllovics presents fairly clearly depicts the Americans as bloodthirsty aggressors with the Saudi monarchy as cravenly in tow. She concludes 'the ways that active readers make use of newspaper humor in their own lives may provide that critical jolt to supplement TV channel-zapping ...'; she does not point out what we learned from Aragno's paper, that 'critical jolt' in Arabic is the meaning of the name Saddam.

VII: Western Public Opinions On the War and Its Aftermath


Single Surveys Amongst British Adults

One British study with a national adult sample interviewed in mid March (Morrison, 1992) found that nine out of ten said it was acceptable to use armed force when a country has to defend itself from outside attack. This documents a feeling that the allied ejection of Iraq from Kuwait was justified. On the other hand as many as 28% thought it was acceptable for a country to use armed force against another in order to protect its economy from collapse. This would have been the Iraqi justification for its invasion of Kuwait, though it is not clear that these respondents realised they may have implied support both for what Iraq did in the first place and then for the coalition's war. Morrison's study concludes by showing that the majority of viewers support showing scenes of war either from a distance or after the badly injured and dead have been removed, while fewer than ten per cent wish to have broadcast close ups of death and grievous injury. Any editorial assumptions that the public wish or need to see the full details of war are thus not justified. In fact,
British television acted accordingly with its restraint over the civilian dead at the Amiriyah bunker bombing.

Across a ten-day period in mid-February Shaw and Carr-Hill (1991) collected approximately 500 responses to a postal survey distributed in the city of Kingston Upon Hull. The authors write that they are aware of other 'one-off' polls which 'did not make it possible how to understand ... how people were influenced ... by the media, ... [so] we decided to address these problems' (pp.2-3); but having described their results the authors are constrained to acknowledge (p.32) that 'the findings of the present survey, because they do not include a longitudinal element, cannot throw light on the process of change among newspaper readers'. Why, then, might it be of value to examine their results? There are at least three reasons for this. First, any survey at one point in time, that is reasonably representative, can be useful to add to the corpus collected from all sources; secondly, they make some claims which might be taken wrongly unless they are examined critically, and this should be done; and thirdly, there is at least one way in which there was in fact a longitudinal element in the survey method, and it has told us something we might otherwise not have known.

Shaw and Carr-Hill point out that the Sunday Times 'War Panel' showed approval for the war which rose from 80 to 89 per cent as the war came to an end, corroborating other sources' evidence that there was little public opposition at the time. There is value in the analyses presented which show that press readership is linked with some of the greatest attitudinal differences concerning the war; for example, 21 per cent of Sun readers favoured using nuclear weapons, compared with less than 5 per cent among broadsheet readers (p.33). The authors wish to point out, however, that 'among the Catholics who responded the proportion strongly approving of the war (36 per cent) was higher than any other group, despite the Papal declarations against the war, and they were the least concerned about Iraqi service personnel' (p.13), a point to which they return in their conclusion (p.34). However, they have not disentangled the role of newspaper reading, class, relatedness to serving personnel and other features which also connect with attitudes to the war, from that of religious affiliation; and before such statistical steps are taken it may be misleading to comment on a descriptive finding ('Catholics show greater approval of war ... [and] least concern ...') with any implication of causation.

Despite the authors' disclaimer of not being able to comment on effects of 'media', the situation that their results trickled in over ten days, crossing the date (14 February) when the Baghdad bunker was bombed, does present a 'natural experiment'. In fact they report (p.7) that there was 'little change in the pattern of responses even after the bombing of the Baghdad bunker'. At the outset of the war 82 per cent of the sample described the air attacks as 'precise strikes against strategic targets', and only 8 per cent endorsed the opinion that the air attacks were 'intensive bombing with unacceptable civilian casualties'. These results add to Morrison's in suggesting that television portrayal of the civilian casualties, which could have been much more harrowing than they already were, probably did not alter viewers' basic 'acceptance' of these as among the penalties of war.

British Children


Morrison also reported a study amongst children, interviewed in the same households as the adults, supplemented with four group discussions two weeks beforehand. Asked what image most stuck in their mind, a wide variety of answers were given. One quarter mentioned scenes of the air war but only one in twenty referred to the sight of dead seabirds. One in five brought up various examples of human suffering. These results were different from those reported by Wober and Young (1992) about attitudes earlier in the war, when the dead sea birds were a much more salient and at that time not superseded sight. Over half of Morrison's sample said they had been worried or upset by something they saw on the screen.

An interesting unexpected sidelight on children's feelings arose when Jukes (1991) reported a study of whether young children who had read an aggression-containing story might be more inclined to choose to play with an aggressive toy. This was not found to happen, and one reason Jukes suggests may be that the children who might have responded to the aggressive 'prime' had already, perhaps because of awareness of the war, been functioning at a more aggressive level.

Netherlands


At least two other studies amongst children are at
hand. One from the Netherlands (Van der Voort, et al., 1992) used a telephone survey to interrogate 145 parent-child pairs. There was a knowledge test of eight items and although there was a 50% chance of guessing the right answer on six of the items, children did not exceed this level on all eight items, and parents only did so by a small margin. Children's knowledge was greater among boys, those who were older, those who discussed the matter more often with their parents and where their parents had greater knowledge, but it was not associated with more frequent reported viewing of television coverage. In greater detail there were signs of same-sex reinforcement of knowledge in that fathers' knowledge correlated with that of sons but not of daughters, and mothers' knowledge with that of their daughters but not sons.

**Australian Children**

Gillard, P., R. Haire, S. Huender and M. Heneghel

Gillard and her colleagues interviewed and had group discussions with eight to twelve year olds. Their fieldwork came close after ANZAC Day and some of the younger children showed confusion between the facts of the Gulf War and the First World War (for example, saying the Gulf War occurred at Gallipoli). Older children and boys knew more about the war, and in a more hardware-oriented way, but the study was not statistically organised and was concerned more with elaborating thematic detail. Sole children had a wider knowledge than did those with siblings, and those from single parent families seemed to discuss the war with their parents in greater depth than did others with two parents. These two studies both show the importance of the home environment in influencing how children know about the war, placing television and radio in a dependent role, even though some of the images, as of oil covered birds crop up in the Australian study as they did in the, British research.

**British News Content**

Morrison in Britain also reported an analysis of the content of TV news, from 14 January to 3 March, in which 71 per cent of all items concerned the war. Remarkably, given the prominence of Saddam Hussein in personifying a target justifying war while it was in preparation, during the war itself fewer than three per cent of items dealt with Saddam (Morrison's Table 28c). Only one percent of items in each case dealt with the bombing of the Amiriyah bunker or reflected on media coverage, or on Parliamentary debates. Over a quarter of all items were in the studio, and these will have been responsible for much of the material about Saddam, which was not in fact pictorial and a majority of which was negative in content.

Morrison concludes that British viewers accepted that the war was just, that it would involve heavy casualties, and that they had seen enough, even in a few partially explicit indications that such casualties had existed. They were not 'tested out' with extended horror pictures of the slaughter on the Basra road, of a kind and content that might have disgusted them and lost their support. However, this slaughter was stopped short, and it soon became known that other escaped Iraqis were causing more devastation in civil war, raising the counter argument that the allied 'follow through' had not gone far enough.

**Longitudinal Studies of British Adult Reactions**

Though various reasons prevented a full set of questions going forward, Wober (1991c) shows that just after the land war was ended four in five British adults agreed it had been right for the UK to take part in the war, and seven in ten felt the allies should carry on, to oust Saddam Hussein. Six in ten saw the reason for the war as being to liberate Kuwait, five in ten to keep (U.S.) control of oil supplies, but only three in ten considered the war had been to protect Israel. Nearly a third said they were paying more attention than usual to TV news at this time, though one in six were avoiding it. Those who were paying more attention expressed a greater sense of patriotism, less sadness, anger or any feeling of frivolity. A measure of 'seeking fundamentals', including thinking about God, reading a serious book, giving to charity and three other behaviours, while not increased above normal, was associated with paying more attention to the war.

Three weeks after the above survey a final one (Wober 1991d) found that three quarters of adults thought the Allied forces were right to have intervened in northern Iraq on behalf of the Kurds. There was widespread support for a 'vigilance' role for television, in updating information about conflicts in other parts of the world such as Lebanon or in Africa. The amount of television news viewing was particularly linked with expecting it to maintain a vigilance role and also with a view that the war had been a justified project, to liberate Kuwait.

Heavy television viewers' opinions tended to be like those of the readers of pro-War broadsheets and 'upper tabloid' newspapers. They diverged from the pattern among both the pro-War lower tabloids and the anti-War broadsheets. The pro-War majority was characterised both by greater attention to television
news at the immediate end of the war and by subsequent support for allied military action to defend the Kurds. It also was linked with heavier news viewing. This indicates that public sympathy for human rights, in the form of liberating Kuwait or protecting some of Iraq’s own citizens, is likely to be stronger than a more cynical perception that the war had been waged to extend control over oil supplies. Amongst these surveys carried out during and after the war, and their precursors with the same panel which were done before the war (reported in a previous section), advantage was taken of the longitudinal structure of the data to perform analyses which will shed light on whether television viewing, or press use may have influenced attitudes and feelings.

In one pair of surveys, the first at the end of November and the second answered at the end of January, but with regard to feelings just before the fighting began on the 15th of that month, as well as reporting feelings at the end of January, the following questions can be explored: ‘Can attitudes at the immediate outset of war be predicted by measures taken six weeks before?’ In particular, did the amount of viewing of conflict coverage on television, over and above the use of the press, existing attitudes, and demographic attributes, contribute to attitudes at the brink of war?’ The second pair of surveys jointly analysed comprise first that at the end of January - which was the later one of the first pair - and then one in the first week of March just after the cease fire.

At the outset of war there was a widespread attitude of support for it, perceived as shared with the view of the newspaper of one's choice and with that of the public at large. Crucially, the amount of viewing of television conflict coverage six weeks earlier, notwithstanding other earlier attitudes and attributes, independently connected with support for the war. The amount of earlier viewing of conflict coverage also correlated with a lower expression of anxiety, and a rejection of the views that the war might be quick or that television had tended to be reassuring. In all three attitudes where television viewing was a significant predictor from six weeks beforehand, it was nevertheless by no means as strong an indicator as were other measures of pre-existing attitudes.

Among five substantial attitude and behavioural "syndromes" at the end of the war - which can be described as a search for meaning, patriotism, anger, disenchantment, and lightness - they were all predictable from knowledge of attitudes at the outset of the war, but viewing of television war coverage at the war's outset did not add any significant predictive value to any of these five measures (Wober, 1991d). In an as-yet unpublished analysis of amount of news viewing in the first week of February in its relation to feelings and behaviour at the end of the war, however, there were again relationships between television consumption and respondents' later attitudes. Specifically, those who paid more attention to television news in the first week of February (when amount of viewing fell, after its near-saturation amounts in late January) were more likely to reveal feelings of patriotism at the end of the war, and less anger and sadness.

British Children's and Teenagers' Reactions
The study by Wober and Young (1992) amongst schoolchildren, showed that they clearly disliked the war, found Saddam Hussein personally responsible for it, did not perceive it as a 'computer game', but showed considerable sadness and anger. A further enquiry among teenagers explored their expression of support for 'political principles' and how these related with television viewing.

Four sets of principles were detected. One supporting a 'general intervention' obligation, for United Nations' forces to intervene within states where individuals' rights were under severe stress. The second supported the particular Iraq war. The third approved the 'mercy' of allied forces helping the Kurds, but not having destroyed the entire Iraqi army. The fourth sought the destruction of Saddam Hussein. Amount of viewing of television news was linked with support for the idea of general intervention in support of human rights, and for the mercy concept. It was not linked with support for the particular Iraq War or for the idea of destroying Saddam Hussein himself. The political principle of mercy was linked with particular belief in the two of the ten commandments abjuring idols and prohibiting murder. The thrust of this evidence was that teenagers had not been alienated from the perceived probity of their leaders' motives in going to war.
Perspective

A considerable volume of quantified research has been done on public opinion about the Gulf War. Much of it is at the same time qualitative - for the often-supposed exclusiveness of quantitative and qualitative procedures is not valid. Most of this work is piecemeal. From one perspective this does not matter, as the results can be taken in a 'time series' and examined for any developmental trends and changes that may be linked with external events. Nevertheless, separate surveys do not enable researchers to examine more precisely what existing ingredients, or added ones at an earlier stage, lead to conditions later on.

Is it one pre-existing attribute - for example, a respondent's Catholic religion, as one of the reviewed surveys seemed to have been interpreted, - which yields certain attitudes, or is it an 'added ingredient', such as what is read in one's newspaper, that produces the attitude which is then recorded? Longitudinal analysis is needed to shed light on such a question. Likewise, longitudinal analysis can examine whether television viewing as an 'added ingredient' may influence the production of attitudes (such as support for war, or dismay) later on.

Fortunately, there have been some longitudinal studies, at least in Britain. They give some indication of an active role for television content. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to accept these results in a 'hypodermic needle' view of cause and effect. Those people who saw more television at an earlier stage did so partly because they wanted to, impelled by their inherent interest and existing attitudes. So measures of interest should also be taken and 'held constant' against the test of any independent influence of television. This was in fact done in the research reported above on British attitudes at the outset of war, and television viewing still retained an independent connection with the later measures. This move towards a diagnosis that television has been influential, though it still does not fully rule out an 'interactive' explanation that viewers process information according to their existing predispositions and are to some extent responsible for the attitudes that develop.

A full understanding of the communication process goes far beyond studies of public opinion. It has to take account of the content of what was on screen and in the press. We have seen that such studies have been done, and to some extent any shortcomings in this area are not a permanent loss, since the print and tape records exist and can be studied in due course.

Another component of a full understanding consists of a more social anthropological level of analysis of the behaviour and attitudes of journalists, both in the field and importantly at the editorial centre of the information web. Field journalists have been quick to write their memoirs, but there is a real shortage of the less 'glamorous' but ultimately more influential role of those at the editorial centre. These should include accounts of how news agendas are constructed, what is kept in and what is excluded, with attention given to the financial as well as ideological and institutional constraints. The fact that such information has been in short supply with regard to the construction of the public account of the Iraq war should alert the research community to the need to secure such studies in the future.

- W. Cordelian

References

Boal, I. A. 1990. 'All Quiet on the Eastern Front'. New Statesman and Society, 16 November, pp. 21-23.  


Kurtz, Howard, and Barton Gellman. 1992. 'Press and Pentagon Set Reporting Rules'. The Inter-


Additional Bibliography

General Perspective


The introductory theory makes it clear that one of the influences on the news product is 'the organizational structure and routines of news operations as well as the economic and medium-related constraints determining them, such as cost control, format, technology and programming time' (p.27).


Journalism

Grossman, L. K. 'A TV plan for the next war: 'Disciplined' CNN would provide 24-hours real time news, old networks would explain and interpret.' Nieman Reports XLV No 2, Summer, 1991. 24-31 and 53.


Morgan, T. 'Racial Censorship. What Information was Missed Because So Few Blacks and Hispanics covered the War?' Nieman Reports, XLV No 2, Summer, 1991. p.37 and p.54.


An analysis of the work of the journalists at the front, their identification with the military goals - and methods. A chapter on 'The Minders' deals with the military interaction with journalism, and one on censorship and information policy explores the political administrative context within which news was put out in Britain. A further chapter on the BBC, the IBA and the government is also about the climate and means of political control of primary information, and its domestic consequences. There is little, however, on the dynamics of the editorial process within the news rooms themselves. A final chapter on 'the audience's response' is based on a survey 'after the war was over' - actually as much as six months later - allowing much time for...
reflection and digestion of opinions.


Wiener was CMM’s executive producer in Baghdad from August 1990 to January 1991. He tells how Saddam Hussein used CNN to visit Kuwait to show that baby incubators which Iraq had been accused of stealing, were still there.

Public Opinion


Children
The following citations are all from Greenberg and Gantz. (1992).
Cantor, J., M.-L. Mares, and M. B. Oliver. 'Parents' and Children's Emotional Reactions to TV Coverage of the Gulf War'.
Hofner, C., and M. J. Haefner. 'Children’s Affective Responses and Information Seeking to Coverage of the War.'
Morrison, D. and B. MacGregor. 'Anxiety, War and Children: The Role Of Television.'
van der Voort, T. H. A., J. E. van Lil, and M. W. Vooijs, 'Parent and Child Emotional Involvement in the Netherlands.'
Wober, J. M. and B. M. Young. 'British Children's Knowledge of Emotional Reactions to and Ways of Making Sense of the War.'

AFTERWORD

Any war is a tragedy which most people wish would not happen. Nevertheless, survivors sometimes can benefit. In the case of the Gulf War, the motives and actions of journalists were laid bare and called into question in ways and to a degree unparalleled in any previous war. Some of the criticisms are merely contentious, but some have enough credibility to warrant serious study. Both journalists and media researchers—and possibly generals and governments, as well—as can turn the situation to their advantage if they analyze carefully and dispassionately the well-documented role of the media in the war and take steps which will help remedy any defects they find—particularly defects in professional ethics and in respect for the principles which must underlie democratic society and the respect due to all human beings as children of God.

The research reports and essays surveyed in this issue point to many of the dilemmas and pitfalls facing those who are relied on to explain wars to the world’s media audiences. The sincere among them can hope to gain insights to guide their actions in the future. The dishonest—one hopes they are not as numerous as some of the works cited seem to imply—are less open to influence, but even they may at least be brought to see that some self-serving behaviors are, in the long run, counter-productive. Analysis of war reporting also can throw into sharp perspective some of the obstacles to ethical and accurate news reporting encountered even in more mundane contexts—news about religion being no exception.

The following points stand out among those cited in the review article as especially worthy of attention.

The parties involved in any confrontation have differing points of view and naturally will slant their arguments as favourably as possible to their own interests. In an age of 'media management' this tendency has become more apparent, and more dangerous, as the highly developed techniques of advertising are increasingly applied to politics and diplomacy. Self-restraint on the part of politicians, governments, military briefing officers, and other protagonists—not excepting religious leaders, in their own crises—would be ideal, but it seems too much to humanly expect. One can hope they would be truthful and fair in representing their position to the media and the public, but their first professional obligation is to their own side. If they have greater technical ability to represent that side more forcefully they are likely to use it to the fullest advantage. It falls to the media gatherers and processors and the public to be critical of this kind of advertising and propaganda 'hype' and to take steps to correct it.

The first line of defense is the reporter on the scene. If he or she accepts 'handouts' at face value, without trying to dig deeper, it is difficult to correct the resulting errors at a higher editorial level. As several of the works cited in the review article make clear, however, false interpretations most often creep into the news at the editor's desk. Most inexcusably,
this can be the result of ideological bias or a vested interest on the part of the editor or of the publisher or owner of his or her particular media outlet. On the other hand, editors may also be ethical but lazy or overworked, failing to check their dispatches against other sources.

The last-ditch defense of the media audience is their own critical awareness of the many ways news can become slanted. 'Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom,' is a saying which applies more than ever today in respect to freedom of information. How can this critical awareness be developed? Parents can do something. One of the survey research projects cited above illustrated how much the expressed opinions of children reflected those of their parents. If the parents keep raising objections to reporting which 'doesn't sound quite right' it is likely that their children will begin to develop the same critical attitude.

However, parents need backup from the schools. Media awareness education must become an integral part of all curricula to provide the chance for all children to equip themselves with the critical faculties they need to evaluate the media hype with which they are inundated.

The Gulf War reporting manifested some other problems which might be corrected by proper attention at various levels.

Trivialization plagues all reporting of serious matters, especially on television. The nature of the medium seems to give equal weight to a war or disaster which kills hundreds, to heartfelt religious expression, to the romantic adventures of Royals and other celebrities, and to the virtues of shampoos, soft drinks, theme parks, cereals, etc. The linear sequencing of presentation to which the electronic media are bound make this inevitable, but the way in which serious matters are presented can be improved. It did little good, for example, for the CNN reporter in Baghdad to describe the city as 'lit up like the Fourth of July' by the bombing. Perhaps it was the first simile which sprang to mind, but it trivialized the fact that people were being killed and heightened the impression that the whole war was a triumphalistic American show--an impression on which critics of the Coalition effort were quick to capitalize.

The increasingly international character of electronic reporting also raises questions of intercultural communication. Much Gulf War reporting was American, and as in the example just cited, was expressed in American smilies and metaphors for an American audience. It generally failed to recognize that an increasing segment of the audience was not American and could be seriously offended by some of the ethnocentric bias of the reporting. Everyone is ethnocentric, but it is incumbent upon those who claim the centre of an international stage to try to be less so.

At least one survey suggested that audiences were soon bored with the kind of reporting--reading of statements, political briefings, reporters' impressions, etc.--which filled most of the news time, and would have preferred more background information to put the current events in focus. Not enough was said, for example, about the historical relationship between Iraq and Kuwait or about the Arab peoples' sense of a broader Arab national unity, both of which were major historical factors affecting the audience's understanding of the war. In the present world situation it also would be constructive to have more information about Islam and its history and a less stereotyped, and less negative, treatment of Islam and of Arabs in the media.

As we go to press, an Allied 'air exclusion zone' to protect the Shi'ites and Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq has just been imposed. While the tragic drama continues to play itself out, the behaviours and motives of both politicians and media remain under intense scrutiny. The same should be true with reporting on the fighting in Bosnia and other conflicts. Continuing research--provided it, too, strives for the utmost in objectivity and balance--will help to show whether the lessons which could be learned from the events of 1990-91 have, in fact, been taken to heart.

W. E. Biernatzki, SJ
Editor

Current Research

(Editor's Note: A substantial number of the current research listings below were drawn from three sources, unpublished as of the time the information was received. For brevity, these will be designated by the following abbreviations:

IAMCR - The biennial meeting of the International Association for Mass Communication Research, held in Sao Paulo, Brazil, August 16-21, 1992.


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AUSTRALIA
Sheldon Harsel, Department of Communication Studies, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (Victoria University of Technology, GPO Box 2476 V, Melbourne, Vic 3001, Tel: 03-662-0611) and Yoshimi Matsuda, Department of Psychology, Australian Catholic University, (Melbourne) 'Countdown: A Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Coverage Leading to the 1991 Gulf War' - IAMCR.

BRAZIL
Omar Souki Oliveira, Universidade Federal De Minas Gerais (Cidade Universitária, Pampulha, CP 1621, 1622. 3000 Belo Horizonte, MG) contributed a brief piece to MGS citing parallels between Brazilian news treatment of domestic violence and of the Gulf War.

CANADA
Gina Stoiciu, Department of Communication, University of Quebec (CP 8888, Suc. A., Montréal, Qué, H3S 3P8) and Dov Shinar (The New School of Media Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel) 'Media Representations of Socio-Political Conflict' - IAMCR.

EGYPT
Hussein Amin, Dept. of Communication, American University in Cairo (113 Sharia Kasr El-Aini, Cairo, Egypt; e-mail: H_AMIN%2999@EGFRCUVX.BITNET.h.amin@auuc.eg) is interested in research on the media and the Gulf War; and James J. Napoli (A. U. in C.) has explored Arab-Western media relations in his paper, 'Beyond Typology: Salman Rusdie and the Research Potential of Comparative Journalism' - ICA.

FINLAND
Heikki Luostarinen, Department of Journalism, University of Tampere (PL 607, Kalivistie 4, 33101 Tampere. University's fax: +358 (31) 156111) writes on the effects of news pools and other factors on the reporting of the war as it appeared to 'bystander countries', such as Finland, in MGS.

INDIA
P. Sainath (Blitz, Blitz Publications Pte. Ltd., Patel House, 17-17H Cowasji Patel Street, Fort, Bombay 400001, Bombay. Telex: 011 86801) writes on Indian media responses to the war in MGS.

IRAN
Naiim Badli and Kazem Motamed-Nejad, Department of Social Communication Sciences, College of Social Sciences, Allameh Tabatabai University (Tehran) and Mehdi Mohsenian-Rad, Imam Sadegh University and Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (Tehran) jointly discuss the impact of Western news agencies on the Iranian media during the Gulf War in MGS.

IRELAND
Farrel Corcoran, Dean, School of Communication, Dublin City University (Dublin 9. University's fax: 360830) writes on the effects of Gulf War TV reporting on the European Community, focussing on Ireland, in MGS.

ISRAEL
Tamar Liebes, The Hebrew University (Mount Scopus, Jerusalem) 'Reporting the Near-Miss: The Journalists’ Dilemma in a Security Crisis' - IAMCR.

Dov Shinar, The New School of Media Studies (Tel Aviv, Israel; e-mail: OPENUA@HUJIVMS.bitnet) with Gina Stoiciu (University of Quebec, Canada) 'Media Representations of Socio-Political Conflict' - IAMCR.

MALAYSIA
Zaharom Nain, Communication Programme, University Sains Malaysia (Minden, 11800 Penang) discusses the interaction between Malaysia's media and government in reporting about the war in MGS.

NORWAY
Rune Ottosen, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) (Fuglehaugt. 11, 0260 Oslo 2. Fax: (02) 55-84-22) discusses the effect of Gulf War censorship and disinformation on media credibility in MGS.

SPAIN
Hector Borrat, Autonomous University of Barcelona (Campus Universitario, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona. University Tel: 581-11-04; Fax: 581-20-00) surveys obstacles the Spanish media experienced in attempting independent coverage of the war in MGS; and Luis-Albert Chillon and J. L. Gomez Monpart (AUB), 'Aggression Against Cultural Identity: Mass-Media's Behaviour in the War of the Persian Gulf' - IAMCR.

SWEDEN
Stig A. Nohrstedt, University of Örebro (Box 923, S-701 82 Örebro Sweden) discusses the effect of Gulf War coverage on Swedish media and government, in MGS.
S-701 30 Örebro, University Tel. (019) 14-01-00 contributed a chapter on the effect of news pools in Gulf War reporting to MGS.

TAIWAN
Ven-Hwei Lo, Department of Journalism, National Chengchi University (Wenshan 11623, Taipei. University fax: (02) 939 3091) 'Media Use, Involvement and Knowledge of the Gulf War' - IAMCR.

TURKEY
Haluk Sahin, (General Secretary, Turkish Press Council, Molla Fenari Sok, No. 43 Kat 2, Cagaloglu, Istanbul. Tel: +90-1-511-71-28) and President, Foreign Press Association (Istanbul) contributed a chapter, 'The War Close to Home: The Turkish Media', to MGS.

UNITED KINGDOM
Martin Shaw and Roy Carr-Hill, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Hull (Cottingham Road, Hull HU6 7RX, England) report on two surveys of British public opinion they conducted during the war in MGS.

J. M. Weber, Independent Television Commission (70 Brompton Road, London SW3 3EY. Tel: +44-71-584-7011) continues to explore viewer reactions to war reporting in longitudinal surveys (see also discussion of his earlier publications in review article, above).

David E. Morrison, Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds (Leeds, LS2 9JT. University fax: +44-532-336017) has continued his interest in Gulf War reporting (see also discussion of Morrison 1992, in review article, above) with a paper 'No Need for Blood or Truth: The Viewer's Response to the Reporting of the Gulf War', IAMCR; and Philip M. Taylor (ICS, U. of L.) 'Apocalypse Where? Keeping Television Away from the "Visible Brutality" of the Gulf War' - IAMCR.

Philip Schlesinger, University of Stirling, (Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland. University Tel: +44-786-73171) has a research interest in Gulf War reporting.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
At American University (4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20016. University Tel: (202) 885-1000) Hamid Mowlana, Danielle Vierling and Amy Tully contributed a chapter consisting of a report on an analysis of 250 editorials in Iranian, Egyptian and Jordanian newspapers to MGS, which Mowlana co-edited; and Abbas Malek (e-mail: amalek@auvm.american.edu) also is interested in research on the Gulf War and associated issues.

At Annenberg School of Communication (University of Pennsylvania, PA 19104. University Tel: (215) 898-5000) George Gerbner presented a paper, 'Global Media and Instant History: Images and Implications', at the 1992 IAMCR meeting, in addition to his co-editorship of, and contribution of a chapter [see review article, above] to MGS.

Robert T. Jones, Barry University (11300 NE 2nd Avenue, Miami Shores, FL 33161. University Tel: (305) 899-3000) 'The Media vs. the Military: Competition and Cooperation' - ICA.

Allen Palmer, of Brigham Young University (Provo, UT 84602. University Tel: (801) 378-1211; e-mail: palmera@yvax.byu.edu) is interested in Arab-Western media relations and delivered a paper, 'The Global Mediated Confrontation: Salman Rushdie and the Satanic Verses Affair' at IAMCR.

At University of California at Berkeley (Berkeley, CA 94720. University Tel: (415) 642-6000) Todd Gitlin with Dan Hallin (U of C at San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093. University Tel: (415) 476-9000) did a paper, 'TV News and the Gulf War as Popular Culture' - ICA.

Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, University of California at Los Angeles (Los Angeles, CA 90024. University Tel: (213) 825-4321) wrote a paper on 'News Coverage of the Gulf: A Survey of Effects on Public Opinion' - ICA.

Dan Hallin, U of California at San Diego, (La Jolla, CA 92093. University Tel: (415) 476-9000) with Todd Gitlin (U. of California at Berkeley) did a paper, 'TV News and the Gulf War as Popular Culture' - ICA. Herbert I. Schiller (U.C.S.D.) is co-editor of MGS and contributed one chapter to it.

William Dorman, California State University (6000 J Street, Sacramento, CA 95819. University Tel: (916) 278-7737) and Steven Livingston (George Washington U.) 'Media, Enemy Formation and Historical Memory' - ICA.

Donald F. Sabo, D'Youville College (One D'Youville Square, Buffalo, NY 14201. University Tel: (716) 881-3200) with Sue Curry Jansen (Muhlenberg College) 'Sport/War: The Gender Order, the Persian Gulf War, and the New World Order' -
Donald E. Williams, University of Florida, (Gainesville, FL 32611. University Tel: (904) 392-3261) 'Saddam Hussein: Exemplifying the Rhetoric of Consummate Personal Power' - ICA.

William J. Small, Fordham University (Fordham Road, Bronx, NY 10458. University Tel: (212) 579-2000) chaired a panel, 'Implications of the Gulf War for Global Communications' and contributed a paper, 'The Gulf War: Mass Media Coverage and Restraints', on the same panel, at ICA. Others from Fordham presenting papers at ICA were Robin Andersen, 'Consuming the Persian Gulf War: Changing Modes of Nonfiction Communication'; Linda Jo Calloway, 'High Tech Comes to War Coverage'; and Marion K. Pinsdorff, 'New PR Masters: The Generals and the Pols'.

Steven Livingston, George Washington University (Washington, DC 20052. University Tel: (202) 994-1000) and William Dorman (Cal. State, Sacramento) presented a paper, 'Media, Enemy Formation and Historical Memory', and Jarol B. Manheim (G. W. U.) chaired a panel on, 'The Mass Media, the Gulf Conflict and the Public Mind' - ICA.

Richard C. Vincent, Department of Communication, University of Hawaii at Manoa, (2444 Dole Street, Honolulu, HI 96822. University Tel: (808) 956-8111) does an extensive analysis of the complexities and pitfalls encountered by Cable News Network (CNN) in its coverage of the war, in MGS.

Wenmouth Williams, Jr., Ithaca College (Ithaca, NY 14850. University Tel: (607) 274-3011) 'British Press Coverage of the Gulf War: Popular Versus Quality Newspapers' - ICA.

Michael Morgan, Justin Lewis and Sut Jhally, Department of Communication, University of Massachusetts at Amherst (Amherst, MA 01003. Fax: +1 413/545-2328. E-mail: michael.morgan@titan.ucc.umass.edu) report on a 2-4 February 1991 survey of reactions to war news among U.S. viewers in the Denver area in MGS. They focus on the degree of success/failure of the media in giving an accurate understanding of issues surrounding the war.

John Masterson, University of Miami (Coral Gables, FL 33124. University Tel: (305) 284-2211) chaired a panel at ICA on Gulf War and Middle East.

Sue Curry Jansen, Muhlenberg College (24th & Chew Streets, Allentown, PA 18104. College Tel: (215) 821-3100. Fax: (215) 821-3234) and Donald F. Sabo (D'Youville College) 'Sport/War: The Gender Order, the Persian Gulf War, and the New World Order' - ICA.

James S. Ettema, Northwestern University (Evanston, IL 60208. University Tel: (708) 491-3741) 'The Innocent Victims of War: A Genre of Journalistic Storytelling' - ICA.

Douglas Kellner, University of Texas at Austin (Austin, TX 78712. University Tel: (512) 471-1232) is author of The Persian Gulf TV War, scheduled for August 1992 publication by Westview Press, Boulder, CO.

Timothy Cook, Williams College (Williamstown, MA 01267. University Tel: (413) 597-4131) 'Domesticating a Crisis: Washington News Beats, Human Interest Stories, and International News in the Gulf Crisis' - ICA.

Book Reviews


The author poses the question whether it is possible to have a development based mainly on economic and political features, without realizing that culture must not be a dimension like others but the general frame in which development takes place. Esteinou invokes the need of reflecting on our culture and what mass media are doing - and what they must do - in order to keep the main characteristics of Mexico's national culture. According to the author, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) administration, which has governed Mexico since 1920, is responsible for neglecting the cultural project it had undertaken.

Esteinou believes the State has the obligation of not leaving either the use or the building of communication processes just to 'free market powers', which ask only for continuous capital accumulation. Otherwise, another way of seeing the world, life, human beings, etc., will be accepted by Mexican society. But this world view is not the one required
for growing with harmony, and if it is consolidated it will emphasize the critical national situation and the unhappiness of the Mexican people.

Seeing that, Javier Esteinou thinks that if the Mexican State does not build a national cultural project - by a rational use of electronic communication media, mainly television - it will be allowing its own death, because the mental bases required to exist as a national State are being destroyed in people's minds.

As we can see, the author of Mexican television in the face of the neoliberal development model is - as Umberto Eco would say - an apocalyptic writer.


Raúl Fuentes aims to describe how communication research has become a study area in Mexico, where a set of researchers constitute a community 'not perceived', as the title indicates, of studious people, who examine the communication process as their main subject.

The book contains a prologue, by Jesús Martín Barbero, in which he makes a resume of the issue of this work. What is the social importance of communication research in Mexico? What is the status of researchers in this area, with respect to academics and to society? What is their degree of coherence and competence? Are communications researchers respected inside and outside the country?

Fuentes' work pays attention to the proliferation of schools; the surge of post-graduate degrees; the opening of investigation centres, like the Latin American Institute of Trans-national Studies, or the Centre of Economic and Social Studies of the Third World; the rise and development of some associations, like the National Council for the Teaching of Communication Sciences and Investigation, or the Mexican Communication Researcher's Association, of which Fuentes was vice-president from 1984 to 1986.

The author emphasizes the multiplication of approaches and the tendency to 'denunciation-ism', among other theoretical and methodological problems. All of them are described by Fuentes conscious that Mexican and Brazilian perspectives and developments in communication studies inevitably have influence on the rest of Latin America.


The prestigious Spanish professor of Contemporary History, M. Tuñón de Lara, who was working in the French University of Pau, during the Franco dictatorship - and is now working in the University of País Vasco, Spain -, directed the First Meeting on Press History, in which the press of Cataluña and País Vasco were special focuses of interest.

This book contains the proceedings of the conference, in which more than forty specialists in particular areas of press history took part. Both book and conference were divided into five parts:

I. Methodology for the study of press history
II. Press, ideology and information
III. Economic and technological features of the press
IV. Studies of the history of the press in Catalonia
V. History of the press in the Basque Country

The director of the conference is convinced that press history is a microcosm of the whole history of a given society at a particular stage. Seeing this, Tuñón, who recognises the print medium as an important source of information for historians, indicated in his conference presentation that press history is a legitimate source of knowledge, interdependent with other subjects, such as the history of ideologies, states of mind and political events. As a theoretical field of knowledge, it needs its own scientific status, and this is mainly focused on the first topic.


Following the 1st Meeting on Press History the Universidad del País Vasco organized a second, focusing on only one period of Spanish history, the 2nd Republic (1931-36) and the Civil War that followed (1936-39).

At this second meeting, unlike the first, the subjects dealt with included not only the role played by the press in actual events, but also that of other media, such as radio, photography and the cinema. All of them contain - and obviously contained between 1931 and 1939 - an important ideological dimension and had a great influence in shaping the
opinion of the masses who received their information through them. This is why historians should not forget to do research in order to understand people's states of mind during this period.

According to Director Manuel Tuñón de Lara, who also chaired the first meeting, Spain's years under the 2nd Republic were the years in which democratic and cultural values were reassessed and the amount and kinds of communication media were increased.

Afterwards, during the armed fighting, several changes were produced. Broadcasting ('the waves war') and cinema content are modified, both as means of sending information, and as means of propaganda. The so called culture services' carried on cultural and didactic activities inside the armed forces, the State administration, regional governments and civil society. On the other side of the war (anti-Republic). The broadcast propaganda was a very important tool.

All these features were dealt with at the meeting (and they are included in the book), with analysis of the periodicals of The (National) Movements Press' and other topics that open new ways of research or develop the work of some writers who had already started investigations in this area.

At the end of the first volume, we are given a catalogue of Basque journals that existed during the Spanish Civil War; which constitute a useful document for all those who decide to approach some of the themes relative to the places and stages indicated.


This book contains the papers of the symposium on Communication in nations without a State, organized by the Faculty of Social and Information Sciences (University of Basque Country), which took place in Leioa, from 19th to 21st of April in 1988.

According to Ramón Zallo - who made the symposium presentation - nations and countries without a State suffer a specific cultural and communicative set of problems. These problems are superimposed on those that transnationalisation of communication poses for a country, even a developed one.

This symposium was organized so that different nationalities could share their experiences. They include Gaëtan Temblay's The policy of Quebec on Communications (University of Quebec-Montreal), and Bernard Miege (University of Grenoble) with his French Policy on Communications With Respect to the New Information Media. The Spanish input focused on specialists from Catalonia and the Basque Country, where the symposium took place, who highlighted how such problems are dealt with.

The chairman of the symposium, Ramón Zallo, argued that initiatives in telecommunication, audiovisual media and in cultural industries in general have to be replaced by a previously debated and programmed model, in which the development of cultural identity should be put in first place.


Large sectors of the Spanish cultural industry are examined with tables, analysed within its European and international context and evaluated from the viewpoint of ownership centralisation and transnationalization.

The rise of press business concentration is described by Enrique Bustamante. According to this author, concentration of firms in print media has reached a notable level and may be dangerous for the socio-cultural, political and communication systems. On the other hand, he also discusses the internationalization process, which is in its early stages.

Rosa Franquet explains the process of radio stations concentration, emphasising that transformation in this sector affects not only ownership, but also the availability of radio programmes.

Inmaculada Giu and E. Bustamante, write on the commercialisation of Spanish state television; internationalisation of the commercial model; the hegemony of advertising, as a source of support; the prevalence of films and entertainment programmes; the evolution of production and importation; and relate the same topic to private and to regional television.

The peak of transnational enterprises, states Daniel E. Jones, is the recording industry: records, audio-cassettes, videoclips and compact discs. He gives a brief account of both the international and Spanish markets and enterprises.

Book publishing is a theme developed by José Carrón. Among other things, he finds that there is a tendency by publishers to specialise, and also that the market proportion of large publishers has increased over that of the small.

Ramiro Gómez B. de Castro deals with the ongoing problems of Spanish cinematography: e.g. inadequate control of the booking office; few technicians, actors and writers of international relevance; productions are made with insufficient capital; there is no sign of a sound policy in the matter of international sales; cinema giants take the lion's share of the Spanish
market, etc.

The last chapter - written by Ramón Zallo - on advertising as a transnational industry, outlines the effects on the industry of an over-concentrated ownership. Not least are the effects seen in publicity activities and in the recognisable limitations of advertising agencies themselves.


Ramón Zallo, who teaches about enterprises which provide information, in the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y de la Información (Universidad del País Vasco, Spain) introduces us to the economic issues of present-day industrialized culture.

The author aims to show the usefulness of a kind of macro-economic perspective for focusing on the communicative process.

His book is divided into three parts: In the first, he marks what can be studied in the communications world from the economic point of view. In order to do that, he indicates which are the basic parameters of a critical economy of communication and culture (creative work, value, production...), proposing a theoretical pattern for applying value theory to that field.

In the second part, he suggests a cultural sector division into several industrial sections, according to the different work processes that appear in each.

Lastly, he studies in an exhaustive way each cultural industry (publishing, records, cinema, print media, radio, television...) describing its productive process, indicating what its product characteristics are, and ways of profiting from its investments.

The main objective of this book is to define some of the basic methods of the ways of capitalist organization within the fields of communication and culture.


Both these books appeared ten years after Martin Barbero’s first work: Comunicación masiva: Discurso y poder (M Communication: Speech and Power), in which the author expounded his theory that we are manipulated by forms of speech that allow us not to adopt a given attitude; in other words, it is through the mass media that ideology imposes the logic of domination.

As indicated by the sub-title, the first book aims to outline the course of research and reflection that Martin Barbero has applied in the field of communication and culture.

The author links articles on diverse themes which he has studied over the past fifteen years and his breadth of coverage indicates how he has moved from one position to another. He did this in order to gain viewpoints that would allow him greater understanding of the problems posed by the media, by messages, speech, culture, identities and so on.

His departure point was reflection on the

The Spanish FUNDESCO publishes a yearly account on Trends in Social Communications Media and another on tele-communications. We are now presenting the one on trends in Social Communications, 1990.

FUNDESCO’s account aims to take two directions:
Firstly, to make a yearly review of the world media situation - focusing mainly on the Spanish circumstance - in order to offer a global view of the information sector after analyzing and evaluating facts extracted from different sources.

On the other hand, beyond evaluating the situation, these yearly accounts aim to contribute - with some contrasted ideas - to a knowledge of what the master lines in sector development will be, highlighting the role of new information technologies.

The 1990 account keeps a similar structure to that the 1989 one: situation analysis (State of Communications); definitions of likely future lines (Media Horizon and General Trends) and a directory with technical economic and professional facts (Media Guide).

A long list of experts contribute their writings: some of them from Spain (Mariano Cebrian, Emilio Prado, José María Alvarez Monzoncillo, Román Gubern, Antoni Mercader, Gilles Multignier, María Antonia Paz, Henry Pryzbyl, Eduardo Rodríguez Merchán, José Antonio Storch) and some from other countries: Armand Mattelart, Jean-Marie Charon, Michael Palmer (from France), Giuseppe Richeri, Augusto Preta, Mauro Wolf (from Italy), Georg-Michael Luyken (from the United Kingdom), and Erguez Osiposki (from the former USSR).
achievements and impasses of Latin American research in matters of mass communications. His point of arrival is the exposure of bias that creates false oppositions between, e.g. cultural against popular; popular (as traditional) against mass; and, finally, mass communications against cultural production.

Martin Barbero seeks to review the communication field with new concepts in his attempt to point out a fresh approach to constituting the dynamics of the different cultures. In the last part of the first book we can find a reflection on the cultural identities crisis, first in relation to technological trans-nationalisation, and then to the rise of regional matters and also to television models.

In his effort to seek an understanding of the sense of communication processes and the role played by perceivers, Martin Barbero thinks that researchers in this field have to change the aim of their investigations: Communication is not only a matter of media, but a matter of culture, and this requires a review of the whole process of mass-mediated from the perspective of the perceiver. So we need to study the conflict that takes place between broadcaster and perceiver; whether people are always seduced by messages or not; how fierce is the resistance to accepting everything from the mass media; etc.

According to the author, popular culture introduces a rupture in communication studies, because it becomes a new place from which thought on communication processes should start. The reason is that clashes which articulate culture emerge from social movements as they encounter mass communications. On the one hand, 'The processes of mass culture constitution are not necessarily processes which debase culture'. On the other hand, we should not forget to criticize all that actually masks an unequal social system, as well as what constitutes a strategy for ideological integration.

The author of these Spanish language reviews, Francisco Bernete Garcia, Ph.D., teaches Communication Theory at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. As a member of the Department ‘Sociology IV’, he dedicates this work to the memory of his mentor, Professor Jesus Ibanez, who was the Department Director until his death, in August 1992.


Although music is not in itself a 'mass medium', it is perhaps the most common and enjoyable form of human communication carried on the electronic mass media. Keith Roe points out in his introduction that because of this pervasiveness music–especially popular music–must be taken into account in discussing the contemporary media world. Neglected, with some outstanding exceptions, in the earlier years of the development of communication research, the study of popular music seemed to come into its own in the 1980s. Swedish researchers were among the pioneers in that period. Eight of the thirteen contributors of original papers to this volume have, at one time or other, been associated with the University of Gothenburg, a major centre for that research.

Three perspectives are represented in the articles: the music industry, the uses and gratifications of music, and the music in itself—the musicological point of view.

The structure of international music holds dangers of 'cultural imperialism', but a decentralizing effect is also present which gives some hope for the survival of local and national forms. Even the commercialized 'packages' of MTV videos retain the character of music, rather than being simply determined by economics. Rock, in particular, is a counter culture form, whose commercialization is continually resisted, at least according to a study of Swedish young people. Another article reports on a large survey of Swedish 15 year-olds, in an effort to determine some of the subcultural and other situational variables which influence the ways they use mass media music. Another highlights the extensive use of popular music by pre-adolescent children, and another analyzes the struggle between 'popular culture' and 'legitimate culture' in the important distinctions in the ways pop and rock music of different kinds are used by young people. One of the pioneers in Swedish popular music studies, Göran Nylof, charts trends in Swedish popular music preferences from 1960 to 1988, noting especially the rise to supremacy of Afro-American music.

The musicological articles deal with an epistemological confusion which has tended artificially to segregate music from other areas of knowledge and science, with the ways interpretative consensus about rock music has developed, with changes in music from 1959 to 1983, and the final article analyzes the ways an Afro-American song changes in performances by various Swedish musicians.

The book concludes with two appendices. One is a 'Statistical Profile of Music Consumption in Sweden', consisting of five tables and five figures comparing various forms of music media behavior. The second is a selective bibliography, since 1975, of popular music research in Denmark, Finland,

Increasing concern about nuclear safety, in Britain and around the world, prompted the 1988-89 research whose findings are reported in this book. The project looked both at the institutional dimensions grounding television's coverage of nuclear safety issues and at the public meanings which surrounded nuclear energy at the time of the broadcasts. Sample programmes were first analyzed for 'their overall rhetorical design, their local mechanisms of signification and the key themes which they appeared to project' (p.2). Then viewers grouped to represent different interests were shown the programmes and observed in discussion sessions about the issues raised in the programmes. The research was therefore simultaneously concerned with discourse analysis and reception analysis.

Of the four programmes analyzed, two were made by the British Broadcasting Corporation, one by the Central Electricity Generating Board, and one was made by an independent producer and distributed through trade union organisations.

An important finding of the reception analysis part of the study was 'the extensive presence in viewers' accounts of the 'civic' frame' (p.107), which demands overall fairness in any presentation, even one weighted towards a particular viewpoint. Although the viewers had extensive doubts and uncertainty about nuclear problems, such as waste disposal and leukaemia statistics, they tended to overlay their uncertainty by a show of confidence--either for or against the nuclear industry--based more on faith or hope than on factual knowledge. The affective dimension of the television was strong among all viewer groups, but they reacted diversely to it, accepting it as true or rejecting it as illegitimate.


Advertising has achieved a prominent place--has become a 'privileged form of discourse' (p.1)--in modern, industrial, consumer society. While the influence of religious, political and even family discourse has shrunk in everyday affairs, 'the discourse through and about objects', of which advertising is a major part, has expanded to fill the gap. Things transmit important social signals, and advertisements manipulate them for the benefit of the advertisers. But, although advertising generally is assumed to have an impact, critics often argue that 'no decent proof has been offered' that it does (p.3). The authors hold that, whatever may be said about its effect on narrowly defined purchasing decisions, advertising has an overwhelming presence which must be recokoned with in contemporary society (p.3).

The book opens with chapters on the pros and cons of advertising, citing both its critics and its defenders. The relationships of advertising, consumer culture and the media are surveyed in terms of their historical development and their interactions in the modern advertising industry. Semiotic and structural aspects of advertisements are then discussed, and separate chapters deal with goods as 'satisfiers' and goods as 'communicators'. Finally, in part four, social policy issues, including tobacco product marketing and advertising for children, are considered, and the final chapter deals with the increasingly worrying question of the 'marketing' of political candidates.

The Canadian-American team of authors has used material from both countries as examples and illustrations. An extensive bibliography is included.